Paul Nwohanmuo Ihekoronye V. Nwaiwu Hart & Anor (2000)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AKPIROROH, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Abia State holden at Isiala Ngwa Judicial Division delivered by Isuama J., on the 5th day of July, 1996 in suit, No.HIN/32/93. The appellant herein took a writ of summons against the respondents herein and claimed as follows:
“Wherefore the plaintiff is damnified” and claims against the defendants jointly and severally as follows:-
(1) One thousand naira (N1,000.00) being special damages for defendants’ destruction and damage to plaintiff’s land called “Mgbara Apiti” land which is situate and lying at Umueze Ihieorji Ngwa Ukwu in the Isiala Ngwa North Local Government Area of Abia State, within jurisdiction.
(ii) Six thousand Naira N6,000.00 being general damages for defendants’ unauthorised entry and trespass to the said “Mgbara Apiti” land without the leave or licence of the plaintiff.
(iii) Three thousand (N3,000.00) being examplary damages for defendants’ trespass into the said “Mgbara Apiti” land and causing destruction thereon without the leave or licence of the plaintiff.
(iv) An order of the honourable court authorising the plaintiff to dig up and destroy the survey beacons placed on the said “Mgbara Apiti” land by the defendant.
(v) An order of the court commanding the defendants to deliver up the 3 survey plans of the said “Mgbara Apiti” land made by defendants without the leave or licence of plaintiff for cancellation.
(vi) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants by themselves, their sons, servants from further trespass into the said “Mgbara Apiti”land.
The appellant commenced this action by a writ of summons at the Magistrate’s court Isiala Ngwa North Local Government Area holden at Okpuala Ngwa and was later transferred to the High Court Isiala Ngwa for hearing and determination.
The case which was tried on the pleadings and supported by evidence relate to a piece of land called “Mgbara Apiti” situate and lying at Umueze Iheorji Ngwaukwu.
From the pleadings and the evidence led in support, the plaintiff’s case put briefly is that the land in dispute is one of the pieces of lands deforested by his fore father Eze. Eze had two sons Ngwa and Njoku. When he died, Ngwa inherited the lands and when Ngwa died, Iheanacho inherited the lands because Njoku died before Ngwa. As the head ofthe family, Iheanacho pledged “Mgbara Apiti”, the land in dispute to one Isiguzo of Amapu and his father Ihekoronye later redeemed it when Iheanacho, the head of the family was still alive. His father died before Iheanacho. When Iheanacho died, he inherited the land in dispute.
The defendants/respondents denied the appellant’s claim to the land in dispute. It was their case that Eze, their fore father founded the land in dispute, Eze begat two sons Ngwa and Njoku who shared the lands, and his grandfather got the land in dispute including five other pieces of land while the plaintiff/appellant lineage got Uzoahaba, Azulorhari and Alaocha lands. It is also their case that since the sharing of the land, nobody had come from Njoku lineage to claim land in Ngwa lineage.
The appellant came into possession of the land in dispute because his father Micah pledged it to Ahudiya Ihekoronye, the mother of the appellant. He later redeemed it after the death of his father.
At the end of the trial, the learned trial Judge delivered his judgment and dismissed all the reliefs sought in the statement of claim. Dissatisfied with the judgment, the appellant has appealed against the decision to this court on eight grounds of appeal. The parties filed their briefs of argument and the appellant identified the following issues for determination:-
(i) Whether the evidence adduced by the defendants was sufficient and credible enough to justify the learned trial Judge in preferring the evidence for the defence as against that for the plaintiff regarding how the plaintiff came into possession of the land in dispute. thus discharging the burden and onus on defendants to prove that the lands of Umueze kindred/Family have been shared with the land in dispute going to 2nd defendant’s lineage exclusively. (Grounds two and six)
(ii) Whether the defendants had sufficiently discharged the burden of proof which lies on them to prove that the 2nd defendant had lawfully regained possession of the land in dispute from the plaintiff having regard to the contradictions and controversions in their evidence and pleadings regarding the Amala Arbitration and their failure to produce and tender the judgment of the Arbitration and the redemption receipt (Ground Two).
(iii) Whether from their pleadings and the evidence of DW1, DW2 and DW3, the defendants sufficiently established that the 2nd defendant regained possession of the land in dispute from the plaintiff by redeeming same from the plaintiff in accordance with Ngwa custom when no evidence was given or pleaded as to what the Ngwa custom regarding redemption is, nor was there evidence of the procedure adopted or any witness to the redemption (Ground Four).
(iv) Whether the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants was sufficient to prove superior customary title of the 2nd defendants over the plaintiff regarding the land in dispute and thereby justifying the learned trial Judge in not only ignoring the prima facie proof of title to the land in dispute in favour of the plaintiff evidenced by plaintiff’s customary certificate of occupancy (Exhibit C) but also in setting it aside and declaring it null, void and of no effect, and holding that the 2nd defendant validly passed title on the land in dispute to the first defendant (Grounds Three and Seven).
(v) Whether the decision of the court below is not against the weight of evidence (Ground Eight).”
The respondent identified the following issues for determination:
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
“1.WHETHER from the state of plaintiffs’ pleadings, the reliefs sought and the evidence proffered in proof of his case, the plaintiff discharged the burden on him to warrant judgment in his favour.
2.WHETHER the issue of partition of Umueze Kindred’s land was critical and fundamental to the determination of the plaintiff’s claim for damages, trespass and injunction.
3.WHETHER from the reliefs sought and the pleadings, title to land was put in issue necessitating reliance on or reference to IDUNDUN v. OKUMAGBA (1976) 9 -10 S. C. 224 by the trial court.”
I will first of all consider the notice of preliminary objection filed by the respondents to the issue framed for determination by the appellant.
On the notice of preliminary objection, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the issues for determination as framed by the appellant in his brief of argument are too lengthy and verbose and at best argumentative in their entirety and relied on the case of Adeyeri v.Atanda (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt. 397) 512, (1995) 5 SCNJ 157 at 165.
On grounds 1 and 5 of the grounds of appeal, he submitted that the appellant did not formulate any issue on them and he is therefore deemed to have abandoned them. It was also his contention that as he did not proffer any argument on them in his brief, they go to no issue stressing that he is deemed to have waived his right to address the court on them.
He further contended that the appellant’s first issue does not refer to grounds two and four because ground two refers to whether the trial Judge erred in law and facts by holding that the appellant was in possession of the land as a pledge whereas the issue for determination raised therein was whether the evidence adduced by the respondent was sufficient and credible to justify the learned trial Judge’s preference of the evidence of the defence and relied on the case of African Continental Bank Plc v. Losada (Nig.) Ltd (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 405) 26, (1995) SCNJ 158. He further argued that ground six is incompetent because it raised the issues of title and partition, which was not canvassed at the court below.
He also submitted that issues 1, 2, 3, and 4 raised in the brief of argument are not raised in any of the grounds of appeal to which the issues are related and relied on Olumolu v. Islamic Trust of Nigeria (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.340) 253, (1996) 35 LRCN 150. He finally urged the court to strike out those issues which do not arise from the grounds of appeal and relied on U.B.N. LTD v. Tropic Foods Ltd. (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 228) 231 at 240.
On the abandonment of grounds 1-5 of the grounds of appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is not fatal to the appeal because an appellant is at liberty to abandon any ground of appeal not supported by the records as was done in this case. On issue one, he submitted that it referred to grounds 2 and 6 of the grounds of appeal because the issue framed is whether or not the Umueze kindred have partitioned their lands.
On the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that ground six is incompetent because it raised an issue not canvassed in the court below, he submitted that the issues of title and partition were pleaded by both parties in the court below and relied on paragraphs 18, 20 and 21 of the statement of claim and paragraphs 3, 9 (1) and 13 of the statement of defence.
On the contention that the points raised in issues 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the brief of argument were not raised in any of the grounds of appeal he submitted that each of the issues formulated by the appellant is supported by grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the grounds of appeal and that the respondents did not show how the issues failed to relate to the grounds. He finally urged the court to strike out the preliminary objection as lacking in merit.
Learned counsel for the appellant conceded that grounds 1 and 5 of the grounds of appeal were abandoned because they were not supported by the record of appeal. They are accordingly struck out.
At this stage, I would like to reproduce grounds 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds of appeal in order to appreciate the submissions of learned counsel for the parties without their particulars:-
“(ii) Error of Mixed Law and Facts:
The learned Judge of the court below committed grave errors of mixed law and facts by holding that the plaintiff was in possession of the land in dispute only as pledge from his mother and that the 2nd defendant properly redeemed the land in dispute from the plaintiff.
The learned Judge of the court below misdirected himself in law when he said thus:
“Which of these two versions is correct can only be resolved by evidence on either side. In the case of Idundun and Ors v. Okumagba and Ors (1976) 10 S. C. Page 227, the Supreme Court stated five ways of proving title to land as follows:-
(1) Credible traditional evidence.
(2) Production of document of title.
(3) Acts of ownership.
(4) Long Possession.
(5) Possession of adjacent lands.
(iv) Error of Mixed Law And Facts:
The learned Judge of the court below committed grave errors of mixed law and facts by holding that the 2nd defendant redeemed the land in dispute from the plaintiff in accordance with Ngwa custom.
(v) Error of Mixed Law and Facts:
The learned Judge of the court below committed grave errors of mixed law and fact by failing to refer to and analysing the various exhibits tendered before him, and indicating what weight, if any, he attached to them.
Error of Mixed Law and Facts:
The learned Judge of the court below committed grave errors of mixed law and fact by failing to resolve the critical and central question of whether or not the Umueze kindred had partitioned their family lands.”
With regards to the first point raised in the preliminary objection that the issues formulated by the appellant are more or less arguments and not issues, I am in full agreement with learned counsel for the respondents. Suffice it to say that the way the issues are formulated is inelegant. Issues formulated should be brief and concise and not in form of argument. Be that as it may, the length of the issues is not a legal ground for striking out the appeal.
On the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the first issue formulated by the appellant does not refer to grounds two and six of the grounds of appeal, it is my view that what is in issue as framed and reflected in grounds 2 and 6 is whether or not the Umueze kindred have partitioned their lands and how the appellant came into possession of the land in dispute. The issue to my mind as framed by the appellant clearly refers to grounds 2 and 6 and as such the issue as framed is competent.
The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that ground six is incompetent because it raised an issue not canvassed at the court below is totally misconceived.
In paragraphs 20 and 21 of the statement of claim, the appellant as plaintiff in the court below pleaded his title to the land in dispute as the legal owner of the land and all Umueze lands as the head of the family. The question of partitioning the land was pleaded in paragraphs 3, 8, 9 (1), 12 and 13 of the statement of defence and evidence was led in support. It does appear to me that the issues of title to the land and its partitioning were canvassed at the court below and as such ground six is competent.
On the contention by learned counsel to the respondents that issues 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the appellant’s brief, were not raised in any of the grounds of appeal to which they are related, I must say straight away that issues 1, 2, 3 and 4 are raised in grounds 2, 3, 4 and 6 of appeal reproduced above.
From the foregoing the preliminary objection is overruled, and it is hereby struck out. I will now proceed to consider the appeal on its merits. On the first issue, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondents having admitted that the appellant was in lawful possession of the land in dispute, the burden of proof that Umueze kindred lands have been shared and that the land in dispute was shared to the 2nd respondent’s lineage was not proved.
He further argued that the evidence of the 2nd respondent that the lands of Umueze kindred had been shared was not supported by the evidence of DW2 and DW3. He further contended that since the record of the Arbitration by Amala where the ownership of the land in dispute by the 2nd respondent was confirmed, was neither pleaded nor tendered, evidence led in support goes to no issue and should be expunged.
On the second issue, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the onus of proof is on the respondents to show that the Amala Arbitration considered the question of whether the land in dispute was on pledge to the appellant’s, lineage from the 2nd respondent’s lineage and that the said arbitration ordered its redemption and the 2nd respondent did redeem it stressing that these facts were not proved by the 2nd respondent.
It was also his submission that failure on the part of the 2nd respondent to tender the judgment of the Amala Arbitration which he relied on in proof of the alleged redemption of the land in dispute is fatal to his case and relied on section 149 (d) of the Evidence Act.
He further argued that the evidence of D.W.1., D.W.2 and D.W. 3 is contradictory as to the years and the number of Arbitration that looked into the matter. He further contended that the 2nd respondent failed to discharge the onus of proof that he actually deposited any sum of money for the redemption of the land in dispute with their village head because no receipt was tendered and the village head could not remember how much was deposited with him for the redemption of the land in dispute.
It was also his submission that the 2nd respondent failed to prove that he validly redeemed the land in dispute from the appellant and as such, the learned trial Judge was in error when he held that the 2nd respondent properly redeemed that land from the appellant and passed a valid title to the 1st respondent.
On issue three, it was submitted that the 2nd respondent ought to have pleaded with particularity that he redeemed the land in dispute according to the custom of Ngwa people, stressing that the burden of proving a custom rests upon the person who alleges its existence like the 2nd respondent in this case and relied on section 15(a) and (3) of the Evidence Act.
He further argued that since the 2nd respondent failed to prove the custom under which he purportedly redeemed the land, the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that the redemption was proved.
On the fourth issue, it was submitted that the appellant properly applied for and obtained a certificate of occupancy in respect of the land in dispute in his capacity as the family head of the kindred. He further argued that the appellant as a holder of family land in trust for the family, he is entitled to apply for and obtain in his own name, a certificate of occupancy over the land in dispute and relied on sections 36(2) (3) and 50(1) of the Land Use Act, 1978.
It was further argued that as no evidence was led in support of the counter-claim filed by the 1st respondent, he is deemed to have abandoned it and the learned trial Judge was therefore in error in granting to the respondents a relief not established in evidence. It was further contended that there was no evidence before the court on which it could hold that the 2nd respondent passed a valid title of the land to the 1st respondent because title to family land can only be granted by the whole family through the family head and principal members of the family. It was further argued that assuming without conceding that the land in dispute belonged to the 2nd respondent’s lineage exclusively his purported sale to the 1st respondent is invalid because he did not obtain the consent of the principal members of the family.
On the fifth issue, it was submitted that the respondents’ failure to establish that the lands of Umueze kindred family have been shared with the land in dispute shared exclusively to the 2nd respondent coupled with his failure to prove that he had redeemed the land in dispute, the judgment of the lower court is perverse and against the weight of evidence.
On the first issue, learned counsel for the respondents argued that since the appellant’s claim is predicated on trespass to the land in dispute, he must prove that he was in exclusive possession of the land at the time of the alleged trespass by the respondents. He then referred to his evidence at pages 30, 55 and 58 of the records where he admitted that he was not in exclusive possession of the land at the time of the alleged trespass. He therefore submitted that the appellant failed to prove that he was in exclusive possession of the land in dispute and as such his claims for trespass, special and general damages must fail so also his claim for exemplary damages.
On the issue of the Arbitration Panel, he submitted that the evidence of the appellant knocked the legal plank on which he rested his case. He relied on paragraph 17 of the statement of claim, which makes it crystal clear that the 2nd respondent’s father Alozie Micah was in possession of the family lands. He also referred to the decision of the Amala and submitted that a previous judgment such as Exhibit although not binding on the appellant as estoppel per rem judicata, strengthens the case of the respondents to establish acts of possession in their favour and cited in support the case of Ajuwa & Ors v. Odili (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 710 and J. Uluba v. Chief Sillo (1973) II SCNJ 55-56, (1973) 1 SC 37. He further contended that, the appellant having admitted that the 2nd respondent’s father inherited the lands, part of which is in dispute, is also a concession of possession in favour of the 2nd respondent by the appellant.
On the second issue, it was submitted that partitioning of Umueze kindred land is not a fundamental issue affecting the claim of the appellant, which is based on trespass.
He argued that the issue of partitioning, pledge and ownership of the land is only ancillary issue which arose in course of proving possession and the entitlement of the appellant to injunction and that the only issue vital and fundamental to the success or otherwise of the suit is exclusive possession or better right to possession which the appellant failed to prove. On the contradictions in the evidence of D.W. 1, D.W 2 and D.W 3 relied on by the appellant, he submitted that they are minor contradictions which are not sufficient to vitiate the 2nd respondent’s case.
He further argued that as title to the land in dispute was raised by the parties in their pleadings and evidence led in support, the learned trial Judge was therefore right in making reference to the case of Idundun and Ors. v. Okumagba and Ors (1976) 910 S.C. 224. It was further submitted that in the instant case where the plaintiff claimed damages for trespass and injunction against the defendants and relied on traditional history and acts of possession for his case, even though he did not claim declaration of title, title is in issue and he is bound to prove his title to the land which he failed to prove. He further contended that in the instant case, although the action was founded on trespass and injunction, the trial Judge was quite right in considering as between the parties who had better title to the land in dispute. Reliance was placed on the case of Ogunde v. Ojomu (1972) 4 S. C. 105 at 106.
From the reliefs claimed by the appellant in paragraph 32 of his statement of claim, it is quite clear that his claim is predicated on trespass to the land in dispute and not title to it. This is confirmed by him at page 8 paragraph 4.04 of his brief of argument where it was submitted thus:-
“…from the pleadings in this case it is clear that the plaintiff sued in trespass. Accordingly, the legal burden on him is discharged if he can show lawful possession.”
It seems to me therefore that the life and vital issue that calls for consideration in this appeal is whether or not the appellant has proved that he was in exclusive possession of the land.
In a claim for trespass, the plaintiff has to establish his actual exclusive possession of the land or his right to possession and that trespasseed the defendant on it. See the case of Shittu v. Egbeyemi (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.457) 650, (1996) 40 LRCN at 1299, Adelaja v. Fanoiki (1990)2 NWLR (Pt 131) 137.
In paragraph 7 of the statement of claim, the appellant pleaded the parcels of land including the land in dispute deforested by their ancestor Eze, during his life time.
At page 32 lines 20-25, page 33 lines 1-3 of the records, the appellant as plaintiff testified as follows:-
“When Nwozuru George died, the plaintiff became the family head. Subsequently, the plaintiff summoned the 2nd defendant who had succeeded his father Alozie to the family lands, before the Amala of Ihieorji asking him to hand over the family lands and gods in his care the Amala then held that each member of Umueze should hold on to the lands in their possession for the meantime….”
At page 58 lines 11-17 of the records, the appellant said:-
“I told the court that I summoned 2nd defendant before the Amala to come and hand over the property of the family head to me. He has not handed over the property to me. The land in dispute is in my possession but I told the Amala that the 2nd defendant should hand over all the family property meant for the head of the family. The land in dispute is meant for the head of the family.
Still at page 58 of the records lines 24-27 the appellant said:-
“The Amala told each and everyone of us to hold on to what he has. The Amala told the 2nd defendant to hand over the family gods to me. The Amala said we should hold what we have pending the day of handover to me.”
It is therefore clear from the evidence of the appellant reproduced above that the 2nd respondent was in exclusive possession of the land in dispute at the time of the alleged trespass and as such, he has failed woefully to prove possession let alone exclusive possession.
As was said in the case of Ogundipe v. Attorney-General of Kwara State (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 313) 558 at 571
“A claim for trespass postulates that the plaintiff is in possession of the land in dispute at the time of the trespass, since the very essence of trespass per se is injury to possession.”
His claim for trespass must fail and the learned trial Judge was therefore quite right in dismissing it.
Reliefs (i) and (ii) claimed by the appellant in paragraph 32 of his statement of claim relate to special and general damages while relief (iii) relates to exemplary damages.
There is no iota of evidence led in support of the above reliefs by the appellant. His scanty evidence on damages can be found at pages 56-57 of the records and it reads as follows:-
‘The 2nd defendant went into the land in March, 1993, removed one beacon, damaged three of the beacons. Each cost one hundred and fifty naira (N150.00) each. At that time, the land was farmed with cassava. The cost of the cassava is four hundred naira (400.00) I want the court to order them to pay me ten thousand Naira damages”
Suffice it to say that the piece of evidence falls below the evidence required in proof of reliefs (i) (ii) and (iii)namely:- special damages, general damages and exemplary damages claimed by him. See the cases of Messrs Dumez (Nig) Ltd v. Patrick Nwala Ogboli (1972) 1 All NIR (pt.1) 244 at 249-250. Oshinjirin and Ors v. Alhaji Elias and Ors (1970) 1 All NLR 153 at 156-158.
Even if I hold that he was in possession of the land in dispute which I do no hold, reliefs (i) (ii) and (iii) claimed by him must also fail because there was no evidence led in support of them and the learned trial Judge was quite right in dismissing them.
The appellant contended that when Eze, their ancestor died, his two sons Ngwa and Njoku did not share the land in dispute while the 2nd respondent contended that Ngwa and Njoku shared the lands after the death of Eze and that the shares of his ancestor, Ngwa, including the land in dispute passed through their lineage until it vested on him as the head of the family.
There was no credible evidence led by the appellant that the lands of Eze were shared between his two sons Ngwa and Njoku after his death. He did not call any member of his family to support his evidence rather he called his own son who did not lead evidence as to the sharing of the land between Ngwa and Njoku after the death of their father, Eze. The onus to prove that the land in dispute was not shared between Ngwa and Njoku rests squarely on the appellant and this he failed to prove. It is for the plaintiff to prove his case and he must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case except where the defendant’s case in itself supports that of the plaintiff’s case which is not the case here. See Akinola and Anor v. Oluwo and 2 Ors (1962) 1 SCNLR 352, (1962) 1 All NLR (Pt. II) page 224 at 227, Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig) Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393 at 395
The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that failure on the part of the 2nd respondent to tender the judgment of the Amala which he relied on in proof of the alleged redemption of the land in dispute is fatal to his case, is totally misplaced because, his evidence supported the 2nd respondent’s case that the said Arbitration found in his favour. As I said earlier, he admitted that he summoned the 2nd respondent before the Amala to hand over the family lands including the land in dispute, and the family gods to him and that it was decided that each person should hold on to what he had. It was also contended that the appellant as a holder of family land in trust for the family, he is entitled to apply for and obtain in his name a certificate of occupancy over the land in dispute. This is also misconceived. Having admitted that he holds the land in trust for his family, he cannot turn round and apply for and obtain a certificate of occupancy in his own name as he did in this case. See the cases of Amodu Tijani v. Secretary of Southern Nigeria (1921) 2 AC 399 and Ekpendu v. Erika (1959) SCNLR 186, 4 F.S.c. 79. Suffice it therefore to say that section 36(2) (3) and 50 (1) of the Land Use Act relied on by the appellant cannot avail him on the facts of this case. On the contention that the learned Judge did not evaluate the evidence led before him, I will only reproduce a portion of the judgment at pages 88-89. It reads as follows:-
In assessing and evaluating the evidence before me, it is noteworthy that the plaintiff testified on his own behalf as PW1, tendered some exhibits and called his son as PW2 whose evidence was to the effect that he was in the land in dispute when the 1st defendant and a surveyor came there and drove him away. On the other hand, the 2nd defendant testified on his own behalf as DW1 and on behalf of the 1st defendant affirming his inheritance of the land in dispute and the subsequent sale by him to the 1st defendant. Confirming DW1 were DW2 the village for both plaintiff and 2nd defendant and lastly DW3. I certainly prefer the evidence of DW1, DW2 and DW3 to that of PW1 and PW2. I accept the evidence of DW1 that the land in dispute belongs to him and that his father pledged it to the mother of the plaintiff and as a pledge it was redeemable. I also accept the evidence of DW2 that the Amala arbitrated between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant in 1988 over the land in dispute and that the 2nd defendant redeemed it from the plaintiff when he deposited the redemption money according to Ngwa custom. Section 14 of the Evidence Law takes care of this aspect.”
These findings of fact based on the evaluation of the evidence led before him are not perverse. It is well settled that unless a finding is perverse and cannot be supported by evidence, a court of appeal will not interfere with it. See Akibu v. Opaleye (1974) 11 S. C. 189, Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 S. C. 291 and Onwube v. Nduba (1972) 3 S. C. 106.
In conclusion, this appeal is devoid of merit and it is hereby dismissed with N5,000.00 costs in favour of the 2nd respondent against the appellant.
Other Citations: (2000)LCN/0782(CA)