Umaru Galadima & Ors V. Mohammadu Mashayabo (1994)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.
The respondent in this appeal instituted an action against the appellants at an Area Court in Argungu, Kebbi State, then in Sokoto State claiming damages arising from the destruction of his farm crops by cattle of the appellants.
The Area Court heard the case, received evidence of two expert witnesses as to the value of the farm crops destroyed. The Area Court Judge also visited the farm to see things for himself.
The appellants, then defendants, admitted that their cattle entered the respondent’s farm and destroyed the farm crops, but asserted that the farmland was a grazing reserve declared by the government and that the respondent planted his crops on the farm land in contravention of the government directives.
At the end of the trial, the Area Court found that the respondent had made a case and entered judgment in his favour in the sum of N3, 600.00.
The appellants were aggrieved with the judgment of the Area Court and they appealed to the High Court sitting at Birnin Kebbi in its appellate jurisdiction.
The High Court heard the appeal and dismissed it as lacking in merit and affirmed the decision of the Area Court.
The appellants were still not satisfied, they appealed to this court.
The appellants filed three grounds of appeal which read as follows:-
“1. The decision of the High Court is erroneous in law, in that it confirms the judgment of the Area Court grade one Argungu which court had no jurisdiction to try the claim, the subject matter of this appeal. giving regard to sections 39(1)(a) and (b) of the Land Use Act, No.6 of 1978.
PARTICULARS
i. The land in dispute is situated within a graze reserve declared Public Lands by the Sokoto State Government.
ii. By virtue of Section 39(1)(a) and (b) of the Land Use Decree 1978, only the High Court of Sokoto State has original jurisdiction to try the case.
- The decision of the High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction at Birnin Kebbi is erroneous in law in that it confirms the decision of the learned trial Judge which was based mainly on oral evidence of two purported experts in violation of Rule 6 of the Sakata State Area Courts (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1980.
PARTICULARS
i. Mamman Kwantili and Garba Dantalli purportedly gave the estimate of crops destroyed by the appellants but did not physically appear before the court or at the locus in quo.
ii. The evidence of the said witnesses were not recorded by the trial court.
iii. The said witnesses were never cross-examined by the appellants.
- The decision of the High Court is erroneous in law when it confirmed the decision of the learned trial Judge who erred in law when he failed to give the appellants a chance to address the court before judgment was passed in contravention of Rule 22 of the Sokoto State Area Courts (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1980.
PARTICULARS
i. Rule 22 of the Sokoto State Area Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1980 which is applicable to this case provides that after all the parties to a case and their witnesses have been heard, it is necessary for a trial Judge to ask the defendant in a case whether he has something more to say for his defence before judgment is passed.
ii. The learned trial Judge in this case did not give the appellants the opportunity to say anything further for their defence before proceeding for judgment.
iii. The appellants were not given a fair trial.”
Learned counsel for appellants also filed the appellants’ brief of argument.
In the brief the counsel for appellants identified six issues for determination twice the number of grounds of appeal. They read as, follows:-
“ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
(i) Whether the Area Court, Argungu which heard this suit at First Instance has jurisdiction to entertain the claim before it, in view of the provisions of S.39 (1)(a) and (b) of the Land Use Decree 1978.
(ii) Whether due notice was given to the respondent to leave the farmland in dispute prior to the destruction of the farm products.
PARTICULARS
i. The land in dispute is situated within a graze reserve declared Public Lands by the Sokoto State Government.
ii. By virtue of Section 39(1)(a) and (b) of the Land Use Decree 1978, only the High Court of Sokoto State has original jurisdiction to try the case.
- The decision of the High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction at Birnin Kebbi is erroneous in law in that it confirms the decision of the learned trial Judge which was based mainly on oral evidence of two purported experts in violation of Rule 6 of the Sokoto State Area Courts (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1980.
PARTICULARS
i. Mamman Kwantili and Garba Dantalli purportedly gave the estimate of crops destroyed by the appellants but did not physically appear before the court or at the locus in quo.
ii. The evidence of the said witnesses were not recorded by the trial court.
iii. The said witnesses were never cross-examined by the appellants.
- The decision of the High Court is erroneous in law when it confirmed the decision of the learned trial Judge who erred in law when he failed to give the appellants a chance to address the court before judgment was passed in contravention of Rule 22 of the Sokoto State Area Courts (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1980.
PARTICULARS
i. Rule 22 of the Sakata State Area Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1980 which is applicable to this case provides that after all the parties to a case and their witnesses have been heard, it is necessary for a trial Judge to ask the defendant in a case whether he has something more to say for his defence before judgment is passed.
ii. The learned trial Judge in this case did not give the appellants the opportunity to say anything further for their defence before proceeding for judgment.
iii. The appellants were not given a fair trial.”
Learned counsel for appellants also filed the appellants’ brief of argument.
In the brief the counsel for appellants identified six issues for determination twice the number of grounds of appeal. They read as follows:-
“ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
(i) Whether the Area Court, Argungu which heard this suit at First Instance has jurisdiction to entertain the claim before it, in view of the provisions of S.39(1)(a) and (b) of the Land Use Decree 1978.
(ii) Whether due notice was given to the respondent to leave the farmland in dispute prior to the destruction of the farm
(iii) Whether the appellants have any authority or justification or reasonable cause to enter upon the farmland and graze their cattle in it.
(iv) Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he placed reliance on the evidence of the two experts whose testimonies were not recorded by the trial Judge, who were not cross-examined by the appellants and who neither appeared physically before the court nor at the locus in quo,
(v) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in awarding compensation of N3, 690.00 based on the evidence of the so called witnesses.
(vi) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in proceeding to judgment against the appellants without calling on the appellants whether they have anything more to say for their defence in view of the provisions of Order 22 of the Area Court (Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 1980 of Sokoto State.”
The most remarkable thing that followed was that the learned counsel for the appellants abandoned all the six issues for determination and went ahead and set out the grounds of appeal again and argued them.
It is obvious that the learned counsel for the appellants has completely lost touch with the present day development of the law. Having adopted this awkward method, the learned counsel has made it very difficult for me to handle the brief of argument of the appellants. To make matters worst, on the day of the hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel merely adopted the brief without offering any oral address. This brief of argument in my view is almost worthless. It has breached all the rules laid down for the purpose of preparation and presentation of arguments by means of a brief of argument. See Order 6 rule 3 which provides as follows:-
“3.(a) The brief, which may be settled by counsel, shall contain an address or addresses for service and shall contain what are, in the appellant’s view, the issues arising in the appeal as well as any points taken in the court below which the appeal wishes to abandon and any point not taken in the court which he intends to seek leave of the court to argue at the hearing of the appeal.
(b) Where possible or necessary, the reason in the brief shall also be supported by particulars of the titles, dates and pages of cases reported in the Law Reports or else where including the summary of the decisions in such cases, which the parties propose to rely upon. Where it is necessary, reference shall also be made to relevant statutory instruments, law books, and other legal journals.
(c) The parties shall assume that briefs will be read and considered in conjunction with the documents admitted in evidence as exhibits during the proceedings in the court below, and, wherever necessary, reference shall also be made to all relevant documents or exhibits on which they propose to rely in argument.
(d) All briefs shall be concluded with a numbered summary of the points to be raised and the reasons upon which the argument is founded.
(e) Except to such extent as may be necessary to the development of the argument, briefs need not set out or summarize judgments or the lower courts, nor set out statutory provisions, nor contain an account of the proceedings below or of the facts or the case.”
Setting out of issues for determination based on grounds of appeal has a purpose, The purpose is to enable the parties narrow the issues in the grounds of appeal so filed in the interest of accuracy, clarity and brevity. Hence they must perforce be related to the grounds of appeal. Thus, issues for determination not related to the grounds of appeal or proliferation of issues are not encouraged. See Ogbuanyinya v. Okudo (No.2) (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 551.
The brief in this instant appeal is clearly in breach of this principle.
It is also settled that counsel arguing an appeal should rely on the issues formulated rather than on the grounds of appeal. This is because it is on the basis of the issues that the parties found their contention and not on the ground of appeal. See Macaulay v. NAL Merchant Bank Ltd. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt.144) 283 at 321.
In this appeal, the learned counsel for appellant did exactly what was not allowed. After setting out six issues, she abandoned the issues and went back to argue the 3 grounds of appeal filed.
It is also a firm established principle of law that it is wrong for counsel to formulate issues for determination in excess of the grounds of appeal filed, See Anie v. Uzorka (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt.309) 1 at p.16 where Onu, J.S.C. stated the law as follows:-
“The appellants through their counsel have formulated seven tautologous issues, which in my view, are amorphous and in the apt words of the respondents in their brief of argument at page 2 thereof “are constructed upon a misapprehension of the true reasoning and the judgment of the Court of Appeal” That this attack is to a large extent justified stems from the now firmly established principle of law that it is wrong for counsel to formulate issues for determination in excess of the grounds of appeal filed. Indeed it is now a very well established principle of law that except in special cases where the grounds of appeal so dictate, it is undesirable to formulate an issue in respect of each ground of appeal. See Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.118) 646: Buraimoh v. Bamgbose (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.109) 352; and Utih v. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.166) 166-214.
Hence, whereas in the instant case, there are five grounds of appeal but learned Senior Advocate on appellant’s behalf has submitted seven issues for the determination of court, such a proliferation of issues can hardly be justified.
This is moreso, when the preponderance of decided cases point irrevocably to the formulation of issues in general practical terms that must be tailored to the issue in controversy. In fact, it is now well settled that such issues for determination must of necessity be limited by, circumscribed and fall within the scope of the grounds.
See Nwosu v. Imo State Environmental Sanitation Authority (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.135) 688 at 714; and Adelaja v. Fanoiki & Anor. (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.131) 137 at 148.”
This issue does not need any further clarification. It is clear that in this appeal the appellant filed three grounds of appeal but formulated six issues for determination.
that was twice the number of the grounds of appeal filed. It was clearly wrong and indefensible.
Another serious issue that came to light in this appeal is that all the six issues for determination were referring to, and challenging the judgment of the Argungu trial Area Court and not the judgment of the High Court from where the appeal came to this court. This clearly raised the issue of the competence of this court to determine the appeal since this court do not have jurisdiction to hear appeal from the decision of an Area Court of whatever grade. See section 219 of the 1979 Constitution, which provides as follows:-
“219. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court of law in Nigeria, to hear and determine appeals from the Federal High Court, High Court of a State, Shari a Court of Appeal of a State and Customary Court of Appeal of a State.”
Possibly, the only issue worth considering is the issue challenging the jurisdiction of Argungu Area Court to entertain the claim before it on the ground that the provisions of Section 39(1)(a) and (b) of the Land Use Act 1978 applies.
This Section provides as follows:-
“39(1) The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings:-
(a) proceedings in respect of any land the subject of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this act: and for the purposes of this paragraph, proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a statutory right of occupancy;
(b) proceedings to determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements on land under this Act.”
From the substance of the claim before the Area Court, there is no doubt that the provision of Section 39(1)(a) and (b) of the Land Use Act do not apply.
The claim is simply for damages arising from the destruction of the respondent’s farm crops by the cattle of the appellants. It has nothing to do with claim of title to the land or any interest in the land or compensation for improvements on the land.
All the other issues are irrelevant because they are directly related to the judgment of Argungu Area Court, and the substance of the complaints were how the Area Court conducted the trial and eventually arrived at its decision.
On the whole the appeal has no merit and it deserves to fail. It is accordingly dismissed. I award the respondent N 1000.00 as costs against the appellants.
Other Citations: (1994)LCN/0186(CA)