LT. CDR F. J. Ebohon (Rtd.) V. Attorney General Edo State & Ors (2016)
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This is a case stated by the National Industrial Court pursuant to Section 295 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) seeking for the opinion of this Court on question of law.
The lower Court appraised the nature of this case as a transferred matter from the High Court of Bendel State, Benin Judicial Division, sitting in Benin where the claimant had taken out against the defendants a writ of summons dated 5th September, 1989 in Suit No. B351/89 seeking for the following reliefs:
1. A declaration that he is entitled to be reinstated in the Edo State Civil Service.
2. A declaration that he is entitled to be paid his salary and allowances from the 1st of April, 1984 and also all the promotions and increments in emoluments that the claimant would have been entitled to base on salary grade level 16 being his salary grade level before being purportedly pruned from service.
3. An Order that the claimant’s properties and those of his family, including money all valued at more than 11.15 million forcibly removed by
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the 1st – 3rd defendants or their agents from the claimant’s office and official residence of No. 4, Jeffia Crescent, Warri on 11/04/1984 be returned to the claimant; or in the alternative, that the said sum of 11.15 million pounds sterling be paid to me as special damages by the 1st-3rd defendants.
4. A declaration that claimant purported “pruning from the service” as contained in letter of pruning S./502/T/230 of 25/4/1984 issued by the 3rd defendant is unlawful, null and void.
5. General damages of N200,000,000.00
The foregoing claims were predicated upon the assertions by the claimant:
a. He was an employee of the 3rd defendant for about four years.
b. The defendants in 1984 pruned him from service while under interdiction without due process and direction from the Governor and Board of Directors of Delta Boat Yard Limited.
c. Being aggrieved the claimant sued at the Edo High Court of Benin Division.
d. During the pendency of the matter at the Edo State High Court, the 1999 Constitution was amended and by Section 254(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended which granted exclusive jurisdiction over all labour and
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employment matters to the National Industrial Court, the Edo High Court was thereby divested of jurisdiction.
e. In consequence, the learned trial judge, Hon. Justice A.N. Erhabor declined jurisdiction over the case and transferred same to the National Industrial Court.
f. When the case came up at the National Industrial Court, the Court suo motu directed that parties address it on whether or not a case stated ought to be made to the Court of Appeal to determine whether the transfer to National Industrial Court is valid.
g. Because the jurisdiction of the Court has been challenged by the defendants, the Court has to determine its jurisdiction to hear this matter before referring it by way of case stated.
The defendant?s responded to that poser as follows:
(i) The claimant was removed from office on the 28th day of March, 1984 under Decree 17, 1984.
(ii) This case is a part heard matter before the Benin High Court and ought to have been concluded in the Benin High Court, one year after the commencement of the National Industrial Court Act by virtue of Section 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act.
(iii) This case
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can no longer be heard or determined in the National Industrial Court since it is abated.
The lower Court, presided over by Hon. Justice A. N. Ubaka, after hearing the submissions on both sides found as established the following facts:
1. Trial has commenced at the Edo State High Court before the coming into effect of the third alteration to the 1999 Constitution on 4th March, 2011 which divested High Courts of Jurisdiction over all labour and employment matters.
2. The Supreme Court in its decision in Obiuweubi v. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt 1247) 465 at 495 – 496 held that the law for determining jurisdiction is the law as at the time trial commences.
After these findings of fact, the lower Court raised the following poser stating the case herein for the opinion of this Court:
The following question as to the interpretation of the Constitution accordingly arose in this proceeding namely – Whether given the fact that trial in this case commenced at the High Court of Edo State sitting in Benin before 4th March, 2011, the date the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution came into effect, and given the decision of the Supreme Court in
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OBIUWEUBI V. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt 1247) 465 at 495 – 496, which held that the law for determining jurisdiction is the law as at the time trial commences and so the Court with jurisdiction is that as per the law existing at the time of commencement of trial, it is not the High Court of Edo State that should hear and determine this case.
The above stated question of law is referred for the opinion and decision of the Court of Appeal.
It is pertinent to observe that the case stated simply invites the opinion of this Court regarding the question of law raised by the lower Court as quoted above and it defines the parameter or terms of reference within which the opinion of this Court will be expressed herein.
The singular issue involved in the foregoing poser is as follows:
Which is the right forum for the hearing and determination of the case under reference between the High Court of Edo State and the National Industrial Court?
In appraising this poser this Court is to be guided by the Supreme Court decision in OBIUWEUBI V. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt 1247) 465 at 495 – 496 where the Supreme Court per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC held thus;
The law in
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force or existing at the time a cause of action arose is the law applicable for determining the case. This does not necessarily determine the jurisdiction of the Court at the time that jurisdiction is invoked. That is to say the law in force at the time a cause of action arose governs the determination of the suit, while the law in force at the time of the trial based on cause of action determines the Court vested with jurisdiction to try the case.
The learned counsel for both parties addressed the Court orally at the hearing of the case stated on 21st July 2016. The learned counsel for the claimant J. O. Egieboro, Esq narrated the checkered antecedents of the case which was referred back by the Supreme Court to the High Court of Edo State for trial de novo before a Judge other than Omoluabi, J. The case was assigned to Justice Sadah, J who subsequently retired from service and thereafter from one judge to another until it was finally reassigned to Justice Erahabor, J. to restart de novo on 16th November 2006. By then the National Industrial Court was already established on 14th June 2006. He relied on Section 11(1) and (2) of the National Industrial
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Court Act 2006 to submit that the case was not part heard at the High Court of Edo State and therefore falls within the ambit of Section 11 (2) of the Act. It was further submitted for the claimant that the case was rightly transferred to the National Industrial Court by the High Court of Edo State. The said Section 11 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 provides thus:
11(1) In so for as jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court in respect of the causes or matters mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Part of this Act, the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or any other Court shall, to extent that exclusive jurisdiction is so conferred upon the Court, cease to have jurisdiction in relation to such causes and matters.
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1) of this Section shall affect the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to continue to hear and determine causes and matters which are part-heard before the commencement of this Act and any proceedings in any such causes or matters, not determined
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or concluded at the expiration of one year after the commencement of this Act, shall abate.
On the 21st of July 2011, when the full panel of the Court of Appeal (this Court) sat to take arguments from the respective learned counsel for the parties in respect of the point of law referred, this Court had the great benefit of arguments from Messrs Justin O. Igiebor Esq. for the plaintiff/claimant and M. O. Airende, Esq for the defendants respectively.
ARGUMENTS OF THE CLAIMANT’S COUNSEL, (IGIEBOR ESQ)
The learned counsel for the plaintiff/claimant had submitted that this matter had been returned to the High Court of Edo State for hearing de novo by a judge other than Omoluabi, J. but was re – assigned from one judge to another of the Court and then to Honouroble Justice Erhobor for hearing de novo, and within which period the National Industrial Court was established on 14 – 6 – 2006 and matter started on 16 – 11 -2006.
Learned counsel argued that since the matter only started on 16 – 11 – 2006 and after the commencement of the National Industrial Court Act, the matter was not part heard as it had not started before the Act come into being;
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and more so that the matter was to start de novo.
Counsel referred and relied on Shell Petroleum Development Corporation V. Otekoh (2011) LPELR 5027 (Court of Appeal) 15 A – E, (2007) 13 NWLR to argue that it was not caught by Section 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court, Act 2006.
It was also the learned counsel’s view that not being a part heard matter, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria had/has the jurisdiction to hear the matter (Suit), and particularly that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction under Section 254 (c) of the 1999 Constitution as amended to hear all matters relating to employment and Labour as in the instant case between the parties.
The learned counsel emphasized the phrase –
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment, or National Industrial Court Act,” as appearing in the preamble to Section 254 (C) of the Third Amendment to the Constitution, 1999 and drawing support from the cases of Ndaba Nigeria Ltd. V. UBA (PLC) (2009)13 NWLR pt 1158 and Eco. V. Tokode (2011) 5 NWLR (pt. 1239) 45 at 64 Par. E. learned counsel posited that the Constitution being the Supreme law of the land and binding on all persons and authorities,
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had elevated the National Industrial Court and taken away or limited the provisions of Sections 251, 257 and 272 of the 1999 Constitution as amended.
That if the matter had not abated it could not be transferred; not started then, the National Industrial Court was seized of exclusive jurisdiction.
Ultimately, it was submitted that the matter had not abated, was to start de novo and before the National Industrial Court.
M. O. Airende Esq, for the defendants, on his part had pointed out that the claimant/plaintiff who had in a suit challenging his pruning down or ‘exition’ from the service of the Edo State by Decree No. 17. 1984, on 28.3.1984 had taken out a suit wherein the preliminary objection to the competence of the suit and Court was upheld in 1990 by Justice Omoluabi but the appeal to the Supreme Court having been allowed in part as reported in Ebohon V. A – G Edo State (1997) (Pt. 505) 298; that ordinarily the matter would have abated having stayed for over 1 year at the High Court, but since by the Act of 2006 the Tribunal had jurisdiction, and not transferable, and that with the promulgation of the Third Amendment to the 1999 Constitution, the
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matter is properly before the National Industrial Court for adjudication.
From the case stated and the submissions of the respective learned counsel thereon in address, the simple question posed for our opinion thereon can be answered, by a consideration of the followings;
Firstly whether the proceedings before the High Court of Edo State in the suit of the plaintiff/claimant was part heard as at the date of the transfer to the National Industrial Court?
Secondly, if the matter was part heard, whether it had abated by the operation of Section 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006?
Thirdly, if the suit had not abated, then was the transfer competently and validly made to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria?
Fourthly, was the National Industrial Court seized of jurisdiction in the suit when the matter was transferred to it?
Can a dispute relating to Labour and Employment, such as in the claims of the plaintiff/claimant be validly transferred from the High Court of Edo State to the National Industrial Court pursuant to the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 before the promulgation of the 3rd amendment to the 1999
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Constitution? What does the term ‘Hearing’ connote?
The answer is simple, as hearing entails the taking of evidence by witnesses testifying and/or the tender of documents in support of a party’s case or in contradiction of his opponent’s case.
This, therefore, means that proof will be required at the hearing and not at a subsequent date.
In the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, Edited by EM Kirk Patric, New Edition 1983, Page 578 defines “hear” as perceive by the ear; to accede to: to listen to: to listen to in trial of ability to repeat; to be informed, to hear, judicially to be heard, judicial investigation and listening to evidence and arguments.
The word “part” has also been defined by the Chambers, 20th Century Dictionary at Page 926 thus: “Something less than a whole: a portion: that which along with others makes up, has made up or may at some time make up, a whole”.
A constituent, component, a member or organ.
From the above, it is obvious that a hearing or part hearing postulates, a partial listening to or taking of evidence in Court by listening to witnesses or documents tendered in furtherance of the determination of the
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suit pending in a Court of law. This is preceded by a hearing notice.
“Hearing” is also defined and clearly too, in the Blacks Law Dictionary, Eight Edition Bryan A. Garner thus: A judicial session usu. Open to the public held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying”
At page 73 of the record of appeal of this matter and page 77, the plaintiff/applicant had by motion on notice under Order 24 Rule 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989, of Edo State brought an application for an Order thus:
“Setting down for hearing the point of law as to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear this action raised by the defendants in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the statement of defence attached here to as Exhibit ‘B”‘
It is, therefore, obvious that jurisdiction of the High Court of Edo State was still a subject of contest before that Court and the suit had not been delved into on the hearing of the substantive matter as yet.
?
What is more, all the parties in this matter through their learned counsel had referred us to the decision in the case of Edohon V. A – G Edo State (1997) 5 NWLR 298 on the
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competence or jurisdiction of the trial Edo State High Court to entertain the suit in the first place, being one purporting to be covered by Section 3 of Decree No. 17 of 1984 had not be resolved as the apex Court had allowed the appeal and set aside the decision on the assumption of jurisdiction and directed that the conflicting evidence in affidavits be resolved first as by the counter affidavit of the plaintiff/claimant, some letters ie of 13th and 19th April, 1984, were denied as existing before and being the basis of authority to invoke the dismissal under Decree No. 17 of 1984, which was contested. The letters were said to be foisted and the pleadings or affidavit on same as afterthought.
I have read the decision of the Supreme Court and clearly find that the apex Court had by its decision confirmed the fact that the hearing of the suit had not yet commenced at the trial Court.
The learned trial judge had bye-passed the preliminary question posed for resolution by him, as it were, was a prerequisite before proceeding with the case, his decision and afortiori; that of the Court below ie Court of Appeal was rendered incompetent.
?
There
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was therefore, no hearing or decision in existence by the lower Court; Without the resolution of the conflicting affidavit as relating the letters in dispute and to tie them to the letter of dismissal, before the issue of jurisdiction to entertain same can be determined under the Decree No. 17 of 1984.
Belgore, JSC, articulating the leading judgment of the apex Court had stated in part, thus:
“The deposition in the appellants’ counter affidavit may appear even spurious, it should not be written off as speculative. It was essential to the fundamental issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the case. The bigger issue of the appropriateness of the dismissal would naturally follow after resolving the conflict in the affidavits. Thus ——–?
See Falobi V. Falobi 1976 1 NMLR 169.
Both learned counsel for the parties and a perusal of the record of proceedings in respect of this matter on reference agree that the suit was not part heard as hearing had not commenced before any judge after the decision of the Supreme Court, ordering a hearing de novo and before another judge other than omoluabi J.
?
The suit had not been partly
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heard or at all. Both counsel had conceded as in the record, that the order for the resolution of the conflicts in the affidavits by calling witnesses to testify, cross examine and re-examine (if need be) on the letters relied upon as Exhibits but which are challenged had not been complied with till date.
A matter to be heard de novo means that it shall be re ? started afresh. See SPDC V. Otokoh. The matter, not having been heard, would also ordinarily not be caught by the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, which provides as follows:
“Nothing in Subsection (1) of this Section shall affect the jurisdiction and powers of the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to continue to hear and determine causes or matters which are part heard before the commencement of this Act and any proceedings in any such cases or matters, not determined or concluded at the expiration of one year after the commencement of this Act shall abate”
From the non-activation of the suit by fact of non compliance with the judgment of the apex Court earlier on referred to, it is
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obvious that the aforesaid Section 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 was inapplicable to the suit, the subject of the instant reference on point of law.
The parties, by their counsel are agreed that the matter in dispute and subject of the suit relates to Labour and Employment.
That is so, I so find. The Edo State High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit at the time it was filed as Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution conferred unlimited jurisdiction in the High Court to hear all cases in which the existence of legal rights, duties, liabilities, exist or any question between a person and government etc.
That being the situation, the provisions of Section 11 (1) of the National Industrial Court, Act terminating the jurisdiction of the State or FCT High Court or Federal High Court in respect of matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on the National Industrial Court is unconstitutional and void to the extent of inconsistency with the said 1999 Constitution.
This is because as at 2006, the National Industrial Court was not a superior Court of record and what is more the Act establishing it could not validly
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take away the jurisdiction constitutionally vested in the State High Courts nay at any stage of the pendency of a case.
In National Union of Electricity Employees & Anr. V. Bureau of Public Enterprises (2010) LPELR 966 (SC), it was held thus:
“It is trite law that under the consistency test that the validity of any law is determined by its consistency with the provisions of the Supreme Law, that is, the Constitution. So that where any law is inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution, such other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. In support of this proposition see Military Governor of Ondo State V. Adewunmi (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 82) 280. Also, see Section 1 (3) of the 1999 Constitution and also Adisa v. Oyinwole (supra) and Attorney General of Ondo State V. Attorney General of the Federation & Ors. (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222 per Uwaifo JSC.
Again it is trite law that the jurisdiction of the State High Court as conferred by the Constitution can only be curtailed or abridged or even eroded by the Constitution itself and not by an Act of Law respectively of the National Assembly or State House of Assembly, meaning
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that where there is conflict in that regard between the provisions of the Constitution and the provisions of any other Act or Law of National Assembly or House of Assembly respectively the Constitution shall prevail.” At page 38 – 39 Per Chukwumo Eneh (JSC).
In PAM & Ors. V. A. B. U. & Ors. (2013) LPER 21406 CA – Aboki JCA is to the effect that:
What the Court will consider when the issue of jurisdiction is raised before it includes:
a. The claim of the parties
b. The Statute creating the Court as Courts are creatures of Statute.
It is the Statute that creates a particular Court that confers jurisdiction on the Court.
By the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 the Constitution vests by Section 254 (c) 1 thereof the exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all civil causes and matters connected to or arising from employment and labour related issues in the National Industrial Court, Inspite of the provisions of Sections 251, 257 and 272 of the Constitution.
…..Hearing had not commenced in this matter before the lower Court. Thus as at today it is the National Industrial Court that
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has jurisdiction to entertain the case.
Furthermore, it is the trite position of the law that it is the law in force at the time the cause of action arose that governs the determination of the suit; while the law in force at the time of the trial based on the cause of action determines the Court vested with jurisdiction to try the case. See Obieweubi V. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR 465.
In the instant case, the suit instituted since 1999, had not proceeded to trial before 4th March, 2011 when the Third Alteration to the Constitution, Section 254 thereof was amended conferring exclusive original jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court.
From the said 4th day of March, 2011, therefore, the law applicable and the Court with jurisdiction is the National Industrial Court of Nigeria.
In Obiuweubi V. CBN (Supra), it was held that all cases filed at the State High Courts before 17 – 11 – 93 on the promulgation of Decree No. 107 of 1993 which had not proceeded to hearing as at 17 – 11- 93 would be heard by the Federal High Court.
On the aforesaid authority, the Court with jurisdiction is the National Industrial Court vide the applicable law conferring
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jurisdiction, id est the Section 254 (1) (c) of the 3rd Alteration to the Constitution, 1999. The High Court had been divested of jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit as of 4 – 3 – 11 when the 3rd Alteration became effective.
The circumstances of this case are the same as the Obiuweubi v. C. B. N. case (supra). See also the cases of Ajayi v. SEC (2009) 13 NWLR (pt. 1157 – 1159) page 1 on the need to observe the exclusivity of jurisdiction conferred on a Court; in that case the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On the pre-eminent position of jurisdiction, see also Governor of Imo State v. Amuzie (2009) 13 NWLR (pt. 1157 – 1159) page 34, N.U. E. E. V. BPE (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1192- 1194), page 538.
In consequence, the order on limitation/abrogation of power/jurisdiction or abatement of suits as provided by Section 11(1) and 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, No. 1 of 2006 is, therefore, unconstitutional, null, void and ineffectual.
This, therefore, means that the suit before the High Court was properly before her and may not ordinarily be validly transferred as it could have amounted to an abdication of jurisdiction conferred by law. The
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trite position is that Courts of law ought not to abdicate jurisdiction where it exists or has been conferred by Statute. see Clemo v. MV ‘Arab’ (2002) 37 WLR 140 at 149 line 5, where this Court stated thus:
“Court must guard its jurisdiction jealously and must do everything to preserve its jurisdiction in favour of litigation. Statutes dealing with jurisdiction must be interpreted strictly so as not to displace litigants.”
As I stated in Appeal No. CA/AK/107/2014 (Suit No. AK/13/2013) Tokunbo Aderinbeye and Attorney – General of the Federation and Minister of Justice a Federal Ministry of Justice, decided on 31st day of May, 2016, (unreported), “where there is a right, there is a remedy (ubi jus ibi remedium); so also there must be a forum for resolution——?
See again the decision in Appeal No. CA/AK/196/2014 Suit No. FHC/AK/CS/03/2013 between, Bayo Philip and Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba Akoko & 5 Ors. (Unreported) per Danjuma, JCA on 11th day of July, 2016 wherein referring to Clemo V. MV Arab (Supra); and his earlier decision in Tokunbo Aderingbeye V. A G. Federation & Federal Ministry of Justice (Supra), it was
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held in part thus:
“A Court of law therefore has no jurisdiction to decline jurisdiction except where the law denies same to it -.———-”
Therefore, any purported transfer of the suit from the High Court to the National Industrial Court before the constitutional abrogation of the jurisdiction of the High Court would be unconstitutional and wrongful and ineffectual in law.
However, the jurisdiction, being concurrent and howsoever, the matter had come to the National Industrial Court, since it is not the order of transfer, but the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to try the suit that is at stake, I hold that the jurisdiction exists in the National Industrial Court to try the case.
Interestingly, by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010,. Act No. 3 which commenced on 4th day of March, 2011 and by the Section 254 (c) (1) (a) thereof, it is the National Industrial Court of Nigeria that now has exclusive original jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in Civil Causes and Matters relating to or connected with Labour, Employment etc.
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For the avoidance of ambiguity, the Section 254
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(c) ? which provides as follows:
“254 ( c ) (1 ) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in Civil Causes and matters –
(a) Relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, Industrial relations and matters arising from work place, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; The Section 254(1) (c), by providing that “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to any other jurisdiction as may be conferred by an Act of the National Assembly” has enlarged the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court such as to include even items set out in the exclusive, concurrent and residual lists in so far as it relates to Employment and Labour. It may even include private employment and labour relationship or
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contracts, and in exclusivity of any other Court as from 4 – 3 – 2011.
See Coca – Cola Nigeria Ltd. & 2 Ors. v. Akinsanya (2013) 1 ACELR 28 (Appellate Court Employment Law Report) Particularly at 43.
The words in Section 254 (1)(c) (a), when given their plain and ordinary meaning may have created a monstrosity as it relates the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court; but these provisions of the Amendment to the Constitution cannot justify the jettisoning of the application of the golden rule of interpretation to the plain and unambiguous provision of Section 254 (1) (a).
See Babatunde v. Pan Atlantic Shipping and Transport Agencies Ltd. (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 372) 1721 wherein the Supreme Court at page 1752 stated per Mohammed JSC, that:
“Judge’s duty is to interpret and not to make the law. In the interpretation process, the judge should be liberal and give the natural meaning of the Statute where the words are clear and unambiguous.”
In Dapianlong V. Dariye (2003) 13 NSCQR 373, NDIC V. Okem Ltd the Supreme Court emphasized on the need to give a word or phrase its ordinary, literal interpretation. In Fawehinmi v. IGP (2002)
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FWLR (Pt. 108) 1335 at 128-129, it was held thus:
“The proper approach to the interpretation of clear words of Statutes is to follow them, in their simple grammatical and ordinary meaning rather than look further because that is what prima facie gives them their most reliable meaning…”
This is generally also true of the ‘construction of constitutional provisions if they are clear and unambiguous even when it is necessary to give them a liberal or broad interpretation.
In Gafar v. The Government of Kwara State on duty of Court to interpret, it was held thus:
“It is now settled law that the duty of the Courts, is to interpret the words contained in a Statute or Constitution in the ordinary or a literally meaning. Certainly, it is not the duty of the Court, to go outside the words used and impart on interpretation which may be or is inconvenient to it or to the parties or one of the parties.”
Drawing from the aforesaid decisions on the interpretation of Statute including the Section 254 (1) (c) of the 3rd Alteration, i.e Act No. 3 of 2010 which commenced on 4th March, 2011, the exclusivity of the original jurisdiction of the National
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Industrial Court is beyond dispute as relating to employment and labour related matters. See the cases of SCC (Nig.) Ltd and Ors. vs. Yusuf Sedi (2013) 1 NWLR (pt. 1335) 231; Echelunkwo John O. & Ors. V. Igbo Ekiti local Government Area (2013) 7 NWLR (pt. 1352) page 1 (Enugu Division Court of Appeal); National Union of Teachers (NUT) Niger State v. Conference of Secondary School Tutors (COSST) Niger State Chapter & Ors. (2012) 1 NWLR (pt. 1307) 89 at 112 – 113 (Abuja Division)
As submitted by the claimant/plaintiff?s counsel, Ogiebor, Esq, I agree that the inhibitions created by Sections 272, 257 and 251 of the 1999 Constitution has been unshackled by the liberating force of the Section 254C (1) (a) of the Constitution.
As Ikye JCA stated in the Coca – cola case (Supra),
“The third Alteration is thus a deliberate and radical break from the post as it has widened the hitherto narrow and specialized jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to new areas like the issuing of injunctions and exclusive jurisdiction over employment matters in all strata of the labour market…”
Accordingly, the reference made pursuant
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to Section 295 (2) of the 1999 Constitution on the novel constitutional provision on the case pending before it;
1. Was properly made, as the case was properly pending in the said Court as the Court had before the 4th of March, 2011 concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court to adjudicate on the case on reference.
2. The said case had not abated and could not be said to have legally abated.
3. The legislation/law, in Section 11 (2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 was unconstitutional and is accordingly penciled down/struck down for its invalidity, it is declared void.
4. The case was not part heard, in law and facts.
5. The National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction and is properly seized of the Suit No. NICN/AK/41/2013
6. The suit shall be heard as a fresh suit filed before the National Industrial Court and the resolution of the conflict in the affidavit evidence ordered by the Supreme Court shall be first resolved before proceeding.
I dare say that on the authority of Bamaiyi v. A – G (Fed.) (2001) 12 NWLR (pt.727) 468, the reference was necessary as proceedings had commenced at the National
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Industrial Court and a matter had arisen inviting more than one interpretation by the parties.
It must be pointed out that it is not correct, however, as stated by the learned judge of the National Industrial Court that hearing had commenced at the High Court of Edo State.
Accordingly, the essential, important and fundamental points of law which are substantial as, enumerated and opined upon supra are to be noted by the National Industrial Court of Nigeria and the said Court is to proceed to adjudicate thereon, the suit transferred to and pending before it in this case between the parties accordingly, and expeditiously (case having protracted). For the avoidance of doubt, the case under reference is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court from the 4th day of March, 2011.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8967(CA)
