Lawani Adesokan & Ors Vs Prince Michael Oyetunji Okeyoyin Adegorolu & Ors (1997)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

OGUNDARE, JSC.

This is a further appeal from an interlocutory decision of the High Court of Oyo State given on 11/ 7/88 wherein that court held that:

‘………….. the plaintiff has locus standi to present this action and that the action is not frivolous. vexatious, and an abuse of process of court. The action also discloses a cause of action.’

The plaintiff had by a writ of summons issued in February 1988 sued three defendants (now respondents in this appeal) claiming:

‘(a)  Declaration that according to the law, custom and tradition ofTede there are only THREE ruling houses for the Onitede of Tede Chieftaincy to wit. Daodu Agba, Adekalu and Egbeomo.

(b)  Declaration that the instrument dated 18th day of January, 1958 and registered on the 12th day of February. 1958. in so far as it purports to declare the customary law prevailing in Tede with respect to the appointment to the Onitede ofTede chieftaincy is wrongful, illegal and void.

(c) Declaration that Adekulu is the rightful ruling house to present a candidate for the Onitede of Tede chieftaincy.

(d) Declaration that the plaintiff is the Onitede-elect appointed in accordance with the law, custom and tradition of Tede,

(e) Injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, officers and agents from inviting any family other than the plaintiffs ruling house, Adekalu, to present a candidate for the vacant Onitede of Tede chieftaincy, and from acting pursuant to or taking any steps to implement the aforesaid registered declaration.’

Subsequently, Lawani, Adesokan,Tijani Adctokun. Alhaji Sulawu Olarloyin and Waidi Adeyemi, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of Gbangbade Erun Ruling House of the Onitede of Tede, sought and obtained an order of court to join in the action as co-defendants. The plaintiff filed his statement of claim and served copies on all the defendants. The 4 new defendants (who arc now appellants before us and shall hereinafter be so referred to) thereafter applied to the trial court for an order ‘striking out the plaintiff/respondents statement of claim and dismissing this action’ on the grounds:

‘1. The action is frivolous. vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.

2. The plaintiff/respondent has no locus standi to institute this action.

3. The plaintiff/responderus statement of claim in this case discloses no reasonable cause of action.’

The motion was argued and in a ruling given on 11/7/88 the learned trial judge (Aderemi, J.) dismissed the application.

The appellants thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeal with leave of that court but the appeal was dismissed on 27/2/91. The appellants being again dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal have further, with leave of the Court of Appeal. appealed to this court upon 5 grounds of appeal.

Pursuant to the Rules of this court the parties filed and exchanged their respective briefs of arguments. except the 1st – 3rd Dcfendants/Respondents who did not tile any written brief. At the oral hearing of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants and plaintiff/respondent proffered oral arguments in elucidation of  their respective briefs. Although the 1st – 3rd defendants/respondents were represented by counsel at the hearing, he was not heard as he did not file any brief on behalf of his clients – See order 6 rule 9, Supreme Court Rules.

In the Brief of the Appellants the following issues are set out as calling for determination in this appeal, to wit:

‘1. Whether the written opinion of ajustice of the Court of Appeal can be delivered in a judgment delivered after he has retired from the Court of Appeal Bench.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal discharged its judicial responsibility to determine all the issues raised before it in this case.

3. Was the Court of Appeal correct to have confirmed the High Courts decision on the issue of locus standi?

. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to have held that the Plaintiff/Respondents statement of claim disclosed a cause of action.

5. Was the Court of Appeal correct to have held that the High Court rightly held that the Plaintiff!Respondents action was not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court.’

In the Brief of the Plaintiff/Respondent, the issues which, are not dissimilar are formulated thus:

‘1.  Whether the Court of Appeal was duly constituted when the judgment subject of this appeal was delivered on 27th day of February 1991.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal discharged its judicial responsibility to determine all the issues raised before it in this case.

3. Whether the two lower courts were right in holding concurrently that the Plaintiff/Respondent has locus standi and that his statement of claim disclosed a cause of action.

4. Whether the two lower courts were right in their concurrent decisions thatthe Plaintiffs/Respondents action was not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court.’

I shall, in determining this appeal, consider issue I as formulated in the two Briefs first and take the other issues together as they dovetail into each other.

ISSUE (1):

The facts on which this issue is predicated are rather simple and undisputed. The appellants appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal (Ibadan Division) on 28th November, 1990 and the coram was Ogwuegbu, JCA (as he then was), Akpabio and Agoro JJCA. At the conclusion of oral hearing, judgment was reserved and was eventually delivered on 27th February 1991. Agoro JCA retired from service in December 1990 but a written judgment signed by him and in which he merely said:

‘I agree’

Was included in the record of appeal to this court. The proceedings for 27th February 1991 read:

‘Court: the lead judgment is written and read by Akpabio, JCA dismissing the appeal with N200.00 costs against the appellants and in favour of the plaintiff/respondent.

Ogwuegbu and Agoro JJCA concurred, Agoro, JCA gave his consent at the conference Oil the appeal before he retired in December, 1990.

(Sgd.) E. O. Ogwuegbu

Justice, Court of Appeal

27/2/91’

It is the complaint of the appellants that the court of Appeal was not duly constituted on the day it determined the appeal before it in this case and that, therefore, its decision given on 27/2/91 is null and void. The appellants argue that the concurring judgment of AgoroJ. C. A was invalid in that the learned justice of the Court of Appeal was without jurisdiction to deliver a concurring judgment in the case on 27/2/91,. They cite, in support of their subm iss ion, section 9 of the Court of Appeal Act and the decisions in Ogbunyiya & Ors. v. Okudo & Ors. (1979) 6-9 SC 32 and Nyarko v. Akowuah, 14 WACA 427. The appellants refer to a portion of the judgment of Akpabio JCA and argue that Ogwuegbu JCA held  a contrary view. It is consequently submitted that:

‘ the above-mentioned opinions are diametrically opposed.

That in the lead judgment prevailed because of the concurring judgment of the late Hon. Justice Agoro. The said concurring judgment was therefore fatal to the Court of Appeals decision.’

It is submitted for the respondent that in view of the express statement madeby Ogwuegbu JCA on the day judgment was deli vered to the effect that Agoro J CA gave his concurrence at the conference on the appeal before he retired in December 1990, the Court of Appeal was properly constituted when the appeal before it was determined. It is further submitted that for the appellants to succeed in their contention they must disprove Ogwuegbu JCAs statement and this they have failed to do. It is also submitted that the constitution of the Court of Appeal on the day ajudgment was delivered cannot be used to impeach such ajudgment. Support tor this sul.rnission is round in section 11 of the Court of Appeal Act. cap 75 laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 which provides:

‘II.  When, after an appeal in any cause or matter has been fully heard before the Court of Appeal, judgment is reserved for delivery on anotherday, then, on the day appointed fordeliveryofthejudgment,  it shall not be necessary for all those justices before whom the appeal in the cause or matter was heard to be present together in Court, and it shall be lawful for the opinion of any of them to be reduced into writing and to be read by any other justice; and in any such case the judgment of the Court of Appeal shall have the same force and effect as if the justice whose opinion is so read had been   present in Court of Appeal and had declared his opinion in person.’

Section 258(2) of the constitution, A. Anyaoke & Ors. v. Dr. F. Adi & Drs (No.1) (1985) I NWLR (Pt. 2) 342; (1985) I NLR 342 at 350 per lrikefe JSC (as he then was) and Lawani Adesokan &Drs, v. Sunday Adetunji & Drs. (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 346)540; (1994) 6SCNJ 123 where the opinion of Olatawura JSC who participated at the hearing of the appeal but had retired before judgment was given, was pronounced by Uwais JSC (as he then was), who presided over the hearing of the appeal.

I have given careful consideration to the submissions of the parties. With respect to learned leading counsel for the Respondent, I do not think that section 11 of the Court of Appeal Act covers the issue under consideration here. That section covers the case where all the justices that sit on an appeal are still in service on the day of judgment and have written and signed their judgments and, because some or all cannot be present to deliver judgment, give same to other justices to read on their behalf. Nor does the dictum of Irikefe1SC in Anyaoke & Drs. v. Dr. F. Adi & Ors. (supra) go far enough to cover the facts of the case on hand. In that case, Irikefe JSC said:

‘For the purpose of this appeal onl y section 258(2) with the proviso thereto arises for interpretation. From the foregoing, it would appear that once the panel that heard the case on appeal was properly constituted, that is competent, a judgment read within the following permutations would nevertheless be valid and unimpeachable:-

(a) One justice sitting alone to read his own signed judgment to which the others who sat with him had earlier signified their concurrence in writing.

(b) All the justices who sat in the case sitting together to read their own individual opinions one after the other.

(c) Justices, other than those who sat to hear the case sitting to read the judgments already signed and authenticated, produced by those who actually sat over the case.’

The dictum covers the case where a written judgment signed by a serving justice is either read by him or by some other justice on his behalf.

Section 226 of the constitution provides for the constitution of the Court of Appeal in the hearing.and determination of an appeal before it. It reads:

‘226. For the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred upon it by this  Constitution or any other law, the Federal Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted if it consists of not less than three justices of the Federal Court of Appeal, and in the case of appeals from –

(a) a Sharia Court of Appeal, if it consists of not less than three justices of the Federal Court of Appeal learned in Islamic personal law; and

(b) a Customary Court of Appeal, if it consists of not less than three justices of Appeal learned in Customary law.’

In the present case, Agoro JCA who took part at the hearing had retired by the time the Court of Appeal gave judgment. He had thus ceased to be ajudge of that court. Any written judgment given by him after he had ceased to be ajudge of the Court of Appeal would begiven without jurisdiction and would consequently beanullity. This court so decided in Ogbunyiya & Ors. V. Okudo & Ors. (1979) 6-9 SC 32; (1979) NSCC 77 where a judgment given by Nnaemeka-Agu JCA in the High Court of former Anambra State two days after he had ceased to be a judge of that court and had been appoi nted a judge of the Court of Appeal, was dec lured a nullity . See also Nyarko v. Akowuah (supra) where the defunct West African Court of Appeal declared ultra Vires and a nullity ajudgrnent delivered by one Mr. Spooner at a time when his authority to preside over the Chief Commissioners Court had lapsed. On the strength of these authorities, I am in agreement with the appellants that the written judgment on page 191 of the record of appeal signed by Agoro JCA and purportedly delivered on 27th February 1991 after he had retired in December 1990, is a nullity and I so declare.

But this is not the end of the matter. At page 173 of the record of appeal, Ogwuegbu, JCA made the following pronouncement on 27th February 1991:

‘Agora JCA gave his concurrence at the conference on the appeal before he retired in December, 1990.’

This pronouncement is in line with the practice of this court and of the Court of Appeal in similar circumstances.

The practice is predicated on section 258(2) of the constitution which came for consideration in Attorney-General oflmo State v. Attorney-General of Rivers State (1983) 2 SCNLR 108 (1983) 8 SC 10.

ldigbe, JSC (of blessed memory) was a member of the Full court that heard the appeal. Before judgment was given on 12th August 1983, he died. On the day judgment was delivered Fatayi-Williarns, CJN after delivering his own judgment, pronounced the opinion of late Idigbe JSC and in doing so, observed at pages 10-12 of the report:

‘In accordance with the provisions of section 258 subsections (2) and (3) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, I would also pronounce the opinion of the late justice Idigbe that the claims should be dismissed for the reasons stated by justice Sowemimo in his judgment. The late justice Idigbe was a member of the panel which heard the case and which later agreed that the claims should be dismissed for those reasons.

Subsections (2) and (3) of section 258 of the Constitution to which I have referred read –

(2) Each Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Federal Court of Appeal shall express and deliver his opinion in writing,  or may state in writing that he adopts the opinion of any other justice who delivers a written opinion:

Provided that it shall not be necessary for all the justice’ who heard a cause or matter to be present when judgment is to be delivered, and the opinion of a justice may be pronounced or read by any other justice whether or not he was present at the hearing.

(3) A decision of a court consisting of more than one judge shall be determined by the opinion of the majority of its members.

To my mind, the phrase may be pronounced used in subsection (2) above can only mean, in the context, ‘to utter, speak, declare aloud, or proclaim’. Moreover, since the phrase is obviously intended to distinguish what may be pronounced from what may be read, what is pronounced cannot be the same as what is read from a typewritten or handwritten script. It must mean, and I so hold, what is orally proclaimed or declared aloud from personal knowledge.

In view of the interpretation which I have put on the phrase may be pronounced, I also hold that any of the justices of the Supreme Court who heard any cause or matter can, after a decision has been arrived at by all the justices, pronounce the opinion of another justice who, for one reason or another, is unable to reduce his opinion into writing or be present when the judgment in the case is being delivered by each of the other justices.’

The practice has been followed ever since by both this court and the Court of Appeal in circumstances where a justice of either court who sat on an appeal and deliberated at conference on the appeal died or retired before delivery of judgment.

A few examples will suffice. In Ibrahim Kano v. Gbadamosi ayeakin (1993) 3 B NWLR (Pt. 282) 399,424, Shehu Usman Mohammed, JSC (of blessed memory) who sat at the hearing of the appeal and took part in the subsequent conference died before the date of judgment, the presiding justice. U wais JSC (as he then was) made the following pronouncement, after delivering his own judgment:

‘My learned brother, the late Mohammed, JSC who took part in the hearing of this appeal and the conference which we held C immediately thereafter died in a motor accident on Tuesday .the 9th day of February, 1993.

In accordance with the provisions of section 258 subsection (2) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 I hereby pronounce that he was of the opinion that the appeal should succeed and that it should be allowed with N 1,000.00 costs to the  appellants.’

Again, in Alhaji A. Aliyu v. Dr. J. A. Sodipo (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 342) 1; (1994) 5 SCNJ 1,23 on the retirement ot Olatawura JSC who sat at the hearing of the appeal and took part in the conference but retired before judgment, the following pronouncement was made by Uwais JSC who presided:

‘The Honourable justice Olajide Olatawura, who sat with us on the  14th day of February, 1994 to hear this appeal, retired on the 3rd day of May, JSC. Before his retirement, he took part in the conference which we held on the 23rd day of February, 1994 on the appeal and he was of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.

In accordance with the provisions of the proviso to section 258 subsection (2) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of F Nigeria, 1979 Cap 62 of the laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 and the decision of this court in A. G. oflmo State v. A. G. of Rivers State,(I983)8S.C. IOatpp.10-12;(1983)2SCNLR 108. I hereby pronounce the opinion of Hon. Olajide Olatawura that the appeal be dismissed for the reasons contained in the judgment read by my learned brother Ogundare, JSC., the draft of which he read before his retirement.’

See also: Lawani Adesokan & Ors v. Sunday Adetunji & Ors, (supra) where asimilar pronouncement was made. Incidentally the present appellants were appellants also in that case.

It is interesting to observe that the practice in this country is not dissimilar to the practice in England notwithstanding that there is no provision similar to section 258(2) of the constitution in their statute book. The following statement appears in Halsbury s laws of England (4th edition) volume 10 at paragraph 726:

‘Where one of the members of an appellate court dies after the hearing but before judgment has been delivered, it would seem that ajudgment written by the deceased member before his death may  be adopted by one of the other members as his own, if it is to stand as part of the decision of the court.’

The authority for this statement is to be found in lnland Revenue commrs v. Wilsons (Dunblane) Ltd. (1954) 1 All ER. 301 at 305, (1954) I WLR 282 at2H8 HL where Lord Normand deli vered as his own an opinion prepared by Viscount Simon before his death. Lord Normand said

‘My Lords, before Lord Simons lamented death [ had intimated to him that I would concur with an opinion prepared and finally revised by him in this appeal. In these circumstances, I am to deliver his opinion as my own. I shall thus have the privilege of preserving hisjudgmenton one of the last Scottish appeals heard by him. Before I read it,l may be allowed to associate myself with the words of my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack about Lord Simon. It is. indeed. true that Scottish lawyers share with their English brethren the grievous sense of loss that his death has brought to all of us. Here, then. is his opinion which I adopt as my own.’

In Re McConnell. Hunter v. McConnell (1956) Nl 156, (a Northern Ireland case)  the court granted leave to enter the appeal for rehearing where the two remaining judges did not agree. No doubt. prudence dictates that, in such a case. the opin ion of a deceased or retired judge should not be allowed to sway the appeal either way as the parties would be deprived of his reasoning leading to his own conclusion.

It was the course taken in the Northern Ireland case that Mr. Alawode has urged on us in this appeal. Learned counsel argues in his Brief that Akpabio and E Ogwuegbu JJCA came to ‘diametrically opposed’ opinions. Akpabio JCA, in his lead judgment observed:

‘Hovever in the instant case, the learned trial judge found that the parties were different as the plaintiff/respondent was suing for himself as an individual, and not on behalf of a ruling house, and also that one of his reliefs No (d) was a new one, not included in any of the two previous cases. He therefore held, rightly in my view, that whether an appeal was pending in any of the two earlier cases or not would not have any bearing whatsoever on the present suit. He therefore rightly held that the present suit was not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of court. So that sub-head of the application was rightly decided.’

Ogwuegbu, JCA, on the other hand, said:

‘I think that plaintiff/respondent should have waited for the outcome of the appeal in HOY/23/87. His impatience gave the impression that suit No. HOY/l4/88 is an abuse of the process of court.’

He followed immediately by saying:

Be that as it may, I am not convincd that the action giving rise to  this appeal is not properly constituted. Which ever way the appeal in suit No. HOY /23/87 goes, it will not defeat the claim or the plaintiff/respondent in the present appeal.’

Both learned justices carne to the conclusion that the appeal failed. (cannot see that. in this case. both learned justices disagreed as to persuade me to invoke the decision in In Re Macconne! (supra).

The final conclusion I reach on this issue is that while I am of the view that the written opinion of ajustice of the Court of Appeal cannot be delivered after he has retired from the court, Oil the facts of this case where the opinion of Agora JCA was pronounced by Ogwucgbu JCA as provided for in section 258(2) of the constitution, the Court of Appeal was duly constituted as provided in section 226 of the constitution, when judgment was delivered by it in this case on 27th February 1991. Ground 1, therefore, fails.

OTHER ISSUES:

(1) Locus Standi:

It is the contention of the appellants that the plaintiff/respondent lacked standing to sue in that his election by the Adekalu ruling house as a candidate for the Onitede Chieftaincy was in breach of the existing Chieftaincy declaration in respect of the office and was therefore an exercise in futility.

I find substance in the arguments of the appellants on this issue. To determine whether the plaintiff has locus standi. it is to the statement of claim one looks – see:

Order 23 rule 4 High Court (Civil Procedure) rules of Oyo State. Indeed, that was the only pleadings before the trial court when the appellants brought their application that has led to this appeal. In that statement of claim, the plaintiff pleaded thus:

‘1. The plaintiff is a Prince of Tede in Ifedapo Local Government, and comes from the Adekalu Ruling House of Onitede of Tede Chieftaincy.

5. The plaintiff has interest in the Onitede ofTede Chieftaincy, as he has been chosen by the ruling house that is entitled to present him, as the Onitede-elect.

6. The plaintiffs name has been submitted by his family to the Kingmakers.

I think these averments show that plaintiff has sufficient interest in the Onitede Chieftaincy to clothe him with standing to institute his action. Unlike the situation in Momoh v. Olotu (1970) I ALL NLR 117 at 123; (1970) ANLR 121 at 127 where Sir Ademola, CJN observed:

‘Now, what is the averment in paragraph 1? The plaintiff says that he is a member of the Olukare family. The question may be asked, is it enough for the plaintiff to state that he is a member of the family? he not got to state that he has an interest in the chieftaincy? Surely not every member of a Chieftaincy family as  such has interest in the Chieftaincy title. We are of the view that it is not enough for the plaintiff to state that he is a member of the family; he has to state further that he has an interest in the chieftaincy title, and furthermore, state in his statement of claim how his interest in the chieftaincy title arose. It is difficult to say on the pleadings filed that the plaintiffhas any locus in the matter.’

Plaintiff has averred that he had been chosen by his ruling house to succeed to the chieftaincy and his name had been submitted to the Kingmakers for consideration.

lie averred also that it was the tum of his ruling house to present a candidate. It must he remembered that the issue of locus standi is not dependent on the success or merits of a case but on whether the plaintiff has sufficient interest in the subject-matter ofthe dispute. I am of the view that the two courts below are right in holding that plaintiffs interest in the Onitede chieftaincy as averred in his pleadings are sufficient to give him a standing to institute his action. Going by the pleadings and claims, plaintiffs action is a challenge to the correctness of the chieftaincy declaration approved for the Onitede chieftaincy.

It is my view that members of a ruling house have a right to challenge such a declaration that, they honestly believe, is not in accordance with the customary law of their community. I, therefore, find no merit in the appellants challenge of plaintiffs standing in instituting his action.

(ii) CAUSE OF ACTION:

Going by plaintiffs amended statement of claim, he contends that the chieftaincy declaration approved in 1958 for the Onitede Chieftaincy does not correctly reflect the custom of the Tede community as to the number of ruling houses entitled to the Onitede Chieftaincy. What is a cause of action is defined by this court, per Fatayi- Williams JSC (as he then was) in Savage v. Uwechia (1972) 3 SC 214 at 221, (1972) All NLR 255 at 261, in these words:

‘A cause of action is defined in Strouds Judicial Dictionary as the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. To our mind, it is, in effect, the fact orcombination of facts which give rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements – the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint and the consequent damages. As Lord Esher said in Cooke v, Gill (1873) L. R. 8 C. P. 107 and later In Read v. Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 (C. A.), it is every fact that it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Sec also Kusada v, Sokoto Native Authority,S.C. 131/68 delivered on 13th December, 1968, where the definition in Read v. Brown (supra) was referred to with approval).’

See alsoJackson v. Spittall (1870) LR 5 CP 542 at 552 where Brett J observed thus:

‘It is that which in popular meaning – for many purposes, in legal  meaning – is the cause of action, viz, the act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint.’

Whether or not the plaintiff is able to prove his case, is another matter. And it is to the writ and pleadings that one has to look to see upon what the action is based – Kusada v. Sokoto Native Authority (1968) I All NLR 377 at 382; (1968) All NLR 366 at 370 where Lewis JSC delivering the judgment of this court observed:

……………….whether there was a good cause of action must be determined…….  when the writ and pleadings had been filed so that it would have become possible to see on what the action was based, for instance whether it was based on an enforceable contract or in tort.’

There are sufficient averments in the amended statement of claim to constitute a cause of action. I refer in this respect to paragraphs 8 – 15 (where the custom relating to the number of ruling houses entitled to the Onitede Chieftaincy was pleaded). paragraphs 16 – 20 (where the existence of a 1958 ch ieftaincy declaration is pleaded and that it is not in accord with the custom ofTede), paragraph 22 (where it is pleaded that it is the turn of the plaintiffs ruling house to present a candidate that occurred in the chieftaincy following the demise on 2nd July 1986 of Oba Salami Aderounmu Olukotun Alebiosu II), paragraphs 23 and 24 (where plaintiffs selection by his ruling house and his appointment by the Kingmakers are pleaded) and paragraphs 25 – 28 (where it is pleaded that the defendants/respondents have refused or neglected to approve his appointment and that the 3rd defendant has called on appellants family to present a candidate). I, therefore, agree with the two courts below that the plaintiffs pleadings disclose a good cause of action. The arguments of the appellants on their Brief only go to the merits of the case which  consideration is premature at this stage. They base their arguments on issues extrinsic to the plaintiffs amended statement of claim, and such arguments are rightly ignored by the court below.

Having held that the plaintiff has locus standi and that his amended statement of claim discloses a good cause of action I must, of necessity, hold that his action is not an abuse of the process of the court, as erroneously contended by the appellants.

In conclusion, this appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed by me with N1,000.00 costs awarded in favour of the plaintiff/respondent only.

BELGORE, JSC.

By the writ and finally by their statement of claim, the plaintiffs clearly manifest they have a cause of action to pursue. The averments in the statement of claim rellect that they have proper locus standi to prosecute the action. The pleadings are replete with the facts in dispute and the persons affected by the issues that it will amount to mischief to claim the action is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the court. I find nothing wrong with the decision of the trial court upheld by the Court of Appeal. [also, by adopting the  fuller reasons in the judgment of Ogundare, JSC, dismiss this appeal for want or merit and I make the sallie consequential orders as to costs.

Other Citation: (1997) LCN/2771(SC)