Ibrahim Geidam V. National Electric Power Authority (2000)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MUHAMMAD, J.C.A. 

: The plaintiff at the Borno State High Court (Court below) sitting at Maiduguri, took a specially indorsed writ of summons with the following claims against the defendant, that is to say:

“(i) A declaration that the purported dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendant from its employment vide the letter with reference No.0221/2.1/035/90 of 24/1/90 is wrongful, null and void;

(ii) N500,000 damages;

(iii) N692.58k per month as arrears of salary and allowances from March 1990 until judgment.

(iv) Interest at 10% on the judgment sum from date of judgment until final payment; and

(v) The cost of the suit.”

The background facts giving rise to the above claims are that the plaintiff was employed as a store man by the defendant in October, 1973 with the plaintiff’s service deemed to be continuous from the 28th day of July, 1969, being the date of plaintiff’s original employment with the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria which was reconstituted as NEPA in 1972. The plaintiff rose to the post of Executive Officer in the employment of the defendant at a salary of N3,586.00k per annum. On the 19th day of September, 1989, the plaintiff was given a query regarding theft of 1009 Meters of 500mm single core under ground cable, which were defendant’s properties. The plaintiff replied the query denying involvement in the theft alleged. The defendant set up an Ad-hoc Disciplinary Committee in October 1989 to investigate the allegation. The plaintiff appeared before the Committee. He testified. He denied any involvement in the theft alleged. Earlier to the setting up of the Ad-hoc Committee, the plaintiff was arrested and detained for five days by the Nigeria Police Sokoto. There was an attempt to prosecute the plaintiff along with others before a Sokoto Chief Magistrate Court. Plaintiff was later cleared by the Police of the offences alleged. After having considered the Adhoc Committees’g report the defendant dismissed the plaintiff from its employment as per defendant’s letter Ref. No. 00221/2.1/035/90 of 24th January 1990, received by the plaintiff on the 2nd of March, 1990.

Aggrieved with the action taken by the defendant, the plaintiff resorted to taking the writ of summons referred to above.

Pleadings were earlier on filed and exchanged. Issues were joined and hearing commenced. The plaintiff testified on his own behalf and closed his case. Two witnesses testified in favour of the defendant. Opportunity was given to learned counsel for the defendant to address the court. There was no address from the defence. Learned counsel for the plaintiff however, addressed the court below later. The learned trial Chief Judge, Kolo, J. after having evaluated the evidence adduced before him and counsel’s submission, entered judgment for the plaintiff by awarding N40,000.00 (forty thousand Naira) as general damages for the wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff and N1,000.00 (one thousand Naira) costs, all against the defendant. Two sets of appeals were filed by the parties: The plaintiff as appellant in the main appeal, filed his Notice and grounds of appeal against the judgment on 22/4/94. That Notice of Appeal contained five grounds of appeal. A notice of cross-appeal was filed by the defendant as cross-appellant. The Notice of cross-appeal contained four grounds of appeal.

Briefs were filed and exchanged in respect of the main appeal. Briefs in respect of the cross-appeal were as well filed by the respective parties.

The appeals were heard by this court simultaneously. Learned counsel for the appellant/cross-respondent adopted and relied on his briefs; had nothing more to add and urged the court to allow the appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent/cross-appellant adopted and relied on his briefs. He urged us to dismiss the appeal and allow the cross-appeal.

I think I should take the arguments on the appeal one after the other. In the brief filed, learned counsel for the appellant formulated an issue for determination:

“Whether the Hon. Chief Judge was right in not ordering the reinstatement of the appellant to his job instead of granting monetary award only in view of the pleadings, evidence and the direct findings made in the case”. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, formulated two issues:

“(1) Whether the learned trial Judge rightly held that the appellant did not insist on reinstatement.

(2) Whether the lower court was right in only awarding damages to the appellant instead of ordering reinstatement of the appellant to his employment, having regard to the appellant’s pleadings, evidence adduced, the specific relief/claim prayed for by the appellant at the trial, the applicable law and the general circumstances of the case.”

I should observe that the general practice in formulation of issues by a respondent is that the respondent can adopt the issues formulated by the appellant based on the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant or at best recast same by giving them a slant favourable to the respondent’s point of view but without departing from the complaint raised by the grounds of appeal. Atanda v. Ajani (1989) 3 NWLR (pt.111) 511 at 543-544; Chia v. State (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.455) 465 at 474. I shall therefore decide this appeal on the appellant’s lone issue which was recast by the respondent in his issue No.2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Chief Judge missed the basic prayer which the appellant pleaded and proved when he ordered for damages in favour of the appellant instead of reinstatement, and that the issue of damages was sought as an alternative prayer. He cited and relied on Order 47 rule 1 of the Borno State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, which he argued was sufficient enough for the court below to order for appellant’s reinstatement. He cited Okupe v. FBIR (1974) All NLR 314; Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550, among others. He argued further that even if not prayed for, the court below could have exercised its discretion to grant reinstatement as a consequential order. It was further contended for the appellant that there were far reaching findings made by the trial court which pointed to the fact that reinstatement of the appellant rather than monetary award was the preferred solution. Appellant relied heavily on paragraph 34(b) of his amended statement of claim. It was learned counsel’s argument that where the dismissal was held invalid (unlawful) and ineffectual just as in this case, there was no dismissal. He cited Imoloame v. WAEC (1992) 9 NWLR (pt.265) 303 at 313 in support. Learned counsel for the appellant finally urged this court to set aside the award of money to the appellant and reinstate the appellant to his erstwhile employment. Learned counsel for the respondent in his submission on the issue argued that the learned trial Chief Judge was right to have held that the appellant did not insist on reinstatement. He argued further, though the issue of reinstatement was pleaded appellant’s specific prayer at trial superseded the appellant’s pleading. He cited and relied on: Bello v. Fayose (1994) 2 NWLR (pt.327) 404 at 419; Progress Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Ugonna (Nig.) Ltd (1996) 3 NWLR (pt.435) 202, at 217, among others. It was submitted that it was not open to the lower court to decide the case according to the pleadings in disregard of or contrary to the evidence adduced. The court’s exercise of discretion in granting the alternative claim and to refuse the other must be judicious, judicial and not capricious. Since the appellant accepted the repudiation/breach of the contract of employment and settled for damages, the appellant thereby waived his claim to reinstatement as he became bound by his election of monetary award. The court, contended further for the respondent, could not be seen to be forcing an unwilling servant on an unwilling master, and that was why the trial court did not declare appellant’s dismissal as ‘null and void’. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted on Order 47 rule 1 of the High Court of Borno State Rules, 1988 that the rule could in no way advance the course of the appellant. Furthermore, learned counsel argued that an order of reinstatement could not be granted in favour of the appellant in the face of the appellant’s evidence of ‘gainful employment’ and specific prayer for damages. Learned counsel differentiated this case from that of Garba v. University of Maiduguri (supra) cited and relied upon by the appellant, and that the employment of the appellant had no statutory-flavour. Learned counsel urged us to dismiss the appeal and affirm the lower court’s decision.

In the cross-appeal, learned counsel for the cross-appellant formulated three issues:

“1. whether the N40,000.00 general damages awarded by the lower court was in accordance with law and justice of the case.

2. Whether the lower court rightly held that the cross-appellant was not fair to the respondent by not putting him on fresh notice in relation to the Ad-hoc Committees’ impression that the respondent was dishonest or told lies.
3. Whether the lower court rightly held that the respondent’s dismissal was wrongful”.

Learned counsel for the cross-respondent adopted the three issues above though put differently in a way favourable to the cross-respondent’s taste. Learned counsel for the cross-appellant submitted that what the plaintiff/cross-respondent claimed was N20,000.00. The lower court awarded N40,000.00 as damages. He argued that the N20,000.00 granted in addition to the claim was not submitted for adjudication. The lower court thus acted without jurisdiction as it cannot grant what has not been claimed. The plaintiff, it was argued further, did not claim for gratuity for 21 years. Learned counsel argued further that the plaintiff was entitled to what he would have earned over the period of three month’s notice under the contract of employment with the defendant/cross-appellant. In reply to this point, learned counsel for the cross-respondent submitted that the basis of the award by the trial court was covered under the general damages. Save that, the award did not meet the justice of the case as justice of the case would have been in the reinstatement of the cross-respondent and not in monetary award. He further mentioned that the trial court found that the dismissal of the cross-respondent was ‘null, void and of no effect’. There was no appeal against this finding which as a result stood admitted and undisputed by the cross-appellant. Learned counsel submitted further that the award of monetary compensation was wrong and unsupportable by evidence placed before the trial court and the direct and bold findings of the trial court.

Learned counsel for the cross-appellant submitted on issue No.2 that the Ad hoc Committee that investigated the cross-respondent, like any Judicial tribunal was not obliged in law to disclose its impression to the plaintiff during the proceedings. The committee did very well and was over fair to the plaintiff; it gave ample opportunity to the plaintiff to correct the bad impression created in the mind of the tribunal. There was, therefore, it was further argued, no need to give the plaintiff a second hearing before committees’ report could be acted upon. For the cross-respondent, it was contended that the procedure adopted by the cross appellant in an attempt to try the cross-respondent fell short of the requirements for a fair hearing which amounted to a serious infraction of the cross-respondent’s constitutional right to fair hearing. The committee, it was argued, has no vires under the law to look into any element of crime against the cross-respondent.

On issue No.3, learned counsel for the cross-appellant submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that the plaintiff’s dismissal was wrongful on the ground that there was no criminal conviction of the plaintiff before his dismissal for acts which constituted criminal offence and that the reliance by the trial court on the case of Garba v. University of Maiduguri (supra) was wrong as that case did not contemplate or deal with the kind of case on hand. He cited Dongtoe v. C.S.C Plateau State (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt 408) 448, 458. The defendant did all they were required to do. They reported the alleged theft to the Police. The defendant could not compel the Police to prosecute. On his part learned counsel for the cross-respondent adopted his arguments on issues 1 and 2 above.

The position of the law under common and Nigerian law is that, ordinarily, a master has right to terminate his servant’s employment for good or bad reasons or for no reason at all. The basic principle considered normally in the resolution of a dispute between a master and his servant where the former determines the latter’s appointment is the determination of whether the contract of service between the two is one with statutory-colouration/flavour. Where the servant is removed in a contract with statutory flavour, the first question the court would ask is: Has the servant’s employment been determined in accordance with the way and manner prescribed by the statute under reference? Or, is the contract governed by an agreement of the parties and not under any statute? Where the servant is sought to be removed in a contract with statutory flavour i.e. a contract of employment wherein the procedures for employment and discipline, including dismissal, are clearly spelt out, such a contract must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the statute. Any other manner of termination which is inconsistent with the relevant statute is null and void and of no effect. But in other cases governed only by agreement of the parties and not by statute, removal by termination or dismissal will be in the form agreed to. Any other form of dismissal or termination connotes only wrongful termination or dismissal but does not warrant a declaration of such dismissal as null and void. Where this happens, the only remedy open to the plaintiff is a claim for damages for that wrongful dismissal and not reinstatement. This is based on the notion that no servant can be imposed by the court on an unwilling master even where the master’s behaviour is wrong. For his wrongful act, the master is only liable in damages and nothing more. See: Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.289) 512 at 560, Union Bank v. Ogboh (1995) 2 SCNJ 1 at 16 (1995) 2 NWLR (pt.380) 647; NEPA v. Isieveore (1997) 7 NWLR (pt. 511) 135; Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.291) 47; Adeniyi v. Governing Council, Yabatech (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.300) 426; Imoloame v. W.A.E.C (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt.265) 303; Bankole v. NBC (1968) 2 ALL NLR, 371; Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40; U.N.T.H.M.B v. Nnoli (1994) 8 NWLR (363) 376; N.O.M Ltd v. Daura (1996) 8 NWLR (pt.468) 601.

With these authorities in mind, I shall now consider the propriety of the trial court’s declaration that the appellant’s dismissal was wrongful and that the appellant could only have his remedy in monetary damages. In its findings, the trial court made the following specific findings:

“It is a fact that the plaintiff, having put up a service for 21 years (from 20th July, 1969 to 2nd March, 1990) was served with a dismissal letter dated 24th January, 1990…

…It is a fact that the plaintiff along with other members of staff was (sic) referred to the police on the allegations of misappropriation of 1009m of 500mmz single core underground cable by some NEPA staff at Yelwa Undertaking Minna District. The Police investigated the matter arraigned certain members of the staff before a court of law but cleared the plaintiff from the allegations. It is a fact that after the plaintiff was cleared by the Police his employer set-up an Ad-hoc Disciplinary Committee to investigate allegations of misappropriation of 1009m of 500mmz single core Underground cable by some NEPA’s staff at Yelwa Undertaking Minna District and make appropriate recommendations in accordance with the provisions of the Authority’s conditions of service. The Ad-hoc Committee therefore recommended that the plaintiff be dismissed from the service of the authority in accordance with Reg. 33.02 paragraph 1. The conditions of service 1978 Edition now marked Exh. K spelt out under paragraph 33.02 page 21 the offences for which dismissal is the maximum penalty”.

Commenting further on the method adopted by the respondent in dismissing the appellant, the learned trial Judge observed that the Ad-hoc Committee inquired into a criminal matter which was earlier referred to and inquired into by the Police. The Ad-hoc Committee found the appellant dishonest as he told lies on the theft issue. The learned trial Judge concluded that the Ad-hoc Committee went outside the terms of reference for which the committee was set up. The learned trial Chief Judge declared the appellant’s dismissal from the services of the respondent ‘wrongful’ and that the appellant was entitled to judgment. The judgment was granted in monetary damages. Learned counsel for the appellant argued tersely that the conclusion of the learned trial Chief Judge was perverse as it was contrary to the pleadings, evidence and findings of fact. I have gone through the pleadings, evidence and findings of the court below. I am in disagreement with the learned counsel. I disagree because the learned trial Chief Judge in my view, considered at length the pleadings and evidence placed before him in arriving at his conclusion. Let me reiterate the law, that a master has the right to determine the employment of his servant for good or bad cause or for no cause at all. The determination (dismissal) of the appellant’s employment in this case was based upon the recommendation of an Ad-hoc Committee which recommended for the dismissal of the appellant in accordance with regulations 33.02 of the Conditions of Service governing appellant’s appointment. The learned trial Chief Judge found that the dismissal of the appellant based on the Committee’s recommendation was wrongful. In his process of reasoning, the learned trial Chief Judge stated:

“In my view, it is not proper for the defendant after the plaintiff was cleared by the Police from the alleged offence of misappropriation to review the same thing and dismiss an employee on the basis of the recommendation of such a committee. A court of law or a Judicial Tribunal is the body charged with the duties of pronouncing a person guilty of an offence either as a principal offender or an abetter. The Ad-hoc Committee did indirectly what the court of law is charged to do. A dismissal or termination of appointment of an employee by an employer based on a recommendation made by a fact finding Committee which delves into a criminal matter cannot in my view stand. A court of law or a judicial tribunal must be involved. It is not proper for the employer to go ahead and dismiss the employee from its service. It is a risky thing to do for if the employee were to challenge his dismissal as in the present case the odds would be against the employer”.

That, undoubtedly, is the correct position of the law. However, even though the dismissal was wrongful, it could not be declared null and void as alluded to by learned counsel for the appellant. This is because as argued by learned counsel for the respondent, it has not been shown that the contract of employment was one tinged with statutory-flavour. At this juncture, I refer again to the Supreme Court’s case of UBN v. Ogboh (supra) where it is said:

“Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the relevant statue is null and void and of no effect. But in other cases governed only by agreement of parties and not by any statute, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to. Any other form connotes only wrongful termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void. The only remedy is a claim for damages for that wrongful dismissal. This is based on the notion that no servant can be imposed by the court on an unwilling master, even where the master’s behaviour is wrong. For is wrongful act, he is only liable in damages and nothing more”.

(Italics for emphasis)

Thus, in this kind of case, the relief/claim of the plaintiff for reinstatement is of no moment. As rightly pointed out in the case of U.N.T.H.M.B. v. Nnoli (supra) where there has been a purported termination of contract of service, a declaration to the effect that the contract of service subsists will rarely be made. See also Bankole v. NBC (1968) 2 All NLR 371. This is for the simple reason that the court will not decree specific performance of personal service as the court cannot force an employer to retain in its services an employee it no longer wants. ACB Ltd. v. Ufondu (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt.523) 169 at 177; NEPA v. Isieveora (supra).

U.N.T.H.M.B v. Nnoli (supra). The learned trial Chief Judge in my view, was quite right in declaring the dismissal of the appellant wrongful and in awarding damages to him. This appeal must be determined against the appellant. The issue of the quantum of damage awarded to the appellant is the main subject of the respondent’s cross-appeal (cross-appellant herein) which has been reduced into issue No.1 of the cross-appeal. The holding of the learned trial Chief Judge is as follows:

”I would not enter judgment in the total sum of N61,588.42 as claimed by the plaintiff per paragraph 33 and 34 of the statement of claim but having taken all the relevant factors in assessing the general damages into account I would award the plaintiff who was wrongfully dismissed from the services of the defendant a sum of N40,000.00(forty thousand Naira) as general damages against the defendant. Having taken the appearances and the protracted nature of the suit, I assessed the costs at N1,000.00 (one thousand Naira) to the plaintiff against the defendant”.

The damages particularised by the cross-respondent as per paragraphs 33 and 34 of the amended statement of claim read as follows:

“33. That by reason of the plaintiffs wrongful dismissal from the defendant’s employment, the plaintiff, a pensionable staff who had put in 21 years of service with the defendant has suffered damages.

34. Particulars of damages

(a) Salary for 14 years (from 2nd March, 1990 to the year 2004 being the mandatory retirement period after 35 years of services at N3,586.00 per annum = N49,340.00

(b) Gratuity after 35 years of service at 300% of final salary N3,586.00 = 10,758.00

(c) Pension after 35 years of service at 70% of final salary of N3,586.00 = 2,506.

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N61,588.42k

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The learned trial Chief Judge considered the above particulars of damages claimed by the cross-respondent as speculative in nature and not in tune with realities of life. In his reasoning, the learned trial Chief Judge stated, inter alia:

“But it is certain that he had put up 21 years of service when he was wrongfully dismissed from the services of the defendant. He is entitled on a pro-rata basis to gratuity and pension but he can draw the pension on attainment of 45 years of age. He had claimed gratuity for 21 years service he had put up. I would have awarded him the amount due to him as special damages in addition to the general damages I would award. As no amount was claimed by the plaintiff as gratuity for the 21 years of service he put up I would not make any award under this heading but when making the award for general damages, I would take into account the fact that the plaintiff was deprived of the gratuity for the 21 years of service he put up before he was wrongfully dismissed from the services of the defendant”.

It has long been a settled principle of law that the measures of damages recoverable in situations of wrongful termination or dismissal of a servant are determined by what the employee would have earned over the period of notice required for the determination of the employment. See: Nom Ltd v. Daura (supra); ACB Ltd v. Ufondu (supra); N.P.M.B.V v. Adewunmi (1972) 11 SC III; Onalaja v. African Petroleum Ltd (1991) 7 NWLR (pt.206) 691; Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Ltd. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.289) 512; International Drilling Co. Nig. Ltd. v. Ajijola (1976) 2 SC 115; Akinfosile v. Mobil (1969) NCLR. 253; WNDV v. Abimbola (1966) 1 All NLR 159.See also Mayne and McGregor on Damages, 12th Ed. Paragraph 608. It was argued for the cross-appellant both before the trial court and this court that from the letter of appointment of the cross-respondent (Exhibit A) and the conditions of service (Exh. K) that either the cross-appellant or the cross-respondent could bring the contract of employment to an end by giving the other 3 month’s notice. That all the cross-respondent could have been entitled to was what he would have earned had he been given the 3 month’s notice. I cannot agree more. Therefore, since the monthly salary of the cross-respondent per month which was never disputed was N692.58 for 3 months, the amount would be N2,077.74k. So this is all the cross-respondent was entitled to under the contract. Thus, as no basis in law has been shown, upon which the learned trial chief Judge rested his assessment on the damages he awarded in favour of the cross-respondent, such damages could not properly stand for want of leg. Macfoy v. UAC (1961) 3 All ER.1169. It is to be pointed out that the length of service, the gratuity for 21 years, the retirement age et cetera have no role to play in cases of wrongful dismissal of a servant. The method of assessing the damages recoverably by the plaintiff is the amount he would have earned over the period of notice which in this case was 3 months.

On the 2nd issue i.e. whether the lower court rightly held that the cross-appellant was not fair to the cross-respondent by not putting him on fresh notice in relation to the Ad-hoc Committee’s impression on the ‘lies’ he told the Committee, I think this issue seeks to raise an academic question. The issue of the role played by the Ad-hoc committee and the effect of the reliance put by the cross-appellant has largely formed the subject matter of the main appeal which has just been decided. The general attitude of courts of law is that they are loathe in making pronouncements on academic/hypothetical issues as it does not serve any useful purpose. See: Ukejianya v. Uchendu (1950) 13 WACA 45. Nkwocha v. Gov. of Anambra State (1984) 1 SCNLR 634. That is all I can say on issue No.2 of the cross-appeal.

On the 3rd issue, it is quite settled that where there is criminal allegation/charge against a person whose employment is sought to be terminated, such employee must be taken before a court or tribunal with criminal jurisdiction to determine his guilt or otherwise, except where the employee accepts his involvement in the crime alleged which of course requires no proof. See: U.N.T.H.M.B v. Nnoli (supra); Nom Ltd v. Daura (supra). In the instant case, the allegation against the cross-respondent was criminal in nature (theft). There was need for a criminal court/tribunal to have considered the crime alleged. An administrative Panel without more could not determine such a crime. An employer in such circumstances is prohibited from instituting disciplinary measures against his employee as that will infringe the fundamental right of a person alleged of a criminal offence. U.N.T.H.M.B v. Nnoli (supra); FCSC v. Laoye (supra); Garba v. University of Maiduguri (supra). Had there been a determination of the offence levied against the cross-respondent by a criminal court/tribunal, that would have earned the cross-respondent a different verdict. The learned trial Chief Judge had made this point abundantly clear in his judgment. I agree with the learned trial Chief Judge’s holding that the cross-respondent was wrongfully dismissed. Thus, it is my view that the learned trial Chief Judge was perfectly in order in holding that the cross-respondent was wrongfully dismissed.

In the light of what I have so far said on the main appeal and the cross-appeal, I find it pertinent to conclude this judgment with the following orders:

(1) That the main appeal lacks merit and same is accordingly dismissed. I hereby affirm the decision of the learned trial Chief Judge of the Court below in declaring the appellant’s dismissal as wrongful and in ordering for damages as the relief recoverable in the circumstance.

(2) I allow the cross-appeal in part. The damages awarded in the sum of N40,000.00 was not based on any known principle of the law. It is hereby set aside. The actual damage is the one quantified by the amount the employee would have earned over the period of notice which is 3 months in this case and whereas the monthly salary of the cross-respondent was N692.58 (see paragraph (iii) of plaintiffs claim on the indorsed writ of summons). The amount payable by the cross-appellant is now N2,077.74k to the cross-respondent and nothing more. See: Chief Akpan & Ors v. Chief Otong & Ors (1996) 12 SCNJ 213; (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt.476) 108 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341 at 354; P.Z Ltd. v. Ogedengbe (1972) 3 SC 98 (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt.1) 202 at 100-101. Accordingly, the cross-appellant is ordered to pay to the cross-respondent the said amount i.e. N2,077.74k.

(3) The respondent is to pay to the appellant the costs of the suit assessed by the court below to be N1,000.00 (one thousand Naira only).

(4) In this appeal, parties in both the main appeal and the cross-appeal shall, each, bear his/its own costs.

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Other Citations: (2000)LCN/0723(CA)