Hon. Alhaji Abdullahi Maccido Ahmad V. Sokoto State House of Assembly & Anor (2002)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
ISA AYO SALAMI, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the decision of Aisha Sani Dahiru, C.J., Sokoto State of Nigeria, delivered on the 18th August, 2000, in suit No. SS/M/271/2000, wherein the applicant on an ex parte application, sought leave of the trial court to enforce his fundamental right to fair hearing, apparently brought under Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, Cap. 62 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
On or about 18th July, 2000, appellant was served with a copy of a petition, written by Alhaji Abubakar Saddiq, Alhaji Almustapha Muhammad and Alhaji Abdulkadir Muhammad, against him and accusing him of poor handling of the implementation of Sharia in Sokoto State, by the 1st respondent, Sokoto State House of Assembly.
The first respondent summoned the appellant to appear before it to answer the allegations contained in the petition on 20th July, 2000 and the respondent duly honoured the summon and attended the hearing of the matter which was further adjourned to 3rd August, 2000. Inspite of the adjournment to 3rd August, 2000, the first respondent proceeded to take evidence of the three petitioners and some other witnesses in his absence without notifying the appellant of the change of date.
Frightened by the turn of events, the appellant commenced an action, suit No. FHC/ABJ/M228/2000, in the Federal High Court, Abuja Division, which granted an interim order restraining the first respondent from further hearing and consideration of the petition. On 8th July, 2000, when the suit was transferred to the Sokoto Division of the Federal High Court, the order of interim injunction was discharged by the court in Abuja. Upon the matter being transferred to Sokoto Judicial Division of Federal High Court, which had no presiding Judge for a period of over one year caused a notice of discontinuance, dated 11th August, 2000, to be filed at the Abuja Division, where the case file and order for transfer were lying as at that date.
Thereafter, appellant filed a fresh suit aforementioned in the Sokoto High Court, which was assigned to the Chief Judge and fixed for hearing on 15th August, 2000. However, on 14th August, 2000, the first respondent, notwithstanding the pendency of the suit before the State High Court, proceeded with the hearing of the petition until 24 August, 2000, when it published its resolution recommending the retirement of the appellant from his office as Grand Kadi Sokoto State to the State Governor.
When the suit came up for hearing on the scheduled date, learned trial Chief Judge suo motu raised the issues of likelihood of bias, jurisdiction and abuse of court process based on a letter dated 11th June, 2000, written from the office of the Attorney-General of Sokoto State to the trial Chief Judge alleging pendency of similar suit, No. FHC.ABJ/M.228/2000 in the Federal High Court. Learned trial Chief Judge then invited counsel to address the court on those allegations and appellant’s counsel did. On completion of the address and without hearing learned Counsel on the application for leave to enforce fundamental rights of the appellant, the matter was reserved for ruling on 22nd August, 2000.
The ruling on the preliminary issues was, however, delivered on 18th August, 2000. The learned trial Judge, in that ruling, declined jurisdiction on the ground that the appellant being a judicial officer like herself and both of them being part of the government the court would be a Judge in its own cause should it assume jurisdiction.
She further found that a similar suit was pending before the Sokoto Division of the Federal High Court and in the result struck out the action. Clearly, the application for leave to enforce appellant’s right had not been canvassed not to talk of being refused.
The appellant, being unhappy and dissatisfied, appealed to this court on four grounds of appeal. And in accordance with the practice and procedure of this court, briefs of argument were filed and exchanged. The appellant framed three issues from the four grounds of appeal contained in the memorandum of appeal dated 21st August, 2000. The issues identified in the appellant’s brief as arising for determination are:-
“(a) Whether or not the High Court of Sokoto State has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appellant’s application for enforcement of the right to fair hearing against the respondents in this case – this issue arise from ground one of the appeal.
(b) Whether in all the circumstances of this case, the reliance by the learned Chief Judge on the letter dated 11/6/2000, written by the Attorney-General of Sokoto State as basis for holding that a similar action was pending and disregard of the notice of discontinuance, dated 11th August, 2000, filed by the appellant is proper – this issue arise from grounds two and three of the grounds of appeal.
(c) Whether the learned Chief Judge properly exercised her discretion in striking out the application of the appellant, this issue arises from ground 4 of the grounds of appeal.”
On the other hand, the respondents framed only one issue for determination. It reads as follows:-
“At what point in law and in fact is a notice of discontinuance filed in court, effective.”
In the circumstance, the respondent is not ready to proffer answer to the appellant’s argument contained in his issue (a) that the learned Chief Judge abdicated her responsibility under the Constitution to adjudicate in a dispute between a citizen and State, simply because she is appointed by the State. The respondent, therefore, impliedly concedes to the appellant’s contention in this issue. And the only issue framed on behalf of the respondent does not arise in this appeal, they themselves having not appealed there is no ground of appeal from which their formulation could have been framed. The learned trial Judge swept the existence or otherwise of the notice of discontinuance under the carpet. She failed to make a finding thereon and there could therefore be no ratio decendendi in respect of which such ground of appeal, capable of giving rise to the respondents’ only issue, could have been formulated. In the absence of a valid ground of appeal from which an issue can be identified the issue is necessarily incompetent – Chief Kafaru Oje and Others v. Chief Ganiyu Babalola & Others (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.185) 267, (1991) 5 SCNJ 110; Oyibo Iriri & Others v. Eseroraye Erhurhobara (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.173) 252, (1991) 3 SCNJ 1 and Sanda v. Kukawa Local Government (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.174) 379, (1991) 3 SCNJ 35. That issue is therefore, struck out along with argument canvassed in support of it in the respondents’ brief of argument: For avoidance of any doubt the appeal would for that reason be considered and determined solely on the appellant’s brief of argument.
I intend to take the issues in the order they are proposed in the appellant’s brief of argument. In the first issue the appellant argued that the combined effect of the provisions of Section 36(1) and 46(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, creates a right to legal redress for any person through the High Court of the State for breach or threatened breach of any of his right as guarantee under Chapter IV of the Constitution. Learned Counsel, in the appellant’s brief, further submitted that the learned Chief Judge ought not to have abdicated her duty and jurisdiction in view of the enormous powers vested in her by S. 6(6) of the Constitution.
Learned Counsel for appellant finally urge this court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant by holding that Sokoto State High Court has competence to entertain and determine the issues in the suit giving rise to this appeal.
The grouse of the appellant in this issue is predicated on the observation and finding of the learned Chief Judge on jurisdiction.
It is pertinent, at this stage to set out the findings of the learned trial Chief Judge thereon:-
“I have read the affidavits in support of the application and considered the submission of the learned counsel Mr. Abobo in support of same. I have also read the exhibits annexed to the motion and the conclusion I have reached is that from the circumstances this court ought not to assume jurisdiction over this matter. It is the duty of every court to observe the rules of natural justice in the discharge of its duty of adjudication. See Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550, (1986) 1 NSCC 245, 261. The 2 pillars of natural justice are:
- Audi alterem partem or the principle that the other side must also be heard; and
- Nemo judex in causa sua, i.e. one must not be a Judge in his own cause. From the averments in the applicant’s various affidavit the cause of dispute involves the Government of Sokoto State of which the High Court which is part of the judiciary is an arm. The applicant is a principal officer of the said judiciary and No.2 in prominence in the circumstances and considering the contents of the allegation being made by the applicant in the various affidavits as well as the contents of the various exhibits it is the humble opinion of this court that assuming jurisdiction to hear this application would be tantamount to being a Judge in one’s own case.”
(Italics mine)
In my respectful opinion, reading of the ruling just set out shows clearly complete lack of understanding of the dictum of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case Garbo v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 and the principle of separation of power enshrined in our Constitutions since 1979. The dictum in Garba’s case relied upon by the learned Chief Judge is no authority for the proposition that the learned trial Judge would be a Judge in her own case. The facts or the circumstances surrounding Garba’s case and those of the instant action are different. The body whose conduct came for scrutiny in Garba’s case, is the one that set up the tribunal to investigate the matter hence, the caution by the Supreme Court that Nemo judex in causa sua, meaning that the University of Maiduguri, could not set up a body to investigate a dispute in which it was an interested party. But in the instant case, the organs of government whose conducts were in issue are the executive and legislative arms of Government and whose duty includes removal of a Grand Khadi. The judiciary is therefore, not a party to the suit except probably one of its members is a victim. It is equally vested with power to do exactly what she was invited to by the Constitution unlike University of Maiduguri, which has no statutory power to do what it did.
The organic structure created by part II of Chapter 1 of both Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 and 1999, are three organs of powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Of these powers, legislative powers are vested in the legislature at both Federal and State levels; the executive i.e. President at the Federal and the Governor at the State levels. Judicial powers both at the Federal and State levels are vested in the Courts established for the Federation and the States under Section 6 of the Constitution. The doctrine of separation of powers has three implications:-
(a) that the same person should not be part of more than one of these three arms or divisions of government.
(b) that one branch should not dominate or control another arm. This is particularly important in the relationship between executive and the Courts.
(c) that one branch should not attempt to exercise the function of the other, for example a President however, powerful ought not to make laws indeed act except in execution of laws made by legislature. Nor should a legislature make interpretative legislation if it is in doubt it should head for the Court to seek interpretation.
We owe this concept or doctrine to the French political philosopher, and one of proponents of American revolution Baron De Montesquieu who reasoned as follows:
“Political liberty is to be found only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is liable to abuse it and to carry his authority as far as it will go… To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the nature of things that one power should be a check to another… There will be an end of every thing if the same person or body, whether of the nobles or of the people, were to exercise all three powers.”
The learned trial Chief Judge therefore, capitulated when she declined jurisdiction. The implication of her meekly and without resistance readily surrendering judicial power has the effect of demolishing the edifice of doctrine of separation of power; a doctrine that has taken long toiling hours to erect by our past heroes. It seems to me respectfully that she by that single act dealt a deadly blow at the “labour of our heroes past” and rendered them in vain. Even in cases of ouster clauses, the courts have always struggled to maintain and guard their sovereignty in the determination of civil rights and obligations of the citizen of this country. The Supreme Court has laid it down the principle that while it will not deny the right or capacity or power of a military regime to make a Decree or Edict, the court reserves the right to ensure that such Decree or Edict was consistent with the Constitution – See Barclays Bank v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 6 SC 175 and University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) NNSC 210.
Ouster of jurisdiction of a court does not preclude it from examining the ouster clause itself and to determine whether or not the act carried out under it is within the contemplation of the authority conferred by the enabling legislation: A.-G., Federation v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618). 187, 217; (1999) 5 SCNJ 324 Per Uwaifo, JSC; Agbaje v. Commissioner of Police Western State (1969) 1 NMLR 137. Courts are enjoined to interprete statutes ousting their jurisdiction strictly. In the course of struggling to guard and protect its sovereignty and jurisdiction of courts jealously Fatayi- Williams, C.J.N. of the blessed memory in the case Dr. O. G. Sofekun v. Akinyemi & Others (1980) 5 – 7 SC 1 at 19 said:
“The jurisdiction and authority of the courts of this country cannot be usurped by either the executive or the legislative branch of the Federal or State government under any guise or pre whatsoever.”
(Italics mine)
There is therefore, no justification or basis for surrendering on the platter of gold or refusing to exercise jurisdiction that is expressly conferred by Section 6 of the Constitution.’ In this connection S. 6(2) and (6) are pertinent. Section 6(2) vests judicial powers of a State in the courts to which Section 6 relates while sub-section (6) thereof vests the States Courts with functions which extend to all inherent powers and sanctions of a Court of law and to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and any person in Nigeria and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to their civil rights and obligations. Section 6(2) and (6) of the Constitution are recited immediately hereunder:
“6(1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
6(2) The judicial powers of a State shall be vested in the Courts to which this Section relates, being Courts established, subject as provided by this Constitution, for a State.
(3) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(4) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(5) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Section-
(a) shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a Court of law;
(b) shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligation of that person.
(c) shall not, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, extend to any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution;
(d) shall not, as from the date when this Section comes into force, extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966, for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any authority or person to make any such law.”
(Italics mine)
The learned trial Judge wrongly declined jurisdiction because the Sokoto State High Court of which she is the Chief Judge is one of the courts in which judicial powers of that State are vested. The judicial powers extends to “all matters between persons and between government or authority and any person in Nigeria. It equally extends to all actions and proceedings and the determination of the civil rights and obligations of the parties before her. The appellant as a person in Nigeria has right to bring an action for determination of his civil rights and obligation against government or authority of Sokoto State in that Court. In so far the action brought is not raising the issue of Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of the Constitution or raising an issue of competence of any authority, or person to make an existing law made on or after 15 January, 1966. See subsection (6)(c) and (d) of the Constitution. The relief sought by the appellant’s ex parte motion reads as follows:-
“(a) An order granting leave to the applicant to apply to this Honourable Court for enforcement of his rights to due process and fair hearing in the determination of the petition pending before the 1st respondent as guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
An interim order of stay or injunction restraining the respondents from continuing with the proceedings or further consideration of the allegations in the petition dated 17th July, 2000 titled PETITION AGAINST THE HONOURABLE GRAND KADI OF SOKOTO STATE FOR HIS POOR HANDLING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHARIAH pending the determination of the motion on notice subject to leave being granted.”
Clearly, the two reliefs set out in this judgment apparently do not offend in any manner the provisions of Section 6(6)(c) and (d) of the Constitution which tend to limit the extent of the judicial powers of the State. His suit is within the contemplation of Section 6(2) and 6(a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution, being an action for determination of the appellant’s civil rights and obligation between him as a person and the government or authority of Sokoto State. The learned trial Chief Judge therefore, quibbled when she declined to entertain the suit on some mundane excuses: Uzoukwu v. Ezeonu II (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 708, 751, cited in the appellant’s brief. The trial court’s jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s suit is therefore not ousted on the ground of nemo judex in causa sua.
There is also substance in the submission of the learned Counsel that the appellant has an inalienable right to seek redress in the High Court of the State for threatened breach and breach of his Constitutionally guaranteed right under Chapter IV of the Constitution. Provisions of Sections 36(1) and 46(1) and (2) of the Constitution relied upon read as follows:-
36(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other tribunal constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.”
“46(1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter.”
(Italics mine)
The combined effect of reading these Sections together shows that there is no limitation or qualification to the nature of persons, who may seek to enforce contravention of their right under Chapter IV of the Constitution. The enforcement of the right guaranteed under Chapter IV is beyond any argument and are without exception or qualification for all persons. The sections undoubtedly give access to Court for enforcement of the rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution to all manner of people, without exception, who claim their rights have been trampled upon; just as Section 6(6) gives access to Court for enforcement and determination of all civil rights and obligation including right guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution. I am encouraged in this view by article ‘a’ or “any” qualifying the word person wherever they occur. The view that the action could be brought in the High Court and the Court is under obligation to entertain and determine same is encouraged by the phrases “by or against any government or authority” in Section 36(1) and “between Government or authority and any person in Nigeria” in Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution.
The Constitution should be given liberal and literal construction and interpreted as a whole with a view of giving effect to all its provisions and not restrictively so as to frustrate or render otiose some of its provisions. See Rabiu v. The State (1981) 2 NCLR 293. In Alhaji Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa v. Aura Hamza & Others (1982) 3 NCLR 229, 251, Karibi-Whyte, JCA (as he then was) said:-
“Hence, the aim of the construction of its provisions should be such as to avoid conflicts in the exercise of their functions; and to ensure respect for the respective spheres of operation of each department of the Constitution. This is because the avoidance of collision between the different departments of the Constitution is the very essence of separation of power.”
And in Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NSCC 245, 270, (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18)550, 583 per Obaseki, JSC, Supreme Court said.
“The attitude of this court to the construction of our Constitution has been stated by this court in Nafiu Rabiu v. State (1981) 2 NCLR 293; The A.-G., Bendel State v. The A-G, Federation and Others (1983) 3 NCLR 1; Senator Adesanya v. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 5 SC 112. It is that the provisions of the Constitution are to be given liberal construction so as to best carry out the intention of the founding fathers. Their construction are not to be guided by construction of other constitutions in other common law jurisdictions unless similar provision in pari material were in question. This court will not give to any provision of the Constitution a construction, which will defeat its obvious intention.”
(Italics mine)
Issue (a) is resolved in favour of the appellant and ground one succeeds and it is allowed by me.
On issue (b), the learned Counsel for appellant contended that the application before the learned trial Chief Judge, was merely for leave to apply to the High Court for an order to enforce the right to fair hearing hence the same was not on notice to the respondents named on the face of the record and it was clearly headed ex parte. Learned Counsel was surprised to be confronted by an order of the Federal High Court in respect of a suit pending there by the learned trial Chief Judge. Learned Counsel further observed that the learned Chief Judge in resolving the matter, raised suo motu failed to allude to the fact of a notice of discontinuance brought before the court.
To put the complaint of the appellant in this issue in perspective it is apt to reiterate the scenario leading to it. The learned trial Judge had apparently shown a document she received from the first respondent to the learned Counsel to the appellant and invited his comments on the contents of the letter and its attachments thus:
“I have shown you an order of the Federal High Court, Abuja, in respect of a similar suit before that Court. What is your reaction to the order, considering that there is similar matter before that Court, which has been transferred to the Federal High Court Sokoto.”
The learned Counsel for appellant, who was leading other counsel before the Court, Mr. Abobo, told the Court that he was unaware of the order, until the Court showed it to him. But another counsel, who was appearing with him, E.I. Ogiza knew about the order in question, when he was allowed to speak, he informed the Court as follows:-
“I am aware of the order of the Court given by the Federal High Court, Abuja. We have however, filed a notice of discontinuance, dated 11/8/2000, in the case of St. Rowland v. Oshiboye (1997) 4 SCNJ page 217 at page 230, the case is determined. I also refer to O.28 r.2 High Court Rules, 1993.”
Learned trial Judge in her reserved ruling said:
“Secondly, it has come to the attention of this Court, that a similar suit filed by the applicant is pending before the Federal High Court, Sokoto Division. Although, this applicant did not disclose this fact by any averment in his affidavits. The Court became aware of this suit, through a letter written to the Hon. Chief Judge by the Hon. Attorney-General Sokota State vide a letter dated 11/6/2000, forwarding same. The order made by the Federal High Court, Abuja, was brought to the leading counsel, Mr. Dafe Abobo, who denied knowledge of the said order. Mr. E.I. Ogiza, who also appeared in this suit and whose Chambers, Amana Law Chambers, participated in the trial at Abuja, acknowledged that such order was infact given. In the circumstance, it is clear that a similar suit is still pending before the Federal High Court, Sokoto Division. It is therefore, improper for this Court to assume jurisdiction in the present suit. It is for these 2 reasons, that this Court hereby, decline jurisdiction to entertain suit No. SS/M.271/2000. In the result, suit No. SS/M.271/2000 be and is hereby, struck out.”
(Italics mine)
The only issue before the learned trial Chief Judge was an application by the appellant for leave, to apply to the Court to enforce the appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing, which was not and should not be on notice by virtue of the provisions of Order 1 rules 2 and 3 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, Cap. 62 LFN. The application indeed, was clearly marked or headed ex parte, which means that it ought to be heard in the absence of the respondents thereto. It necessarily, follows that the respondents named in the application have no right of audience either directly or surreptitiously. The learned trial judge wrongly scrounged for extraneous material, which in the instant appeal, the State Attorney General smuggled to her and which she heavily relied upon. In the circumstance, she held brief for the respondents and used material or evidence she received improperly from the respondents to defeat the appellant’s case. A court is to rely on the evidence before it and not on extraneous matter. See Idowu v. The State (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.574) 354, (1998) 9 SCNJ 40. She ought to be seen as an impartial umpire. On no account should she be seen to descend into the arena in the dual role of a Judge and counsel for the respondents which she assumed.
In resolving the issue raised by the correspondence between the learned Chief Judge and the learned Attorney-General of Sokoto State, learned trial Chief Judge failed or refused or neglected to advert her mind to the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant that a notice of discountinuance already, filed before the Federal High Court had the effect of terminating the action taken before that court on the authority of the cases Ezomo v. A.-G., Bendel State (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.36) 448, Adewunmi v. Plastex Ltd. (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 32) 767 and Order 28 rule 2 of the Sokoto State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1993. The submission is relevant or material to the issue raised suo motu by the learned trial Chief Judge and she has a duty to consider same and make a finding thereon. See Dr. Ella v. Agbo (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 613) 139, 151 per Edozie, JCA, who state as follows:-
“It is incumbent on a tribunal to make a finding on crucial issue joined by parties.”
Also, in Harriman v. Harriman (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.119) 6,16 – 17 it was held thus:-
“The second is a complaint that the trial Judge was too brief in his judgment and failed to consider all the issue of law properly raised before him. There is substance in this complaint. It is the duty of a trial Judge to consider all the issues canvassed before him and to make findings thereon vide Bala v. Bankole (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 27) 141″.
See the case of Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation v. N.N.P.C. (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 252) 161. The learned trial Judge by her acts, default or failure to consider the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant, gave credence to appellant’s allegation in his brief that only a perfunctionary hearing was given to their client’s case. She wrongly in my respectful opinion aligns herself with the respondents.
Even if the respondents were in Court and were entitled to be heard at that stage of the proceedings, the Attorney-General’s letter and the order of the Federal High Court cannot be conveyed to the Court through a private correspondence. The two documents could only be brought to the attention of the court by way of an affidavit to which, certified true copies of those documents would be attached.
In the circumstance, I resolve issue (b) also in favour of the appellant and held that it was improper for the trial court to have countenanced talkless of considering and relying on the Hon. Attorney-General’s letter.
Having found the two issues (a) and (b) formulated in appellant’s brief in his favour, it is no longer necessary to consider his issue (c). The appeal succeeds and it is allowed. The application for leave to enforce the appellant’s right to fair hearing is remitted to the trial court to be heard ex parte, on the merit, by a Judge of Sokoto State High Court of Justice, other than the Chief Judge. The appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal, which is assessed at N5,000.00.
Other Citations: 2002)LCN/1171(CA)