Golden Dibie & 2 Ors V The State (2007)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

KATSINA-ALU, J.S.C

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Benin Division, delivered on 28 June, 2004 which dismissed the appeals of the three appellants.

The appellants who were students of Oko Polytechnic, Anambra State, were jointly arraigned before the High Court of Delta State, Holden at Agbor upon an information containing two counts to wit:

“Statement of Offence Count I

Conspiracy to rob, contrary to section 4(b) and punishable under section 1(2)(a) respectively of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree, 1984 as amended.

Particulars Of Offence

Golden Dibie (m), Friday Iyamah (m) and Godfrey Ujomu (m) on or about the 21st day of August, 1996 at Agbor in the jurisdiction of the Asaba Robbery and Firearms Tribunal, conspired with one another to commit a felony to wit: Armed robbery.

Statement of Offence Count II

Armed Robbery punishable under section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree, 1984 as amended.

Particulars of Offence

Golden Dibie (m), Friday Iyamah (m) and Godfrey Ujomu (m) on the 21st day of August, 1996 at Agbor in the jurisdiction of the Asaba Robbery and Firearms Tribunal, while armed with a locally made pistol robbed one Mrs. Florence Iyamah of the sum of four thousand Naira cash.”

On 22 October, 1999 the trial court took the pleas of the appellants. The record on that day reads as follows:

“Accused persons present; J. G. Eze-Owens Senior Legal Officer, Ministry of Justice, for the prosecutions: (sic) A. O. Ewere, Esq. for 1st and 2nd accused Persons. K. N. Njokuemeni, Esq. for 3rd Accused.

Court: Each of the 2 counts is read out in English language to the accused persons to the satisfaction of the court and each say as follows:-

Count I: 1st accused; not guilty

2nd accused; not guilty

3rd accused; not guilty

Count II: 1st accused; not guilty

2nd accused; not guilty

3rd accused; not guilty.”

In proof of its case, the prosecution, called five witnesses. Each of the accused persons testified on his own behalf and called no witness. At the close of evidence and addresses of counsel, the learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellants to death by hanging. The appeals of the appellants to the Court of Appeal were dismissed. They have further appealed to this court upon a number of grounds. They filed similar or indeed same grounds of appeal.

Based upon the grounds of appeal filed, the appellants, in their respective briefs of argument formulated the following issues for determination:

1. Whether the entire trial was not a nullity
2. Whether the lower court was right in holding that the contradictions in the case of the prosecution were mere discrepancies (sic)
3. Whether the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt as required by law

The second and third appellants added a fourth issue which is whether they were properly linked with the offence as charged.

The respondent, for its part adopted the issues for determination formulated by the appellants.

I will deal with the issues seriatim.

Issue No.1: The appellants have contended on this issue that the trial did not satisfy the requirements of section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 49, Vol. 11, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976 applicable to Delta State. It was argued that the plea as recorded did not meet the requirement of a valid arraignment under section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law and section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution which states that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence. Learned counsel relied on the cases of Tobby v. The State (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 720) 23; Kajubo v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 721; Rufai v. The State (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.731) 718; Erekanure v. The State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 385; and Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 548. It was finally contended that the mandatory provisions of section 215 CPA and section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution were not complied with since the charge was not explained to the appellants. The trial, as a whole it was said, is defective, null and void. The court was urged to resolve this issue in favour of the appellants.

For the respondent it was submitted that the arraignment of the appellants did not breach the provisions of section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Learned Senior Advocate of Nig. placed reliance on the cases of Effiom v. The State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 373) 507 and Adeniji v. The State (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 375. The court was finally urged to affirm the finding of the court below that the arraignment of the appellants was in compliance with the law and the trial was not a nullity.

Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides as follows:

“The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the court unfettered unless the court shall see cause otherwise to order, and the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the court by the Registrar or other officer of the court and such person shall be called upon to plead instantly thereto, unless where the person entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the court finds that he has not been duly served therewith.”

This court has, in a number of cases, laid down the requirements of a valid arraignment of an accused person. In Tobby v. The State (supra) this court laid down the following requirements of a valid arraignment:

(a) The accused must be placed before the court unfettered unless the court shall see cause otherwise to order; The charge or information must be read over and explained to the accused to the satisfaction of the court by the registrar or other officer of the court;

It must be read and explained to the accused in the language he understands; The accused must be called upon to plead thereto unless there exists any valid reason to do otherwise such as objection to want of service where the accused is entitled by law to service of a copy of the information and the court is satisfied that he has in fact not been duly served therewith.

These requirements are inherent in the provision (section 215 CPA).See also Effiom v. The State (supra); and Adeniji v. The State (supra).

I have earlier on reproduced the record of arraignment on 22 October, 1999. In this connection the court below found as follows: “From the record of appeal as a whole, coupled with the fact that the appellants are literate in English and the statement of the trial Judge which could only mean that she was satisfied the appellants understood the charge, I am of the firm view that the appellants clearly understood the charge before they were called upon, to enter their pleas. In the circumstance, I hold that the requirements of S. 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law has been substantially complied with. My answer to the first issue is that the trial was not a nullity.” In Adeniji v. The State (supra) I had this to say on section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law:

” … Thirdly, the appellant understood English. This is evident in the record. He made his plea and also gave his evidence in English. The omission by the learned trial Judge to state that he was satisfied that the appellant understood the charge is of no moment. Where the accused understands the language of the court – English, it becomes unnecessary to record that fact. It is however, good practice to ask the accused the question whether he understood the charge so read and explained and to record the answer. But the omission to do so would not constitute non-compliance with the constitutional and procedural requirements. I am therefore, in agreement with the respondent that the appellant was properly arraigned.”

The appellants in the instant case clearly understood English. The record shows that they made their pleas in English, made statements to the Police in English and they also testified in English.

In my judgment, the arraignment of the appellants was in compliance with the law. I resolve this issue therefore against the appellants. I now turn to issue No 2. This is whether the lower court was right in holding that the contradictions in the case of the prosecution were mere discrepancies. In this regard the trial Judge said at pages 119 – 120 as follows:

” … Counsel for the defence has pointed out some alleged contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, some of which are:-

1. That the PW 1 testified that 3 people came to the house as opposed to 4 people she mentioned in exhibit ‘A’ her previous statement to the police;
2. That the PW 1 testified that they heard the PW2’s car when they were searching for money in their room as opposed to what she said in exhibit ‘A’, that she wanted to take them into their room when they heard the car.

3 That the PW 1 testified that one of the accused persons pointed a pistol at her as opposed to what she said in exhibit ‘A’ that one of them pointed what looked like a pistol to her;

4. That the PW1 said it was the 2nd accused who knocked on the door as opposed to the evidence of the PW4 who said it was the 1st accused;
5. That the PW2 denied that PW1 told him 4 men came to the house, as opposed to what he said in his statement.
6. That the evidence of the PW5 that he arrested the 2nd accused at Oko Polytechnic contradicts the earlier testimony in exhibit ‘J’.
7. That the PW4 did not tell the court that any of the accused persons has any object at the time they came to their house.”

It is the submission of counsel that these are material contradictions, capable of creating doubt in the mind of the court. Counsel for the prosecution submitted that they are mere discrepancies that do not go to the root of the offence. I tend to agree with the prosecution. The accused persons were in the house of the PW1. Whether there were 4 of them or 3, or whether the PW1 told the PW2 that they are 4 are immaterial to the charge against them. That PW4 did not say that any of them had an object in his hand does not take into consideration the evidence of this witness that he ran away through the back door after he saw one of the accused at Oko in court. And stated in his earlier testimony that the 2nd accused was brought to the station and handed over to him has nothing to do with the fact of robbery itself. That PW1 did not profess to be an expert in firearms, that she said in exhibit ‘A’, her statement to the Police that the object pointed at her looked like a pistol, not detract from the fact that it is a firearm. The type of firearm used is immaterial, as which of the accused persons knocked at the door.

On this issue therefore, the court holds that the alleged material contradictions are mere discrepancies that do not affect the substance of the charge.

The court below confirmed the position of the trial court. At page 309 to page 310 of the record the court below said: “The alleged contradictions mostly concern the testimony of PW1 and her statement to the Police. In her testimony, she said three people came to the house while in her statement to the police she stated that four people came to the house. It is my considered opinion that this is a mere discrepancy. What is important to the proof of the charge is that the appellants went to her house, whether they were three or four, to my mind is immaterial. PW1 also testified that they were searching for money in the room when they heard PW2’s car coming whereas in her statement she stated that she was taking the appellants to the room when they heard the car coming. This discrepancy too has no moment in the proof of charge(sic). The third alleged contradiction is that PW 1 testified that one of the accused persons pointed a pistol at her as opposed to what she said in her statement that one of the accused pointed what looked like a pistol to her. Whether it was a real pistol that was pointed at PW 1 is immaterial. What is material is that either an actual pistol or what looked like a pistol was used to threaten her which induced fear in her. It is the object made use of and the manner it is made use of that qualifies it to be an offensive weapon. In our present case, an object which is either a pistol or what looked like a pistol was used. See: Sele v. State (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 269) 276.

The other alleged contradictions are that PW 1 said it was the 2nd accused who knocked on the door while PW4 said it was the 1st accused who knocked on the door. Also it was stated that PW2 denied that PW1 told him four men came to the house as or posed to what he said in his statement. Another alleged contradiction is that PW5 testified that he arrested the 2nd accused at Oko Polytechnic which contradicts his earlier statement in exhibit ‘J’. One could see that all these alleged contradictions are not substantial to the main issue in question as to raise doubt in the mind of the trial Judge.

Whether there were four persons or three is not material to the charge against them. It is therefore my considered opinion that all the alleged contradictions are mere discrepancies. They are so trivial that they do not go to the root of the offence. My answer to the second issue is therefore in the affirmative. The learned trial Judge was right in holding that the contradictions in the case of the prosecution were mere discrepancies.”

A material contradiction must go to a material point in the prosecution’s case, as to create doubt in the case that the appellant is entitled to benefit from. See the case of Ahmed v. The State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 90) 1358 at 1385; (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 622. The alleged contradictions were ably treated seriatim by the learned trial Judge and subsequently on appeal by the court below as can be seen from the above quoted passages. Both courts held that the alleged contradictions were mere discrepancies that were trivial in nature and did not go to the root of the charge against the appellants. I have not been persuaded that this finding is perverse. I resolve this issue also against the appellants.

I now move to issue No.3 which is whether the case of the prosecution was proved beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.

On the state of the facts before the trial court I am satisfied and hold that the case of the prosecution was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The 1st appellant was caught at the scene of the robbery while the 2nd and 3rd appellants made confessional statements that were admitted in evidence in the course of the trial.

PW1 identified the 1st appellant as one of the armed robbers who came to her house. It was PW2 with the assistance of PW3 who apprehended the 1st appellant at the scene of the crime. The learned trial judge believed these eye-witnesses and came to the conclusion that the 1st appellant was guilty of the offence as charged.

The 2nd and 3rd appellants escaped from the scene of the robbery but were later arrested. Both of them made confessional statements which were tendered and admitted as exhibits ‘G’ and ‘K’ respectively, after they were subjected to trials within trial in order to determine if the appellants made them voluntarily. The lower court affirmed the finding of the trial court that the 2nd and 3rd appellants’ confessional statements were voluntarily and freely made.

There is of course no evidence stronger than a person’s own admission or confession. Such a confession is admissible in evidence. Although an accused person can be convicted solely on his confessional statement, it is desirable to have some evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true. See Emmanuel Nwaegbonyi v. The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 343) 13; Effiong v. The State (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 362.

There is nothing sacrosanct about retraction of a confession. In Akpan v. The State (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 737) 745 this court held that once a confession of guilt is shown to have been made freely and voluntarily, be it judicial or extra-judicial, if it is direct, positive and properly established, it constitutes proof of guilt and is enough to sustain a conviction so long as the court is satisfied as to its truth. The appellants admitted in their respective statements exhibits ‘G’ and ‘K’, that they participated in the robbery and gave details of how they executed their conspiracy to rob PW1. The learned trial Judge warned himself of the need to look for cooperative evidence outside the confessional statements in order to test the truth of their confessions and found that the evidence of PW 1 corroborated the said confessional statements. See R. v. Kanu 14 WACA 30. At pages 120-121 of records, the learned trial Judge stated as follows:

“On the relevance of exhibits ‘F’ and ‘H’ other F implements the accused persons were alleged to have been armed with on the day in question, counsel for the accused persons had urged the court to disregard them as they are not part of the charge. It is trite law that a charge must disclose all relevant particulars. The only object mentioned in the charge is a locally made pistol.

No mention was made of a wheel spanner or knife. The submission of counsel appears to be well founded. The Court therefore disregards the evidence of the PW 1 and 2 (sic) relating to these objects.

“Before I reach my conclusion on the eye witness account of the PW 1 and 4, (sic)I would pause here to comment on exhibits ‘G’ and ‘K’ the confessional statements made by the 2nd and 3rd accused persons, respectively. It is trite law that a court can convict on the confessional statement of an accused person. It is also prudent for a court, before doing so, to test the confessional statement against with other facts outside the confessional itself. Exhibit ‘G’ is the confessional statement of the 2nd accused, while exhibit ‘K’ is that of the 3rd accused. The 2nd accused persons, in these statements said it was the 3rd accused who armed with the gun and that he was the one who pointed at the PW1 and demanded for money. The evidence of the PW1 corroborates this. They also state that the sum of N4,000 was handed over to the 3rd accused. The evidence of the PW1 corroborates these statements. They stated that the 1st accused was at the corridor or outside acting as the lockout. The evidence of the PW1 corroborates these statements. These are the material facts in an offence of armed robbery, and the court is of the view that the evidence of the PW1 corroborates exhibits ‘G’ and ‘K’ in all material particulars. The court is satisfied therefore, that exhibits ‘G’ and ‘K’ are free and voluntary statements made by the 2nd and 3rd accused persons respectively, and that the Court can convict them on these statements, even standing alone.” A voluntary confession by itself without any other evidence is sufficient to supply a conviction. The learned trial Judge however, found corroboration. I resolve this issue also against the appellants. The last issue is whether the 2nd and 3rd appellants were properly linked with the offence as charged. This issue is indeed sub-sued in issue No.3 where I have already, shown that the appellants were convicted on their confessional statements which were voluntary, direct, positive and properly proved before the court. The appellants have not shown that the concurrent findings of the trial court and the court below are perverse. I have no reason therefore to disturb such findings. There was thus ample evidence upon which the learned trial Judge could convict the appellants of armed robbery.

In the result, the appeals of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd appellants fail. According, I dismiss the appeals and affirm their convictions and sentences.

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SC.103/2005