Dumbili Nwadiajuebowe V. Col. C. D. Nwawo (Rtd.) & Ors (2003)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.C.A.
This is an appeal by the 4th defendant/appellant against the ruling of Hon. Justice M. C. U. Odita sitting in the Asaba High Court of Delta State in suit No. A/115/95. Therein, the plaintiffs claimed as follows in the writ of summons:
A. A declaration that Onicha-Olona is a chiefly society and the Obiship stool of Onicha-Olona vested in Ogbe-Obi based on rotational succession (by selection among the Royal Houses (Ebos) of Idumu Ogbele, Ugbe/Ikpase, Idumu lyi and Ozo-Alumona based on a democratic rulership showing structure and kindred that have, under Onicha-Olona customary law, remained intact and of consanguinary affinity.
B. A declaration that a hereditary system of primogeniture is alien to Onicha-Olona custom, culture and tradition.
C. A declaration that the Okpalabuisi system signifies gerontocracy which emerged from the development of the Ichi Nmo that produced Nkpalor class is an indicum of the criterion for the selection and appointment of Nze Ogbe to terminate as Onihe next to the Obi of Onicha-Olona vis-a-vis the Onicha-Olona royal stool.
D. Restraining the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants by perpetual injunction from selecting, appointing, approval of appointment, recognising, installing and grading of the 4th, 5th and 6th defendants and their servants, agents, privies of house ever as Obi of Onicha-Olona.
By a motion of notice dated the 12th of September, 1996, the plaintiffs, as applicants prayed for an order for interlocutory injunction –
(i) restraining the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants/respondents from selecting, appointing, approval of appointment, recognizing, installing and grading of the 4th, 5th and 6th defendants and their servants, agents, privies or howsoever as Obi of Onicha-Olona, pending the determination of the suit.
(ii) restraining in particular, the 4th defendant/respondent, now appellant by interlocutory injunction from holding himself out or parading himself as the Obi of Onicha-Olona or acting or behaving as the Traditional ruler of Onicha-Olona or the people of Onicha-Olona, or permitting himself to be called or addressed or greeted Doh-Baa (as contained in DSLN No.6 of 1996 but which greeting is alien to Onicha-Olona customary law) or exercising the functions, powers, duties, rights and responsibilities of an Obi of Onicha-Olona, pending the determination of the suit.
After arguments by counsel for the parties, the lower court granted the injunctive orders sought on 30/1/97. The learned trial Judge held as follows-
Accordingly, I hereby grant the application and order of interlocutory injunction as follows:
(i) restraining the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants/respondents, from selecting, appointing, approval of appointment, recognizing, installing and grading of the 4th, 5th and 6th defendants/respondents and their servants, agents, privies or howsoever as Obi of Onicha-Olona, pending the determination of the suit.
(ii) restraining in particular the 4th defendant/respondent from holding himself out or parading himself as the Obi of Onicha-Olona or acting or behaving as the Traditional ruler of Onicha-Olona or permitting himself to be called or addressed or greeted Doh-Baa (contained in DSLN No.6 of 1996 but which greeting is alien to Onicha-Olona customary law) or exercising the functions, powers, duties, rights and responsibilities of as Obi of Onicha-Olona pending the determination of this suit
It is against this ruling that the appellant has appealed to this court on four grounds of appeal. The grounds without their particulars are as follows:
1) The learned trial Judge erred in law when he restrained the 1st, 2nd & 3rd defendants/respondents from selecting, appointing, approval of appointment, recognising, installing and grading of the appellant as Obi of Onicha-Olona pending the determination of the suit, when the acts complained of by the plaintiffs/applicants have been completed or carried out.
2) The learned trial Judge erred in law in granting the application for interlocutory injunction when there were no materials by way of affidavit evidence as to what irreparable loss or damage, the plaintiffs’ would suffer if the said injunction was not granted.
3) The learned trial Judge erred in law in granting the injunction when the balance of convenience is on the side of the 4th defendant/appellant.
4) The learned trial Judge erred in law when he granted the application for injunction, when the plaintiffs/applicants’ had no locus standi to institute same.
Apart from the 5th respondent who did not file any brief, the other parties filed and adopted their respective briefs of argument, In the brief of the plaintiffs/respondents prepared by Dr. C. Y. O. Adei, learned counsel contended that the brief filed by the 4th defendant/appellant is a jumble and is not in consonance or compliance with Order 6 rules 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1984. He referred the court to the book “Manual of brief writing in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Nigeria” by Hon. Justice Philip Nnaemeka-Agu, and the cases of Dibiamaka v. Osakwe (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 101 at 103 and Nwokoro v. Onuma (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 136) 22 at 25, Now, in Nwokoro v. Onuma (supra), the Supreme Court per Karibi- Whyte, J.S.C. defined a brief as a condensed statement of the propositions of law or fact or both, which a party or his counsel wishes to establish at the appeal; together with the reasons and authorities which can sustain them.
And in Dibiamaka v. Osakwe (supra), the Supreme Court per Oputa, J.S.C. said –
No counsel can file a good brief who does not even understand his case or who cannot properly appreciate the reasons for the decision. A good brief is thus, a reflection of counsel’s acquaintance and appreciation of the case for or against his side. In Engineering Enterprise of Niger Contractor Co. of Nigeria v. The A-G., Kaduna State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.57) 381, this court went out of its way to instruct counsel on the format and substance of a good brief and my noble learned brother, Eso, JSC pointed out at p. 396 –
“The rules require that the brief so filed by a party-
(a) shall be a succinct statement of his argument in the appeal;
(b) shall contain issues arising in the appeal.”
The word succinct means brief, precise, exact. See Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. I have scrutinized the appellant’s brief and I find the brief satisfactory for the purposes of this appeal. It is a succinct statement of his argument and contains the issues arising in the appeal. The contention of counsel on this issue lacks merit and is discountenanced in its entirety.
The appellant formulated four issues for determination, and two issues each were formulated for the 1st – 3rd respondents, and the plaintiffs/respondents.
The appellant’s issues for determination are as follows-
(i) Was the learned trial Judge right in restraining the appellant as Obi of Onicha-Olona when the acts of appointment, selection, grading, recognition and installation complained of by the plaintiffs/applicants have been completed or carried out?
(ii) Whether the plaintiffs/applicant by their affidavit evidence establish any legal right in this matter which ought to be protected by the grant of an interlocutory injunction.
(iii) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding at page 198 of the records that from the state of available affidavit evidence, the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiffs.
(iv) Whether the plaintiffs/applicants had by way of affidavit evidence establish what irreparable loss or damage they would suffer if the injunction was not granted.
The issues formulated for the 1st – 3rd respondents are as follows –
(1) Was the learned trial Judge right in granting the interlocutory injunction, on the affidavit evidence before the court especially as it related to completed acts?
(2) Was the balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs/applicants?
And the plaintiffs/respondents’ issues for determination are as follows-
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right or wrong in granting an interlocutory injunction against the defendants in this action.
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was, in the circumstances of this case, justified in granting an interlocutory injunction against the defendants pending the determination of the action on the merits. The 1st defendant during the pendency of this action went ahead to promulgate the Delta State Legal Notice No.6 of 1996. In other words, whether the 1st defendant can be allowed to take the law into their own hands, thereby preferring the rule of force to the rule of law?.
In my view, the issues formulated for the appellant are more in line with the grounds of appeal filed and I will adopt them in dealing with this appeal.
The background facts to this case is that the plaintiffs filed their writ of summons on the 7th of December, 1995 and on the 12th of September, 1996 filed the application, which is the subject-matter of the appeal before this court.
The appellant filed a counter-affidavit sworn to by the appellant himself, wherein he averred as follows in paragraph 11 –
“That on 6th January, 1995, I was selected, appointed, approved, recognized, graded and installed as the Obi of Onicha-Olona. The letter ref. No. ANLG/03/Vol.III/20 of 6/1/95 is exhibited hereto and marked as exhibit A2.”
The said exhibit A2 is a letter dated 6th of January, 1995, titled Rulership in Onicha-Olona, it is addressed to the appellant by the Chairman, Aniocha North Local Government Area Issele-Uku, the 3rd defendant/respondent, and it reads as follows –
“I wish to invite your attention to the Government White-paper on the administration of Onicha-Olona and to inform you that the main issue rests on who governs the town at a particular time. The white-paper recognised the position of HRH T. U. Okwuzi as the Obi of Onicha-Olona. It emphasized that he should rule the town until he joins his ancestors. It also stated that a heir apparent be appointed by the people. This, the Traditional Council of the Local Government Area has ratified and you are the heir apparent to the throne of Onicha-Olona. I am to warn that even though this is a well-known situation, you should not by your action, words or insinuation rival the present (incubent (sic}) Obi of Olona i.e. HRH Okwuzi. You must be silent, orderly and law-abiding in the interest of peace and stability of the town. Law and order must be maintained at Onicha-Olona, while the Police must continue to maintain surveillance over Olona night and day. It is my fervent hope that you will help the Local Government to maintain peace and order in the town as well as in the Local Government Area.”
Albert N. Maidoh, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is clear from the tenor of exhibit A2 (supra) that the appellant had been selected, appointed, recognized, graded and approved as the heir apparent to the throne of Onicha-Olona. He argued that the acts complained of by the (applicants) had been completed or carried out before the writ of summons was filed on 7/12/95 and the motion for interlocutory injunction on 12/9/96, and that it is trite law that when a court is asked to restrain a party from doing an act pending the decision of a matter before it, but the act has been done, no order to restrain will be made since what is sought to be prevented has in fact happened. He cited John Holt (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v. Holts African Workers Union of Nigeria & Cameroon (1963) 1 ANLR 379 & 390, (1963) 2. SCNLR 383; & Ayorinde v. A.-G.; Oyo State (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 434) 20, (1996) 35 LRCN 266 at 279, and submitted that the learned trial Judge correctly stated this principle of law when he said at page 198 of the record:
“There is no doubt at all that if an act complained of have been completed, there is no need at all to issue an order of interlocutory injunction. See John Holts (supra).”
He however submitted that the trial Judge failed to apply the law to the facts and circumstances of the case, in that, he never adverted his mind to exhibit A2 and neither rejected nor pronounced on the admissibility of the said exhibit. It is also his contention that the learned trial Judge was not right when he restrained the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants/respondents from selecting, appointing, approval of appointment, recognizing and grading the appellant as Obi of Onicha-Olona, pending the determination of the suit.
Exhibit A2, he argued alluded to the Government White Paper on the administration of Onicha-Olona, which report is exhibit A1 annexed to the counter-affidavit of the appellant.
He said the report enjoined the Aniocha North Traditional Council to make a declaration in writing in accordance with S. 3(1) of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict, 1979 of former Bendel State, now applicable to Delta State, stating the customary law which regulates the selection of a person to the chieftaincy stool of Onicha-Olona. This, he argued, the traditional council had done and ratified the appellant as the heir apparent to the throne of Onicha-Olona, which fact was recognized in exhibit A2. He further submitted that these acts were performed before the plaintiffs/applicants filed the writ of summons and the application for injunction at the lower court. Mr. G. E. Okirhienyefa, Director, Civil Litigation, for the 1st – 3rd respondents, submitted that the trial Judge was wrong to have granted the injunction in the face of the overwhelming counter-affidavit evidence of the 1st – 3rd defendants/respondents and the 4th defendant.
He argued that from exhibit A2 it is clear that the appointment, selection of the 4th defendant restrained by the order of the court had been completed as at 6th January, 1995 even before the institution of this action on the 7th December, 1995 when the writ of summons was filed and on 12/9/96 when the application was filed. It is his contention that if the court had properly evaluated the affidavit evidence before him. he would not have arrived at the conclusion he came to, citing Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR 372; Obikoya & Sons v. Gov. of Lagos State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 50)385 at 398. & Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91.
He further submitted that the facts of this case are not the same with circumstances where a party knowing fully well of the pending action proceeds without regard to the pending suit to carry out the acts sought to be restrained, as was the situation in A.-G., Anambra State v. Okafor (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 224) 396 at 427. He also argued that the acts restrained were concluded acts. Citing John Holts Case (supra) & Uwegba v. A.-G., Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 16) 303 at 309.
He, therefore, urged the court to allow the appeal.
Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents, Dr. C. Y. O. Adei, on the other hand, argued that the learned trial Judge was right to grant the interlocutory injunction against the defendants/respondents having considered the nature of the application, the submissions of counsel for the parties and the relevant authorities cited by them and in particular, the peculiar circumstances of the said application vis-a-vis the resort to self-help embarked upon by the 1st defendant/respondent during the pendency of the suit.
The step taken by the 1st defendant/respondent, he submitted, is tantamount to executive lawlessness. Citing the following authorities –
1. The Registered Trustees of the Apostolic Church v. Mrs. Emmanuel Olowoleni (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 158) 514 at 537.
2. The Military Governor of Lagos State v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621.
Dr. Adei further submitted that the step taken by the 1st respondent in promulgating the said D.S.L.N. No.6 of 1996 is an abuse of court process as well as a flagrant disrespect to the Court. Citing Regd. Trustees of the Apostolic Church v. Olowoleni (supra), at page 533. & Sodipo v. Lemminkainen OY (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 258) 229 at 233. He was also of the view that this appeal is a storm in a tea-cup since it is an unwarranted luxury which does not in any way finally determine the questions in controversy in the case, citing Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 39 at 63. It is also his contention that all the issues raised and argued by the appellant had been carefully considered by the learned trial Judge and urged the court not to disturb the decision of the learned trial Judge, as all the authorities cited by learned counsel for the appellant have been galvanized and considered in the ruling.
Now, an interlocutory injunction is a preservatory measure taken at an early stage in the proceedings, before the court has had an opportunity to hear and weigh fully the evidence on both sides and it is intended to preserve matters. It is an injunction, which is directed to ensure that particular acts do not take place pending the final determination by the courts of the rights of the parties. See Alcatel Kabelmetal (Nig.) Plc. v. Ojugbele (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 429; Omaliko v. Awachie (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 780) 1 and Madubuike v. Madubuike (2001) 9 NWLR (pt.719) 698.
In other words, interlocutory injunctions are those issued at any time during the pendency of a litigation for the short term purpose of preventing injury to the application prior to the time that the court will be in a position to either grant or deny permanent relief on the merit. It is for this reason that the law is trite that an injunctive order cannot be a remedy for an act, which had already been completed or carried out. See John Holt (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v. Holts African Workers Union of Nigeria & Cameroon (supra), Anaekwe v. Mashasha (2001) 12NWLR (pt. 726) 70; Ilechukwu v. Iwugo (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.101) 90; Ayangade v. O.A.U.T.H.C.M.B. (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.711) 187; Kadiya v. Kadiya (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 578.
In the instant case, in granting the interlocutory injunction sought, the learned trial Judge held as follows at page 197-198 of the records-
“There is no doubt at all that if an act complained of have been completed, there is no need at all to issue an order of interlocutory injunction- see John Holts (supra). But if the defendants or even the plaintiffs in an action pending before the court, knowing fully well of the pending action, proceeded without regard to the pending suit went ahead to carry out the acts sought to be preserved, the court will certainly proceed to ordering the dismantle of the action even though it was completed. See Bedding Holdings Ltd. (supra)” . (Italics mine)
In Bedding Holdings Ltd. v. N. E. C. (1992) 8 NWLR (pt. 260) 428, relied on by the learned trial Judge, this court held that once parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, they must not resort to self-help. In that case, Bedding Holdings Ltd. v. N.E.C. (supra), there was evidence that at the time the respondents decided to enter a contractual relationship with a third party in respect of the res, there were a number of court processes of generally an ‘injunctive’ nature. Following the 15th November, 1991 order of the trial Judge, the appellant/applicant filed a notice of appeal on the 18th November, 1991. The notice of appeal was followed by an application for stay of proceedings also on the 18th November, 1991. The appellant/applicant further filed two applications in the Court of Appeal all on the 2nd December, 1991.
Despite the fact that the respondents had knowledge of the pendency of the two applications before the Court of Appeal, they re-awarded the contract in issue. In setting aside the re-award of the contract and nullifying same, the Court of Appeal per Tobi, J.S.C. (as he then was), stated as follows –
“Once parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, they cannot unilaterally ‘decide’ the case in their favour and ‘execute’ it in their favour. The only remedy open to an aggrieved person is to file an appeal. The whole rationale or basis for the above position of the law is that, if parties are allowed to resort to self-help, the machinery of justice will not only grind to a halt but will be most ineffective in the enforcement of court processes. And what is more, there will be anarchy, despotism and totalitarianism in society. The social equilibrium will be in disarray. There will be destability of society. Everybody in the litigation process will be his own master, rendering the courts in a helpless and hopeless situation. That is not the best situation for the courts to find themselves. Such a situation will not only be bad for the courts, but will also be bad for the litigants and society itself. Therefore, the courts must quickly intervene in relevant situation to ensure that society does not decay to such a level or slump.” (Italics mine).
The learned trial Judge in this case relied on the above decision in Bedding Holdings Ltd. v. N.E.C. (supra), to grant the interlocutory injunction prayed for, even though, in his words – ‘the acts sought to be preserved was completed’. I have looked at the records.
The plaintiffs/applicants filed their writ of summons on the 7th of December, 1995, exhibit A2, wherein the 3rd defendant/respondent informed the defendant/appellant that the traditional council of the Aniocha North Local Government Area had ratified him as the heir apparent to the throne of Onicha-Olona, is dated 6th January, 1995, 11 months before the plaintiffs/applicant filed their writ of summons.
The plaintiffs/applicant filed the application for interlocutory injunction on the 12th of September, 1996. In the joint counter affidavit of 1st, 2nd, & 3rd defendants, the deponent averred as follows in paragraph 3 (e) & (f) –
(e) That the 4th defendant/applicant has been selected and approved as the heir apparent to the Throne of Onicha-Olona.
(f) That the Delta State Government on the 16/8/96 published the declaration of the Customary Law regulating succession to the Traditional ruler title of Onicha-Olona in Aniocha North Local Government Area as D.S.L.N. of 1996.
In other words, the Delta State Legal Notice No.6 of 1996 was published before the application for interlocutory injunction was filed. The trial Judge based his decision to grant the injunctive orders because, as he put it –
“The learned counsel for the plaintiffs/applicants and that of the 5th defendant/respondents were aware of this pending suit and proceeded to publish the legal notice. Consequently, the court ought to proceed in making the order sought, relying on the cases of Onyesoh (supra) and The Registered Trustees of the Apostolic Church” (supra).
In Onyesoh v. Nnebedun (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 315, relied on by the learned trial Judge, the respondents as plaintiffs had sued the appellant claiming inter alia for an order of injunction to restrain the defendant from presenting himself for installation and/or coronation as the Eze or Igwe of Nri. Simultaneous with filing of the writ of summons, the respondents also filed an ex-parte motion, which was granted, for interim injunction to restrain the appellant from being crowned the Eze Nri. Thereafter, an application to discharge the order of injunction and for accelerated hearing of the substantive suit was then filed. The trial Judge refused to discharge the order but granted the prayer for accelerated hearing. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the grant of the interlocutory injunction. The appeal was dismissed. Being further dissatisfied, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held as follows per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C.-
“I am satisfied that the Court of Appeal was right to hold that on the evidence before the learned Judge, the plaintiff’s case cannot be said to be frivolous. In so holding, the Court of Appeal observed as follows-
‘It was the contention of the defendant that he had fully performed all the customary rites precedent to his public enthronement as Eze Nri. I do not see what he stands to lose if he waits for the substantive case to be decided before he meets the subjects which is an act of mere public gesture according to the defendant himself. If on the other hand, the defendant is not restrained, and the plaintiffs succeed in their claim, the judgment of the court would be nugatory and worthless. The consideration of balance of convenience enjoins the lower court to restrain the defendant/appellant’.
I entirely agree. Although a successful action nullifying the installation and crowning of the defendant will have the same effect, it is better still to keep the parties in status quo pending the determination of the substantive suit, by the grant of the interlocutory injunction.”
The learned trial Judge also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Regd. Trustees Apostolic Church v. Olowoleni (supra), wherein the appellants had instituted the suit and during the pendency thereof, erected a fence around the land in dispute. The trial Judge held that the act constituted not only an abuse of court process but a flagrant disrespect to the court. He therefore dismissed the appellant’s suit and ordered that the fence be pulled down.
The appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. The Supreme Court in dismissing the further appeal to it held as follows –
“During the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court, the appellant took the unauthorized step of erecting a fence round the land in dispute. When this was brought to the notice of the court, the court in dismissing the claim ordered the removal of the fence. This order was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The dispute in this matter having been handed over to the court for determination, the appellants cannot be allowed to take the law into their own hands.
The rule of law and the rule of force are mutually exclusive Law rules by reason and morality. Force rules by violence and immorality. See The Military Governor of Lagos State & Anor. v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu & Anor. (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621. The Church should not have departed from the law laid down for Christians by the Prince of Peace, our Lord Jesus Christ ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself.”
In this appeal under consideration, I am of the firm view that the reasoning and conclusion of the learned trial Judge can not be faulted in any way. There is no dispute as to the fact that the Delta State Government published the said Delta State Legal Notice No.6 of 1996. And this was done on the 16th of August, 1996 during the pendency of the suit, which had been filed by the plaintiffs/respondents on the 7th of December, 1995, wherein the plaintiffs/respondents claim that the rulership of Onicha-Olona was based on rotational succession by selection within the Ogbe-Obi. (See paragraph 2 of the statement of claim).
There is also no dispute that the 4th defendant/appellant’s position on the issue is that the rotation- a system of succession- is alien to the traditional system of Ezechima clan, which is based on primogeniture. (See paragraph 37 of the statement of defence). For the Delta State Government to go ahead and promulgate a legal notice, which favours one of the contending parties, is clearly to undermine the proceedings before the court, and amounts to treating the court with levity and contempt.
A similar action was deprecated by the Supreme Court in The Military Governor of Lagos State v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (supra), wherein Obaseki, J.S.C. stated as follows:
“In the area where the rule of law operates, the rule of self-help by force is abandoned. Nigeria being one of the countries in the world which proclaim loudly to follow the rule of law, there is no room for the rule of self-help by force to operate. Once a dispute has arisen between a person and the government or authority and the dispute has been brought before court, thereby invoking the judicial powers of the State, it is the duty of the government to allow the law to take its course or allow the legal and judicial process to run its full course. The action the Lagos State Government took can have no other interpretation than the show of the intention to pre-empt the decision of the court. The courts expect the utmost respect of the law from the government itself which rules by the law.”
As the Supreme Court observed in Ojukwu’s case, the judiciary can not shirk its sacred responsibility to the nation to maintain the rule of law, and the law should be even handed between the government and citizens. What was the hurry? I do not see what the Delta State Government had to lose if it had waited for the substantive case to be decided before it published the Legal Notice. The law is trite that once the Court is seised of a matter, no party has a right to take the matter into his own hands. See The Military Governor of Lagos State v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (supra), Regd. Trustees Apostolic Church v. Olowoleni (supra), & Bedding Holdings Ltd. v. N.E.C. (supra). It must be repeated, no one (including Government) is entitled to take the law into his own hands. The learned trial Judge was therefore right to have made the injunctive orders granted.
Having arrived at that conclusion, it will be an exercise in futility to consider the other issues canvassed by the appellant in this appeal.
Quite apart from the fact that it will amount to an academic exercise, which I am not allowed to undertake, I am also of the view that doing so will touch on the live issues in the case that must be left for the substantive trial of the suit. A Judge must be careful not to decide the substantive issue between the parties or make findings on an issue to be contested in the substantive suit. See Ogunsola v. Usman (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.788) 636; North-South Petroleum (Nig.) Ltd. v. FGN (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt. 797) 639; Onyesoh v. Nnebedun (supra), & Kadiya v. Kadiya (supra).
In the final analysis, I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge reached the correct conclusion in this case. The appeal lacks merit and is therefore dismissed. I affirm the ruling of Hon. Justice M.C.U. Odita sitting in Asaba High Court in suit No. A/115/95. The appellant shall pay N2,000.00 costs to each set of respondents.
Other Citations: (2003)LCN/1469(CA)