Ceekay Traders Ltd. V. General Motors Co. Ltd & Ors. (1992)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

KAWU, J.S.C 

This is a further appeal to the Supreme Court by the appellant from the decision of the Court of Appeal which had dismissed its appeal against the decision of the Federal High Court, Lagos Division.

In the trial court, the appellant, as plaintiff, had instituted an action against the respondent claiming as follows:-

“1. A declaration that the plaintiff are as against the defendants entitled to the possession of the motor vehicles (particulars of which are set out in the scheduled hereto) being part of the motor vehicles purportedly seized by the 3rd defendant under a Notice or Seizure dated 18th March, 1983.

2. A declaration that the said vehicles are the exclusive property of and belong to the plaintiffs.
3. An injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and/or agents from interfering with the plaintiffs’ possession and right to possession of the said vehicles or otherwise selling or purporting to sell or in any other way dealing with the said vehicles.

SCHEDULE

1. Nissan Patrol 80 units
2. Renault 8 units.”

Pleadings were ordered, filed and exchanged.

The circumstances leading to the dismissal of the appellant’s case by the trial judge are as stated in the Ruling of the trial court on the 3rd day of June, 1986 at pg.101 of the Record. He stated as follows:-

“This case was filed on the 11/4/84 and on four occasions the ease had been fixed for hearing but could not proceed. On the first occasion when the case came up for hearing, learned counsel for the plaintiff stated that he had filed an application to amend the Statement of Claim. He urged the court to allow him move his application and he asked for adjournment to enable him file the amended Statement of Claim. The application was granted. Later on the 1/7/85 the case came up and counsel informed the court that they had agreed for the 15th and 16th October, 1985 for the hearing of the case. On the 15th October, 1985 when the case came up for hearing plaintiff or its representative was not in court and learned counsel for the plaintiff asked for an adjournment on the ground that the principal witness who is the Managing Director of the plaintiff company had been deported and he wanted an adjournment in order to get one of the Directors to give evidence and that if he found it impossible he would apply that their evidence be taken on commission.

Learned counsel for the defendant opposed the adjournment and he urged the court to dismiss the action. The action was adjourned with costs against the plaintiff. On the 21st January 1986 when the case came up for hearing, the plaintiff or its representative was not in court, learned counsel for the plaintiff asked for an adjournment on the ground that the principal witness was not yet in the country.

Learned counsel for the 1st defendant opposed the application for an adjournment and urged the court to dismiss the action.

The application for an adjournment was granted with costs against the plaintiff and the case was fixed for today. When the case was called the plaintiff or its representative was not in court and the learned counsel for the plaintiff asked for an adjournment on the same similar reason that the principal witness is not around.

From the facts as related it is obvious that the plaintiff is not ready to prosecute this case and it will serve no useful purpose adjourning the case.”

Thereupon the learned trial judge dismissed the appellant’s case.

Being dissatisfied with the ruling of the trial court, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on a number of grounds and that court, having given careful consideration to all the various points made by all the parties, unanimously dismissed the appeal on 26th May, 1988. In the lead judgment of the Court delivered by Awogu, J.C.A., with which Akpata, J.C.A. (as he then was), and Kalgo, J.C.A., concurred, that Court held that the learned trial judge was right in refusing the appellant’s application for adjournment and that “the claim was properly dismissed for want of prosecution.”