Bulama Dungus V. Kellu Mbudiye & Anor (2004)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
IKECHI FRANCIS OGBUAGU, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the decision of the Borno State High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the leave granted by this court on 2nd October, 2000.
From the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the parties and their privies, had litigated over land/village in the Area and Upper Area Courts before the High Court appeal.
The case started in Gulumba Area Court and the parties were Dungus Khurso v. Bulama Hassan (both of Mashamish). The judgment was in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff – Dungu’s appeal to the Upper Area Court was successful. The said court, ordered a retrial of the case before Bama Area Court II which after the retrial, also gave judgment in favour of the defendant- Hassan.
On 7th January, 1997, the appellant sued the 1st respondent at the Bama Area Court 1, but lost the case. He appealed to the Upper Area Court on 15th May, 1997 and his appeal, was successful. At the Upper Area Court, Abani Mbudiye was joined as a co-appellant. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the respondents appealed to the High Court which allowed the appeal and set aside the decisions of the Bama Area Court 1 in suit No. CVC/M2/97 and that of the Upper Area Court in suit No. CVA/9/97 declaring the said decisions, as nullities. The High Court upheld the decision of the Bama Area Court II which it stated, was the only valid and subsisting judgment.
It is against the judgment of the High Court (hereinafter called ‘the lower court’) that the appellant has appealed to this court on four (4) grounds of appeal.
It need be noted that in the lower court, the respondents raised and canvassed the plea or issue of estoppel per res judicata in respect of the suits between the parties.
The grounds of appeal read as follows:-
“(1) The Borno State High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction erred in law when it entertained and declared suit numbered CVC/M2/97 which is a decision of an Area Court and declared same a nullity while it has no jurisdiction to do so.
Particulars of Error
(a) The decision in suit No.CVC/M2/97 is a decision of an Area Court.
(b) By the combined effect of sections 53 and 54 of the Area Courts Law Cap 9 Laws of Borno State, it is only an Area Court that has the power or jurisdiction to entertain appeals arising from decisions of all grades of Area Courts.
(2) The Borno State High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction erred in law when it upheld the doctrine of estoppel per res judicata and went ahead to declare suit Nos.CVC/M2/97 and CVA/9/97 as nullities while the parties/privies and subject matter are not the same.
Particulars of Error
(a) There is nothing on the records of suit Nos. CVC/M2/97 and CVA/9/97 to show that the parties are related in any way.
(b) The parties in suit No.CVC/M2/97 are Bulama Dungus v. Kellu Mbudiye quite distinct from the parties in suit No.CVA/9/97.
(3) The Borno State High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction erred in law when it held as follows, ‘…we uphold that the decisions before Bama Area Court 1 suit No. CVC/M2/97 between Bulama Dungus v. Kellu Mbudiye, which went on appeal before Bama Upper Area Court suit No. CVA/9/97 between Bulama Dungus Mashamishri v. Abani Mbudiye and Kellu Mbudiye were nullities. These two decisions are accordingly set aside as being nullities…’ without stating any reason thereby it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
Particulars of Error
a) Suits Nos. CVC/M2/9/97 and CVA/9/97 which were declared nullities are not suits before the Borno State High Court for determination, rather, suits No. 2/97,133/91 and suit 5/92 are the suits before it for determination.
(b) Courts of law must always state reason for its decisions.
(4) The Borno State High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction erred in law when it went on a voyage of discovery by entertaining issues not before it and at the end went ahead to grant prayers and reliefs not sought by the parties.
Particulars of Errors
(a) The suits sought to be declared nullities are suits No. 2/97,133/91 and suit No. 5/92 while the Borno State High Court went ahead to declare suits CVC/M/97 (sic) and CVA/9/97 which were never challenged.
(b) The only ground of appeal before the Borno State High Court complained of suits No. 2/97,133/91 and 5/92.
(c) The suits the subject of appeal to wit: 2/97, 133/91 and 5/92 (sic) are not in any way related to the parties.”
The appellant has formulated three (3) issues for determination, namely:
1. Whether the lower court was right when it held and declared as nullities cases No. CVC/M2/97 and CVA/9/97 as having been caught up by the doctrine of estoppel per res judicata?.
2. Whether it is permissible for court of law to embark on a voyaged (sic) of discovery by pronouncing and or adjudicating on matters not covered by grounds of appeal canvassed before it and also not part of the issues raised in the appeal before it?.
3. Whether a High Court of a State has jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal from the decision of an Area Court?.
It is stated in the appellant’s brief of argument, that issue one (1) subsumes grounds 2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal, while issue two (2) relates to ground 4 and that issue three (3) relates to ground 1 of the grounds of appeal.
The respondent on his part, has formulated two (2) issues for ‘consideration’ (i.e., determination) namely:
1. Whether from the circumstances of the case the records of the various Area Courts and Upper Area Courts vis-a-vis the only ground of appeal before the lower court the issue of jurisdiction and estoppel per res judicata was properly consider (sic) and upheld?.
2. Whether the decision of the lower High Court Appeal could be said to be a voyage of discovery?.
It is stated that issue 1 relates to grounds 1, 2 and 3 while issue 2 relates to ground 4 of the appellant’s grounds of appeal. When this appeal came up for hearing on 20th January, 2004, Tatama, Usman, Esq., learned counsel for the appellant, told the court that the appellant filed his brief on 21st January, 2002. He adopted the same in its entirety and urged the court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order a retrial.
Odoma, AAA Esq. – learned counsel for the respondent, told the court that the respondent’s brief of argument, was filed on 28th March, 2003. He adopted the same and urged the court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower court. Judgment was thereafter, reserved till today.
In dealing with this appeal, it is my respectful view, that since the issue of the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine an appeal from the decision of an Area Court, has been raised by the appellant in his Issue 3, it will be prudent for me, to consider this issue first before going into any other issue or merits of the appeal.
This is because, as has been settled in a string of decided authorities, that Jurisdiction, is the threshold to any action in court and therefore, must be looked into and decided first. This is because, any proceeding of a court in the absence of jurisdiction, is futile and the whole proceedings rendered nugatory however well the said proceedings have been conducted. Let me just refer at least, to the recent cases of Ayman Enterprises Ltd. v.Akuma Industries Ltd. & 3 Ors. (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) 22, (2003) 6 SCNJ 307 at 315, per Kalgo, J.S.C. citing several other previous cases and Amoo & 4 Ors. v. Alhaji Alabi & 4 Ors. (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 835) 537, (2003) 7 SCNJ 213 at 221 – 222 also citing other previous decisions in respect thereof.
Jurisdiction is a substantive matter, and must be addressed promptly. See Captain Chacharos & Anor. v. Ekimpex Ltd. & 2 Ors. (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 88; (1988) 1 SCNJ 93, and Chief Obaba & 2 Ors. v. Military Governor of Kwara State & 2 Ors. (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 336) 26 at 40 C.A. just to mention but a few.
Issue No.3 of the appellant
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that suit No.CVC/M2/97 is a decision of the Bama Area court. He posed the question – ‘is the Borno State High Court competent to hear and determine the appeal or cases from an Area Court?’
In answer to his question, he reproduced sections 53 and 54 of the Area Courts law applicable in Borno State thus:
“53. Any party aggrieved by decision or order of any Area Court Grade 1, II may appeal therefrom to (sic) (it is therefore to the)
(a) Sharia Court of Appeal in cases regarding Islamic Law.
(b) The Upper Area Court in all other cases.
54. Any party aggrieved by decision or order of Upper Area Court may appeal (sic) to –
(a) The Sharia Court of Appeal in cases involving questions regarding Islamic personal law, and
(b) The High Court in all other cases.”
Learned counsel then submitted that from the two said sections, the Borno State High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, lacks the powers to hear appeals from an Area Court and therefore, cannot set aside the decision of an Area Court as it did to case number CVC/M2/97 which is a decision of an Area Court. That an appeal from the decision in CVC/M2/97 can only properly lie to the Upper Court for adjudication. He agrees that the High Court has supervisory powers but that it does not extend to ousting the provisions of a law as in this case – the Area Courts Law.
He finally submitted that the lower court has in serious error (sic) (meaning was) to have gone ahead to set aside the decision of an Area Court was (sic) (meaning as) it did in the circumstances. He urged the court to so hold and allow the appeal on this issue.
Comment: The reproduction of section 53 of the said Law, Cap. 9 is not quite correct. It provides for an appeal to the Upper Area Court, having jurisdiction in that area. It does not include Sharia Court of Appeal.
It seems to me that although this issue is stated by the appellant to relate to ground 1 of the grounds of appeal, the respondent has treated his issue 1 as according to him, it relates to grounds 1, 2 and 3. I assume that is why in his issue 1, it is stated that issue of jurisdiction and estoppel per res judicata was properly considered and upheld.
Although the learned counsel devoted much of the time on issue of estoppel per res judicata, with respect, he did not effectively address the issue in question. Rather, he was submitting about the lower court having competence and exercising its jurisdiction properly ‘to set aside the decision of the Barna Area Court No.1 in complaint No. CVC/M2/97 as well as the appeal case No.CVA/9/97’. He gave his reasons for this submission.
I want to say that this issue, poses no difficulty to me. With the greatest respect to the learned counsel, he has, in my humble and firm view, dissipated unnecessary energy in respect of this issue. The argument in respect thereof is a complete misconception of the provisions of the said sections relied on by him.
This is because, a reading of the records of proceedings particularly at page 29 thereof, leaves me or no one in doubt, that the lower court traced the ‘history’ or ‘genesis’ of the case that led to the appeal before it. Said it inter alia, as follows:
“…On 7/1/97 Bulama Dungus v. Kellu Mbudiye was filed before Bama Area Court 1 and again the plaintiff lost the case. He appealed to U.A.C. Bama (meaning Upper Area Court Bama) on 15/5/97 which reversed the decision of the Area Court and gave the village to Dungus. Dissatisfied with the decision of the U.A.C., the appellant appealed to this Court. He filed 2 grounds of appeal but abandoned ground of appeal No.2 which was struck out.” (Italics mine).
A reading of page 1 of the records, shows thus, inter alia:
“Notice of Appeal. This is to give notice of appeal against the decision of the Upper Area Court Bama (sitting on appeal) presided over by …” (Italics mine).
The notice of appeal, was addressed to the Registrar of the lower court.
It is noted by me, that the appellant’s learned counsel, had submitted that the appeal before the lower court was the decision of the Bama Upper Area Court case numbered CVA/9/97 delivered on 3rd day of July, 1997. See pages 1 – 2 of the records of appeal.
The lone/one ground of appeal, is clear and unambiguous. The provisions of Sections 53 and 54 of the said Area Courts’ Law, are also clear and unambiguous. That is to say, an appeal from the decision or order of any Area Court Grades 1 and II, lies (b) to the Upper Area Court in all other cases. An appeal from the Upper Area Courts, lies (b) to the High Court also in all other cases.
In the said Notice of Appeal, ground 1of the Grounds of Appeal read inter alia thus:
“The Upper Area Court Judge Bama erred in law…”
In view of the clear provisions, I have no hesitation in holding that the lower court was properly seised with the appeal before it and therefore, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the same. This issue, with respect lacks merit and the same is resolved against the appellant. This issue distilled from ground 1 of the grounds of appeal, fails and it is accordingly dismissed together with the said ground 1.
Issue No.1 of the appellant and the respondent.
I had earlier in this judgment stated briefly, the facts of this case as also dealt with by the lower court. The learned counsel for the appellant, has reproduced the holding of the lower court in their brief to the effect that the said suits were caught by the doctrine of res judicata.
It is conceded in the appellant’s brief at page 4, that the cases that make up the records of appeal reveal as follows:
“(a) Pages 3 – 8 is the record of trial of Bama Area Court 1 and the case was between Bulama Dungus v. Kellu Mbudiya (i.e., appellant and the 1st respondent). The complaint is against the respondents in respect of land and village in which the land is situate.
(b) Page 9 – 18 of the records before Barna Area Court II and the case was between Dungus Khurso v. Hassan Mohammed Mashamish. The land/village claimed by the plaintiff is called Mashamish where he also comes from or is a member. It is same subject-matter as in the suit at the Buma Area Court.
(c) Page 19 – 21 is the record of the proceedings at the Bama Upper Area Court in the case No.CV/6/92 which was/is an appeal from the decision of the Bama Area Court II in the said case numbered 49/92. The Bama Upper Area Court ordered a re-trial by the Bama Area Court II.
(d) Pages 22 – 25 of the record, is a case between the appellant of Mashamish v. The Respondents.” (Italics mine).
In other words, it can be seen that there are four (4) records of proceedings from the Bama Area and Upper Area Courts. Undoubtedly, the parties and the subject-matter of the suits throughout, are the same. But it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, that there is no proof, that the parties in the various suits and the subject-matter are not the same. This submission, with respect, is not borne out by even the facts stated by him in the (a) to (d) above.
He said, that there may be similarity of names, but that there is nothing on the record, to show that the parties in suit before Bama Area Court 1, are the same parties in the case before Bama Area Court II likewise the parties in the suit before the Bama Upper Area Court. Far from the truth. In fact, the reason for this unacceptable submission, is because.
“While some of the suits are complaining about land, others are complaining or laying claim to village (Kufa). There is also no iota of evidence showing that the parties are related so as to come within the ambit of privies to suit.”
Frankly speaking, these submissions and the stance of the learned counsel for the appellant, show, with respect, a lack of understanding or appreciation of the said records in the Bama Area and Upper Area Courts. It has to be borne in mind and this is settled, as regards the attitude of appellate courts, to proceedings in the Native/Customary/Area Courts.
It is settled in this country by a long line of decisions, that since proceedings in the Native Courts, are not amenable to the Common Law of England, English rules of evidence, nor ordinarily to our local statutory laws of evidence, they should always be given greater latitude and broader interpretation devoid of adherence to strict interpretations to which proceedings in the Magistrates or High Courts are usually subject, should be placed on them. See also Ajigbonna v. Chief Iledare (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 1, (1997) 6 SCNJ 33 at 41.
That it is always necessary to look at the entire evidence in proceedings in Customary/Area Courts in order to discover the precise nature and subject matter of the controversy between the parties, the form and wording of the claim before that court, notwithstanding. See Chief Ajagunjeun & Ors. v. Sobo Osho of Taku Village & Ors. (1977) 5 SC 89. It is immaterial that lawyers appear or preside in those courts.
What is looked at is always the substance and not the form in deciding what the subject matter of the proceedings is. See Chukwunta v. Chukwu (1953) 14 WACA 341; Adogan v. Aina (1964) 1 ANLR 127; Studham v. Stanbridge (1895) 1 Q.B. 870 and Oyah & Anor. v. Ikalile & 4 Ors. (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 406) 150, (1995) 7 SCNJ at 131 – 132 – per Iguh, J.S.C.
This is why, the said proceedings, has to be carefully scrutinized to ascertain precisely who the parties really were and what the subject matter and the issues in the case were. It is in this regard, that it is said to be permissible, to look at the claim, the evidence and the findings in the proceedings in order to determine what the real issues were. On these premises, the decisions of these Native/Customary/Area Courts, on those issues ought not to be disturbed without very clear proof that they are wrong. See kwamin Akyin v. Essie Egymah (1936) 3 WACA 65; Ajao v. Alao (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 802 at 822; Nwosu v. Udeaja (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 188; Chief Dokubo & Anor. v. Chief Omoni & 9 Ors. (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 616) 647, (1999) 6 SCNJ 168 at 180 -181 – per Onu, J.S.C. just to mention but a few.
Now, as regards the doctrine/plea of estoppel per rem judicatam or estoppel per res judicata, it is now firmly established in numerous decided authorities, that the defence, cannot succeed, unless it is shown that the parties, issues and subject matter, were the same in the previous case/cases as those in the action in which the plea is raised. See Echebiri v. Anozie (1972) 2 ECSLR 665; Chinwendu v. Mbamali & Anor (1980) 3 – 4 SC 31 248; and Alhaji Ladimeji & Anor v. Salami & 2 Ors (1998) 4 SCNJ 1; (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 548) 1 – per Ogundare, J.S.C. (of blessed memory).
It must be borne in mind that a successful plea of the doctrine operates not only against the party whom it affects, but also against the jurisdiction of the court itself.
Thus, the party affected is estopped per rem judicatam from bringing a fresh action before the court. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine such a claim is ousted. See, the illuminating passage in the case of Bassil v. Honger (1954) 14 WACA 569 at 592. This is exactly the same situation or what has happened in the case leading to this appeal before the lower Court. See also recently, Ebba & 3 Ors v. Chief Ogodo & 2 Ors (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 387, (2000) 6 SCNJ 100 at 117, 121; and Afolabi & 2 Ors v. Governor of Osun State & 3 Ors. (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) 119, (2003) 7 SCNJ 27 at 33, 36.
This plea/doctrine is said to be an application of the rule of public policy that no man shall be vexed twice for one and the same cause on the same issue. See chief Adomba & 3 Ors. v. Odiese & 3 Ors (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 165 at 178; (1990) 1 SCNJ 135; Ekennia v. Nkpakara & 7 Ors. (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) 152, (1997) 5 SCNJ 70 at 83 and Kamalu & 2 Ors. v. Umunna & 6 Ors. (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 505) 321, (1997) 5 SCNJ 181 at 204 and many others.
It is said also to be based on the Latin maxim of interest reipublicae ut sitfinis litium – there must, in the public interest be an end to litigation. See Aro v. Fabolude (1983) 1 SCNLR 58, (1983) 2 SC 75 at 83 – per Aniagalu, J.S.C. and Nwadike & Ors v. Ibekwe & Ors (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 718, (1987) 12 SC 14; (1987) 11 – 12 SCNJ 72.
I therefore agree that with the decision of the lower court. This issue, on the authorities, is resolved against the appellant as my answer to the issue, is rendered in the affirmative. Grounds 2 and 3 on which the issue is distilled, fail and are accordingly dismissed together with the said issue 1 of the appellant.
Issue 2 of both the appellant and the respondent.
My answer immediately to the No.2 issue of the appellant, is surely and certainly in the negative. It has been stated and restated in a long line of decided authorities that a Court of Appeal, has no right to be a ‘Knight – errant engaging in skirmishes’. In the case Chief Ebba v. Ogodo & Anor. (1984) 1 SCNLR 372 at 385; (1984) 4 SC 84 – Eso, J.S.C., had this to say inter alia:
“It should be plain to a Court of Appeal that when an issue is not placed before it, it has no business whatsoever to deal with it. A Court of Appeal is not a Knight Errand looking for skirmishes all about the place.”
The learned counsel for the appellant has cited and relied on the case of Adeniyi v. Oroja & Ors (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 235) 322 at 339 C.A. and the observation of Tobi, J.C.A. (as he then was) which he reproduced, thus:
“The law governing appellate procedure and appellate practice is very clear. An appellate court cannot go out on an unquarded (sic) (meaning unguarded) voyage of discovery of issues not specifically pronounced upon by the trial court. Similarly an appellate court is forbidden from raising factual issues that were not canvassed at the trial court. An appellate court cannot go a jamboree or frolic in search of facts outside the four walls of the trial court and accept or reject them suo motu. After all, a court of law is not an excursion group or jamboree. The main function of an appellate court is to examine only the four walls of the records and come to a decision one way or the other. The position is as tight as that.”
Fine! the above and more, have been held to be the attitude of an appellate court. But the real issue for determination in my respectful view, is the No.2 issue of the respondent.
The cases of Alhaji Babale v.Abdulkadir (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 281) 253 at 261 – 262: (it is also reported in (1993) 2 SCNJ 110); Anyanwu v. Mbara & Anor. (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 386 at462, (it is also reported in (1992) 6 SCNJ 22 and Bamgboye & Ors v. Olarewaju (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 132 (it is also reported in (1991) 5 SCNJ 88) cited and relied on and which have no relevance to his said issue No.2 under consideration.
The point is, how could the lower court have considered and determined the issue of res judicata or estoppel in rem judicatam, without looking at the previous record of proceedings in the Area and Upper Courts? I or one may ask.
From all that I have stated in respect of the appellant’s issue No.1, it is clear to me that his issue No.2, is simply, with respect, an exercise in futility. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent, the only issue formulated by the lower court at page 30 lines 12 – 13, is as follows:
“The only issue for determination before us is whether from the 5 records of proceedings before us, res judicata could be pleaded.”
Indeed, Mr. Popoola at page 3 of their brief, posed this question – “Are the suits which the lower court declared as nullities actually then caught off by the doctrine of res judicata?”
The lower court, proceeded to review, appraise and in fact, consider all the issues, the subject-matter and the parties involved in the Area Courts, before setting aside the decisions in suits Nos. CVC/M2/97 and CVA/9/97 declaring them, nullities as they were caught by the doctrine of res judicata held inter alia, as follows:
“We uphold that the decisions before Barna Area Court No. 1 suit No. CVC/M2/97 between Bulama Dungus, i.e., the appellant v. Kellu Mbudiye (i.e. the 1st respondent) which went on appeal before Barna U.A.C. suit No.CVA/9/97 between Bulama Dungus Mashwnashi (Mashamashi being the village both parties come from or belong) v. Abbain Mbudiye and Kellu Mbudiye were nullities. These two decisions are accordingly set aside as being nullities. The decision in complaint No. 51/92 (case No. 49/92) before Bama Area Court II between Dungus Hurso v. Hassan Mohanuned Mashamashi is the only valid and subsisting Judgment between the parties.”
They then held that the appeal succeeds.
To say/contend/submit as has been done in the appellant’s brief, that the lower court went on a voyage of discovery, with respect, is to say the least, unfair, unjustified and indeed unfortunate having regard to the solid and overwhelming evidence in support of the said findings in the record of proceedings. See pages 30 – 32 thereof.
If there are five (5) records and counsel for the appellant says they are three, and by his own concession, the records show they are five (5) or at least four (4) from his brief.
Mr. Tatama, cited and relied on the cases of Ojemen & Sons v. Momodu & Ors. (1983) 1 SCNLR 188; Alashe v. Ilu (1964) 1 All NLR 390; Salawu Yoye v. Lawani Olubode & Sons (1974) 10 SC 209; Okere v. Nwoke (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 209) 317 at 347 CA and Oyegbola v. Aremu (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.259) 326 C.A, as how res judicata operates. He had earlier cited and relied on the cases of Iyaji v. Eyigebe (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 523 at 533 (it is also reported in (1987) 7 SCNJ 148) as what res judicata means.
As I had stated earlier, the principle as regards this doctrine or plea, is now firmly established in a plethora of decided authorities and there will be no need ‘flogging’ it. Mr. Tatama, even embarked on citing and relying on the English case of Carlzeiss-Stif Tung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No.2) (1966) 2 All ER 536 at 550 – per Lord Reid as to what the word ‘Privies’ include.
What I wish to say, is that the lower court was right in raising and considering the issue of res judicata or estoppel rem judicatam and it was right in its conclusion or decision.
I have already answered in the negative, Issue No.2 of the appellant. But in respect of issue No.2 of the respondent, my answer is also rendered in the negative. Ground 4 from which it is distilled and the said Issue No.2, lack substance and merit and they are accordingly dismissed.
In the end or final result, if there is any appeal that is devoid of any merit, with respect, this is one of them. It has sapped energy and time of both the learned counsel for the parties and the court, the appeal is accordingly dismissed in its entirety. I hereby and accordingly affirm the judgment/decision of the lower court delivered on the 6th August, 1999.
Costs follow the event. The respondent is entitled to cost fixed at N10,000.00 (Ten thousand naira) payable to him by the appellant.
Other Citations: (2004)LCN/1569(CA)