Alhaji Ganiyu Solomon V. Mr. Abidemi Daisi-olatunji & Ors (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.

This is an appeal against the Judgment of the High Court of Lagos State delivered on the 11th day of January, 2005 by Hon. Justice O. A. Williams.

By a writ of summons together with a Statement of claim dated 11th April, 2000 but filed on the 17th April, 2000, the Respondent as Claimant claimed against the Appellant as Defendant as follows:
?1. A declaration that the Plaintiff is the person entitled in Law and equity to the certificate and right of occupancy in respect of a piece of land which situates, lying and being at No.54, Palm Avenue Mushin, Lagos State measuring approximately 833.33 square yards (i.e. 696,764 meters) on Survey Plan No. 68/1965 annexed to an Indenture made on the 11th day of July, 1965 and duly registered as No. 51 at page 51 in Vol. 2 of the Lands Registry Office at Ibadan (now Alausa, Lagos State),
2. A declaration that the Defendant’s forceful entry and ejectment of the Plaintiff by the Defendant from the landed property which situates, lying and being at No, 54, Palm Avenue, Mushin, Lagos State is unlawful.
3. The sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million

1

Naira) being special and general damages for trespass committed and still being committed by the Defendant on the Plaintiff?s plot of land which situates, lying and being at No, 54, Palm Avenue, Mushin, Lagos State and marked as Plot 15 on the survey plan No.68/1955 dated 20th June, 1955 and more particularly delineated on Plan No.MAF/18/92L dated 6th February 1992 and drawn by M. F. Fasasi Esq,, Licensed Surveyor.
4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, his servant, agent, workmen and or privies from further committing acts of trespass on the said Plaintiffs land.”
?
The Appellant on his part filed his Statement of Defence. He did not counter-claim. The matter went to trial.
Parties are at ad idem on the fact that the land in dispute otherwise known as Plot 15 on Survey plan No. 68/1955 dated 20th June 1955 is part of the land covered by an Indenture dated 11th July, 1955 duly executed between Sunmola Agaran Bale of Ojuwoye, Amodu Iyalode, Amusa Aganran, Kasali Akinbiyi, Sanusi Olowu, Salami Akinsanya, Jimoh Aileru, Tijani Akanbiyi, all of Ojuwoye in Mushin District in the mainland of Lagos for themselves and on

2

behalf of the Ojuwoye people (hereinafter called the Lessors) of the one part and the Ikeja Co-operative Building Society Ltd (hereinafter called the Lessees) of the other part and registered as No 51 at Page 51 in Volume 2 of the Lands Registry, Lagos State.

It is the case of the Respondent that based on the Survey plan 68/1955 the land in dispute originally belonged to one Nathaniel Martins a member of the Ikeja Co-operative Building Society. Upon the death of Nathaniel Martins the land devolves to his son Abel Martins from whom he bought the land. He also contended that before the sale of the land, he was tenant of Pa Laditan on the land. Following the purchase, he continued to use the land as a mechanical workshop and put some tenants who were paying rent to him until he started receiving several demolition notices from some Lagos State Agencies which resulted to the demolition of his workshop and his forceful ejection by the Appellant.
?
It is the case of the Appellant that he got the land by virtue of Power of Attorney jointly executed by Pa Laditan and one Chief A. A. Adeyemi who were the President and secretary of the Society respectively. He

3

denied in its entirety all the facts of threats, demolition and forceful ejection pleaded by the Respondent.

After hearing the respective witnesses of the parties and the submission of their respective counsel, the trial Court held as follows:-
?1. It is hereby declared that he is the person entitled in law and equity to the certificate and Right of Occupancy in respect of a place of land situate, lying and being at No.54, Palm Avenue, Mushin, Lagos State measuring 833.33 square yards delineated on the Survey Plan No.68/1955 annexed to the indenture made on 11th July, 1955 registered as 51 at page 51 in vol. 2 of the Lands Registry, Ibadan now Alausa, Lagos State.
2. I hereby grant an Order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants, agents, workmen, and or privies from further committing acts of trespass on the land in dispute,
3. I award damages in the sum 50,000.00 against the defendant and in favour of the Claimant.”

Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on 28th day of January, 2005 consisting of six (6) grounds of appeal.

According to the Rules of Court parties

4

filed their brief of argument. When the appeal was heard the Appellant relied on the Appellant’s brief filed on 16th March, 2015 and his reply brief filed on the 16th March, 2015. In his brief the Appellant formulated five issues for determination viz:-
?1. Whether having regard to the provisions of clause 2 of Exhibit P6, the Learned trial Judge was right in holding that the land in dispute can be transferred to a non member of Ikeja Co-operative Building Society as to make the Respondent an owner.
Grounds A and B.
2. Whether having regard to Exhibit D1, the learned trial Judge was right that the Respondent has established that he has equitable interest in the land in dispute. Grounds C and D.
3. Whether the learned trial Judge did not misconceive the issue raised before him when he came to the conclusion that the parties have agreed on the identity of the land in dispute when the real issue was whether the Respondent had proved that Plot 15 was allotted or belonged to Nathaniel Martins and was properly vested in him. Ground E.
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in declaring the Respondent as being entitled to

5

certificate and Right of Occupancy over the land dispute when the rights held by the society of which Nathaniel Martins was a member was leasehold.
Ground F
5. Whether the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence before him.
Ground G.”

The Respondents filed their brief on 27th February, 2015 but deemed properly filed and served on the 18th May, 2016. In addition to their brief, the Respondents filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 27th February, 2015 praying this Court as follows:
?1. The introduction of the concept of “Restrictive Covenant” and the rule in TULK v. MOXHAY (1848) 2 Ph. 774, at 773 M & B 63; 41 ER 1143 strenuously argued by the learned Appellant’s senior counsel under Issue No.1 in the Appellant’s Brief of Argument was not pleaded or canvassed during trial before the honourable trial judge of the High Court of Lagos State which consequently renders the issue incompetent;
2. The nature of interest acquired by Ikeja Co-operative Building Society Limited or indeed reversionary interest of the Ojuwoye people were not canvassed or made an issue before the trial Court which similarly rendered

6

Issue No.4 in the Appellant’s Brief of Argument incompetent.”

The Respondent in their brief adopted the five issues formulated by the Appellant for consideration of this Court and argued the preliminary objection alongside with the issues.

ISSUE 1
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Respondent in proof of his root of title relied on Exhibit P6, which is the Indenture. It is the contention of counsel that Exhibit P6 contains a restrictive covenant which forbids the lessee from transferring any interest in the land to non-members of the Society. He referred to Clause 2 (f) of Exhibit P6. He further contended that the covenant binds not only the lessees but also it assigns, who are limited to its members. He referred to the cases of Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774; Holloway Brothers Limited v. Hill (1902) 2 Ch 612; Regent Oil Co Ltd v. J. A. Georgy (Hatch End) Ltd (1966) Ch. 402.
?
Thus upon the death of Nathaniel Martins, his interest reverted back to the Society and do not devolve to his son Abel Martins or formed part of his estate with the consequence that neither the legal representatives or beneficiaries could transfer any

7

interest in the land based on the principle of Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

He also argued that even if the land in dispute devolved on Abel Martins, Abel Martins could not validly transfer to the Respondent as neither of them are members of the Society.
Learned counsel for the Respondent on the other hand submitted that the Appellant having abandoned all the averments in his Statement of Defence particularly paragraphs 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 in his evidence in chief, the Claimant/Respondent evidence remained unchallenged.

On the issue of restrictive covenants, counsel contended that the said issue was not raised at the trial Court, thus the Appellant is precluded from raising such issue on appeal. He relied on the case of Shonekan v. Smith (1964) All NLR 168; Nigeria Ports Plc. v. Beecham Pharmaceutical PTE Ltd & Anor. (2005) 24 WRN 38.

He further contended that issue of restrictive covenants can only be enforced/raised by the original lessors and not the Appellant. He noted that the original lessors are not party to this suit.
He also submitted that contrary to the Appellant’s argument in clauses 5.03, 5.04,

8

5.05, 5.06, 5.07 and 5.08 of the Appellant’s brief, the trial judge extensively reviewed the facts of this case and came to the right conclusion when it held thus:
“The agreement did not debar the individual members from alienating their interest in the land; rather Clause 2(f) clearly conveys the intention that the Society is restrained from alienating the land to any other person other than its members. There is nothing in Exhibit P6 to lead to a conclusion that the members of the Society cannot alienate land allotted to them, nor is there any indication that the land cannot devolve to their heirs.”

In his reply, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the issue of restrictive covenant was raised and argued before the trial judge ruled on same.

He also contended that the Appellant having assumed the powers of the lessee by virtue of Exhibit D, the Appellant has the right to enforce the restrictive covenant. He also noted that the restrictive covenant binds both the lessee Society and its members as assignees.

Finally he emphasized that Exhibit P6 forbids alienation to non-member of the Society and can only create an estate for life

9

for its members. He thus urged this Court to hold that no title can pass to the Respondent by virtue of the restrictive covenant in Exhibit P6. The Appellant argued that Exhibit P6 contained a restrictive clause which restricts or forbids the Lessee from transferring any interest in the land to non-members of the Society. Who are the members of the society still living? They are the ones that can challenge any breach of the clause (2F) of Exhibit P6. The Appellant cannot challenge the breach of this clause since he is not a member of this Society.

It is also on record that the issue of this clause 2F did not form part of the pleadings.
?It is settled that evidence led on any matter not pleaded goes to no issue and ought to be disregarded when giving Judgment”
Per Kutigi JSC in Amadi v. Nwosu (1992) LPELR 442.

The purpose of pleadings is to give the other side at the earliest opportunity, the case the other is to meet.
“It is now generally accepted, that the main function of pleadings in litigation made up of the statement of claim of the Plaintiff and the statement of defence of the Defendant is to enable the parties ascertain as

10

much as possible the various matters actually in dispute and in which there is agreement.”
Per Karibi-Whyte JSC in Ukaegbu v. Ugoji (1991) 6 NWLR Pt.796 page 127.
It has been held in a plethora of cases that pleadings are important. This is to first ascertain to both parties the issues between them and to enable each other prepare to meet the issues. Secondly it enables the Court to determine the scope and limits of the issues to be tried and to determine the nature and mode of the trial. Thirdly, it eliminates the element of surprise. Fourthly, it limits the scope of the evidence that can be adduced during the trial. Parties are bound by their pleadings and they are not allowed to deviate from it.

As the Appellant did not plead clause 2F, the restrictive clause, he cannot now bring it up on appeal without the leave of Court.
The introductory part of the Exhibit P6 contains the following:
“Between Sunmola Aganran Bale of Ojumoye, Amodu Iyalode, Amusa Aganran, Kasali Akinbiyi, Sanusi Olowu, Salami Akinsanla, Jimoh Aileru, Tijani Akanbiyi, all of Ojuwoye in Mushin District in the mainland of Lagos for themselves and on behalf of the

11

Ojuwoye people (hereinafter called the Lessors which expression shall where the con so admits include their successors in title and assign) of the one part and The Ikeja Co-operative Building Society Ltd; a body registered under the Western Region Cooperative Societies Law No. 6 of 7953 having its registered Address at 53, Idumagbo Avenue Lagos (hereinafter called the Lessees which expression shall where the con so admit include their successor-in title and assigns) of the other part.”

The last three lines does not seem to restrict or limit what the original assignees could do, including their successor-in-title and assigns. This means that the assignees right can devolve on their successor-in-title. Clause 2f is a restrictive clause for the society. The Society cannot allot land to anybody who was not a member of the society. The recital recognizes that the assignees i.e. the members of the Society can be succeeded by their children on their demise. The recital envisages that the assignees would not live forever and therefore will be succeeded by their relations or their assigns.

I believe the trial judge was right when it held as follows:

12

“The agreement did not debar the individual members from alienating their interest in the land; rather Clause 2(f) clearly conveys the intention that the Society is restricted from alienating the land to any other person other than its members. There is nothing in Exhibit P6 to lead to a conclusion that the members of the Society cannot devolve to their heirs.?

The restriction is that the society can only transfer to the assignees named and members of the society. It does not state that the assignees cannot alienate their allotted property. It is also on record that the children of other lessees are the ones in possession of their properties and exercising thereon unlimited acts of ownership including the rights of sale. This issue is resolved against the Appellant.

ISSUE 2
Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that though payment of purchase price coupled with possession creates an equitable interest in land, the Respondent in this case has failed to establish payment of purchase price and possession. On the issue of purchase price, he contended that there was no evidence of when full payment of purchase price was made. On

13

the issue of possession, counsel contended that there is no evidence of handing over with the result that physical possession without title amounted to trespass.

He further contended that the learned trial judge failed to evaluate and ascribe probative value to Exhibit D being the Power of attorney executed by the lessee in favour of the Appellant. He submitted that if the learned trial judge had put Exhibit D in its correct and right perspective, he would not have come to the conclusion that the Respondent is the owner of the land. He urged this Court to resolve this issue in his favour.

On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that contrary to the Appellant’s submission, the trial judge made findings as when the full payment was made. He referred to the trial Judge’s judgment at page 149 of the Record of Appeal hereby reproduced as follows:
“?Abel later said he was willing to sell the land to him, so he started paying for the land installmentally in 1993. He paid N250,000 in 1996, and the receipt was issued then. I believe that that suffices as evidence of when full payment was made.”

Counsel further argued

14

that Exhibit D1 is a worthless piece of document and a mere technical contrivance designed to deprive the Respondent of its title to the land in dispute. He contended that the Society having allocated the land in dispute to Nathaniel Martins by virtue of Clause 2(f) of Exhibit P6, it no longer had any power or authority over the land to warrant the execution of Exhibit D1. He also contended that there is evidence which remain unchallenged before the Court that as at the time that Exhibit D1 was executed Pa Laditan, one of the donors, died since 1994, thus making Exhibit D1 invalid.

In his reply, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that equitable interest cannot defeat the legal interest vested on the appellant by virtue of Exhibit D. He contended that the Exhibit D is valid by virtue of a letter dated 1st December, 1995 from the Governor’s office approving the power of attorney. He also contended that the Respondent failed to prove the sale of the land to him either under English law or customary law. He thus urged this Court to resolve this issue in his favour.

It has been held in a plethora of cases that there are five ways of proving or

15

establishing title to or ownership of and. These are:
1) By traditional evidence;
2) Production of title duly authenticated in the sense that their due execution must be proved;
3) By positive acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time;
4) By acts of long possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land, would in addition, be the owner of the land in dispute. The law is that the establishment of one of the five ways is sufficient proof of ownership. Ayoola v. Odofin (1954) 1 SC page 120, Nkado v. Obiano (1994) 5 NWLR Pt 503 page 31, Nkwo v. Iboe (1998) 7 NWLR Pt.558 page 354.

A Petitioner who claims a declaration of title to land has the burden of setting out clearly by who and how the land was founded and the names of persons who had exercised acts of ownership on the land before it devolved upon him. Olokotuntin v. Sarumi (2002) 73 NWLR Pt.784 page 307.

The Respondent in this case has traced his title to the Society that sold to Nathaniel Martins. On the demise of Nathaniel Martins it devolved on Abel Martins. Abel Martins in

16

turn sold to the Respondent for N250,000.00 paid over a period of from 1993 – 1996 vide the receipt. The Respondent was also in possession before he was chased out.

The payment of the purchase price by a party for a property automatically confers a right on the party which right is enforceable unless otherwise determined, E.F.P. Co. Ltd. v. NDIC (2007) Pt.1039 page 276. A purchase of land can be proved by a purchase receipt or by an agreement of sale, or by any fact that shows such a transaction did take place. See Adepate v. Babatunde (2002) 4 NWLR Pt.756 page 99.
Invariably a purchase receipt is evidence that there was an agreement for sale of land, and that the consideration for sale was paid by the purchaser Aminu v Ogunyebi (2004) 10 NWLR Pt.882 page 457.
Where a purchaser of land has paid the purchase price to the vendor, he had acquired an equitable interest in the land Ohiaeri v. Yusuf (2004) 1 NWLR Pt.855 page 548.
?
It is trite law, that where a person pays for land and obtains a receipt for the payment, followed by his going into possession and remaining in possession, equitable interest is created for him in the land, such as

17

would defeat the title of a subsequent legal estate purchaser with knowledge of the equitable estate in the land.

The Respondent was already in possession as a tenant for many years before he bought the land from Abel Martins. The Appellant in his own case stated that a Power of Attorney Exhibit D1 was donated to him by the Society. The question, does the Society have any reversionary rights to the land in dispute? The Power of Attorney was donated by the Society and executed by Chief Laditan and Adeyemi, President and Secretary respectively of the Society.

It is doubtful that Chief Laditan as President actually executed this Power of Attorney on 14th December, 1995 whilst he died in 1994. Be that as it may the society had no right to donate a Power of Attorney to the Appellant of a piece of land they had no reversionary interest to as the Power of Attorney cannot in any way compete with the evidence of ownership as exhibited by the Respondent and also proved.

The Power of Attorney cannot take precedent over the title of the Respondent. The trial Judge was therefore right in holding that the Respondent had a better title to the land in issue.

18

This issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant.

ISSUE 3.
It is the contention of learned counsel for the Appellant that the identity of the land in dispute was not an issue before the trial judge rather the real issue was whether the land in dispute was allocated or belonged to Nathaniel Martin from which the Respondent claimed to have derived his title. He referred to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Statement of Claim and paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Statement of Defence. Counsel submitted that the burden was on the Respondent to prove that the land in dispute belonged to Nathaniel Martins. According to counsel this burden has not been discharged by the Respondent as the Respondent had failed to plead or prove that the land in dispute was allocated to Nathaniel Martins and subsequently devolved to Abel Martins.

In response, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that there was no misconception of issues on the part of the trial judge. He contended that the trial Judge properly identified the issue before it as follows:
“The matter in contention between the parties is to whom the Society allocated the land, and whether title

19

has passed to either of them”. See page 145 of the record of appeal.

It is the contention of Counsel that the Appellant’s submission that the Respondent did not prove that the land in dispute was allocated to Nathaniel Martins is misconceived as the trial judge relied on pleading and evidence before it to hold that land in dispute belonged to Nathaniel Martins. Thus the Respondent had successfully traced his title to Nathaniel Martins.

I have already exhaustively discussed this issue in the previous issues 1 and 2. It is clear that Nathaniel A. Martins was the owner of land vested in him by the Ikeja Co-operative Building Society Ltd. The land the Respondent purchased was that which was allocated to Nathaniel A Martins. On his death, his only son Abel Martins inherited this land under the Yoruba Customary Law. It was Abel Martins that sold to the Respondent. The Respondent has traced his root of title to Nathaniel Martins who was the original allotee from the Society. The Appellant did not put forward any evidence challenging the Respondent’s root of title. This issue is also resolved against the Appellant.

20

ISSUE 4
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the title that resides in the original lessee is a leasehold interest and not a radical title since the radical title resides in the original lessors, based on the principle of Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet the lessee, since the lessee do not have absolute title he could not transfer what he does not have and the transferee cannot get a Statutory Right of Occupancy as awarded by the trial judge.

Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand submitted that the issue of restrictive covenant was not raised by the Appellant at the trial Court. Thus the Appellant is estopped from raising it on appeal. He contended that even if the Appellant is allowed to raise such issue, Nathaniel Martins was deemed to be a holder of the Right of Occupancy in respect of the land in dispute upon the enforcement of the Land Use Act 1978. He relied on Section 34 and 35 of the Land Use Act.

In his reply, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted the issue is not a new issue. He also contended that Section 35 and 34 of the Land Use Act relied upon by the Respondent is inapplicable in this

21

case as it deals with compensation in relation to the holder of right of occupancy.

It is difficult to know what the Appellant is challenging and for whose benefit. The Appellant argued that Abel Martins had no legal right to sell the land the subject matter or the res to the Respondent. The Appellant had complained about the clause 2f of Exhibit P6. The Appellant himself would not have any rights through the alleged Power of Attorney. Nathaniel Martins was one of the allotees of land from the Society. I have already held that the restrictive clause 2f is only for the Lessees i.e the Society itself. The allotees have a right to have successors in title and assigns. This clause 2f can only be restrictive to the Lessees i.e. the Society. The Society was not allowed to allocate their land to anyone other than a member of the Society. Once allotted the allotees can deal with their land anyway they deemed fit. Having held that the land was in the family before the land Use Act 1978 came into effect, therefore the Act will be made to take effect. The Society allotted the land to Nathaniel Martins. On the death of Nathaniel the land was inherited by Abel

22

Martins. He enjoyed this allotment by renting it to the Respondent and finally selling to the Respondent. The Respondent thereafter paid the purchase price between 1993 – 1996.

A declaration that a party to a suit is entitled to a Statutory Rights of Occupancy does not relieve that party of the burden of applying for such right to the Governor who may in his absolute discretion, grant or refuse same under the power vested in the Governor by Section 5(1) of the Land Use Act 1978.U.B.A. Plc. v. Samba Petroleum Co. Ltd. (2002) 16 NWLR Pt.793 page 361.
?By virtue of Section 34(1) and (2) of the Land Use Act 1978, where a land in an urban area is developed and is vested in any person immediately before the commencement of the Act, the land shall continue to be held by the person in whom it is vested as If the holder of the land was holder of a Statutory Rights of Occupancy issued by the Governor under the Act. Ilonan v. Idakwo (2003) 11 NWLR Pt.830 page 63.”

It is the law that in a claim for entitlement to a Right of Occupancy based on title to the land in dispute before the promulgation of the Land Use Act, the onus is on the Plaintiff to

23

prove his entitlement to the title. The Respondent in this case has proved his root to title. The trial Judge was therefore right in holding that he is entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy. This issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant.

ISSUE 5
Counsel for the Appellant submitted that based on his submission on the previous issues, the judgment of the trial judge is against the weight of evidence. He thus urged this Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court in its entirety.
Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant having failed to produce credible evidence in support of his case before the trial judge is deemed to have accepted the facts adduced by the respondent and cannot complain now. He relied on the case Of Edosa v. Zaccala (2005) 34 WRN 103.

The learned trial Judge had evaluated the evidence proffered during trial. He took cognisance of all the documents tendered in evidence. The trial Judge painstakingly perused all the oral evidence in reaching his conclusions.

He found as a fact that the Respondent traced his root of title to the Society and the Ojuwoye Family of Mushin. The

24

law is that a Plaintiff who claims a declaration of title to land has the burden of setting out clearly by who and how the land was founded and the names of persons who had exercised acts of ownership on the land before it devolved upon him. See Olokotintin v. Sarumi (2002) 13 NWLR Pt.784 page 307.

Thus the trial Judge found as a fact that the Respondent has proved his title and the declaration he sought. In civil cases, the general burden of proof in the sense of establishing his case lies on the Plaintiff, such burden is not as static as in Criminal case. Not only will there be instances in which on the state of the pleadings the burden of proof lies on the Defendant but also, as the case progresses, it may become the duty of the Defendant to call evidence in proof of rebuttal of some particular point which may arise in the case. See Osawuru v. Ezeiruka (1978) 6 – 7 SC, page 135.
?
Likewise, the Appellant was to prove his claim to the res by his Power of Attorney. This Power of Attorney was held to be at best a useless piece of paper, as Pa Laditan was already dead before he was purported to have donated the Power of Attorney. Moreover did Pa Laditan

25

have the right to donate a Power of Attorney to what does not belong to him. If indeed it was Pa Laditan that donated this Power of Attorney he would be termed to be mischievous as he was the one that encouraged and introduced the Respondent to Abel Martins. He also knew about the purchase of the said land.
The Appellant failed to prove the authenticity of his title to the land in issue.

The trial judge was therefore right in his holding and declaration. This issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant.

All the five (5) issues articulated by the Appellant have all been resolved against him. This appeal is therefore unmeritorious. It is dismissed. I hereby affirm the Judgment of the learned trial Judge and all the orders contained in the judgment of the Court below.
N50,000.00 cost to the Respondent against the Appellant.

Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8904(CA)