Yakubu Ali V. The State (2019)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS, J.S.C.

The appellant was one of the five accused persons who were arraigned before the Kogi State High Court holden at Egbe in amended Charge No HCL/18C/2002 for conspiracy, culpable homicide and armed robbery contrary to Sections 97, 221 (a) and 298(b) respectively of the Penal Code. The charge against the accused persons was preferred with leave under Section 185 (b) CPC. The appellant was the 4th accused while the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th accused were Sgt. Monday Yakubu, Rasak Olanrewaju, Akeem Abiodun and Rasheed Ayinde respectively. The amended 3 count charge read as follows:-

FIRST HEAD OF CHARGE

That you, Sgt. Monday Yakubu, Rasak Olanrewaju, Akeem Abiodun, Yakubu Ali and Rasheed Ayinde on or about the 6th day of May 2001 at Egbe in Yagba West Local Government Area within the Kogi State Judicial Division committed the offence of criminal conspiracy by doing an act to wit:- You agreed to commit armed robbery in the premises of Ise Oluwa sawmill belonging to Mr. Ojo Adedeji in Egbe Town and in furtherance of the agreement you killed

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Mohammed Shaibu, a security guard of the aforesaid Sawmill and removed a sawing machine valued N25,000.00 belonging to the aforesaid Ojo Adedeji, and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 97 of the Penal Code.

SECOND HEAD OF CHARGE

That you, Sgt. Monday, Rasak Olanrewaju, Akeem Abiodun, Yakubu Ali and Rasheed Ayinde, on or about the 6th day of May, 2001 at Egbe in Yagba West Local Government Area within the Kogi State Judicial Division did commit culpable homicide punishable with death in that you caused the death of Mohammed Shaibu, a security guard with Ise-Oluwa Sawmill, Egbe, by doing an act to wit; You hit the said Mohammed Shaibu on the head with the knowledge that his death would be the probable consequence of your act, and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code.

THIRD HEAD OF CHARGE

That you, Sgt. Monday Yakubu, Rasak Olanrewaju, Akeem Abiodun, Yakubu Ali and Rasheed Ayinde at Egbe in Yegba West Local Government within the Kogi State Judicial Division committed armed robbery, by doing an act to wit: while being armed with guns and other dangerous weapons,

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you robbed the premises of Ise-Oluwa Sawmill, Egbe, of one sawing machine valued N25,000.00 belonging to one Ojo Adedeji and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 298 (b) of the Penal Code.

Nine witnesses testified for the State and tendered several exhibits. A trial within trial was conducted to determine whether the accuseds statements were voluntarily made. The accused also testified in the trial within trial. The trial Judge delivered his judgment on 11 May 2005. He found all the accused guilty of criminal conspiracy and sentenced each of them to 10 years imprisonment. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th were found guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced to death. In addition they were found guilty of armed robbery and were given life imprisonment. The sentences are to run concurrently. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed and the present appeal is against that judgment delivered on 26 November, 2013.

The appellant filed an amended appellant’s brief while the respondent amended its brief. The amended briefs of argument were all deemed filed on 24 January, 2019 the date oral arguments were taken in the appeal.

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The appellant formulated three issues for determination. The issues are:-

1. Whether having regard to the entire circumstances of this case, the Court below was correct in holding that the appellant gave his consent to the assignment, by the trial Court of Chief Oyibo to represent him as counsel and that no miscarriage of justice or denial of fair hearing had been shown by the assignment of one counsel to represent the appellant and the other accused persons (Grounds 1 and 2).
2. Whether the Court below was right in holding that the trial Court complied with the provisions of Section 191 of the Criminal Code at the trial of the appellant (Ground 4)
3. Whether in the entire circumstances of this case the Court below was correct in affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant for conspiracy, culpable homicide punishable with death and armed robbery (Grounds 3 and 5).

The respondent adopted the issues framed by the appellant in its amended brief of argument.

This Court decided the sister case Sgt. Monday Yakubu v. The State in appeal No. SC.196/2011 on 28 February, 2014 now reported in (2014) All FWLR

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(Part 732) 1680. The appellant who was the 1st accused was tried along with the present appellant (who was then 4th accused) and three others namely Rasak Olanrewaju, Akeem Abiodun and Rasheed Ayinde who were listed as 2nd, 3rd and 5th accused respectively in Charge No. HCL/18C/2002 and all the accused were found guilty of criminal conspiracy and each of them was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. All the accused were represented by the same counsel. The appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, Abuja and this Court were dismissed and the judgment of the trial Judge, Medupin J. of the Kogi State High Court was affirmed.

In his argument on Issue 1, learned counsel for the appellant, Zakari Sogfa pointed out that the appellant did not understand English and the charge was read and explained to him in Yoruba. He said that prior to this, there was nothing on record to show that the appellant was made to understand what transpired in regard to the appointment of a counsel for him by the trial Court. He argued that the purported consent of the appellant to have Chief Oyibo represent

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him as counsel is null and void. The appellant cannot be said to have participated in the proceedings that culminated in the appointment of Chief Oyibo as his counsel. He was therefore denied the right of a counsel of his choice and as a consequence there was no fair hearing and placed reliance on Section 36 (6) (e) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the case of Ogboh & Anor v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 774) 21 at 37.

H. E. Yusufu Esq. the Solicitor-General and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice, Kogi State who appeared for the respondent submitted that when the appellant appeared before the Court, he was asked about the whereabouts of his counsel and when he replied that he had none, the Court in compliance with Section 36 (6) (b) and (c) Constitution read along with Section 186 CPC, assigned Chief B. C. Oyibo as the counsel to represent him. He further argued that there was no conflict of interest in the counsel representing him and the other accused since the accused rejected the alleged confessional statements in which they implicated one

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another during the trial within trial.

Section 36(6)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides:-

“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to defend himself in person or by a legal practitioner of his own choice.”

Section 186 Criminal Procedure Code makes it mandatory for a person accused of an offence punishable with death to be represented by counsel at his trial and where he is not so represented, the Court has a duty to assign one to him. The section stipulates:-

“186 Where a person is accused of an offence punishable with death, if the accused is not defended by a legal practitioner, the Court shall assign a legal practitioner for his defence.”

Where an accused person shows preference for a particular legal practitioner to handle his defence, his wishes must be obeyed by the Court by giving him adequate time to brief the legal practitioner he wants to handle his defence but where, as in this case, the appellant was asked: “Where is your counsel” and he replied: “I have none”, it became incumbent on the Court to assign a legal practitioner

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to handle the defence because the second count accused him of committing an offence punishable with death. The interpretation of Section 186 CPC cannot be stretched to the limit that the Court must assign one legal practitioner to represent each accused where there are more than one accused persons in a joint trial. The legal requirement of Section 186 was satisfied when the Court assigned Chief Oyibo to defend him. The Court even went further to enquire if any of the accused had any objection to Chief Oyibo being asked to represent them, but none of them raised such an objection. None of them sought for an adjournment and was refused to contact the counsel that would represent him. There is therefore no denial of fair hearing as alleged by learned counsel for the appellant. Apart from alleging lack of fair hearing, learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to pinpoint which defence the appellant intended to advance which was in conflict with that of other accused that would have necessitated appointing different counsel for the other accused persons. See: Ngoroh & Anor v. State (1951) 13 WACA 256 at 258; Gyang & Anor v. R

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(1954) 14 WACA 586 and Gwonto v. State (1982) 1 NCR 251 at 265. The complaint of lack of fair hearing tantamounts to crying wolf only where there is none. The appellant and the accused did not testify in their defence and each of them denied making the extra judicial statement which implicated the co-accused. Had the appellant testified in his defence and implicated any other accused, it is then that the conflict in representation would have become manifest. Issue 1 is resolved against the appellant.

Turning to Issue 2, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court did not comply with the provisions of Section 191 CPC that sets out the procedure to be followed when an accused has a case to answer and the Court below was wrong to hold that the trial Court duly complied with the provisions of that section. He maintained that the trial Court is bound to inform the accused that he is not obliged to answer any questions which are meant to discover the line of defence of the accused, having regard to the particular points in the case of the prosecution which the accused should address in his defence. He contended that the intention of the

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law maker in wanting the Court to enquire from the accused if he wishes to give evidence on his behalf and whether he would be calling witnesses other than witnesses as to character is to ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done in the trial of the accused and to give effect to the constitutional right of an accused to fair hearing. This failure in the appellant not having a fair hearing has resulted in a miscarriage of justice that should lead to a nullification of the appellant’s trial and conviction. Reliance was placed on Section 191, 235 and 236 CPC and the cases of Josiah v. State (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 125 and Salu v. Egeibon 1994 6 NWLR Pt. 348 23.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned trial Judge could not fully comply with Section 191 (1) CPC because the reading of the examination of the accused in accordance with the provision of Section 190 relates to a criminal proceeding where a Magistrate Court had conducted a preliminary enquiry and forwarded it to the High Court. He said that the record of proceedings in this case does not show that there was a preliminary enquiry which was forwarded to the trial

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Court. He therefore submitted that Section 235 CPC has not been breached as there was no report of any preliminary inquiry before the trial Court upon which such examination can be based. He submitted in the alternative that the Judge has a discretion in the matter on whether or not he should draw the attention of the appellant at the trial to the vital evidence adduced by the prosecution to which he may need to respond.

He said the learned trial Judge exercised his discretion in favour of the appellant when he embarked on the exercise with the appellant and referred to page 113 lines 1-20 of the record. He submitted that the learned trial Judge substantially complied with Sections 191 (1) and 235 (1) CPC in drawing the appellant’s attention to the evidence that had been adduced and going further to ask him if he understood what was said and if he wanted to testify and call other witnesses for his defence. All this was done in the presence of counsel representing the appellant who did not raise any objection.

At page 113 of the record the proceedings of 21 June, 2004 were recorded thus:-

“Court to the accused persons: Do you

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want to give evidence or do you want to rely on all that the prosecution has stated.

Note: John Owoleke, Court Secretary interprets from English to Yoruba and vice versa.

Yinusa Saliu: Driver interprets from English to Hausa and vice versa.

1st accused: I have not additional statement to make to what I have already stated in the trial within trial.

2nd accused: Nothing to add to what the prosecution has said. I am not calling any witness.

3rd accused: I have nothing to add. I will not call any witness.

4th accused: I have nothing to say at all.

5th accused: I have nothing to say. I will not call any additional witness. I will rest my case on what the prosecution had stated and my narration at the trial within trial.

Court: The 5 accused persons when asked if they had understood all that had been said against them all agreed that they understood same. They were equally asked if they wanted to testify on their own behalf, tender any document or call additional witness and they all said that they would be resting the case on all they had stated

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at the trial within trial and as such would not be adducing any evidence.

Signed.

M. A. Meduqin.

Judge

27/6/2004

When this issue was raised in Yakubu v. State (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 732) 1680, my learned brother, Kekere-Ekun JSC in resolving the issue said at page 1691 supra:-

“it is noteworthy that, the appellant and the other accused persons were represented by counsel throughout the trial and in particular, on 12 May, 2004. Learned counsel did not raise any objection when the Court read out its record nor did he apply to call the appellant or any other witness in his defence. Indeed in the course of addressing the Court, he asserted that the appellant and the other accused persons were not bound to say even a word in their defence. (See page 121, lines 9-12 of the record). I agree with the lower Court that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of the law in the circumstances of this case, particularly as the appellant was represented by counsel.

If as argued by learned counsel for the appellant the trial Judge went over his head and put the wrong options to the appellant directly, he owed it as a duty to his

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client to raise an objection which he failed to do. The contention that the appellant was denied a fair hearing, thereby rendering the trial a nullity is misconceived.”

I participated in the appeal and I endorsed the judgment of my learned brother, Kekere-Ekun JSC not only with regard to the issue raised but the entire judgment.

The appellant in this appeal was the 4th accused in Yakubu v. State supra. My stand then has not changed. The learned trial Judge substantially complied with Sections 191 (1) and 235 (1) CPC in drawing the appellant’s attention to the vital evidence that had been adduced by the prosecution that required his response. I only need to add that since the holding of preliminary enquiry has been abolished, all that the prosecution does is to apply under Section 185(b) CPC for leave to prefer the charge without holding a preliminary enquiry and once the trial Judge grants leave, the charge is read to the accused and thereafter his plea is taken and the prosecution proceeds to call its witnesses to prove the charge. This was the procedure that was adopted in this case. It has been held that for a condition to nullify judicial

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proceedings it must be a substantive provision which affects the jurisdiction or competence of the Court, or a procedural defect in the proceedings which would result in a miscarriage of justice and none has been shown in this appeal. See: Kajubo v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 21; Ejelikwu v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 554.

The last issue argued by counsel for the appellant is whether the Court below was correct in affirming the convictions and sentences of the appellant for conspiracy, culpable homicide punishable with death and armed robbery.

The facts of the case which were presented by the 9 witnesses called by the prosecution and exhibits tendered are as follows:-

On or about 6 May, 2001 around 12.45 am, the 1st accused, Sgt. Monday Yakubu drove a TATA green army truck with Reg. No. DHQ 154 from Lagos to Ise Oluwa Sawmill Egbe in Yagba West Local Government Area of Kogi State carrying the other 4 accused namely Rasak Olanrewaju, Akeem Abiodun, Yakubu Ali (the present appellant) and Rasheed Ayinde. He parked the truck at the entrance of the Sawmill and the other 4 accused alighted from the truck. A security guard,

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Joseph Folatayo (PW1) sighted the four accused when they entered the Sawmill carrying a halogen lamp and a gun. PW1 ran to alert Ojo Ayodeji (PW3) a Manager at the Sawmill concerning what was going on. PW3 in turn called the police and when they arrived, they found the said army truck at the entrance of the Sawmill and the 1st accused was inside the vehicle and they arrested him. They saw the corpse of Mohammed Shuiabu (popularly called Baba Muri) one of the security guards in the Sawmill. He was in a pool of blood, with his head battered and his hands and legs were tied with a rope. A blood stained piece of wood was found near the corpse. A sewage machine valued at N25,000.00 was stolen. One of the machine wheels had been loosened and rolled towards the army truck. A box of tools and other items belonging to the accused were found inside the vehicle. The other accused including the appellant were later arrested. At the joint trial of the accused the prosecution tendered 29 exhibits which included the confessional statements of the accused. The accused objected to the tendering of the statements by alleging that they were obtained under duress and the Court

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had to order for a trial within trial before admitting the statements. The 4th accused/appellant made two statements on 7/5/2001 and 8/5/2001. They were admitted as exhibits 28A and 28B respectively (See page 110 of the records).

Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Exhibit 28B at pages 235-236 of the records and submitted that it was recorded in violation of the appellant’s right under Section 35(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) to remain silent and avoid answering any question after his arrest by the Police. He said that a cursory look at exhibit 28B will reveal that words of caution were not administered to the appellant before exhibit 28B was recorded and argued that there is no distinction between the making of the initial statement or additional statement. He submitted that any statement recorded by the police without the words of caution first administered, is in contravention of Rule 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Statement to Police Officers) Rules and is therefore inadmissible. He therefore urged this Court to expunge Exhibit 28B from the records and relied on the case of

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James v. Nigeria Air Force (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 406 at 424.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent led ample and credible evidence at the trial in support of each of the ingredients of the alleged offences. For the offence of conspiracy, learned counsel referred to the evidence of PW1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 as well as the confessional statements of the accused (including the appellant) from which the learned trial Judge drew the inference of the commission of the offence.

As regards the armed robbery, learned counsel again referred to the evidence of PW1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 and the confessional statement in Exhibit 28A showing that the appellant was a member of the armed robbery gang which dismantled and carted away the machines in the sawmill at night which evidence was corroborated by Exhibit 28B and during the robbery Mohammed Shuaibu was tied up and his head was battered with a plank and this eventually led to his death. The case of culpable homicide punishable with death was also proved.

From the evidence adduced, the 1st accused was arrested inside the truck near the entrance to the sawmill. Later

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the other accused were arrested while trying to escape and when they were shown the 1st accused, they recognised him.

The offence of conspiracy is often proved by circumstantial evidence, usually inferred from the overt acts of the accused persons. lt is complete by the agreement to do the act or make the omission complained about. See: Njovens & Others v. The State (19731 All NLR 371 at 404: Omotola v. The State (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 148. The learned trial Judge relied on cogent and material evidence adduced at the trial from which he drew the inference of the commission of the offence by the appellant e.g. the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW7 and the confessional Statement of the appellant (Exhibit 28A and 28B), PW1 testified that on the night of 5/5/2001 and the early hours of 6/5/2001 at about 12.45 a.m., while on guard at lse Oluwa Sawmill, Egbe in Kogi State, he saw a vehicle parking at the entrance of the gate of the Sawmill, and two persons emerged from the vehicle. They stooped and started moving towards the Sawmill holding lamp and a gun. He immediately took to his heels and after running for 300 yards, he heard the shout from Mohammed Shuaibu

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(Baba Muri) who was later found dead with his head battered and a wooden plank with blood stains found near his corpse. His hands and legs were tied with a rope. The evidence showed that the 1st accused was arrested in the vehicle at the Sawmill that night by the police and PW7 testified that on receiving intelligence report in the morning around 6 am on 6/5/2001 the appellant was arrested bare footed at the garage in Egbe while trying to flee the town and immediately he was accosted by the Police he said in Yoruba “Akeem lo pa man yen. Ebami wa Akeem o wa lodo wa” meaning that Akeem (i.e. the 3rd accused at the trial) killed the man. PW4 testified that when they got to the Police Station, the D.P.O directed that the 1st accused be brought out from the cell and when he was shown to the appellant, 2nd and 5th accused, they confirmed that the 1st accused (who had admitted earlier that he conveyed the accused in the army truck) was among the group.

The lower Court reviewed the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the confessional statement of the appellant, Exhibit 28A and the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant and stated at page 414 of the records:-

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“Learned counsel for the appellant had made heavy weather out of the fact that in the confessional statement of the appellant, he had said he had only agreed to go to Akure in Ondo State to load iron road and did not know he was going to Egbe Ise Oluwa Sawmill and so he couldn’t have conspired with the other accused persons, to rob the Ise Oluwa Sawmill. Yes, the appellant stated in Exhibit 28A that one Akeem invited him to go to Akure to help in loading iron rods. But then what happened Obviously, they did not go to Akure to load iron rods. They instead, went to the Oluwa Mill at Egbe in Kwara State. The appellant did not say why they had to over pass Ondo State to go to Kogi State Ise Oluwa Sawmill and arrived there at the dead of night. There is no evidence that there was iron rod to load at Ise Oluwa. So the appellant must have known that they were going to Egbe Ise Oluwa Sawmill. From the evidence given by PW1, the appellant and others arrived the mill at night armed with a gun and proceeded to rob the mill, and killing one of the security guards on duty.”

The inference drawn by the lower Court proved the conspiracy which the

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appellant and the other accused hatched to go for the robbery operation in Ise Oluwa Sawmill in Egbe. In the process of the robbery they killed Mohammed Shuaibu. The 1st accused no doubt participated in the conspiracy to rob the Ise Oluwa Sawmill since he took the co-conspirators to the vicinity of the sawmill but there is no certainty that he knew or consented to the killing of Mohammed Shuaibu since the wooden plank which was used in hitting the deceased on the head was not part of the weapons they took along with them from the truck.

The lower court correctly found that a Court can convict an accused person based on his confessional statement alone, if it is voluntarily made. The appellant had objected to the admissibility of Exhibit 28A and 28B on the ground that he made the statement under duress and this prompted the trial within trial. Before this Court, learned counsel has asked that Exhibit 28B be expunged because the appellant was not cautioned before he made Exhibit 28B. The appellant’s conviction was not based solely on Exhibits 28A and 28B. What the appellant stated in Exhibit 28A and 28B was corroborated.

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The contents of the statement are true and it is an account of what the appellant and the other accused did. He was together with the other accused persons when Mohammed Shuaibu was dealt the fatal blow on the head in the course of the robbery.

The lower Court in its re-evaluation of the evidence by the trial Judge found that the trial Judge had evaluated the evidence properly and had arrived at the correct conclusion. The lower Court found at page 420 of the records:-

“No doubt, the appellant knew very well, when they left Ojota in the army truck that they were going to Egbe Oluwa sawmill to rob it. He knew there were guards, since there was a previous survey and knew they had to be disabled possibly eliminated, before they could succeed in their illegal act. He watched as the deceased was tied and battered to death whilst he was busy loosening the engine they stole. He never lifted a finger to stop the killing of the deceased. He had thus coalesced (sic acquiesced) in the illegal acts of the other accused persons.”

In Alarape v. State (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 705) 79 it was held by the majority decision (with Kutigi JSC dissenting) that where two or

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more persons set out to steal and one of them is known by the others to be armed with a lethal weapon, all of them may be held criminally responsible for any consequences which result in the use of the weapon by the one who carried it, even if there is no evidence to show that there was any express pre-concerted agreement that he was to use it. See: Gyang v. Queen (1954) 14 WACA 584; Ofor v. Queen (1955) 15 WACA 4 at 5 and Digbehin v. Queen (1963) 2 SCNLR 3.

The brief facts in Alarape v. State supra were that the four appellants after their meeting in the house of the 1st appellant went out together at midnight for an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another. In order to foster or achieve their common intention, one of them carried a lethal weapon, a dane gun, which the 1st appellant successfully used to facilitate or aid their escape and avoid being caught or arrested when they were disturbed and hotly chased by the deceased and the other night guards. In the leading judgment, Iguh JSC held

“I think this is a proper case where Section 8 of the Criminal Code, Cap 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, must apply. In my view, the gun,

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though fired by the 1st appellant at all material times, is deemed in the eyes of the law to have been fired by the rest of the gang. The 1st appellant was no more than the hand by which the other appellants struck and all are liable to be convicted for the murder of the deceased.”

In his contributory judgment in support of the majority decision Belgore JSC (as he then was) said:-

“When the appellants set out on the fateful night they not only knew they were out to commit an offence but armed in case they were confronted in carrying out their design. They were confronted by vigilantes, and the deceased, a member of the vigilantes was shot at point blank range by 1st appellant who took the gun from 4th appellant. That was the common purpose to confront by any force whoever obstructed their escape. (R v. War (1955) 15 WACA 4; R v. Bada 10 WACA 249. It does not matter which of the accused did what, so far there was a common purpose as the gang of these appellants went out fully armed to confront any person who would try to prevent or obstruct their escape.”

In the present appeal, the common purpose was manifested when the appellant and the

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other three accused decided to tie up the deceased’s hands and legs and one of them used the wooden plank to hit him on the head while others were engaged in loosening the engine which was rolled towards where the truck was parked and carrying off the sawing machine. This was to facilitate not only the theft but their escape.

If the appellant had registered a protest when the deceased was being hit with the plank on the head, there would have been a clear manifestation that his intention was to steal and not inflict any injuries on the deceased. His acquiescence to the use of the plank on the deceased’s head implies consent.

All the ingredients of the offences of conspiracy to rob Ise Oluwa Sawmill against the appellant and the other accused was proved; so also the culpable homicide punishable with death and armed robbery proved against the appellant and the other three accused who walked into the Ise Oluwa sawmill on the night of 5th/6th May, 2001. I therefore find no merit in the appeal. All the issues raised in the appeal are resolved against the appellant and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. I further affirm the convictions and sentences

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passed by the trial Judge and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Abuja. Appeal is dismissed.

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SC.762/2013