Usman Saminu V. The State (2019)
LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report
OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.
By an amended charge, the appellant and three others had been arraigned before the High Court of Katsina State, holden at Katsina on a two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery contrary to Section 5 (b) and 1 (2) (b) of the Robbery and Firearms Act Cap.398 No. 5, Laws of the Federation, 1990 as amended. The appellant was the 1st accused person. He was alleged to have, on the 28th June, 1996, in Rugar Wake village in Kuraye District of Charanchi Local Government Area of Katsina State, conspired with three others to break into the house of one Indo Dago with the intent of robbing her and to have indeed robbed the said Indo Dago of the sum of N650.00 (six hundred and fifty Naira), while armed with a knife and to have in the course of the robbery, stabbed the said Indo Dago with the knife causing a deep hole in her neck which led to her death.
The appellant had pleaded not guilty to the two count charge and the matter proceeded to trial. The prosecution called six witnesses and tendered 2 Exhibits in proof of the charge. Only the appellant testified in defence but
did not call any other witness.
At the end of the trial, the trial Court found the appellant guilty as charged. He was convicted and sentenced to death.
Upon being aggrieved with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant had appealed to the Court below, which court, on the 5th day of May, 2015 found the appeal lacking in merit and dismissed same. The conviction and sentence by the trial Court were affirmed.
Being further aggrieved led to the instant appeal to the Court, by a Notice of Appeal filed on 3rd June, 2015 with four grounds of appeal. This appeal was heard on the following briefs of argument.
Appellant’s brief of argument settled by O. M. Atoyebi Esq., was filed on 18/3/2016 but was deemed properly filed and served on 11/4/2018. The respondent’s brief of argument settled by one Abdul Mohammed Esq., was filed on 21/02/2018 but was equally deemed properly filed and served on 11th April, 2018.
In the said appellant’s brief of argument was distilled a sole issue from the four grounds of appeal for the determination of the appeal. The said lone issue is as follows:
“Whether the judgment of the lower Court
affirming/upholding the decision of the trial Court was/is based on clear, cogent, credible and unequivocal evidence as required by the law.”
In the respondent’s brief of argument was formulated the following sole issue for determination of the appeal.
“Whether there is anything before this Honourable Court that warrants the disturbance of the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeal.”
On a careful consideration of the four grounds of appeal filed by the appellant with the Notice of Appeal earlier filed on 3/6/2015, the Court needs to re-couch the sole issue clearly for the proper determination of the appeal. The sole issue shall be –
“Whether the Court below was right in affirming the decision of the trial Court that the prosecution proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, relying on the alleged confessional statement of the appellant. (Grounds 1,2,3 and 4).
In arguing the sole issue, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the lower Court’s judgment affirming or upholding the decision of the trial court was not premised on clear, cogent, credible and unequivocal evidence as
required by the enabling law. He urged the Court to so hold for the following reasons:
(a) He contended that the lower Court wrongly relied on the confessional statement of the appellant, in arriving at its decision in affirming/upholding the judgment of the trial Court.
(b) The appellant’s retraction of his confessional statement on the ground of none voluntariness of same is never an afterthought as held by the lower Court.
(c) The purported corroborative evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 relied upon by the lower Court constituted hearsay evidence which is not admissible in law, therefore, there was no corroborative evidence outside the purported confessional statement of the appellant which can ground the appellant’s conviction and death sentence.
Learned counsel argued the above reasons together. He submitted that it is settled principle of law that in criminal matters, the onus of proof is beyond reasonable doubt and the prosecution carries the burden of proof throughout the trial which does not shift at all. He relied on a number of decided cases including: Inusa Saidu Vs. Tile State (1982) 4 SC 26 at 42; Oforlete Vs. The State (2000) 12
NWLR (Pt.601) 415 at 432; Olayinka Vs. The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1006) 561.
He submitted that the prosecution in this case failed woefully to link the appellant with the death of the deceased Indo Dago and his conviction is liable to be quashed.
Learned counsel referred to the offence of conspiracy alleged against the appellant and the other accused persons who were tried together at the trial Court and contended that the charge of conspiracy was never established by the prosecution. He referred to the definition of conspiracy and contended that none of the prosecution’s witnesses, that is, PW1-PW6 established the two ingredients of conspiracy in their evidence on record. He contended further that the entire evidence adduced was hearsay, which is inadmissible in law. He relied on Ahmed Vs. The State (1999) 5 SCNJ 223 at 241.
Learned counsel referred to the testimony of each of the PWs one after the other and submitted that the said evidence was not cogent, credible, clear or unqequivocal to sustain the guilt of the appellant and he urged the Court to so hold. He cited Aigbadion Vs. The State (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt.666) 686 at 701.
Learned counsel contended that the appellant was not arrested at the scene of the crime and no weapon was recovered from him. He submitted that it is wrong to convict the appellant as done by the trial Court and as affirmed by the Court below on his purported confessional statement which he said was retracted on the ground of involuntariness. He submitted further that the lower Court erred in law when it stated in its judgment that the assertion of the appellant in his oral testimony on the voluntariness of his confessional statement and his retraction of same was clearly an afterthought and an affront to reason, and the error has occasioned a great miscarriage of justice against the appellant. He urged the court to so hold.
Learned counsel submitted that an accused person has the right to challenge the voluntariness of his confessional statement on appeal contrary to the holding of the lower Court. He relied on Inusa Saidu Vs. The State (supra) and Paul Ameh Vs. The State (1978) 6-5 SC Reprint at p. 21 at 35.
He contended that the corroborative evidence required in the circumstances of the instant case is legally admissible evidence but not the type of
evidence adduced by the prosecution’s witnesses in this case, in particular, PW1, PW2 and PW4 upon which the two Courts below relied in convicting and affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant.
Learned counsel referred to the six tests to be applied to a confessional statement that can ground conviction in criminal matter and contended that all the requirements must be met conjunctively but not disjunctively. He submitted that in this case the requirements were not met. And that where the confessional statement fails to pass the test, no conviction can properly be founded on it, and if any is founded on it, on appeal, it will be hard to sustain. He relied on Dawa Vs. The State (1980) 8-11 SC 147; Oseni Vs. The State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1415) 613 at 637.
Learned counsel contended that although there has been a concurrent finding by the two Courts below and agreed that this Court does not ordinarily interfere with same unless a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. He submitted that this case falls within the exception to the general rule in which this Court is precluded from interfering with the concurrent findings. He urged the
Court to so hold relying on, Amadi Vs. FRN (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1119) 259 at 282-283.
He finally urged the Court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the appellant, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court which affirmed the decision of the trial Court. He urged the Court to acquit and discharge the appellant in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
In the respondent’s brief of argument, settled by Abdul Mohammed of Madyan Legal Consult filed on 21/2/2018 but deemed properly filed and served on 11/04/2018 the sole issue earlier referred to was formulated for determination of the appeal.
In arguing the said lone issue, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the law is that the concurrent decision of the two Courts below will only be interfered with where it is found that the decision is perverse or the trial Court had applied wrong principle of law to accepted fact in this case. He relied on Anyegwu Vs. Onuche (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt.1129) 659 at 674. He agreed and conceded that that is the position of the law but contended that the said principle is not applicable to the instant case. He submitted that
the conditions in the case on hand does not require the intervention of this Court in reversing the concurrent findings of the two Courts below.
Learned counsel submitted that Exhibits D and D1 were properly admitted in evidence contrary to the objection by the appellant that because PW6 was not the one that arrested the appellant, the testimony regarding the manner in which the confessional statement was taken from the appellant is hearsay. He contended that it is not part of our jurisprudence that a police officer must be the arresting officer before he could be competent to take the statement of an accused. He submitted that what is necessary in law for a confessional statement to be admissible is that it must have been made in compliance with Sections 27 and 28 of the Evidence Act, Cap E14 Laws of Federation of Nigeria 2004 which was the extant law at the time of the trial of the appellant. He relied on Sule Vs. The State (2009) All FWLR (Pt.482) 809 at 830; Arogundade Vs. The State (2009) All FWLR (Pt.469) 409; Onungwa Vs. State (1976) 2 SC 169.
Learned counsel submitted that the complaint that the confession was made to PW6 who was not the
arresting Police Officer is not enough to prevent the Court from relying on the confessional statement.
Learned counsel referred to the findings of the Court below on pages 147 and 149 of the record on the said confessional statements of the appellant and submitted that the findings cannot be impugned by the appellant, as he cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time. He contended that the appellant cannot at the trial allege that he never made the statement and come on appeal to contend that the statement was obtained involuntarily from him. He submitted that a party should be consistent in stating his case and in proving it. He relied on Ajide Vs. Kelani (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.12) 248.
Learned counsel submitted that the fact that a confessional statement is retracted at the trial is no good reason not to have it admitted as evidence. But that before a conviction can be based on a retracted extrajudicial statements made by an accused person, it is desirable to have some evidence which make it probable that the confession is true. He relied onMusa Vs. State (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt.1286) 59 at 74.
On the evidence outside the retracted
confessional statement learned counsel referred to the testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW4 and the findings of the lower Court on same. He submitted that the testimonies of PW1, PW3 and PW4 of what each of them saw in the deceased’s room is not hearsay. He urged the Court to so hold.
Learned counsel contended that where an appeal is against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below, such findings can only be set aside on appeal if they are found to be perverse in the sense that they have not evolved from the evidence on record or that the two Courts arrived at the concurrent findings by relying on extraneous matters and because of either reason the findings have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. He relied on Ibeme Vs. State (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt.1362) 333.
Learned counsel submitted that this Court has consistently held that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts unless such findings are perverse or manifestly wrong or have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. He relied on Avan Vs. The State (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt.1376) 34. He submitted that the judgment of the Court below in affirming the decision of the trial
Court is premised on settled principles of law and nothing has been put before this Court to cause it to upturn the decision of the Court below. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal after resolving the sole issue against the appellant.
As earlier stated, the appellant was charged, tried and convicted along with some others for the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery. He was sentence to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Court below which led to the instant appeal.
Generally, it is trite law that the proper approach to an indictment which contains conspiracy charge and substantive charges is to deal with the latter first, that is, the substantive charge and then proceed to see how far the conspiracy count has been made out in answer to the fate of the charge of conspiracy.
Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. Therefore, failure to prove substantive offence does not, in any way, make conviction for conspiracy inappropriate, being a separate and distinct offence in itself, independent of the actual offence conspired to commit. See; Segun Balogun Vs. A.G.
Ogun State (2002 2 SC (Pt.11) 89; (2002) 4 SCM 23; (2002) 2 SCNJ 196; Osetola Vs. The State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt.1329) 251; (2012) 12 SCM (Pt.2) 347.
The substantive offence in this case was armed robbery.
Robbery generally is the illegal taking of property from the person of another or in the person’s presence by violence or intimidation. While armed robbery is robbery committed by a person carrying a dangerous weapon regardless of whether the weapon is revealed or used. See; Akeem Agboola Vs. The State (2013) LPELR – 20652; (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt.1366) 619; (2013) 8 SCM 157; (2013) All FWLR (Pt.704) 139; (2013) 54 NSCQR (Pt.11) 1162; (2013) 5 SCNJ 653.
It is trite law that for the prosecution to establish the offence of armed robbery, the following are required to be proved: –
(a) That there was infact a robbery or series of robberies;
(b) That the robbery was an armed robbery;
(c) That the accused person was the armed robber or one of the armed robbers.
See; Bozin Vs. State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.8) 465 at 467; Alabi Vs. State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.307) 551; Olayinka Vs. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1040) 561; (2007) 8 SCM 193;
Osetola & Anor Vs. The State (supra).
The law is settled that there are various ways of proving the guilt of an accused person standing trial. It can be proved by:
(a) Confessional Statement of an accused person;
(b) Evidence of eye witness of the crime;
(c) Circumstantial evidence.
See; Agboola Vs. The State (Supra); Nigerian Navy & Ors Vs. Lambert (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt.1066) 300; Alufohai Vs. The State (2014) 12 SCM (Pt.2) 122; (2015) 3 NWLR (Pt.1445) 172.
Under our criminal justice system, an accused person is presumed innocent until the prosecution prove his guilt. Hence, an accused is not expected to prove his innocence before the law Court. It is clearly the duty of the prosecution to establish the charges against an accused beyond reasonable doubt. See; Uche Williams Vs. The State (1992) 10 SCNJ 74; (1992) NWLR (Pt.261) 515; (1992) LPELR – 3492.
There is no doubt that the trial Court relied on the confessional statement of the appellant to find him guilty and be convicted as charged.
Before the trial Court, the prosecution had through PW6, tendered the statements of the appellant allegedly given to the
Police in Hausa language which was translated into English language. Both were tendered. PW6 testified that after the appellant gave the statement, he took him to his superior, named Ade Hamzat who endorsed the said statement in red ink after ascertaining from the appellant that it was his statement. The record however shows that the counsel to the appellant first objected to the admissibility of the said statement on the ground that it was not made by his client – the appellant, at all. But having been informed that mere denial of making a statement by an accused is no bar to its admissibility, the defence counsel withdrew his objection and the statement was admitted and marked as Exhibits D and D1 respectively.
In his oral testimony in his defence in Court the appellant as 1st Accused and as DW1 testified that he was arrested at Kankara Market where he went to get passengers. He was later taken to Rimi Police Station and locked up in the cell. He claimed to have been beaten and hanged because he denied being involved in any robbery incident or death of the deceased. He stated that he saw the Police writing on a paper which he was later forced to
thumb print. The trial Court upon the evaluation of the total evidence adduced was convinced that the appellant made the statement credited to him as confessional statement.
On appeal to the Court below, the said statement was considered Exhibit D1. The appellant’s counsel had complained against the reliance placed on the confessional statement by the trial Court in convicting and sentencing the appellant, contending that the appellant had led evidence in his defence that he knew nothing about the alleged offences. The Court below had found, inter alia, as follows:
“Now the records of appeal show that neither the appellant nor his counsel objected to the admissibility of the confessional statement on the ground of involuntariness when it was being tendered by the sixth prosecution witness. Counsel to the appellant did not object to the admissibility of the confessional statement on the ground that the appellant was compelled to make the statement under torture or duress when the respondent sought to tender it in evidence…. the proper time to object to the admissibility of a confessional statement on the ground of involuntariness is when it is
about to be tendered in evidence so as to allow the issue of voluntariness to be determined by a trial within trial and where it is not so raised, it is too late to raise it in the defence.” See pages 149-150 of the Record.
Still on the attack on the alleged Exhibit D1, the Court below further found as follows:
“Again, the evidence of the appellant in his defence on the making of the confessional statement was completely at variance with the statements made by the counsel when he raised objection to the tendering of the confessional statement. It will be recalled that the counsel stated at the time that the appellant denied making any statement to the police and that the appellant only gave his particulars to the sixth prosecution witness who proceeded to write the statement. This is not the same thing as saying that the confessional statement was obtained by duress or torture….
Looking at the contents of Exhibit D1, it started with the family, educational and work background of the appellant as well as his history of criminality and from there proceeded to the activities of the appellant on the day of the commission of the crime, including the
details of the planning and execution of the crime, and then the execution of the crime, and then the aftermath of the crime and his arrest. The story was properly sequenced, well structured and patterned and it was a continuous narrative which told a flowing and consistent story of the appellant…. It gave a detailed account of events that could only be recounted by an active participant in the commission of the crime.”
In view of the above findings, the Court below came to the conclusion that there was nothing presented by the appellant to warrant the need for the trial Court to look for corroborative evidence.
At this juncture, I consider it apposite to have a look at the controversial alleged confessional statement of the appellant in Exhibit D1. It is on pages 101-104 of the records as follows:
“I was born at Rugar Wake Village in Kuraye District of Rimi Local Government Area about 28 years ago. My father is Samina Ali and he is still alive living in Rugar Wake. I am his fifth son, he has divorced my mother since 10 years ago. My mother whose name is Hassu is now married to one man at Yau Mariga in Kurfi Local Government area. I attended Rugar
Wake Primary School but I did not complete it. I was in Class two when I left the school and become a motor conductor for Alhaji Yunusa Mai Kangudu at Charanchi. After three years he sold the vehicle so I went to one Audu Soja at Abukur but he died then I went to Alhaji Sale Giwa at Charanchi to be his motor conductor.
There I stole his petrol and ran away to Rugar Wake and stayed. It was there at Rugar Wake that I broke into the shop of one Isiyaka Ahmadu and stole some provisions which included Cigarettes, Batteries, soaps and some other things. I was arrested and taken to Court at Charanchi where I was convicted to two years imprisonment at Katsina prison. After I finished the sentence I went back home where I again stole beans belonging to our neighbor by name Shuaibu. I was also arrested but we settled that. I was to pay back the beans which I paid.
I could remember on Thursday 27/6/96 at about 2100hrs at Rugar Wake we started gambling myself, (1) Musa Namanu (ii) Gambo Saidu (iii) Habu Alhaji Duntaguwa (iv) Ma’aru Tukura (v) Buhari Lawal and (vi) Rasku who is the leader of the gambling. They won me and Buhari Lawal, then I and
Buhari Lawal went to our house and ate food, we also went to Buhari Lawal’s house and eat food and came back to where we were gambling. I removed my shirt and I pledged it to Musa Namanu at N60.00. The money was won again at the gamble, so I went home and took another shirt and came back again and sat down. Then Buhari Lawal said that he had Indian Hemp that we should go and smoke it. Myself and him went behind the Ward Head house near a pool of water it was about 0130hrs of Friday 28/6/96. While we were still smoking the Indian hemp Habu, Alhaji Dantaguwa came and met us, Ma’aru Tukura also came, we become five in number with Musa Namanu. After we have finished smoking, among us only Musa Namanu had money on him decided th We all decided that since we don’t have money we should go and steal. Then Buhari Lawal said that let him go home and bring his torch light and a knife, we told him that if he took… we should meet at Jammat mosque. He went home and we all met at the Jammat mosque. He brought the knife and the torch light, we all went to the house of Ma’aru’s brother by name Nari, and Buhari climbed the wall of the fence and looked into the house but sheep started
making noise so we left that house. Then Habu Alhaji Dantaguwa said we should go to the house of Indo Dago that he saw when someone brought money to her on Thursday 27/6/96. We went to her house at about 0200hrs of Friday 28/6/96. We met the door closed with an old bed made up of woods and langa-langa, then Buhari Lawal brought out his knife and cut the rope used in tying the door. We then all went inside and look into the room and saw Indo Dago sleeping on her bed, we were about to decide on what to do, then Ma’aru said that there was nothing to discuss, he took a wooden handle of an axe and hit her on the head. She started struggling to get up when the remaining four of us pinned her down to the bed and Buhari Lawal brought out his knife and stabbed her on the neck and she died. Myself and Ma’aru came out and stood watching whether somebody could come out but nobody came out, while Musa Namanu, Habu Alhaji Dantaguwa and Buhari Lawal ransacked the room and found N650.00. We came out nobody saw us we sent behind the town and shared the money everyone of us get N100.00 each remaining balance of N150.00 and Buhari Lawal brought out card and we gambled on it and
Musa Namanu won it.”
In the said Exhibit D1 the appellant proceeded to state what he did from the morning of Friday 28th June, 1996, until he was arrested on 2nd of July, 1996. I had quoted the alleged statement of the appellant copiously to show the narration and sequence of his story.
There is no doubt that the above is a confessional statement of the appellant made to the Police on 4/7/1996. Ordinarily, a confessional statement of a suspect is admissible if it is direct and positive and relates to his own acts, knowledge or intention, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime charged. See; Solomon Thomas Akpan Vs. The State (1992) NWLR (Pt.248) ; (1992) & SCNJ 22; (1992) LPELR – 381. And it is well settled that a confessional statement does not become inadmissible merely because it is subsequently retracted by the maker.
Generally, by virtue of Section 29 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, Laws of the Federation, a confessional Statement is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. It is an extrajudicial statement made by an
accused person to the Police containing assertion of admission showing that he participated in the commission of the offence for which he stands accused. Therefore, once admitting the charge or creating the impression that he committed the offence charged, the statement becomes confessional.
When a confessional statement has been proved to have been made voluntarily and it is positive, direct and unequivocal, it amounts to an admission of guilt and it is enough to sustain the conviction of an accused. Any subsequent retraction by the maker of such a statement, in the cause of the trial, does not affect the admissibility of such a confession. See; Egboghonome vs. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.306) 383; Bature Vs. The State (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt,.320) 267; Sotola Vs. The State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt.1422) 613; (2014) 8 SCM 34; (2014) 50-6 SC (Pt.2) 68.
And it is well settled that once the Court is satisfied with its truth, a proved confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground and support conviction without corroboration. However, the test for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement is to seek any other evidence, no
matter how slight, of circumstances which make it probable that the confession is true. See; Asimiyu Alarape & Ors Vs. The State (2001) LPELR 412; (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt.705) 79; (2001) 3 SCM 1; (2001) 2 SC 114.
As I stated earlier, the appellant’s confessional statement, which was tendered and admitted in evidence without proper required objection was direct, cogent and positive enough to earn the appellant the conviction he got for the offence charged.
However, notwithstanding the status of the confessional statement of the appellant, the Court is enjoined to apply the required tests to the said confessional statement to verify the veracity or otherwise of the statement. The tests are: –
(a) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true;
(b) Whether the statement is corroborated no matter how slight;
(c) Whether the facts contained therein so far as can be tested, are true;
(d) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence;
(e) Whether the confession of the accused person was possible;
(f) Whether the confession was consistent with other fact which has been
ascertained and proved in the matter.
See; Alarape & Ors Vs. The State (supra) Akpan Vs. State (2001) 11 SCM 66; (2001) 53 WRN 1; Osetola & Anor Vs. The State (Supra).
On the record, the Court below had found that the trial Court recognized and applied the required tests earlier stated to the confessional statement credited to the appellant and admitted as Exhibits D & D1 and the Court found corroborative evidence in the testimonies of the 1st, 3rd and 4th prosecution witnesses. The Court below also found as follows:
“The 1st, 3rd and 4th prosecution witnesses testified that they saw Indo Dago dead, lying in a pool of blood in her room. The 1st prosecution witness testified that he discovered that the door to the room of the deceased was removed and that she had a deep cut on her neck. These pieces of evidence corroborated the portion of the confessional statement of the appellant as how they gained entry into the house of the victim and on the place of attack of the victim, i.e. her room and the part of the body of the victim that was stabbed, her neck.”
On the above, the Court below came to the conclusion that the findings of
the trial Court that the testimonies of the 1st, 3rd and 4th prosecution witnesses constitute independent evidence verifying the contents of the confessional statement cannot be faulted.
Further, the Court below opined that the contents of the confessional statement Exhibit D1 proved the ingredients of the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and of armed robbery with which the appellant was charged beyond reasonable doubt.
I am convinced that the appellant has not shown any cause to warrant the interference of this Court with the concurrent findings of the facts of the two Courts below. It is clear that the trial Court rightly relied on the confessional statement of the appellant to convict him as charged. And the conviction and sentence were rightly affirmed by the Court below.
In the final analysis, the sole issue distilled from the four grounds of appeal is resolved against the appellant. The appeal is liable to be dismissed and it is hereby accordingly dismissed.
In the circumstance, the judgment of the Court below of 5th May, 2015 which had earlier affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant is affirmed.
Appeal is dismissed.