Evarist Eze V. The State (1985) LLJR-SC

Evarist Eze V. The State (1985)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

C. A. OPUTA, J.S.C. 

The court heard the above appeal on the 10th day of September, 1985. After close and careful study of the record of proceedings and the Briefs filed by counsel on either side; and after listening to oral arguments by counsel, in elaboration of the various issues canvassed in their respect briefs; the court, there and then, dismissed the appeal and reserved its reasons for the dismissal to the 6th day of December, 1985.

Hereunder are my reasons. The original ground filed by the appellant himself from his prison cell reads as follows:-

“That the Court of Appeal has not based its findings on the weight of evidence and law.”

This ground was abandoned by Mr. Mogboh, learned counsel for the appellant and was consequently struck out. Leave of Court was sought and obtained by the appellant’s counsel to file and argue two “Additional Grounds of Appeal.” During the argument however, the second ground was also abandoned by learned counsel for the appellant. That ground was also accordingly struck out. Only one ground was in fact argued.

That ground reads:”

Ground 1

The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held at p. 79 Lines 11-16 as follows:-

“The finding of the key that filled the motor cycle, the property of P.W.1, is sufficient together with other pieces of evidence as to the identity of the appellant as they lead to no other conclusion than the appellant’s participation in the robbery.”

Particulars of Error

(i) The circumstantial evidence was not conclusive enough.

(ii) Possession of Ex. E, i.e. the ignition key was not conclusive.

(iii) The “stolen property” was a motor-cycle not an ignition key that can start a motor-cycle.

(iv) No effort was made by the prosecution to test Ex. E with the appellant’s own motor-cycle RV 9136 PB Honda CD 175.

(v) The mere fact that Exhibits D and E had been in the possession of P.W.1 from April 1981 to April 1983 (having been released to him by the police) leaves possibility of a change of the ignition keys.”

To appreciate and better follow the arguments, it may be necessary to have a brief resume of the facts of this case. In the early hours of the morning of the 14th July, 1981, Livinus Eke called as the 1st P.W. was riding on his Suzuki motor-cycle model 125 with registration No. 1M 1453 along Faulks Road, Aba. He then saw two persons beside a motor-cycle, one was looking beneath it, while the other was standing beside it. Livinus rode close to them thinking they had some trouble with their motor-cycle. On approaching them, they ordered him to stop and to put up his hands. When he obeyed, one of them – the Appellant – pointeq a gun at him (Livinus) who then dropped his own Suzuki motor-cycle and fled. The Appellant fired at him and missed. On looking behind, Livinus Eke discovered that the Appellant and his other partner in crime had collected his motor-cycle and their own motor-cycle and disappeared.

In the evening of the self same day, 14/7/81, Gilbert Eke (called as 5th P.W.) the son of Livinus Eke (1st P.W.) on his way back from the Ariaria Market saw someone riding his father’s motor-cycle, stolen that morning. He followed him ultimately to a Beer Parlour. Having satisfied himself that the motor-cycle he saw earlier on was his father’s missing motor-cycle, Gilbert Eke went home and told his father. Both of them went to the Ariaria police Post and reported. Following their report, sergeant Donatus Esele, Sgt. NO. 5168, called as 2nd P.W., Newton Dunu, Sgt. No. 29904, called as 3rd P.W. and PC. No. 92503, Ukpabi Ekoh, called as 4th P.W., all proceeded to the Beer Parlour. On reaching the Beer Parlour, Gilbert Eke (5th P.W.) identified his father’s motor-cycle to the police officers – and immediately he did that, two men among the crowd drinking in the Beer Parlour got up from their seats. One ran away, but the other, the Appellant, was arrested.

The Appellant was then taken to the Ariaria Police Post along with Livinus Eke’s missing Suzuki motor-cycle parked in front of the Beer Parlour. The Suzuki motor-cycle was pushed to the Police Post. At the Ariaria Police Post, Sgt. Donatus Esele (2nd P.W.) personally searched the Appellant and found, tucked away in his breast pocket, a Suzuki 125 ignition key. Sgt. Newton Dunu, No.29904 (3rd P.W.) obtained a voluntary statement from the Appellant after the usual caution. The statement was tendered as Ex. e. Exhibit C contained this remarkable sentence –

“I did not know how the ignition key of the Suzuki manage and enter my pocket.”

This was a summary of the prosecution’s case against the Appellant.

In addition to this Statement, EX. C, the Appellant gave oral evidence in court and called one witness Ferdinand Onyebuchi. The Appellant denied being an armed robber. He however admitted that the Police (2nd P.W., 3rd P.W. and 4th P.W.) along with Livinus Eke, 1st P.W. and his son, Gilbert Eke, 5th P.W. met him at the Beer Parlour; that “a man come out of the Beer Parlour and started running”; that the Police witnesses asked him to go along with them to Ariaria Police Post. He denied knowing anything about the ignition key of the Suzuki Motor-cycle, although he admitted making the Statement, EX. C. to 3rd P.W. The evidence of Onyebuchi, 2nd D. W. dealt with the Appellant’s Honda motor-cycle which he (Onyebuchi) alleged he recovered from Corp!. Dunu on 20th July, 1981.

The next vital question that naturally arises is – Which side did the trial judge believe After this comes another important and closely related question – Was there any credible evidence to justify the trial judge in his belief In his judgment, the learned trial judge noted:-

“In the instant case all the evidence point not just circumstantially but directly, forcefully and irresistibly to the accused as having been associated with the snatching of EX. D) the Suzuki motor-cycle)” .

He then went on:-

“I accept the evidence of P.W.1………The accused has been properly and sufficiently identified as having been involved in the snatching of the motor-cycle. P.W.1 had ample opportunity of identifying him. P.W. 5 saw two persons standing in a mechanic’s shed beside two motor cycles one of which is EX. D (the Suzuki motor cycle of 1st P.W.)………At the Beer Parlour P.W.5 saw two men stand up when he pointed Ex. D to the Police. One of them ran away but accused was arrested. The cumulative effect of this chain of events in all of which the accused featured, point irresistibly to the accused and no one else as the associate and partner in crime with the runaway man…….I am satisfied from the evidence that this charge has been proved……I find the accused guilty.”

From the above, it is clear that the trial court believed the prosecution witnesses. He saw them give evidence. He watched their demeanour and he believed them. That belief was not perverse, it was not against the natural drift of the evidence, it was not unreasonable. Neither the court below nor this Court can thus intervene to upset the trial court’s findings of fact based on the credibility of witnesses that Court saw, heard and believed. The ground of appeal argued will thus be argued against the background of trial judge’s findings of fact (as set out above) and no more.

The first of the “Particulars of Error” complains that “the circumstantial evidence was not conclusive enough”. The court usually relies on circumstantial evidence where there is no direct evidence linking the person accused with the crime with which he stands charged. But here there was the direct oral evidence of (1st P.W.) Livinus Eke that “accused then pointed a gun at me ….and fired his gun behind me”. In other words, there was direct oral evidence of the Appellant’s participation in the robbery. The prosecution’s case did not rest only on circumstantial evidence. I agree with the observation of the learned trial judge that in this case “all the evidence point not just circumstantially but directly, forcefully and irresistibly to the accused as having been associated with the snatching of EX.D (the Suzuki motor cycle).”

In addition to direct oral testimony, the court can also rely on Presumptions. One such presumption which will adequately fit in with the facts of this case is the presumption:-

“that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.”

This is the statutory provision of Section 148(a) of the Evidence Law of Eastern Nigeria (Cap 49 of 1963) applicable in Imo State. The above Section 148(a) of the Evidence Law is thus the Nigerian equivalent of the English doctrine of Recent Possession (of Stolen Goods). For this doctrine to operate there ought to be evidence:-

1. That the accused (here the Appellant) was found in possession of some goods.
2. That those goods were recently stolen.
3. That the Appellant failed to account for his possession.

The expression “soon after the theft” – (in other words how soon will the possession be to lead to the inference that the possessor was the thief and not merely the receiver with guilty knowledge) – will naturally depend on the nature of the goods and the facility and ease with which that type of goods can pass from hand to hand: R v. Palmer Iyakwe (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 180: Kwartia Kwashie v. The King (1930) 13 W.A.C.A. 86. In Palmer Iyakewe’s case, the Appellant was found in possession of the stolen shoes “five months after the theft” and the West African Court of Appeal held that – “the doctrine of recent possession cannot operate in such a way as to make it proper for the Appellant to be convicted of the burglary and stealing”. A verdict of guilty of receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen was accordingly substituted by W.A.C.A. In Kwartie Kwashie’s case, the Appellant was found in possession of stolen articles barely 90 minutes after the theft and the West African Court of Appeal held that from those circumstances, it was open to the trial court to convict the Appellant of house breaking and stealing. Before deciding whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, the Appellant’s possession was recent, that is, that it was soon after the robbery to lead the trial court and the Court of Appeal to the conclusion they arrived at – that the Appellant was one of the armed robbers who being armed with a gun robbed Livinus Eke (1st P.W.) of his 125 Suzuki motorcycle on 14th July 1981, I will like to emphasise the point made by the West African Court of Appeal in Kwartie Kwashie’s case supra.

The presumption of “Recent Possession” as contained in Section 148(a) of the Evidence Act is not a presumption of law but a presumption of fact. If it were a presumption of law (praesumptionis juris et de jure) it will be an absolute inference established by law and therefore irrebuttable. But being a presumption of fact, it is inconclusive and rebuttable. In fact the marginal heading of Section 148 of Evidence Law clearly states – “The Court may presume the existence of certain facts.”

The presumption that an appellant found in recent possession of stolen property is either the thief or the receiver with guilty knowledge is merely an inference which the court of trial is at liberty to draw, (not must draw) from the facts and surrounding circumstances of each particular case. In any given case, the court may think that the totality of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances do not support the inference that the person accused was the thief or receiver with guilty knowledge.

In such a case, Section 148(a) of Evidence Law and the presumption therein contained fail. Section 148(a) above clearly meant this when it made the presumption subject to “unless he can account for his possession.” Where the person accused successfully accounts for his possession, he may be found “not guilty.”

But to be able to account for “his possession” the fact of such possession will first of all be unequivocally admitted. In the case on appeal, the issues agitated in the only ground argued will boil down to:-

1. Was anything found in the possession of the appellant linking him with the robbery complained of
2. Was the appellant’s possession recent
3. Did the appellant give any explanation or did he account for his possession

Were the trial court, and the Court of Appeal, on the totality of the evidence and all the surrounding circumstances, justified in finding the appellant guilty of Armed Robbery

I will now consider the issues raised above one by one. The most devastating evidence against the appellant is the evidence of Donatus Esele, Sgt. No. 5168 (2nd P.W.):-

“On 14/7/81, I was on duty at Ariaria Police Station. Two men came to the Police Station at about 7 p.m. and lodged a report that they had seen a motor-cycle belonging to one of the complainants which had been stolen at the early hours of the same day…….. I followed them. When we got to the place where the motor cycle was parked two men among the people drinking got up ….. One of the two men took to his heels and I ordered the constable to hold one still there …….The accused is the person the constable apprehended………We took the accused to the Police Station along with the motor cycle. At the Police Station/searched him and recovered a Suzuki 125 ignition key in his breast pocket.”

There was evidence that the ignition key found on the appellant was the ignition key of the motor-cycle of (1st P.W.) Livinus Eke which was involved in the robbery of the same day 14/7/81. The appellant’s possession of the ignition key was therefore recent. What was the explanation of the appellant On the very same day, 14/7/81, when the matter was still fresh in his mind, the appellant made a statement to the Ariaria Police which was tendered as Ex. C. There, he said, “I did not know how the ignition key of the Suzuki manage and enter my pocket.. ” The appellant did not deny, or, more accurately, could not possibly deny possession of the ignition key of the Suzuki motor-cycle of 1st P.W. found on him (in his breast pocket).

Two questions now arise, namely:-

(a) Is the possession of the ignition key of the Suzuki motor-cycle of 1st P.W. the possession of the stolen motor cycle

(b) What conclusion, what inference, can any fair-minded jury draw from the appellant’s unexplained possession at 7 p.m. of 14/7/81 of an ignition key of a motor-cycle snatched away from the owner during a robbery which occurred “after 5 a.m. of the same 14/7/81.”

In answer to the first question, learned counsel for the appellant argued both in his Brief and oral argument that what was stolen in the robbery was a Suzuki motor-cyle and not the ignition key of a Suzuki motor-cycle. He then concluded that “Possession of Ex. E, i.e. the ignition key, was not conclusive.” The above argument portrays a radical misconception of the theory of possession in our jurisprudence. Lord Fitzgerald in Lord Advocate v. Young (1887) 12 App. Cas. p. 556 was quick to point out that “by possession is meant possession of that character of which the thing is capable.” Thus in the interesting case of The Tubantia (1924) Probate 78 the plaintiff was held to be in possession of a wreck which lay in the open sea at twenty fathoms depth because he had located the wreck, marked the spot with buoys, and sent divers down on such days as the state of the sea allowed. Possession implies not only physical power or custody over the res but also (and even more importantly) the power to exclude others. How can the latter power be exercised over a motor vehicle (be it a car or a motor cycle) more than by the possession of the ignition key It is my humble view that in the surrounding circumstances of this case, the possession of the ignition key of the motor cycle is possession of the said motor cycle. In the case of Jewish Maternity Society’s Trustees v. Garfinkle (1926) 95 UKB. it was held that the possession of the key to an unoccupied building is the possession of the building. The trial court and the court below were therefore both right in drawing the inference they drew that the appellant’s unexplained possession of the ignition key to the Suzuki motor cycle of Livinus Eke which was snatched away from him in the morning of 14/7/81 was proof of his possession of the said motor cycle.

Now to the second question – What presumption, what ‘conclusion will the court rightly make or arrive at in this case The presumption which S.148(a) of Evidence Law allows is that, depending on the peculiar circumstances of the case, the appellant in unexplained possession of a recently stolen motor cycle is either the thief or the receiver with guilty knowledge. In the case of appeal, the appellant’s case is not that he received or bought the motor cycle in good faith and that he did not and could not from the surrounding circumstances have known that it was stolen. That was not his case. So the question of a receiver with guilty knowledge is here a non-issue. It is only where the appellant’s case is that he as an innocent receiver that guilty knowledge or otherwise becomes an issue – Isaac Schama and Jacob Abramovitch (1914) 1 Cr. App. R. 45 refers. In the case of lames Loughlin (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 69 where it was proved that premises had been broken into and property stolen therefrom and that very soon after the breaking, the prisoner had been found in possession of that property, it was held that it was open to the jury to find the prisoner guilty of breaking and entering and the jury should be so directed.

But the charge against the appellant was Armed Robbery not just stealing. This now raises the question I posed earlier on -Were the courts below on the totality of all the evidence and surrounding circumstances justified in finding the appellant guilty or Armed Robbery The evidence of Livinus Eke (1st P.W.) was that he “saw two persons besides a motor cycle’, one was looking underneath it, whereas the other was standing. He got near to them and they ordered him to raise his hands up The accused then pointed a gun at me. I dropped my motor cycle and started to run away.” Continuing his evidence, 1st P.W. Livinus Eke said. “The accused fired his gun behind me.” This witness was not cross-examined on this vital issue. There was not as much as a suggestion that he was lying or mistaken, that nothing like that happened. The trial court believed the evidence of Livinus Eke and that evidence proved all the essential ingredients of the armed robbery charged. The circumstantial evidence – the finding of the ignition key of the Suzuki motor cycle in the breast pocket of the appellant merely reinforced the direct oral testimony of Livinus Eke that the appellant (and his partner in crime) on 1417/81 robbed him, at gun point, of his Suzuki motor cycle.

Now, after this armed robbery which took place after 5 a.m. of 14/7/81, where the appellant and one other snatched the Suzuki motor-cycle of 1st D P.W. (Livinus Eke) from him, his son Gilbert Eke (5th P.W.) returning from the market on the same 14/7/81 saw someone riding his father’s motorcycle. He and his father (1st P. W.) reported to the Police and in the company of the Police traced the stolen motor-cycle to a Beer Parlour. The 5th P.W. identified his father’s motor-cycle outside and immediately “two persons in the Beer Parlour got up from their seats and one of them ran away but the accused was arrested.” From the sequence of events, the following facts appear in bold relief:-

(1) At the tie of the robbery, 1st P.W., Livinus Eke saw “two persons beside a motor cycle; one was looking underneath it whereas the other was standing beside it.”

(2) After the robbery, the 1st P.W. “looked behind and noticed that F they had col/ected my motor-cycle and their own.” They now had two motor-cycles.

(3) At the Beer Parlour, two motor-cycles were seen outside, one of them being the very one snatched from the 1st P. W. during the dawn armed robbery of the same day.

(4) As the 5th P.W., Gilbert Eke pointed at one of the two motor-cycles parked outside the Beer Parlour, “two persons in the Beer Parlour got up from their seats; one of them ran away but the accused was arrested.”

(5) The appellant was immediately taken to Ariaria Police Station where he was searched and the ignition key of the Suzuki, stolen in the dawn robbery of the very same day 14/7/81 was found in his breast pocket. He had another key to a Honda motor cycle.

What do all these things prove One thing is certain – not only that the appellant took part in the dawn robbery but also that he was the principal actor- He held the gun, be fired at P.W.1, he had the two keys. To use the language of the learned trial Judge:-

“The cumulative effect of this chain of events in all of which the accused featured, point irresistibly to the accused and no one else as the associate and partner in crime with the runaway man.”

“The Particulars of Error No.1” in the Ground of Appeal complaining that:-

“The circumstantial evidence was not conclusive enough.”

is clearly and definitely misconceived and wrong. There was direct evidence. But that notwithstanding the circumstantial evidence in this case can lead only to one conclusion and that is, that the appellant was one of the armed robbers.

It was also contended in “Particulars of Error No. IV” that – “No effort was made by the prosecution to test Ex. E with the appellant’s own motorcycle.” Now Ex. E was the Suzuki 125 ignition key recovered from the breast pocket of the appellant. It was not the appellant’s case that Ex. E was the ignition key of his own motor cycle RV 9136 PB Honda CD 175. Therefore whether Ex. E could start his Honda motor cycle was not an issue between the parties.

I must confess that I do not quite understand the point the learned counsel for the appellant was making when he argued that “the mere fact that (the motor cycle) Ex. D and (the ignition key) Ex. E had been in the possession of the 1st P.W. from April, 1981 to April, 1983 (having been released to him by the Police) leaves a possibility for a change of the ignition keys.” In the first place, a court bases its judgment on facts proved in evidence. A change of ignition keys is a fact. If that fact is relevant to the case of either party in this case, such party should at .least introduce evidence to prove it. In this case, the appellant was searched on the same very day of the robbery, 14/7/81 and the Suzuki ignition key found on him started the stolen motor-cycle of Livinus Eke, the 1st P.W. What then was the necessity or relevance of “change of ignition keys” I do not know.

There is one final point which was relied upon during the argument but which was not made a ground of appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant referred the Court to the learned trial Judge’s comments at p. 48 of the Record as follows:-

“However that may be I strongly recommend the accused to mercy so that the appropriate authorities may exercise their prerogative and committee the sentence of death by hanging to a term of imprisonment for these mitigating circumstances. Neither the accused nor his colleague had any intention to kill the complainant because they could have done so if that was their desire. The gun was not recovered. Thirdly, the Police investigation was slip shod in that they ought to have removed the motor cycle they found when they collected Exhibit D from the Beer Parlour to Ariaria Police post. ”

Relying on the above, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial Judge had doubts about the guilt of the appellant. As I observed earlier on, this was not a ground of appeal. Secondly, after conviction and sentence as at the end of p. 47 of the Record, the learned trial judge became defunctus officio. He could not reopen his own judgment in order to comment on same. In any event, intention to kill though an essential ingredient of murder as defined by S. 319 of the Criminal Code is not an ingredient of armed robbery as charged. Thirdly, any recommendation for mercy should follow the strict wording of Section 370(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap 31 of 1963) of Eastern Nigeria applicable to Imo State to wit:-

“S.370(1) After the sentence of death has been pronounced the presiding Judge shall, as soon as conveniently may be, forward to the appropriate authority a copy of the finding and sentence and of his notes of evidence taken at the trial together with a report in writing signed by him containing any recommendation or observations on the case which he thinks fit to make.”

The Report envisaged by Section 370(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law above does not form part of the judgment at all. It is in that report that any recommendations for mercy and any other observations relating to the case need be made.

It was for the above reasons that I, on the 10th day of September, 1985, dismissed this appeal and upheld and confirmed the judgment and sentence of the court of first instance and the appeal judgment of the court below.

A. O. OBASEKI, J.S.C. (Presiding): This appeal came up for hearing on the 10th day of September, 1985, and after hearing the submissions and argument of counsel, I dismissed it and reserved the reasons for the judgment till today.

I now proceed to give them.

The appellant was tried on a charge of armed robbery contrary to section 1(2)(a) of the Armed Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree 1970, convicted and sentenced to death. The article stolen in the act was a model 125 Suzuki motor-cycle Registration No. 1M 1453 Exhibit D belonging to P.W.1 Livinus Eke. The robbery took place along the highway, Faulks Road, Aba, at about 5.00 a.m. in the morning of the 14th of July, 1981. P.W.1 identified the appellant as one of the two men who robbed him. In particular, he recognised him as the person who pointed the gun at him and when he dropped his motor cycle to escape death and took to his heels, he fired the gun at him as he turned and fled.

The two main questions for determination raised in this appeal are:

(1) whether the appellant was properly identified as one of the two persons who armed with a gun held up Livinus Eke, P.W.1 at Faulks Road, Aba;

(2) whether the motor cycle stolen from Livinus Eke, P.W.1 was proved by evidence to have been found in the possession of the appellant.

These questions have been exhaustively dealt with by my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C. in his Reasons for Judgment delivered a short while ago and I agree with him.

P.W.1 was in no doubt when he testified that it was the appellant who held the gun and pointed it at him. He was also emphatic in testifying that when he took to his heels leaving his motor-cycle behind, he fired the gun behind him to frighten him away the more.

The evidence was accepted by the learned trial judge and on that piece of evidence alone, a conviction could be properly founded.

With regard to the second question, I find enough evidence on record from which the question must be answered in the affirmative. There is evidence that the motor cycle with its ignition key in the keyhole was stolen in the morning. There is evidence that the appellant was found in the premises where the stolen motor cycle was recovered towards the evening of the same day.

There is also evidence that he was not far away from where the stolen motor cycle was recovered, and finally, there is evidence that the iginition key of the stolen motor cycle was found in the pocket of the shirt the appellant was wearing when he was arrested. The appellant’s explanation that he did not know how the key entered his shirt pocket is no defence but only goes to emphasise the fact that the ignition key was found in his possession.

The doctrine of recent possession enshrined in our law section 148(a) of the Evidence Act reads:

“The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in relation to the facts of a particular case, and in particular the court may presume:

That a man who is in possession of stolen goods after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.” There are very many judicial authorities, old and recent, in which this doctrine has been invoked by our courts and the English courts and I need mention only a few.

R. v. Palmer Iyakwe 10 WACA 180

R. v. Kwashie 13 WACA 86

R. v. Braimah and Another (1943) 9 WACA 197 Gfeller v. The King (1943) 9 WACA 12 (PC)

R. v. James Loughlin (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 69, 70-71

R. v. Schama and Abramovitch (1914) Cr. App. R. 45

R. v. John Bailey (1919) 13 Cr. App. R. 28

R. v. Christ (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 76

R. v. Alfred James Seymour (1954) 38 Cr. App. R. 68 F

R. v. Melvin and Eden (1953) 37 Cr. App. R. 1

Possession envisaged by the section and the doctrine must be physical possession and must be in respect of things capable of being stolen.

A key and a motor cycle are all movable properties and are both capable of being stolen. Without other evidence establishing that fact in a criminal charge, I am not prepared to presume that possession of an ignition key of a motor cycle simpliciter is evidence of possession of a motor cycle. It is possible to steal the ignition key without stealing the motor cycle and it is equally possible to steal the motor cycle without stealing the ignition key. In the instant appeal, the evidence conclusively establish that the appellant was in possession of not only the motor-cycle but also the ignition key. These facts taken together with the identification of the appellant by P.W. 1 sufficiently justify the conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

It was for the above reasons and the reasons so ably set out by my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C. in his Reasons for Judgment that I dismissed the appeal.

A. N. ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.: I have read in draft the Reasons for Judgment just delivered by my learned brother Oputa, J.S.C., and I am in full agreement with those reasons for dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgments of the Courts below.

M. L. UWAIS, J.S.C.: This appeal was dismissed on 10th September, 1985, and were served our reasons for the dismissal to today. I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the reasons for judgment read by my learned brother Oputa, J.S.C. I entirely agree with the reasons and adopt them as mine. I do not wish to add anything more as the said reasons adequately state why I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

B. O. KAZEEM, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the Reasons for Judgment just read by my learned brother, Oputa, J.S.C.; and I entirely agree that it has adequately dealt with all the issues canvassed before us in this case on 10th September, 1985, before the appellant’s appeal was dismissed summarily. I have nothing more to add.

Appeal dismissed

Decision of the High Court

and the Court of Appeal Confirmed

Other Citation: (1985) LCN/2244(SC)