Tkwaku Addai V. Nana Ama Serwah Bankuo (1953) LJR-WACA

Tkwaku Addai V. Nana Ama Serwah Bankuo (1953)

LawGlobal Hub Judgment Report – West Africa Court of Appeal

Jurisdiction of Supreme Court—Suit between natives—Land held under native
tenure—Pledge under Native Custom—Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance
(Cap. 80), section 35—Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4), section 17.

Facts

Appellant (plaintiff below) sued in the Supreme Court to recover possession of some rooms which had been pledged to respondent and which he claimed to redeem; the respondent alleged that the deceased owner later transferred them to him outright. The appellant lost and in his appeal argued that in view of section 35 of the Native Courts (Ashanti) Ordinance (Cap. 80), the Supreme Court should have stopped the suit as being outside its jurisdiction, and referred also to section 17 of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4). The parties were natives, the land was held under native tenure, and the original pledge was made on the footing of native custom.

Held

It was not a proper cause for the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction over, consequently the suit was not properly tried there.


Appeal in a civil case by plaintiff: No. 32/52.
K. Adumua-Bossman for Appellant.
J. B. Siriboe for Respondent.

Anthony Aburime V. The Secretary, Assemblies Of God Mission, Ewu Ishan & Anor (1952) LJR-WACA

Anthony Aburime V. The Secretary, Assemblies Of God Mission, Ewu Ishan & Anor (1952)

LawGlobal Hub Judgment Report – West Africa Court of Appeal

Jurisdiction—Supreme Court Ordinance, section 12 and proviso—Practice and Procedure—Claim in trespass—Ouster of jurisdiction how decided.

Facts

The plaintiff sued in trespass, the first defendant alleged entry under a lease and the second defendant that he would contend that the issue was as to title to land. The Judge suo motu raised the point of ouster of jurisdiction and plaintiff opposed the idea. The Judge took no evidence but concluded that his jurisdiction was ousted under the above proviso (text in judgment infra); he assumed that there was a Native Court with jurisdiction to hear the case. The plaintiff appealed.

Held

There was no admission that title to land was raised by this suit for damages for trespass—which is a suit based on possession and does not necessarily involve any issue as to title to land or any interest in land—and there was no evidence of that fact; further there was no admission that there was a Native Court having jurisdiction and there was no proof; therefore the Judge erred in concluding that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was ousted by the proviso to section 12 of the Supreme Court Ordinance.

Appeal by plaintiff: Np. 3760.
O. Onyechi for Appellant.
H. U. Kaine, with him D. O. Ibekwe, for Respondents.

Kwame Aboah V. The Queen (1954) LJR-WACA

Kwame Aboah V. The Queen (1954)

LawGlobal Hub Judgment Report – West Africa Court of Appeal

Criminal Law—Stealing by treasurer—Defence ofgeneral deficiency

Facts

The appellant was a Native Authority Treasurer; he collected revenue and paid out salaries and the like. At a checking of his accounts there was a shortage in his cash of a certain amount, which he admitted was missing but could not explain why.

At his trial he admitted on oath that at the checking he was short of that amount but denied stealing it. He was convicted of stealing it and appealed on the ground that the evidence disclosed only a general deficiency.

Held

Appellant in effect admitted that that amount ought to have been in his safe, so it was not a case of general deficiency.

Case cited:—
Rex n. Morris, 24 Cr. App. R. 105.

Appeal by convicted person: No. 79/52.
Koi Larbi for Appellant.
G. V. C. Young, Crown Counsel (Akiwumi with him), for the Crown.

H. N. O. Abbey & Anor V S. K. Ollenu (1954) LLJR-WACA

H. N. O. Abbey & Anor V S. K. Ollenu (1954)

LawGlobal Hub Lead Judgment Report – West Africa Court of Appeal

Fraud—Acquiescence amounting to fraud. Estoppel—Purchaser not a party in later litigation—Owner standing by.

Facts

One I.F. sold and conveyed land to the respondent, who later built on the land in ignorance of the fact that after his purchase, and before he built, the appellants sued his vendor I.F. and obtained a declaration of title in their favour.

After the building was completed the appellants as plaintiffs sued the respondent in the Native Court and obtained judgment for recovery of possession and mesne profits; this was set aside on appeal by the Land Court; and the appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

For them it was argued that the respondent knew of the defect in his title but built nevertheless, and that he was bound by the declaratory judgment; for him that they knowingly stood by whilst he built in ignorance of it.

Held

(1) The respondent was not estopped as being privy in estate by a judgment in an action against his vendor commenced after the purchase;

(2) The Land Court Judge was right in holding that all those elements existed in the present case which amounted to fraudulent acquiescence in the plaintiffs.

Cases cited:—

(1) Mercantile Investment and General Trust Co. v. River Plate Trust, Loan, and Agency Co., 1894, 1 Ch. D. 578.

(2) Willmott v. Barber, 15 Ch. D., at p. 105 (where the elements mentioned in Held (2) are set out; they are quoted in the judgment infra).

Attorney-General v. John Hannah Khoury (1953) LLJR-WACA

Attorney-General v. John Hannah Khoury (1953)

LawGlobal Hub Lead Judgment Report – West Africa Court of Appeal

Minerals Ordinance, Chapter 114—Sections 60 and 61—Possession of mineral— Onus to prove lawful possession.

Facts

The Minerals Ordinance, section 60, provides that no person (with exceptions not relevant here) shall possess any mineral (which by definition in section 2 includes diamonds).

Section 61 makes a person found in possession liable to punishment if he “does not prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he obtained such mineral lawfully”.

A police officer searching the respondent found in his pocket diamonds tied up in a small cloth and cautioned him saying he, the officer, had reason to believe ” these are rough diamonds ”, to which the respondent replied, ” Yes, they are not mine, I amcarrying them forJohn Jacobs Jacobssaid, ” Yes, he is carrying
them for me”.

At his trial the respondent said that when Jacobs gave him the parcel to carry he “felt some stones” but did not know what they were. And Jacobs testified that on respondent asking him what was in the parcel he said to respondent, “Keep it first and after ten minutes I shall tell you my reason”.

The Magistrate regarded the respondent as untruthful and did not believe that he did not know what the bag contained. The respondent was convicted and appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Judge thought that the Magistrate erred on the facts and acted on wrong principles; that he ought to have been satisfied by the explanation of the respondent and Jacobs. The conviction was set aside and the Attorney-General appealed from the Judge’s decision on the grounds that the respondent’s answer to the police officer was an admission that he knew what the bag contained and that the onus of proving innocent possession lay on the respondent, who failed to satisfy the Magistrate. For the respondent it was argued that guilty knowledge was essential and the Magistrate ought to have accepted the respondent’s
explanation.

Held

A person found in possession of diamonds contrary to section 60 of the Minerals Ordinance does not discharge the onus shifting to him under section 61 by giving an explanation which may reasonably be true but must actually satisfy the Magistrate that it is true; in this case the Magistrate did not act on wrong principles nor ought he to have been satisfied by the explanation offered by the evidence for the defence, and the conviction ought not to have been set aside.