Stephen V. State (2022) LLJR-SC

Stephen V. State (2022)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C. 

This Appeal No. SC.128/2019 was commenced on 29-1-2019 when the appellant filed a notice of appeal in Appeal No. CA/PH/13CR/2018, against the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 7-12-2018 upholding the judgment of the High Court of Bayelsa State at Yenagoa delivered on 22-6-2017 in charge no. YHC/173C/2016, finding that the appellant and his co-accused are not guilty of the offences of conspiracy to commit robbery and armed robbery for which they were charged and tried and rather finding them guilty of the offence of conspiracy to commit robbery and the offence of robbery.

Both sides have filed, exchanged and adopted their respective briefs as follows – appellant’s brief, respondent’s brief and appellant’s reply brief.

The appellants’ brief raised the following issues for determination –

  1. Whether the lower Court was right when it affirmed that the trial Court can convict the appellant of a lesser offence of robbery when there is no provision under the Robbery and Firearm (Special provisions) Act, Cap. R11, LFN 2004 to do so?

Distilled from ground one of the Notice and Grounds of Appeal.

  1. Whether the conviction of the appellant on the basis of Exhibit A and B is not perverse?

Distilled from ground two of the Notice and Grounds of Appeal.

  1. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the conviction of the appellant in the circumstances of this case?

Distilled from ground three, four and five of the Notice and Grounds of Appeal

The respondent’s brief also raised three issues for determination as follows:-

  1. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the conviction of the appellant for the lesser offences conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery under the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, Cap. R11, LFN, 2004 by the trial Court as against the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery which the appellant was charged.
  2. Whether the lower Court rightly affirmed the reliance of the Court on the extra-judicial statement of the appellant (Exhibit B) which was admitted without objection.
  3. Whether the lower Court was not right when it held that there were no material contradictions in the case of the respondent/prosecution which could have been resolved in favour of the appellant and fatal to the case of the respondent/prosecution.

The date of the delivery of the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the date of the filing of the notice of this appeal against that judgment show that the notice of appeal was filed on the 53rd day after the date the judgment of the Court of Appeal was rendered. I am compelled by this situation to find out if this appeal was filed within the time prescribed by Section 27(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 2004 before I delve into the merit of the issues raised for determination in this appeal if need be.

Section 27(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 2004 provides that “The periods prescribed for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are:

(a) …

(b) In an appeal in a criminal case, thirty days from the date of the decision appealed against.”

The record of this appeal shows that the judgment of Court of Appeal was delivered on 7-12-2018. The notice of this appeal was filed on 21-1-2019. It is glaring that the notice of appeal was filed after 53 days from the date of the Court of Appeal judgment.

It was not filed within 30 days from the date of the judgment as required by Section 27(2) (b) of the Supreme Court Act 2004. It was therefore filed out of time.

The notice of this appeal is incompetent. See Adelekan V Ecu-Line NV (2006) 5SC (pt. 11) 32, Etim V The State (1982) LPELR-1173(SC).

This appeal cannot be sustained on the incompetent notice of appeal and this Court is robbed of jurisdiction to entertain and determine it by the absence of a competent notice of appeal. As it is, the notice of the appeal and this appeal are struck out.

Having struck out this appeal, no useful purpose would be served determining the merit of the appeal that is adjudged incompetent and struck out.


SC.128/2019

State V. Sadiq (2021) LLJR-SC

State V. Sadiq (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

This appeal is against the decision of the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Judicial Division delivered on 3rd July, 2015 in appeal No. CA/K/435/C/2014. In that appeal, the Court below acquitted and discharged this Respondent of the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the High Court of Katsina State for offences of robbery and culpable homicide.

The Respondent who was 3rd accused person, was arraigned together with four others before the High Court of Katsina State on a two count charge of robbery and culpable homicide as follows:

“Count one: That you Babangida Abubakar alias Gidgo of Sabuwar Kofa quarters Katsina, Sani Idris alias Shamuloke of Kofar Marusa quarters Katsina, Abdulhadi Sadiq alias Baba Reza of Kofar Marusa quarters Katsina, Lawal Abubakar alias Dan Lawal of Kofar marusa quarters Katsina and Idris Umar alias Dan Idi of Sabuwar Unguwa Koren Dorowa Katsina, on or about the 11th day of October, 2012 while in company of others now at large, while armed with sticks and matchets, attacked, wounded and left unconscious Sulaiman Abubakar and Usman Abubakar who are security guards of Mangal Plaza, Yahaya Madaki way, Kofar Kaura Katsina, you then burgled and entered the shop of one Alh. Babangida Ali at the same address where you took away different types of G. S. M. handsets valued at about the sum of Three Million Naira (N3 million) and money in the sum of Three Hundred and Fifty Two Thousand Naira (N352,000.00) and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 1 (2) (b) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act Cap R11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.”

“Count two: That you Babangida Abubakar alias Gidigo of Sabuwar Kofa quarters Katsina, Sani Idris alias Shamuloke of Kofar Marusa quarters Katsina, Abdulhadi Sadiq alias Baba Reza of Kofar Marusa quarters Katsina, Lawal Abubakar alias Dan Lawal of Kofar Marusa quarters Katsina and Idris Umar alias Dan Idi of Sabuwar Ungwa Koren Dorowa Katsina, on or about 11th day of October, 2012 while in company of others now at large, at Mangal plaza Yahaya Madaki Way Katsina, attacked and beat one Usman Abubakar with sticks and cut him with matchets which resulted in his death with the knowledge that death would be the probable consequence of your act and you thereby committed the offence of culpable homicide punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code”.

They were all found guilty on both counts and sentenced to death by hanging. The Respondent’s appeal to the Court below was allowed wherein he was accordingly acquitted and discharged. It is against that decision of the Court of Appeal that the Appellant has now appealed to this Court.

​The prosecution’s case is that on or about 11th October 2012, the Respondent in company of others now at large, while armed with sticks and machetes attacked and grievously injured two security men at Mangal plaza, Yahaya Madaki Way, Kofar Kaura Katsina, leaving them unconscious, which act subsequently resulted in the death of one of the security men. They also burgled the shop of one Alhaji Babangida Ali Mai-chanji (the PW1) at the same premise and stole the sum of N352,000.00 cash and G.S.M. handsets valued at about N3,000,000.00. About two months after the robbery incident, one Muhammad approached PW2 to purchase battery for his phone. Upon close inspection, it was discovered that the phone which Muhammad sought to purchase battery for was actually one of the phones stolen during the robbery incident. He was therefore apprehended and upon interrogation he led the police officers to one Suleiman Kasuwar Tsaye who upon his arrest stated that the phone was given to him to sell by Idris Umar (the 5th accused person). The police conducted a search in the house of Idris Umar from where 3 other handsets and several other stolen items were recovered.

On arraignment, all accused persons pleaded not guilty to both counts of robbery and culpable homicide. The prosecution called a total of 10 witnesses and tendered several exhibits including exhibits A and A1 which were this Respondent’s extra-judicial statements recorded in Hausa language and translated into English language. The Respondent raised an objection to the admissibility of his confessional statement on the ground that he was forced to thumbprint the statement. Despite his objection, the learned trial Judge admitted the statements without a trial within trial and relied on same to convict the Respondent.

​At the Court of Appeal, it was found that the confessional statements were wrongly admitted for failure to test its voluntariness in a trial – within-trial. Exhibits A and A1 were therefore expunged from the record and the Respondent acquitted and discharged. It is against the judgment of the Court below that the Appellant has now appealed to this Court in his amended notice of appeal filed on 10th February, 2020 but deemed filed on 19th march, 2020.

Both parties filed and exchanged their briefs of arguments deemed filed on 19th March, 2020 respectively. The appeal was set down for hearing on 30th September, 2021 wherein the Appellant distilled two issues for determination which were equally adopted by the Respondent as follows:

(i) Whether the Court of Appeal was right in expunging the confessional statement of the Respondent and holding that there was no other evidence to ground his conviction (Ground 2); and

(ii) Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Statement of the Respondent was not voluntarily procured. (Ground 1)

​A careful perusal of the two issues for determination proposed by the Appellant and adopted by the Respondent shows that the argument on both issues centre essentially on the decision of the Court below to expunge the Respondent’s confessional statement in exhibits A and A1 from record on the ground that they were wrongly admitted. In my opinion, the two issues are more or less the same except for the different words used to couch them.

I also hold the view that the first issue canvassed by the parties is sufficient to determine this appeal. I shall therefore adopt same as reproduced supra, although I shall reframe it to make it concise as follows:

“whether the Court of Appeal was right to expunge the Respondent’s confessional statement from record for being involuntarily procured and wrongly admitted in evidence.”

Learned counsel for the Appellant in his argument laboured to distinguish the facts in the case of Uche Obidiozo & Ors v. The State (1987) LPELR-2170 (SC) from the instant case to show that there are differences between where an accused person raises objection to the voluntariness of his confessional statement and where an accused person denies making the statement. Counsel submitted that where admissibility of a statement is challenged on the ground that it was not made voluntarily, it is for the Judge to determine whether or not the prosecution has established that it was made voluntarily in a trial within trial, which he contends is not the situation in this case. Counsel placed reliance on the case of Queen v. Eguabor 1962 vol. 1 All NLR part 2 page 287 to buttress his argument.

Learned counsel for the Appellant further argued that the objection of the Respondent was predicated on the fact that he did not make the statement and also on the fact that the Illiterate Protection Law was not complied with in the recording of his statement. Thus, the statement was admissible pending the weight to be attached to it. The expunging of the confessional statement on the authority of Uche Obidiozo v. The State (supra) was wrong in law and a clear departure from the established position in Queen v. Igwe 5 FSC 56-56, he contended.

Learned Counsel finally relied on the authorities of Augustine Nwangbomu v. The State (1994) LPELR-2105 (SC): Manu Galadima v. The State (2012) LPELR-15530 (SC) and Egboghonome v State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 306) 383 SC, to submit that the attitude of the Respondent towards the confessional statement is that of denial which goes to the issue of retraction and not voluntariness as misconstrued by the learned justices of the Court of Appeal. He therefore urged on this Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant and allow the appeal.

On his part, learned counsel for the Respondent argued that the Respondent’s ground of objection to the admissibility of his confessional statement and the decision of the Court of Appeal to expunge the statement from record having been procured by force are on all fours with the facts and findings in the case of Obidiozo v The State (Supra). Counsel submitted that the current position of our law is that when a Defendant alleges that his signature or thumb print on a written confessional statement was procured by force or intimidation, a trial-within-trial is mandatory to determine the voluntariness of the statement.

Learned Counsel argued further that by the authorities of Corporal Jona Dawa & Anor. V. State (1980) LPELR 932 (SC) and Obidiozo v. The State (supra), this Court has departed from the position laid down in Queen v Igwe (supra) where it was held that allegation that signature or thumb print on a written Confessional Statement procured by force will not warrant a trial-within-trial.

Finally, Counsel argued that the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were on firm ground to have expunged the Respondent’s confessional statement in exhibits A and A1 from record, same having been obtained by force and was not subjected to the voluntariness test in a trial-within-trial. He then urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent and dismiss the appeal.

In the appeal before us, the learned trial Judge held that the prosecution proved its case against the Respondent beyond reasonable doubt and therefore convicted the Respondent and sentenced him to death by hanging. His Lordship relied on the Respondent’s confessional statement recorded in Hausa language and translated into English language by PW5 who was a police officer. The trial Court relied on the statement and found the Respondent guilty as charged despite the fact that the Respondent raised an objection to its admissibility on the ground that he was forced to thumb print the statement.

​At the Court below, the Respondent’s confessional statement was expunged from the record on the ground that it was wrongly admitted, the trial Court having not conducted a trial-within-trial to ascertain its voluntariness. The Court went further to acquit and discharge the Respondent having found no other evidence linking him to the offence.

For reference, a portion of the vexed judgment of the Court of Appeal which is at page 177 of the record is reproduced as follows:

“Therefore, as the law now stands, the Appellant’s thumbprint which he said he was forced to append on the exhibits A and A1 are part and parcel of the whole statement and cannot be detached or severed from the body of the statements. A claim that his thumbprint on the statement was not voluntarily appended on the statement is invariably a claim that the statement was not voluntary, which calls for a trial within trial.

The learned trial Judge with respect was in error to have declined to conduct a trial-within-trial. The result is that the statements were wrongly admitted. The consequence of that, to quote Agbaje JSC again Is that: – “I would expunge them from the proceedings in this case. ”

I abide by that order of the Supreme Court and accordingly, I expunge exhibits A and A1 from the record.

Having expunged the statements from the record, the question of whether the Court could convict upon, the now expunged confessional statement does not arise. In the circumstance, this issue is resolved in favour of the Appellant that exhibits A and A1 were wrongly admitted and relied upon by the learned trial judge to convict the Appellant”

In his conclusion at page 184 of the record, the Court set aside the decision of the trial High Court convicting and sentencing the Respondent to death and thereby acquitted and discharged the Respondent.

My lords, the issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the prosecution proved the offences of robbery and culpable homicide made against the Respondent beyond reasonable doubt based principally on the extra-judicial statements made by the Respondent to the police which the trial Court admitted in evidence as exhibits A and A1.

The Court below disagreed with the findings of the learned trial Judge on the ground that the Respondent, having alleged that he was forced to endorse the confessional statement, the Court was duty bound to conduct a trial within trial to ascertain its voluntariness. The statement was therefore expunged from the record and the Respondent’s conviction and sentence set aside.

It is now well settled that in our criminal jurisprudence, the onus is on the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.

See Josiah Orungua & Ors v. The State (1970) All NLR 266; (1970) LPELR 2780 (SC)

– Olayinka Afolalu v. The State (2010) 16 NWLR (PT 1220) 584

– Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372

– Yongo v. Commissioner of Police (1992) 4 SCNJ 113; (1992) 8 NWLR (pt. 257)36

– Alonge v. IGP (1959) 4 FSC 203; (1959) SCNLR 516

– Babuga v. State (1996) LPELR-701 SC; (1996) 7 NWLR (PT. 460) 279

– Sections 135 and 138 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended)

I need to emphasize that the standard of proof required of the prosecution is not proof beyond all shadow of doubt as absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure.

See State v. James Gwangwan (2015) 13 NWLR (pt 1977) 600 at 621.

​The law has made it explicit that there are three ways of proving criminal liability by the prosecution in any criminal trial, to wit:

(a) Confessional statement of the accused.

(b) Evidence of an eyewitness otherwise known as direct evidence; or

(c) Circumstantial evidence which must be cogent and compelling leading to the irresistible conclusion that the accused committed the offence.

See Agboola v. The State (2013) 8 SC M 157; (2011) 11 NWLR (pt 1366) 619

– Abdullahi Ibrahim v. State (2014) 3 NWLR (pt 1394) 305

– Alufohai v. The State (2015) 3 NWLR (pt. 1445) 172.

In the instant case, it seems to me that the prosecution relied largely on the Respondent’s confessional statement as the only substantial evidence linking him to the commission of the offence. I note that the Respondent took the earliest opportunity in Court to resile from voluntarily endorsing the confessional statement at the point of its being tendered in evidence. At that juncture, what was expected of the learned trial Judge was to conduct a mini-trial to ascertain the voluntariness or otherwise of the confessional statement before admitting it in evidence.

See Auta v. The State (1975) 4 SC 125; Gbadamosi & Ors v The State (1992) 9 NWLR (pt. 266) 465 at 480; (1992) 11- 12 SCNJ 1268; Effiong v The State (1998) 5 SCNJ 158 at 166; (1998) 8 NWLR (pt. 562) 362.

The law is trite and well established that the Court can admit and safely rely on a retracted confessional statement to convict an accused person once the Court is satisfied that such statement is voluntary, direct, positive, unequivocal and a truthful account of what transpired. The law has however made it desirable for the Court to look for some corroboration outside the confessional statement, to determine if the circumstances made it probable that the confession was true.

See Haruna v. A-G, Federation (2012) 9 NWLR (pt. 1306) 419

– Alarape v. State (2001) 5 NWLR (pt. 705) 79

– Osuagwu v. The state. (2013) 5 NWLR (pt. 1347) 360.

In otherwords, a confessional statement remains the best form of evidence against an accused person once it is proved to be voluntary, direct and positive. The Court can rely solely on it to ground conviction.

See Edhigere v. The State (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 464) at P. 1;

– Oseni v. State (2012) 5 NWLR (pt 1293) 351

– Egboghonome v State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 306) 383.

​At this juncture, I consider it pertinent to make a distinction between a situation where an accused person completely denies making a confessional statement and where an accused contends that he made or endorsed the confessional statement under duress.

In the first situation, the Court is at liberty to admit the statement without having to conduct a mini-trial to determine its veracity. Only that the weight to be attached to the statement would be determined after subjecting it to the six-way tests prescribed by the law as follows:

(i) Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true?

(ii) Is it corroborated?

(iii) Are the statements made in it true as far as can be tested?

(iv) Was the prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the offence?

(v) Is the confession possible?

(vi) Is the confessional statement consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved?

​Once the statement has been subjected to these tests and it is ascertained that there are other facts outside the confession to corroborate it, the law decrees that same can be relied upon to ground conviction.

See R v. Sykes (1913)8 LR APP R-233 approved and applied in Dawa v. State (1980) 8-11 SC 236; Musa v. State (1995) 9 NWLR (pt. 421) 540 at 554.

On the second scenario where the accused person alleges that he made the statement or endorsed same under duress or some form of influence by a person of authority, the law requires that a trial-within-trial must be conducted to ascertain the voluntariness of the statement.

See State v. Gwangwan (supra).; Obasi Onyenye v. The State (2012) LPELR 7866(SC)

This issue was primarily considered in the case of Akpa v. State (2008) 14 NWLR (pt. 1106) 1 at 98 where this Court per Ogbuagu, JSC observed as follows:

“… trial within trial is ordered and conducted where the voluntariness of the making of the statement by an accused person is in issue or raised by an accused person. In other words, where an accused person admits making the statement, but contends or asserts that he did not make it voluntarily but under duress or some other alleged influence, then a trial within trial is conducted in order to determine whether the statement was voluntary or made by duress or otherwise. When the Judge is satisfied that the statement was voluntary, he then admits it as an exhibit in the evidence before the Court”.

Flowing from the above and with due respect to the learned trial Judge, the evidence of the Respondent did not amount to a retraction. Rather, he challenged the voluntariness of the evidence extracted from him by the police by use of force. He did not contend the fact that the statement was recorded in Hausa language by PW5 and translated into English Language after it had been read over to him. His only objection was that he was forced to thumb print on the statement, which objection automatically pulled a cloak of involuntariness over the statement.

Having successfully cast doubt on the voluntariness of his thumb print on the statement, the learned trial Judge ought to have conducted a trial within trial to ascertain the voluntariness of the endorsement on the statement. Admitting the confessional statements and marking them as exhibits without testing their voluntariness in a mini-trial, was in my humble view, fatal to this case. The Court below was therefore on sound wicket when it expunged exhibits A and A1 from record for having been wrongly admitted. I so hold.

​Now, having affirmed the judgment of the Court below expunging the Respondent’s confessional statement from record, I shall consider if there exist any other evidence which linked the Respondent to the offence charged.

I must say that I have carefully perused the record of appeal and the only mention of the Respondent is in the evidence of PW5, the police officer who recorded the statement of the Respondent already expunged by the Court below and the evidence of DW4, Lawal Abubakar, in exhibit A1 as well as the evidence of DW5, Idris Umar in Exhibit H1 wherein the Respondent was named as one of the persons who participated in the crime.

​The law is settled that an accused person’s confession is only evidence against him and not against a co-accused person except otherwise adopted by the co-accused. Putting it differently is to say that where an accused person makes a confessional statement as to his participation in a crime, he is not confessing for his accomplices but himself alone. The Court cannot therefore rely on the confession of one accused person to convict another accused person unless the confessional statement is voluntarily adopted by the co-accused, although it can be used as a corroborating evidence where other pieces of vital evidences exist pointing to the fact that the co-accused committed the offence.

See Ozaki v. State (1990) LPELR-2888 (SC); (1990) 1 NWLR (pt. 124) 92 Evbuomwan v C O P (1961) NWLR 257

– Section 199 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended)

In the case of State v. Gwangwan (supra), my learned brother, Fabiyi, JSC, in his contributory judgment, had this to say:

“A statement made to the Police by an accused person implicating a co-accused is not admissible against that accused. Where the prosecution intends to use the statement against a co-accused, as herein, then the prosecution is bound to make a copy of the incriminating statement available to the co-accused for him to reject or adopt same. There is nothing in the record that same was carried out by the prosecution. The decisions in the cases of Mumuni v. The State (1975)6 SC 79; Chukwueke v. The State (1991) 7 NWLR (pt 205) 604 and Yongo v. Commissioner of Police (1992) 8 NWLR (pt.257) 36 are in point here.”

​In the instant case, the Court below was on firm footing to discountenance the inference that the statements of DW4 and DW5 implicated the Respondent as long as he did not adopt same.

From all that I have said above, I hold the firm opinion that the Court below was in order when it held that:

“the result is that there is nothing on record linking the appellant to the crime committed.”

To my mind, having expunged the Respondent’s confessional statement from the record, the prosecution had no other evidence to sustain the charge against the Respondent. There was indeed no evidence to infer the offences of robbery and culpable homicide. This issue is resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

It has now become trite in our criminal law jurisprudence that it is better that 10 guilty persons go free than that one innocent person be convicted. This Court for all intent and purposes frowns at technical justice but in a situation where the law prescribes the manner in which justice must be attained, circumventing such set down rule would certainly vitiate justice. My point here is that the learned trial Judge fell into a grave error by not conducting a trial within trial to ascertain the voluntariness of the Respondent’s confessional statement. Having said that, I affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal which set aside the judgment of Katsina State High Court in this case. I also affirm the order setting aside the conviction and sentence of the Respondent to death by hanging. I uphold the order of acquittal and discharge of the Respondent rendered by the Court below.

Appeal dismissed.


SC.1019/2015

State V. Jimoh (2022) LLJR-SC

State V. Jimoh (2022)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C. 

This is an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division delivered on 24th May, 2012 which upturned the decision of S. O. Otu, J. of the High Court of Kogi State sitting at Okene delivered on 13/11/2009.

The facts that led to this appeal are as follows, The Respondent was arraigned on a two-count charge of criminal conspiracy and Armed Robbery contrary to Sections 97 (1) and 298 (c) respectively of the Penal Code. The Prosecution called 3 witnesses and tendered Exhibit “A”. The Respondent testified and called only one witness.

At the end of the trial, Counsel addressed the Court and in a considered judgment, the learned trial judge convicted the Respondent and sentenced him to a term of 12 years imprisonment on 13/1/2009. The Respondent being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court appealed to the Court of Appeal; Abuja Division by a Notice of Appeal filed on 5/1/2010. The Counsel for the respective parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument.

​The Court of Appeal in its judgment of 24/5/2012 upturned the judgment of the trial Court and in its place entered a verdict of discharge and acquittal in favour of the Respondent. The Appellant being dissatisfied with the decision of the Court below has now appealed to this Court on three 3 grounds of appeal.

The facts adduced by the Prosecution in proof of its case is to the effect that PW1 and PW2 who were Police Officers were on their way from the old Police Barracks to the new Police Barracks at Okene when they were accosted by the Respondent and one other person (hereinafter called the accomplice). The accomplice snatched the handset of the PW2 and ordered the Respondent to show the witnesses what he had with him. The Respondent then opened his shirt and the witnesses saw a pump action gun in his possession. The accomplice also snatched the sum of N25,000.00 from the PW2. The PW2 later slapped the Respondent and the “pump action” gun fell from him. The PW1 then took the gun and hit the accomplice on the head and the accomplice fell down. The PW1 helped PW2 to overpower and subdue the Respondent. The accomplice who had been on the ground all these while stood up and bolted away. The Respondent who had been overpowered was arrested and taken to the Police Station.

The Respondent on the other hand stated on Oath that on the very day of the incident, he went to the bush to get some herbs on account of the fact that he was sick. While there in the bush some boys accosted and robbed him of N25,000. On his way back home through the Police Barracks, he encountered the Prosecution witnesses who alleged that he had robbed them. He denied being a robber and informed them that he too was also a victim of the robbery incident. The Prosecution witnesses slapped him, arrested him and took him to the Police Station at Okene. There the Respondent made Exhibit ‘A’ before his case was transferred to the Criminal Investigation Department at Lokoja.

​The trial Court held that the Respondent by his extra judicial statement Exhibit “A” already admitted that he was in possession of a gun and it was unbelievable that the robbers gave him the gun. The Court found that the Respondent’s boss who gave evidence as DW1 did not have any knowledge of what transpired at the time material to the case. Based on the evidence of PW1 and PW2, the Court held that their testimony showed how the Defendant with the accomplice conspired to commit the offence. The Respondent who had pretended to be sick had stayed back at work till 6.00pm in furtherance of the common and agreed criminal plan. The trial Court convicted the Respondent for the reasons given above. The Respondent being dissatisfied appealed to the Court below.

The Court of Appeal adopted the Respondent’s issues. The Court of Appeal held that PW1 did not include in his statement that his handset and N25,000.00 were stolen until at trial stage and that where a victim fails to state at the earliest opportunity to the Police vital information regarding the property stolen or the name of the assailant, the Court should be careful in accepting the story. The Court held further that there were contradictions in the story of the prosecution witnesses regarding how the money was stolen. The Court of Appeal expunged Exh. ‘A’ the statement of the Respondent and held that since the trial Court did not make a specific finding on whether or not the Respondent made Exh. ‘A,’ the exhibit was inadmissible in evidence. The Court below also held that the evidence of the two Prosecution witnesses was unreliable since they could not give account of the stolen items and the exhibits i.e. gun used to rob them.

Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court was filed on 22nd August, 2013 with two grounds of appeal. The issues distilled by both parties are similar. In my view, the sole issue for determination here is as follows:-

Whether upon a careful perusal of the totality of the evidence of the Prosecution, the Court below was right to have acquitted and discharged the Respondent.

In the Appellant’s brief settled by J. A. Akubo Esq., learned Counsel argued that since the Respondent admitted on oath that he was at the venue of the incident with someone who robbed him at the time of the incident and that he encountered PW1 and PW2, coupled with the fact that the evidence of both witnesses was not discredited during evaluation by the trial Court in its evaluation of the evidence before it.

Counsel cited Akeem Agboola v. The State (2013) 11 NWLR Pt. 1366 Pg. 619 at 641; Adeniyi Adekoya v. The State (2012) 9 NWLR Pt. 1306 Pg.539 at 582.

Counsel also contended that there are no substantial contradictions in the evidence of PW1 and PW2 to render same unreliable and unworthy of belief as the said examples of contradictions are minor, immaterial and inconsequential. Counsel submitted that only material contradictions would affect the case of the prosecution adversely. Counsel cited ISIBOR v. The State (2002) SCNJ 162 at 167; ENAHORO v THE STATE (1965) NSCC (Vol.4) Pg.98 at 113. Learned Appellant’s Counsel argued that the substance of the evidence against the Respondent to wit that he held a gun while his accomplice robbed PW2 of his money and handset is not in issue. The specific denomination of Naira notes carried by the victim is irrelevant. Counsel also submitted that the finding of the Court below that it had to expunge Exh. A from the evidence of the prosecution is perverse.

​Counsel argued that the conclusion of the Court below that in the absence of a specific finding by the trial Court on the issue of whether or not Exh, ‘A’ was made by the Respondent, makes Exh. ‘A’ inadmissible is erroneous. Counsel argued that the trial Court gave a considered Bench ruling on Exh. ‘A’, the final address of Respondent’s Counsel at trial did not mention Exh. ‘A’, so no live issue was raised on Exh. ‘A’ regarding its admissibility before the trial Court or the Court of Appeal to warrant any pronouncement on it. Counsel cited FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH & ANOR V. COMET SHIPPING (2009) 9 NWLR Pt.1145 Pg.193 at 220-221, WILSON v. OSHIN (2000) 9NWLR Pt.673 Pg.442, ODUNAYO v. THE STATE (1972) 8-9 SC.290. Counsel urged this Court to hold that the acquittal and discharge of the Respondent was perverse and unreasonable.

In the Respondent’s brief settled by K.C. WISDOM ESQ., Counsel argued that the Respondent during the trial had stated that Exhibit “A” was not the statement that he volunteered to the Police as he could not sign but thumb printed the document made by him. The Respondent under cross-examination affirmed this fact on page 32 lines 4 of the record. It follows therefore that the Respondent had retracted the statement allegedly made by him. Counsel submitted that where a Defendant retracts an extra-judicial statement allegedly made by him, the Court should admit the statement and determine, in its judgment, whether the statement was actually made by the defendant or not. Counsel cited IKPASA v. Bendel State (1982) NCLR 152 AT 162.

​Counsel further argued that the learned trial judge did not at any stage in the consideration of this case advert his mind to the question of whether the Respondent made the statement tendered or not. There was therefore a straight issue of fact which should have been determined by the trial Court. The trial Court in this case did not determine the issue. Counsel argued that in the absence of a specific finding by a trial Court on an essential fact, an appellate Court cannot choose between the two versions in order to make a finding of fact which the trial Court did not make. Rather, the only conclusion an appellate Court can draw from the conflicting evidence in that situation is the one most favourable to the Respondent. Counsel cited EJUREN v. POLICE (1961) ALL NLR 498 AT 501.

​Counsel further argued that the failure of PW1 to state categorically in his statement to the Police that he lost his handset and N25,000.00 in the course of the robbery is fatal to the case of the Prosecution. Counsel submitted that where a victim or eye-witness to a crime fails at the earliest opportunity to mention to the Police vital information such as the name of the Defendant or the property stolen by the Defendant, the Court should be careful in accepting his story.

Counsel cited ABDULLAHI v. STATE (2008) 17 NWLR Pt. 1115 Pg.203 AT PG. 216. Counsel argued that the identity of the person who took the handset and the money is very material in this case and in the absence of contradictory evidence regarding that fact, any doubt was rightly resolved in favour of the Respondent by the Court below.

OPINION

My Lords, I would not go as far as to call Exhibit “A” “a confessional statement” as the two lower Courts and the parties have done, I must say that Exhibit A is not a truly confessional statement in that as improbable as it is, it is not a direct and positive confession to the crime of conspiracy and armed robbery by the Respondent. In Exhibit A, the maker states that he was robbed and the robber gave him the gun and he pursued the robber into the Police Barracks to return the gun and encountered the victims who arrested him. He denied the robbery. It is apt to set out the contents of Exhibits A;

I wish to state that I finished my primary school education from NA Primary School, Okene in the year 2002 and I have been learning Welding since then. My father is in Ogaminana while my mother Is in Idogido. Throughout this week we have been very busy at the shop welding some windows and doors and I was getting sick so I did not go to work yesterday. At about 1830 hours I came to the back of Otutu Secondary school so that I can cut mango tree back so that I can use it for herbs as one woman advised me. I did not carry cutlass to cut the tree back. When I got to the mango tree two boys whom I did not know but can recognize ambushed me and collected the sum of two hundred and fifty naira from me. One of them was with a gun. He gave it to me to hold and was walking into the Police Barracks. I told him that I can’t hold the gun so I was pursuing him to give it back to him. The other one remained in bush. When I followed the other one into the Barracks, I was hiding gun under my shirt. I saw that he collected handset from one person inside the Barracks. The person was struggling with him that was when I got there and asked him to collect the gun. He did not collect it. Then the gun fell on the ground. I began to go because I know that trouble must come. That was when one short officer held my shirt and hit my face. I fell on the ground and they arrested me. Then I was brought to the station by some people who were around. The other boy ran away. I don’t know the two boys before. I am not a thief. I don’t belong to any gang. I am a welder. Everybody knows me at Inike where I work. This is all my statement.

In any event, at the point of tendering the statement, the Respondent’s Counsel objected to its admissibility on the basis that the Respondent did not sign the statement he made to the Police but thumb printed whereas the statement sought to be tendered was signed. This Court had reiterated the settled position of the law on several occasions. There are two ways of retracting an extra judicial statement in a criminal trial whether confessional or not. The first is by the Defendant and/or his Counsel admitting at the point of the statement being tendered by the prosecution that indeed the Defendant made the statement BUT was forced by threats, violence to his person, inducement etc. to make same by the Police. At that point, Defence Counsel must state categorically according to his brief whether it was by threats, violence or inducement of any gain etc. that the Defendant was made to confess. The onus being on the Prosecution at all times to prove the guilt of the Defendant, the prosecution must discharge the onus of proof that indeed the Defendant volunteered the statement since an involuntary statement extracted by threats, inducement etc. from a Defendant contravenes Section 29 of the Evidence Act, and would be inadmissible for all purposes in evidence. To prove the voluntariness of the statement, the Court calls for and conducts a trial within trial to determine whether or not the statement sought to be admitted by the Prosecution was voluntarily made. The second instance of retraction of a confessional statement is where the confession is wholly retracted, that is where the Defendant denies making the statement at all, denies the signature on the statement, claims he was forced to sign a statement he never made at all, or as in this case agreed he made a statement but says the statement sought to be tendered is not the one he made at all, etc. The possibilities of a full retraction are endless. In such an instance, there is no question whether or not the statement/confession is admissible. The law is that it is admissible as evidence of an event which had occurred in the course of Police investigation into the charge and the Court is entitled to decide as a matter of fact whether in the circumstances, the Defendant actually made the statement or not. It is my view, that there need be no formal statement of the finding so long as the circumstances in which the offence was committed and the contents of the statement are considered to enable the Court make a just finding on its credibility. Also, whether the statement is true in so far as it can be ascertained by other undisputed evidence. That is the probability test or credibility test. The Court then decides what weight to be attached to such a statement. See: BASIL AKPA v. THE STATE (2008) 14 NWLR Pt. 1106 Pg.72 at Pg. 98-99. The trial Court held thus, on Pg. 42 of the record:-

“Even though the accused denied robbing the victims or belonging to a gang, a careful scrutiny of exhibit A shows its confirmation of the evidence of PW1 and PW2. It is beyond comprehension that a victim of robbery will be given a gun by the robber who has just robbed him and walk away calmly to the Barracks. It is even more weird that the victim, the accused in this instance, will hold onto the gun, put it under his shirt and go after the robber with intention of giving the gun back to that robber. I have no doubt in my mind that while attempting to deny the allegation against him, the accused person has merely enmeshed himself more into the culpability net. I have no doubt therefore that the accused himself has admitted being in possession of a gun on the day of incident when he was arrested and so the non-tendering of the gun cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution.”

The Court below held as follows on page 109 of the record:

In the instant case, the learned trial judge did not at any stage during the consideration of this case advert his mind to the question of whether the Appellant made the statement under consideration. It is therefore my view that in absence of a specific finding on the issue stated above on the issue whether or not exhibit “A” was made by the Appellant, this Court as an Appellate Court cannot choose between the two versions in order to make finding of fact which the trial Court failed to make. In the circumstance, it is my view that the Appellant did not make the statement and it is hereby expunged from the Record.

I cannot bring myself to agree with the finding of the Court below to the effect that the trial Court made no specific finding on whether or not the Respondent made Exh. A. I cannot also bring myself to agree that the trial Court made no specific finding on the credibility and the probative value to be attached to Exhibit A. I am of the view that it is very clear on the record that the trial Court found the story of the Respondent in Exhibit A improbable and that its improbability supports the case of the Prosecution in all material particulars. That much was made clear in the judgement of the trial Court. I am of the view that the Court below was wrong to expunge Exhibit A from the evidence of the Prosecution as it was properly admitted, and a finding was made on it by the trial Court. There is no doubt that the onus is on the Prosecution throughout to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt as required by Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act. See: ANI v. THE STATE (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt.1068) 443 AT 457; STATE v. AIBANGBEE (1988) 7 SC (Pt.1) 96 AT 132-133; AMINU TANKO v. THE STATE (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt.1114) 597 AT 636.

I agree with the contention of the Appellant’s Counsel that the function of evaluation of evidence is essentially that of the trial judge. When he satisfactorily performs this duty, an appellate Court should not interfere. Ordinarily, an appellate Court will not interfere with the decision of a trial Court where so much of it turns on the credibility or reliability of the witnesses on the rational that ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary function of the trial Court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses. The Appellate Court will not interfere merely for substituting its view for the view of the trial Court where the trial Court has properly evaluated the evidence and made findings of fact. See: ALHASSAN MAIYAKI v. THE STATE (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt.1109) 173 AT 202 & 211; OCHUKO TEGWONOR v. THE STATE (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt.1069)630 AT 654-655; DOKUBO-ASARI v. FRN (2009) 37 NSCOR (Pt.11) 1146 AT 1173)19; JOSEPH OYEWOLE v. KARIMU AKANDE & ANOR (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 119 at 143.

To prove armed robbery the Prosecution must adduce evidence that:

a) That there was robbery;

b) That the robbery was committed while the accused person was armed with offensive weapons;

c) That the accused person participated in the robbery.

My Lords, in this appeal, the victims who were Policemen stated their encounter with the Respondent on that day. The Respondent in his own evidence on Oath admitted that on that day he actually, encountered the Policemen while he was on the road – Barracks Road where the Policemen were robbed. The only difference is that he claimed to have also been robbed by two boys prior to his encounter with the policemen and denied robbing the Policemen. In my view this boils down to a case of Oath against Oath.

The strenuous point made by the Respondent relates to when precisely the handset and N25,000.00 of PW2 were stolen. Heavy weather was made by the Respondent on the issue of fact of whether the money was taken by the accomplice from PW2 or PW2 gave up the money after he was threatened with the gun being held by the Respondent.

​It is pertinent to note that PW1 and PW2 are ad idem in their evidence without contradictions that it was the Respondent herein who was in possession of the gun that was used by him to threaten the victims while the accomplice was the one who collected the handset and money of PW2 and ran away with them. The trial Court which saw and heard them believed their evidence in that regard. The fact that PW1 and PW2 were able to establish in their uncontroverted evidence that they met two boys of whom the Respondent is one and the 2nd one at large shows that a case of criminal conspiracy and armed robbery had been proved by the Appellant against the Respondent herein.

I do not agree with the lower Court that in this case it is material whether PW1 gave the accomplice the money before or after he was threatened with a gun or whether or not the one victim knew the denomination of the money taken from the other victim. The record at the trial Court does not show that these issues were contested and that they constituted material contradictions. In ISIBOR v. THE STATE (2002) 2 SCNJ 162 at 167, this Court held that:

It is well established that contradictions which do not affect the substance of the issue to be decided are irrelevant. The contradictions must be shown to amount to a substantial disparagement of the witness or witness or witnesses.”

The most important issue raised against the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses was the failure of PW1 to state at the earliest opportunity that he lost his handset and the sum of N25,000.00 was taken from him by the Respondent’s accomplice. My Lords, the case of ABDULLAHI v. THE STATE (2008) 17 NWLR Pt.115 Pg.203 and cases in like ilk relied upon are not really relevant in the circumstances of this case. In ABDULLAHI v. THE STATE; relied on by the Respondent, the Defendant was not arrested at the scene of crime and the identity of the armed robbers was a live issue at trial. Also in that case, the victims of the armed robbery said in their evidence that they knew the armed robbers before the date of the armed robbery incident but failed to mention their names at the earliest opportunity when they reported the case to their neighbors and the community leader as well as in their statements to the Police.

The law on this point by this Court is as stated by KATSINA-ALU JSC (as he then was) inABDULLAHI v. STATE SUPRA as follows:

The position of the law is this. Where a witness failed to mention the name of an accused whom he knew before the commission of a crime, to the Police at the earliest opportunity, that would detract from what-ever credibility the trial Court may wish to ascribe to his evidence. In addition, he should describe the clothes the accused wore at the scene of crime. Surely this is common sense and failure to adopt this commonsense approach would inevitably result in the acquittal of the accused”.

However, in the instant case, the Respondent was arrested at the scene of crime or caught in the course of committing the offence of armed robbery. The items stolen are known in the instant case. The handset and money were stolen by the accomplice of the Respondent, while the gun was found in possession of the Respondent who used it to threaten PW1 and PW2.

Finally, the failure of the Police to tender the gun is not fatal to the Prosecution’s case. The witnesses (victims) stated that the case was later transferred to the CID Lokoja. No issue was made at the trial of the absence of the gun. The circumstances when the failure to tender the gun would adversely affect the case of the prosecution is absent here. There was no controversy about the existence of a gun. There was no controversy about the type of gun used. There was no issue of ballistic report in contention to warrant absolute certainty about the model of the gun or the type of bullets used. The Respondent said on oath that he was also robbed by some boys carrying a gun.

There is no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial Court relating to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the proper probative value to be placed on Exhibit ‘A’ which I agree lent credence to the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses which proved the charge against the Respondent beyond reasonable doubt.

In the circumstances, this appeal succeeds. The Judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 24/5/2012 is hereby set aside. I restore the conviction and sentence of the Respondent for conspiracy and armed robbery.

Appeal Allowed.


SC.376/2012

State V. Fafuru (2022) LLJR-SC

State V. Fafuru (2022)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

ABDU ABOKI, J.S.C. 

This appeal emanated from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division (hereafter called the “Court below”) delivered on 9th of June, 2016, wherein the Court below set aside the judgment of the trial High Court of Lagos State, holden at Ikeja, which convicted the Respondent for the offence of conspiracy to commit robbery, and sentenced him to 21 years imprisonment, with hard labour.

The Respondent was charged along others, at the trial Court, as follows:

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 1ST COUNT

Conspiracy contrary to Section 403A of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State 2003.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

Abraham Abiodun ‘m’, Michael Fafuru ‘m’ and Abiodun Akinbami ‘m’, on or about the 11th day of June, 2006, along Ikorodu Road, by Palmgrove Bus Stop, in the Ikeja Judicial Division, conspired together to commit Robbery.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 2ND COUNT

Robbery contrary to Section 402(1) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State 2003.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

Abraham Abiodun ‘m’, Michael Fafuru ‘m’ and Abiodun Akinbami ‘m’, on or about the 11th day of June, 2006, along Ikorodu Road, by Palmgrove Bus Stop, in the Ikeja Judicial Division, robbed Kayode Babalola of his Siemens A55 phone.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 3RD COUNT

Robbery contrary to Section 402(1) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State 2003.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

Abraham Abiodun ‘m’, Michael Fafuru ‘m’ and Abiodun Akinbami ‘m’, on or about the 11th day of June, 2006, along Ikorodu Road, by Palmgrove Bus Stop, in the Ikeja Judicial Division, robbed Abak Noah Quincy of his Sender phone.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 4TH COUNT

Robbery contrary to Section 402(1) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State 2003.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

Abraham Abiodun ‘m’, Michael Fafuru ‘m’ and Abiodun Akinbami ‘m’, on or about the 11th day of June, 2006, along Ikorodu Road, by Palmgrove Bus Stop, in the Ikeja Judicial Division, robbed Macualy Busayo of his phone, MP3 player and wrist.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE – 5TH COUNT

Robbery contrary to Section 402(1) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State 2003.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

Abraham Abiodun ‘m’, Michael Fafuru ‘m’ and Abiodun Akinbami ‘m’, on or about the 11th day of June, 2006, along Ikorodu Road, by Palmgrove Bus Stop, in the Ikeja Judicial Division, robbed Okezie Azubike Williams of Two Hundred Naira (N200.00).

The summary of facts leading to this appeal, is that by an amended Information dated 17th March, 2008, the Respondent, who was the 2nd Defendant, was charged along with two others, on five counts of Conspiracy to commit robbery and Robbery contrary to Section 403A and Section 402 (1) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C17 Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State 2003. They all, pleaded “not guilty” and the matter proceeded to trial.

The Prosecution called only one witness, one Corporal Sunday Ogbamebor (PW1) and closed its case. PW1/IPO testified that while he and his team were on patrol on 11th June, 2006, they noticed a suspicious commercial bus and decided to tail it. At about 11 pm around Fadeyi bus stop, they noticed one of the passengers jumped off the bus unceremoniously and when interviewed he stated to the police team that his reason lay behind the fact that he was being taken off his agreed route. This fact strengthened their decision to continue pursuing the bus. Upon reaching the top of the bridge at Fadeyi, they heard screams of distress of passengers and decided to bring the bus to a halt. When that was done the Respondent and two others were thereafter arrested upon identification by the passengers that they tried to rob them.

The Respondent’s counsel on his part filed a no case submission. In delivering his Ruling dated 22nd February, 2010 the trial Judge dismissed the 2nd – 5th counts (four counts) of Robbery against the Respondent and the other Defendants, but however held that the Respondent had a case to answer in respect of the first count of conspiracy to commit robbery.

Consequently, the Respondent’s Counsel opened its case by calling the Respondent DW2, and the other Defendants, as his witnesses. It is the case of the Respondent that he was not part of any conspiracy. He stated that on 12th June, 2006 as he was returning from his shop at Ladipo at about 6.00pm. He took a commercial motorcycle from Ladipo to Oshodi. On alighting from the motorcycle, he gave N500 note to the motorcyclist who became agitated as he did not have any change. He went out to look for change but with no success. The motorcyclist who was now infuriated sped off and immediately thereafter, he was accosted by three men who demanded to know what he gave to the motorcyclist and he explained to them. Disbelieving him, they slapped and molested him with the butt of their gun and ordered him into their pick-up van and drove him to Shomolu Police Station.

At the Police Station he was tortured, however he denied making or signing any statement/document.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court in a considered judgment found the Respondent and the 1st and 3rd Defendants guilty of the offence of conspiracy, and sentenced each of them to 21 years imprisonment, with hard labour, as aforestated.

The Respondent was aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court and lodged an appeal at the Court below, asking the following questions:

(1) Whether the prosecution discharged the burden of proof required by law to establish the offence of Conspiracy against the Appellant.

(2) Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have convicted the Appellant on Exhibit P1, the alleged confessional statement.”

In its judgment, the Court below set aside the judgment of the trial Court.

The Appellant is dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court below and appealed to this Court. The 2nd Amended Notice of Appeal, deemed filed on the 4th of March, 2021, is upon Three (3) Grounds.

At the hearing of the appeal on the 17th of March, 2022, Idowu O. Benson, Esq., of Counsel for the Appellant, adopted and relied on the Appellant’s amended brief of Argument, dated the 2nd of March, 2021, filed on the 3rd of March, 2021 but deemed filed on the 4th of March, 2021, wherein he raised the following two issues:

  1. Whether the eminent Justices of the Lagos Judicial Division of the Court of Appeal were right in unanimously holding that the learned trial Judge wrongfully inferred conspiracy from the evidence of PW1 and Exhibit P2?
  2. Whether the eminent Justices of the Lagos Judicial Division of the Court of Appeal were right in refusing to rely on the trial Court’s findings of fact?

In the Amended Respondent’s brief of argument, a sole issue was formulated, to wit:

“Whether the Court of Appeal was right to hold that the Appellant failed to prove the offence of Conspiracy to commit robbery against the Respondent beyond reasonable doubt?”

I have closely examined the issues identified in the respective briefs of the parties. I find that the Respondent’s sole issue has subsumed the two Issues raised by the Appellant. For this purpose, I take the view that the Respondent’s sole Issue is actually determinative of this appeal.

For the avoidance of doubt, the sole Issue reads thus:

“Whether the Court of Appeal was right to hold that the Appellant failed to prove the offence of Conspiracy to commit robbery against the Respondent beyond reasonable doubt?”

It is submitted for the Appellant that a thorough evaluation of the facts presented and the evidence adduced at the trial Court, will reveal that all the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy to commit robbery had been established beyond reasonable doubt against the Respondent, based on the credible and cogent testimony of PW1, the eyewitness before the trial Court. Reliance was placed on the case Maikudi Aliyu v. The State (2013) LPELR-20748 SC.

Referencing the case of Yakubu v. The State (2014) LPELR-22401 (SC), learned counsel defined conspiracy to be an agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. He maintained that from the evidence of PW1 at pages 126 – 127 of the Record, as well as the confessional statement of the Respondent, Exhibit P2, and that of the 1st and 3rd Defendants (Exhibits PI and P3), the common criminal intention of the Respondent and the other Defendants, can be inferred.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the Respondent in Exhibit P2, not only gave a graphic account of his activities with the 1st and 3rd Defendants, but that his version was in consonance with the testimony of PW1 as well as the statement of the 1st Defendant. He invited this Court’s attention to some portions of Exhibit P2, at Pages 15 and 16 of the Record, where in his view, the Respondent established the common criminal intent to commit the offence of robbery.

He pointed out that the offence of conspiracy is inferentially deduced from the acts of parties thereto which are focused towards the realization of their common or mutual criminal purpose. These cases were relied on:

Oduneye v. The State (2001) 2 SC 71; Daboh & Anor v. The State (2001) 2 SC 71;

Segun Balogun v. A.G. Ogun State (2002) 2 SC (Pt. 11) 89.

He added that where a charge of conspiracy accompanies a charge for a substantive offence, the two charges remain separate and a conviction of conspiracy cannot fail merely because the Defendant had been acquitted of the substantive offence. Reliance was placed on the case of Akinrinlola v. The State (2016) LPELR-40641, amongst others.

It is the opinion of learned Counsel for the Appellant that the retraction of Exhibit P2 by the Respondent, only affected the weight to be attached to the statement and the trial Court relied not only on the Exhibit P2, but he also sought and found independent corroborative evidence from the evidence of PW1 whose evidence before the trial Court is one of a vital and material eyewitness.

He opined further that the finding of the Court below that the testimony of PW1, being that of an Investigative Police Officer, was not one of an eye witness, was misconstrued as there exists no rule of practice or evidence that restricts an investigating Police Officer from testifying as an eyewitness. Reliance was placed on the case of Ogedengbe v. The State (2014) LPELR-23065, as well as Section 200 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as amended.

On the refusal of the Court below to rely on the trial Court’s findings of fact, learned Appellant’s Counsel quoted copiously, the judgments of the trial Court and the Court below, at pages 193 – 197 and 291 – 298 of the Records, respectively, and submitted that the Court below, failed to take cognizance of the findings of the trial Court, which is against the express admonition of this Court that appellate Courts ought not to interfere or disturb the findings of fact of a Court of first instance, except under exceptional circumstances. The case of Guardian Newspaper Ltd & Anor v. Ajeh (2011) LPELR 1343 SC, amongst others, was relied on.

In conclusion, this Court is urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant, allow the appeal, and set aside the judgment of the Court below.

In response to the above, it is submitted for the Respondent that the learned Justices of the Court below were right in holding that the Appellant failed to prove the offence of conspiracy to commit Robbery, against the Respondent, the fact being that the essential elements of the offence of conspiracy were not established against the Respondent.

Referring to the case of Kaza v. State (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1085) 125, amongst others, Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent set out the essential ingredients which the Prosecution must establish to ground the offence of conspiracy, and opined that the Court below was right to set aside the findings of the trial Court.

Learned Silk contended that nowhere in the testimony of the PW1, was the offence of conspiracy established, adding that the Court below was right to set aside the judgment of the trial Court, which was based mainly on suspicion. He cited and relied on the case of Al-Mustapha v. The State (2013) NWLR (Pt. 1383) 350. He maintained that the Prosecution failed to show that there was any physical or overt act by the Respondent, sufficiently proximate to proceed with the purported offence, or from which an agreement to commit an offence may be inferred, as rightly held by the Court below.

He argued that the case of Segun Balogun v. A.G. Ogun State (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 512, cited by the Appellant, is not on all fours with the instant appeal. According to him, in that case, evidence showed that the Appellant and his colleagues had a common purpose and agreement. They were together at the victim’s premises armed with a gun, where they demanded money from him. The PW1, who testified to the effect that he had known the Appellant therein, for more than 10 years, clearly saw him in his bedroom. In the instant case however, there is no scintilla of evidence of meeting of minds, agreement or coming together between the Respondent and the other defendants to carry out any robbery, and thus Court is urged to so hold. He placed reliance on the case of Roda v. FRN (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1468) 427.

It is the opinion of learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that the Court below was right to hold that there was no sufficient evidence to establish Conspiracy, and Exhibit P2, (the extra-judicial statement of the Respondent), was unreliable to have been the basis for the Respondent’s conviction for conspiracy.

Further on Exhibit P2, which the Respondent had denied making, it is the submission of learned Senior Counsel that the where an accused person retracts his earlier statement to the Police, the weight to be attached to such a statement is governed by the tests laid down in the R v. Sykes (1913) 8 CR APP R. 233, and approved in various decisions of this Court, including:

Dawa v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 236; and

Akindipe v. The State (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 470.

He noted that there is nothing outside of Exhibit P2 to make it probable the Court below was right to have set aside the judgment of the trial Court.

This Court is therefore urged to resolve this sole Issue against the Appellant, dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the Court below.

The offence of conspiracy is established once it is shown that the criminal design alleged is common to all the suspects. Proof of how the suspects are connected with or among themselves is not necessary. As a matter of fact, the conspirators need not know each other. They also need not have started the conspiracy at the same time. The foundation of the offence is the meeting of minds of the conspirators. The offence of conspiracy is not specifically defined in our Penal or Criminal Code. Consequently, a direct positive evidence of the plot among the conspirators is hardly provable. The Courts therefore tackle the offence of conspiracy as a matter of inference to be deduced from certain acts or omissions of the parties concerned. All the same conspiracy constitutes an agreement by two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. See:

Nwosu v. The State (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 897)466;

Obiakor v. The State (2002) 10 NWLR (PT 776) 612.

It is also trite that the Conspirators need not know themselves and need not have agreed to commit the offence at the same time. But conspiracy can be inferred from the facts of doing things towards a common goal, where there is no direct evidence in support of an agreement between the accused persons. See:

Aituma vs. State 2006 10 NWLR (PT 989) 452.

Innocent v. State (2013) LPELR-21200.

The ingredients of the offence of conspiracy under the Penal Code are as follows:

a) An agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done some illegal act, or some act which is not illegal by illegal means.

b) Where the agreement is other than an agreement to commit an offence, that some acts besides the agreement was done by one or more of the parties in the agreement, and

c) Specifically, that each of the accused persons individually participated in the conspiracy.

See:

Musa v. The State (2016) LPELR-42803 SC;

Obiako v. The State (2002) 6 SC (Pt. 11) 33; (2002) LPELR-2168SC.

Thus, it is hard and almost impossible for the Prosecution to procure and proffer, in proving the offence of conspiracy against an accused person, hard evidence of how the conspiracy was hatched by the conspirators. Therefore, direct evidence of a plot by the conspirators is hardly achievable. The bottom line of the offence of conspiracy, is the meeting of the minds among the conspirators for them to commit a criminal offence and they need not to meet physically and arrange how their criminal mission will be actualized. However, it is from each of the overt actions of the conspirators, in furtherance of their criminal agreement, that the offence of conspiracy is inferred. And most often, it is from the testimonies of some of the accused persons at the trial, of how they each got linked with one another, that the offence of conspiracy becomes apparent.

Now let me briefly examine the evidence adduced at the trial.

The summary of the evidence of PW1, is that while they were on patrol they suspected a commercial vehicle and followed it. They noticed the occupants were wailing and crying. They pursued it with sirens and he heard a shot fired from the vehicle. They also shot at it and eventually stopped it. Some occupants ran away and they pursued and captured them. Then the passengers identified the three accused persons/defendants as the robbers. He took them to the Pedro Police Station and recorded their statement first, before he took them to his DPO and cautioned them. He sought to tender the extra-judicial statement of the Respondent recorded by a certain Sgt. Ossai Chukwuka, who was said to be deceased. The Respondent’s counsel objected to its admissibility on grounds that it offended Section 35 of the old Evidence Act. After hearing arguments, the trial Court overruled the objection and admitted the statement in evidence as Exhibit P2.

Under cross-examination, he stated that it was the alleged victims who identified the robbers. He also stated that no investigations and findings were carried out on the bus.

The Respondent, in his testimony stated that he was not part of any conspiracy. He stated that on 12th June, 2006 as he was returning from his shop at Ladipo at about 6.00pm. He took a commercial motorcycle from Ladipo to Oshodi. On alighting from the motorcycle he gave N500 note to the motorcyclist who became agitated as he did not have any change. He went out to look for change but with no success. The motorcyclist who was now infuriated sped off and immediately thereafter, he was accosted by three men who demanded to know what he gave to the motorcyclist and he explained to them. Disbelieving him, they slapped and molested him with the butt of their gun and ordered him into their pick-up van and drove him to Shomolu Police Station. At the Police Station he was tortured, however he denied making or signing any statement/document. Simply put, he retracted his extra-judicial statement, Exhibit P2.

It has been an established practice that a Defendant in a criminal trial can easily be convicted solely on his confessional statement if the prosecution can show that the confessional statement was made freely and voluntarily by the accused person to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

However, where the Defendant retracts his confessional statement during trial, that alone cannot render the statement inadmissible. This is because retraction of or resiling from a confessional statement or denial by an accused person/Defendant of his having made such a statement does not ipso facto render it inadmissible in evidence. See:

Alarape v. The State (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt.205) 79.

Thus, a confessional statement, so long as it is free and voluntary and it is direct, positive and properly proved, is enough to sustain a conviction. The trial Court should not, however, act on the confession without first testing the truth thereof. But so long as the Court is satisfied with its truth a confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground and support a conviction without corroboration.

The test, however, for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement is to look for any other evidence be it slight, or circumstances which make it probable that the confession is true.

In R. v. Sykes (1913) 8 CAR 233 at 236, Ridly, J, suggested the tests to be applied on an accused person’s confessional statement in the determination of its veracity to include:

  1. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true.
  2. Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight.
  3. Whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true.
  4. Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence.
  5. Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter.
  6. Whether the confession of the accused person was possible.

The above tests have been accepted and consistently applied by this Court over a long period of time in a number of cases, including:

Dawa v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 236;

Akindipe v. The State (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 470.

I have thoroughly perused Exhibit P2. It did not give any graphic details of the activities of the offence the Respondent is charged with. This much was conceded by the trial Court, when at page 195 of the Record, it held inter alia:

“The 2nd Defendant in his statement Exhibit P2, did not give a graphic account of their activities but he stated that he was one of those alleged robbers arrested on the 11th day of June, 2006. He also gave account of some other robberies he participated in and their modus operandi.”

In commenting on the evidence adduced at the trial, the Court below, at pages 289 – 298 of the Record of Appeal, held conclusively inter alia:

“For us to understand the case of the Appellant, the Court would go through the evidence of the witnesses in this case. The Prosecution only proffered evidence from only one witness, the IPO. The job of the IPO is to investigate crime and come to Court to testify as to the form or outcome of his investigations. From the evidence of the IPO, PW1, he saw a bus and he suspected the occupants of some nefarious activities. He claimed that they followed the bus. He claimed they saw people fighting in the bus and could hear them screaming. He admitted that the patrol car had the siren on and the revolving lights on. The IPO claimed they were pursuing the bus and it stopped and one man jumped out. They interrogated the man who jumped out. The man said the bus was heading away from the destination he called. The man did not say there were robbers in the bus robbing people. The IPO did not get the number of the bus he had been following for a long time. He also did not produce in Court the people the Appellant robbed. He did not recover any of the items stolen. He also claimed that the occupants of the vehicle fired at them and they returned fire by shooting at the tires of the bus. No weapons were recovered from the scene. The above information is the sum of the IPO’s evidence. The job of an IPO is to investigate crime. He said he was at the spot when the bus stalled and the passengers rushed out. In that rush he was able to quickly identify the passengers and the robbers. The IPO did not arrest all the passengers if he was there as they were rushing out of the vehicle. The IPO could not recover any of the so called stolen items from the robbers neither could they recover any gun. The vehicle used in that robbery was neither detained and the driver of the vehicle was not identified either. In the usual run of events, if the bus was used in committing a crime, it is detained for some time until investigation is over. There was no mention of this aspect. You will recall that the IPO said that the patrol team shot at the tires of the vehicle to demobilize it. The IPO forgot to state what happened to the person who was hit by their bullets. I believe that this charge is trumped up to cover for the shooting of an innocent man in a bus. How could the IPO in a patrol car with siren blowing and the blue lights on, see the fracas in the vehicle and hear the sound of the cries of the occupants of the bus. It is unimaginable. When the vehicle stalled the passengers scampered off as the policemen in the patrol car had shot at them. Probably the ones who couldn’t run away fast enough were arrested beaten and made to confess. The DWS had given different testimony of how they were arrested at various bus stops. The other passengers who were robbed did not get to the police station to say how they were robbed and to state their missing items. How can there be a robbery, you arrested the robbers supposedly at the scene of crime and no items found including the firearms used. The IPO in any investigation is not usually an eye witness to any crime. He investigates alleged crimes reported to him. He interrogates the suspects, and takes down their statements. He visits the locus in quo for further investigations. He interviews witnesses and investigates alibi. The IPO never gave in evidence, that he interviewed anyone. There was only one supposed eye-witness Kayode Babalola who he interviewed and obtained his statement, Exhibit P4 but was not called as a witness to corroborate the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant. The Appellant’s evidence in Court was at variance with his extra-judicial statement made to the deceased colleague of PW1 who does not appear to be a truthful witness from his anecdote of how the Appellant and two other accused persons were arrested. The inconsistency rule is to the effect that where a witness statement to the police contradicts with the evidence in Court, the Court should regard him as an unreliable witness and discountenance both his statement to the police and his testimony in Court. It would be recalled that none of the items stolen was found on the Appellant nor with the other two accused persons. The stolen items were not also found in the bus nor around where the Appellant was arrested… Because the evidence of the Appellant was in total contradiction with his extra-judicial statement, the Court would need to corroborate the evidence of PW1. Evidence in corroboration must be an independent testimony, direct or circumstantial which confirms in some material particular not only that an offence has been committed but that the accused person has committed it. Corroboration need not consist of direct evidence that the accused person committed the offence nor need it amount to a confirmation of the whole account given by the witness, provided that it corroborates the evidence in some respect material to the charge… As it stands now, there is no corroboration of the testimony of the Appellant. The IPO/PW1 is not in any position to corroborate any evidence of the Appellant. Without corroboration of the tainted and unreliable evidence of the IPO, PW1, it would be difficult to convict the Appellant with this sort of evidence. Unreliable to say the least! It is true that the conspiracy is difficult to prove except by inference…The prosecution could not prove that there is any agreement between the Appellant and the 1st and 3rd accused persons. Apart from the discredited Exhibit P2, nothing connects the Appellant with the crime. There was no proof that the Appellant knew the two other accused persons before now. He was arrested on a different date other than the date the crime was said to have been committed. The prosecution gave in evidence that the Appellant and the other two accused were arrested at the scene. It turned out they were not arrested at the scene. It turned out they were arrested at different but stops on different days. It is true that the conspirators need not know themselves and need not to have agreed to commit the offence at the same time. A conspiracy can be inferred from the facts of doing things, towards a common end, where there is no direct evidence in support of an agreement between the accused persons …It is difficult to decipher how the PW1 would manufacture evidence that may be inferred to convict the Appellant of conspiracy. The learned trial judge was therefore wrong to have believed the cock and bull story of the IPO, PW1. His story was incredible to say the least. At best he concocted the statement of the Appellant and the other two accused persons to cover their own crimes. The IPO, PW1 and his crew shot a passenger in the vehicle. They claimed the vehicle was used to rob some imaginary people. The vehicle was neither detained nor the driver investigated. How then could any iota of conspiracy be inferred from a botched investigation. The learned trial judge was therefore wrong in inferring conspiracy from the evidence of PW1 and the so called Exhibit P2.”

I am satisfied and in total agreement with the finding of the Court below. The judgment is well researched and reasoned. Indeed the Court below effectively settled the matter of the offence charged and it would not be just, to split hairs and go into repetition of the issue of the Conspiracy, as the Court below has, done a thorough job of it. I adopt the judgment as mine and have nothing further to add.

I find in conclusion, that it was not established by credible evidence that the Respondent acted in concert; nor was there a meeting of minds to commit an unholy cause which can very properly be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of this case. There is no evidence before this Court, which suffices for the Court to make a finding of Conspiracy as charged.

The summation of all I have been saying, is that there is no iota of merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed by me.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, delivered on the 9th of June, 2016, is hereby affirmed by me.

Appeal dismissed.


SC.597/2016

State V. Da’u (2021) LLJR-SC

State V. Da’u (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.

This is an appeal by the State against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Kaduna division, Coram: Abba Aji) JCA (as he then was) Aboki, JCA (as he then was) and Abiru, JCA, delivered on 22/5/2015.

The respondent had been tried before the Katsina State High Court, sitting at Dutsin-ma on a sole charge dated 28/12/2005. The charge reads thus:

“That you, Murtala Da’u of Kasai village, Wagini District, Batsari Local Government Area of Katsina State, on or about the 6th day of October 2004 at the same address, committed culpable homicide punishable with death, in that you caused the death of one Lawal Musa by hitting him on the head with an axe with the knowledge that his death would be the probable consequence of your act and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code.”

​At the trial Court, the respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case proceeded to hearing. The gist of the case is that sometimes on 6/10/2004, the respondent was said to have killed the deceased – Lawal Musa in a forest by hitting him on the head twice with an axe. The respondent was arrested by the police. Thereafter, he made two statements to the police. The first statement was made at Batsari Police Divisional Headquarters wherein the respondent denied killing the deceased. The second statement was an alleged confessional statement where he admitted he committed the alleged offence.

At the proceedings, the prosecution called six witnesses and tendered four exhibits. In his defence the respondent testified as DWI but he called no other witness, In his oral testimony, the respondent denied that he committed the alleged offence.

At the conclusion of the trial and addresses of both counsel, the learned trial Judge found the respondent guilty as charged. He was also convicted. In pronouncing on the sentence, the Trial Court stated, inter alia, as follows:

“I have heard the plea for mitigation made on the convict’s behalf by his counsel and have noted that the convict by his testimony before the Court that he is now 21 years old in an offence committed in 2004, he was indeed 14 years of age at the material time which age by our laws he was not criminally responsible. I have similarly taken into account that the convict by Exhibit 3 was provoked by the victim into such act as an immediate reaction to the hit with a stick by the victim on him. However, the offence of culpable homicide punishable with death is the highest known to law and should not go unpunished. The accused person through his counsel did not plead any of those mitigating circumstances in his final address before the Court …

In the light of the above, and considering that human life was lost which is irreplaceable whose punishment is death, I now sentence you Murtala Da’u to a prison term of 50 (fifty) years with effect from the date of this judgment.”

Being dissatisfied with the judgment led the respondent to appeal to the Court below on six (6) grounds of appeal from which the Court below distilled the following sole issue to determine the appeal.

“Whether the prosecution has proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law, and whether the sentence of 50 years imprisonment is justifiable in the circumstance.”

Upon consideration of the above-identified issue for determination of the appeal, the Court below, inter alia, found as follows:

“The appellant, (that is respondent herein) in his confessional statement raised a defence of provocation as it was the deceased that first hit the appellant with his stick which suddenly provoked the appellant. This piece of evidence was not debunked by the respondent in any way…

The law is that by Section 222 of the Penal Code, culpable homicide is not punishable with death if the offender while deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident…

The appellant in the circumstance of this case ought to have benefitted from such defence which could have mitigated the offence from culpable homicide punishable with death to that not punishable with death under Section 222 of the Penal Code.” (Bracket supplied)

Ordinarily, the Penal Code in Section 222 provides for life sentence. However, the Court below also found as follows:

“The appellant (that is the respondent herein) was, at the time of the commission of the offence a minor, 14 years of age. In passing sentence on the accused, the age of the accused person at the time of the commission is to be taken into consideration.” (Bracket supplied).

Upon consideration of the above, the Court below finally found merit in the appeal of the convict and therefore set aside the conviction and sentence of 50 years imprisonment passed on the respondent by the trial Court. He was accordingly acquitted and discharged in the unanimous decision of the Court below.

The State was aggrieved by the judgment of the Court of Appeal, hence, it appealed to this Court.

The said appeal was heard by this Court on 30/9/2021 upon the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 10/2/2020 but deemed filed on 8/3/2020 on two (2) Grounds of Appeal. Pursuant to the Rules of this Court, parties filed their respective brief of arguments. The appellant’s brief of argument settled by Kelechi Obi Esq. was filed on 01/9/2016 but was deemed properly filed and served on 19/3/2020. The respondent’s brief of argument filed on 30/9/2016 was equally deemed properly filed and served on 19/3/2020.

In the said appellant’s brief of argument, the following two issues were distilled for the determination of the appeal.

Issue No. 1-

Whether the Justices of the Court of Appeal was right to have entered a judgment of culpable homicide not punishable with death? (Ground 1).

Issue No.2 –

Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal had the jurisdiction to release the respondent, despite finding him guilty of culpable homicide not punishable with death? (Ground 2).

In the respondent’s brief of argument filed on 30/9/2016 but deemed properly filed and served on 19/3/2020, which was settled by Obinna Ajoku Esq., the two Issues identified by the appellant in its brief of argument were adopted for the determination of this appeal.

In arguing Issue No. 1, learned counsel referred to the judgment of the trial Court as the genesis of the appeal. He also referred to the findings of the Court below at page 144 of the record. He contended that the appellant proved all the particulars of the offence charged and that there was no basis for the substitution of the lesser offence by the Court below. Therefore, he contended further that the judgment of the Court below was based on wrong principles and the Court acted in error to have mitigated the offence from culpable homicide punishable with death to that not punishable with death.

Learned counsel referred to Sections 135 (3) and 137 of the Evidence Act, 2011 for the provisions as to the standard of proof and the burden of proof in criminal proceedings. He further referred to the elements of the offence of culpable homicide not punishable with death under Section 222 (1) of the Penal Code.

Learned counsel conceded that it is trite law that culpable homicide is not punishable with death if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. He contended that the evidence upon which the Court below found that the defence of provocation availed the respondent was the confessional statement of the respondent. He alluded to the respondent’s said statement but contended that the act of the deceased in hitting the respondent with a stick at his back was not grave or sudden to have provoked the respondent. He submitted that the Court below erred in coming to the conclusion they did that the respondent was provoked by the act of the deceased.

Learned counsel referred to the element of provocation on the loss of self-control, both actual and reasonable, and submitted that the act of the deceased in hitting the respondent with a stick was not one capable of depriving a reasonable man and did not deprive the respondent of his power of self-control to make him for the moment, not the master of his mind. Learned counsel contended that the facts on record did not disclose any grave or sudden provocation that would amount to the triggering of a unilateral act of aggression on the part of the respondent.

Learned counsel contended that the respondent, for all intent and purposes, was acting for a reason other than complete loss of self-control caused by sudden provocation. He submitted that the respondent was clearly in his right senses when he grabbed the deceased’s axe and used it on the deceased twice. He submitted further that the respondent who retaliated with an axe by hitting the deceased twice on the head must have intended the natural and probable consequences of his act. He relied on Harrison Owhoruke vs. C.O.P. (2015) LPELR – 24820 (SC).

Learned counsel submitted that the respondent was in control of his mind when he inflicted the injury on the victim and thus the defence of provocation does not avail him.

On the element of retaliation not disproportionate to the provocation, learned counsel submitted that the Court below erred in its finding as it relates to the defence of provocation as the respondent’s retaliation was disproportionate to the provocation. He submitted that the defence of provocation could not avail the respondent.

Learned counsel contended that the nature of the weapon used by the respondent on the victim which was an axe, as opposed to the stick used by the deceased, cannot be said to be proportionate, but was excessive. He submitted that there was no sufficient provocation from the record to justify the use of an axe twice on the head of the deceased who hit him with a stick at his own back. He relied on Usman Kaza vs. The State (2008) LPELR 1683 SC.

Learned counsel contended further that the ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide punishable without death were not proved, hence there was no justification for the finding of the Court below to mitigate the offence. He urged the Court to resolve issue No. 1 in favour of the appellant against the respondent and set aside the judgment of the Court below which acquitted the respondent.

In arguing issue No. 1 as formulated by the appellant, learned counsel for the respondent referred to the judgment of the trial Court in particular on page 72 of the Record of Appeal. He contended that the trial Judge fell into grave error when he held that the respondent did not avail himself with any of the mitigating circumstances contained in Section 222 of the Penal Code.

He contended that the respondent raised provocation as a defence in his alleged confessional statement which was admitted as Exhibit 3. He submitted that the learned trial Judge was duty-bound to consider the defence. He relied on Shalla Vs. The State (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 240; Ojo vs. State (1973) NSCC 590 at 594.

Learned Counsel submitted that the Court below was right to have considered the defence of provocation raised in the respondent’s confessional statement which the trial Court failed to consider.

Learned counsel contended that there is no hard and fast rule for determining acts to constitute sufficient provocation but each case depends on its peculiar facts. He referred to the evidence on records where both the deceased and the respondent were below 17 years at the time of the incident and that they were both herders who were virtually living inside the forest. He submitted that the act of the deceased in hitting the respondent with the stick being used for herding cattle and goats when the respondent was separating his goats from that of the deceased could cause and indeed caused the respondent temporary loss of self-control. He relied on Queen Reuben Enyi Jinobil (1961) All NLR 654 at 656; Lado vs. State (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt.619) 369. At 436.

Learned counsel referred to the findings of the Court below at page 144 of the Record of Appeal to the effect that the respondent had raised the defence of provocation in his confessional statement to the Police that it was the deceased that first hit him with a stick at his back which suddenly provoked him. He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the respondent against the appellant.

As earlier stated, the respondent was charged on one count of committing culpable homicide punishable with death pursuant to Section 221 of the Penal Code by causing the death of one Lawal Musa. Before I proceed to consider the first issue for determination of the appeal – Whether the Justices of the Court of Appeal were right to have entered a judgment of culpable homicide not punishable with death, I wish to state the following facts that are not in dispute or controversy.

– The respondent as the accused was 14 years old at the time of the incident in question.

– The deceased was also of the same age, below 17 years at the time of his death.

– Both the deceased and the respondent were herders respectively of their cattle and goats in the forest.

– It was not disputed or controverted that the deceased was the first to hit the respondent with his herding stick at his back.

– That the axe used to hit the deceased on the head by the respondent was spontaneously taken from the deceased in retaliation for hitting him with his stick at the back.

– That after being hit on the head with the axe by the respondent and he fell down, the deceased started begging the respondent and asking for forgiveness from the respondent.

Generally, the particular Section of the Penal Code pursuant to which the respondent was tried – Section 221 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

S.221 “Except in the circumstances mentioned in Section 222 of this Penal Code, culpable homicide shall be punishable with death:-

(a) If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or;

(b) If the doer of the act knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only a likely consequence of the act or of any bodily injury which the act was intended to cause”.

However, Section 222 of the Penal Code referred to in the law pursuant to which the respondent was charged, tried, found guilty as charged and sentenced to 50 years imprisonment, states as follows:-

S.222 “(i) Culpable homicide is not punishable with death if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.”

From the records of Appeal and in the judgment of the trial Court at page 69, the trial Judge found as follows:-

“In Exhibit 3, the accused person gave a graphic account of how in the course of rearing their animals on 6/10/2014 the victim’s goats got mixed with that of the accused person which, according to the accused person’s account annoyed the victim (Lawal Musa), and the latter challenged the accused as to why he allowed his goats to mix with his (Lawal’s) own goats. That accused person began to separate the goats and it was in the process the victim’s goats got frightened then he (Lawal) instantly used his stick and hit the accused with it on his back. That the accused person then grasped his (Lawal’s) axe and hit him twice with it on the head which resulted in his (Lawal) falling down shouting “forgive me, forgive me”. That the accused then left him there and went ahead …”

There is no doubt, from the findings of the trial Court as stated above in the graphic account claimed to have been given in the statement of the respondent made to the Police as admitted and marked Exhibit 3, the exceptional circumstance envisaged in Section 222 of the Penal Code is clearly evident. It was the deceased who instantly used his stick to hit the respondent on his back. In other words, the hitting with a stick at the back came on the respondent suddenly and unaware. And as reflected in the quoted findings of the Trial Court, the respondent, with passion grasped the axe of the deceased and used it on the deceased to hit him on his head in retaliation.

Generally, provocation has been described to be some acts or series of acts done by the deceased to an accused which would cause any reasonable person and actually does cause in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him, for the moment, not the master of his mind. See; Ahmadu Lado Vs. The State (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt. 619) 369.

From the above, what will amount to provocation in a particular situation must be considered with the peculiar facts in mind. For instance, the station in life of the person and the society in which he lives. In the instant case, the respondent was then 14 years old and a Cattle and goats herder in the bush.

In other words, if the trial Court had been diligent enough and had put into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it would have been realized that the respondent was actually provoked by the deceased which deprived him of the power of self-control which made him to suddenly grasp the axe of the deceased and used it on him.

I am therefore at one with the Court below that the instant case is covered by the provision of Section 222 of the Penal Code, being the exception envisaged in Section 221 of the Penal Code. The respondent was entitled to the defence of provocation, raised and not controverted, in his statement and as rightly found and noted by the trial Court. The Court below was therefore right to have entered the judgment of culpable homicide punishable without death. The defence of provocation in Section 222 of the Penal Code availed the respondent to mitigate the effect of his act that led to the death of the deceased. In this circumstance, Issue No. 1 is resolved against the appellant but in favour of the respondent.

Issue No.2 –

“Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal had the jurisdiction to release the respondent despite finding him guilty of culpable homicide not punishable with death.”

Learned appellant’s counsel referred to the findings of the Court below on page 145 of the record of appeal. He also referred to Sections 222 (2) and 224 of the Penal Code. He contended that the law admits of life imprisonment or any less term or with fine or with both and nothing more. Learned counsel contended further that the Court has no discretion in the sentence to be passed where the law had specifically and mandatorily prescribed one. He relied on Joseph Amoshima Vs. The State (2011) LPELR 471 SC.

Learned counsel contended that the fact that the respondent was a minor at the time of the commission of the offence was the reason taken into consideration by the Court below in the exercise of its discretion to discharge and acquit the respondent.

Learned counsel submitted that the discharge and acquittal of the respondent by the Court below who was said to be 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence and therefore less than 18 years was not in consonance with Section 12 of the Children and Young Persons Act and Sections 272 (1) and 303 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Learned counsel contended that by virtue of the provisions of the above laws the respondent should have been dealt with as a young person instead of the acquittal and discharge order. He contended further that where the respondent had been found to be less than 17 years at the time of the commission of the offence, and he was found guilty, a sentence of death shall not be passed or recorded but that in lieu thereof, the Court shall order such a person to be detained during the pleasure of the Governor. He relied on Orisakwe Vs. State (2004) 12 WLR (Pt.887) 258 and Guobadia vs. State (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt.869) 360.

Learned counsel submitted that the acquittal and discharge Order by the Court below was wrong in principle and against the provisions of the law, which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. He submitted further that the acquittal and discharge order by the Court below of the respondent was ultra vires the sentencing power of the Court. He urged the Court to set it aside and resolve the issue in favour of the appellant and finally allow the appeal.

In arguing the 2nd issue for determination, learned counsel for the respondent contended that it is settled case-law that an accused person is entitled to all the defences that are in evidence and if the trial Court failed to consider the defence, the appellate Court is in a good position to consider same and make appropriate findings. He relied on Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004. He referred to the findings of the Court below upon consideration of the said confessional statement of the respondent which was admitted as Exhibit 3 by the trial Court, that the defence of provocation availed the respondent. He contended that by virtue of the provisions of Section 224 of the Penal Code, the Court below has the discretion to either sentence the respondent to life imprisonment or any less term or with fine or with both.

Learned counsel contended further that in reckoning the length of sentence, the Justices of the lower Court were right to have considered the number of years the respondent had served in prison in compliance with the judgment of the Trial Court.

Learned counsel submitted that it would not be said that the release of the respondent for the offence of culpable homicide not punishable with death after serving 14 years incarceration occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

Learned counsel further submitted that the Children and Young Persons Act, in particular, Sections 272(1) and 303 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code do not apply to the facts of this case as the lower Court did not convict the respondent for culpable homicide punishable with death. He referred to Sections 272 (1) and 303 (1), (2) and (4) of Criminal Procedure Code and Section 12 of Children and Young Persons Act Cap 485. He submitted that they are not applicable to the instant case, hence he urged the Court to discountenance with the submissions of the appellant on the said laws. He urged the Court to resolve the 2nd issue against the appellant and dismiss the appeal.

It is clear from the record of appeal and in the judgment of the Trial Court, that the trial Judge had, in his findings on page 69 noted that on the day the incident in question happened, both the deceased and the respondent were together rearing their respective animals in the bush. The trial Court also found that the deceased – Lawal Musa was the first to instantly used his stick and hit the accused with it on his back. It was also found that the respondent then grasped the deceased’s axe and hit him twice with it on the head which resulted in Lawal’s falling down.

​It is interesting that the trial Judge did not consider the instant use of the stick by the deceased to hit the respondent on his back as provocative which led the respondent to grasp the deceased’s axe from him and in retaliation used it to hit him on the head twice.

Ordinarily, not having availed the respondent with the provisions of Section 222 of the Penal Code, the trial Court went ahead to convict the respondent as charged with culpable homicide punishable with death.

However, the Court below, in my firm view, rightly in the peculiar circumstances of this case, availed the respondent with the provisions of Section 222 of the Penal Code on the effect of provocation arising from the act of the deceased leading to the assault inflicted on him by the respondent. There is no doubt that the deceased provoked the attack on him by the respondent. In other words, the deceased can be said to be the first aggressor. It is clear from the record that the trial Court did not consider the defence of provocation for the respondent even though he had raised it at the earliest opportunity in his statement made to the police – Exhibit 3.

It is noteworthy that the Court below in computing the sentence to give the respondent having availed him the defence in Section 222 of the Penal Code, the Court held, inter alia, as follows on page 145 of the record of appeal:

“The appellant (respondent herein) was at the time of the commission of the offence a minor, 14 years of age. In passing sentence on the accused, the age of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence and not at the time of conviction is to be taken into consideration …

The appellant having spent close to 16 years incarceration, since his arrest, detention and conviction, I have a duty, in the interest of justice and the fact that the appellant was a minor at the time of the commission of the offence to allow this appeal and order the immediate release of the appellant from custody”

The Court below was right to have converted the term already served by the respondent in custody as a sufficient term of imprisonment as punishment for the offence of culpable homicide not punishable with death. Indeed, the sentence of 50 years imprisonment passed on the respondent by the trial Court was ridiculous and unwarranted in the circumstance of the instant case. This issue No.2 is resolved against the appellant.

In this circumstance, this appeal is adjudged lacking in merit and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The Order of acquittal and discharge of the respondent is equally affirmed.

Appeal is dismissed.


SC.1018/2015

State V. Adu (2021) LLJR-SC

State V. Adu (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.

The respondent was the Vice Chairman of the Task Force of the Youths Association of Amaorie Ozziza Community in Afikpo North L.G.A of Ebonyi State. On 18-9-2016, as such Vice chairman, he and other leaders of the taskforce directed and led members of the said Task Force of the Youths Association of the Amaorie Ozziza to go out and force youths in the community that had refused to attend the meeting of the Youths Association holding that day at the community playground, Armed with sticks, machetes and axe, singing war songs, they invaded the home of one Ali Agha to compel him to attend the said meeting. In the process of compelling him to follow them, they killed him by inflicting multiple machete cuts on his body resulting in acute loss of blood.

​Nine members of the group, including the respondent, were arrested by the police in connection with the incident. They were arraigned before the High Court of Ebonyi State, at Afikpo in Afikpo Judicial Division in criminal case No. HAF/24C/2017 on an amended one count charge of murder of Ali Agha contrary to Section 319(1) of the Criminal Code Law Cap. 33 Vol. 1 Laws of Ebonyi. The respondent was the 3rd accused.

Following conclusion of evidence and addresses by the prosecution and the defence, the trial Court rendered its judgment on 15-10-2018, holding inter alia that-

“The firm view of this Court is that all the accused persons in this charge are caught up by Section 7 of the Criminal Code Law Cap 33, vol. 1, Laws of Ebonyi State of Nigeria, 2009. ANIGBOGU V. UCHE JIGBO (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 776) page 472 at page 477 on need for local associations not to violate citizen’s rights to freedom of association, Court of Appeal held thus:

“Desirable as development project in the community may be, there must be precaution to ensure that the fundamental rights of individuals are not trampled upon by popular enthusiasm. These rights have been enshrined in the legislation, that is the constitutions, enjoy superiority over local custom, freedom of association and religion are all constitutional rights which ought to be respected”.

See also the case of Agbai v. Okogbue (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 204) 391.

The above authorities, it is evident that the movement of the youths to the house of the deceased in the manner in which it was carried out, was unconstitutional and was in the … a breach of the fundamental right of freedom of association of the deceased as stated by Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

It is the law that where more than one person is accused of joint commission of crime as in the instant case, it is enough to prove that they all participated in the crime. What each did in furtherance of the commission of the crime is immaterial. The fact of the common intention manifesting in the execution of the common object is enough to render the accused persons guilty of the offence.

The Supreme Court in NWANKWOALA V. STATE (2006) 14 NWLR (pt. 1000) … at page 667 Ratio 3 – where on proof of common intention to commit crime, the Court intoned as follows: “where more than one person are accused of joint commission of a crime, it is enough to prove that they all participated in the crime. What each did in furtherance to the commission of the crime is immaterial. The mere fact of the common intention manifesting in the execution of the common object is enough to render each of the accused persons in the group guilty of the offence. ”

The Supreme Court in the same case at page 667 ratio 4, on joint liability for common action to commit crime the Supreme Court intoned as follows:

“Where common intention is established, a fatal blow or gunshot though given by any of the parties is deemed in the eyes of the law to have been given by all those present and participating. The person who actually delivered the fatal blow is, in that case, no more than the hand by which others also struck.”

Consequently, the firm view of this Court that based on the pieces of evidence of PW3, PW4, and PW5, it is all the accused persons in this charge that perpetrated the acts of inflicting the deceased with the machete cuts that abruptly sent the deceased to his maker.

The PW2 who is the medical practitioner gave evidence to the effect that the deceased Ali Agha had multiple injuries and bled from several blood vessels and most of these multiple witness were on the lateral part of the deceased which are used for defence.

The view of this Court is that these multiple injuries on the deceased could not have been inflicted on the deceased by Ejike Obiangwu alone while the other accused persons stood. Even if all the accused persons stood akimbo while Ejike Obiangwu was inflicting cuts on the deceased, having come to the scene of crime with Ejike Obiangwu for compelling the deceased to attend the proposed meeting of the youths of 2016, that would still have amounted to a criminal omission under Section 7 of the Penal Code (supra).

The further view of this Court is that even if it was only Ejike Obiangwu that inflicted the cuts on Ali Agha which killed him as harped and parroted by all the accused persons on the authority of Nwankwoala v. State (supra), Ejike Obiangwu would only be the … which the other accused persons struck.

The firmly entrenched law that where persons have embarked on a joint enterprise are liable criminally for the act done in pursuance or furtherance of the joint enterprise unusual consequences arising from the execution of the joint enterprise”.

The trial Court convicted the respondent and his co-accuseds for the murder of Ali Agha and sentenced them to death by hanging.

Dissatisfied with this judgment, the respondent herein commenced appeal No. CA/E/131C/2018 to the Court of Appeal at Enugu by filing a notice of appeal on 21-11-2018 against the said judgment. On 1-8-2019, the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment. It concurred with the finding of the trial Court that the evidence adduced by the prosecution proved that the deceased, Alli Agha was murdered and then proceeded to decide inter alia that- “The appellant raised the defence of alibi at the earliest opportunity when he stated that he did not go with the other youths and task force members to compel other people to attend the meeting in his extra-judicial statement, see page 66 of the Records. The appellant subsequently stated that he was at the village square with the chairman where they waited for the others to join the meeting. This is further corroborated by the fact that none of the other Accused persons mentioned the appellant as one of those who went to compel the other youths to attend the meeting in their extra-judicial statements; neither did they mention it in their testimonies before the learned trial Court. Furthermore, there is no evidence adduced by the Prosecuting placing the appellant at the scene of the crime.

The defence of alibi, where raised presupposes that the Accused person was somewhere else other than the crime scene at the time crime was committed.

Appellant furnished the respondent with the information of about which left to the respondent to duly investigate it is the responsibility of the respondent to investigate, this rebut it or place the appellant at the scene of the crime which had to do. The police must investigate the defence of alibi at the … opportunity. That was not done in the instant case and the prosecution did not offer any explanation for the lapse. That was also a serious blunder on the part of the prosecution. See Ani v. State (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1168) 443 S.C. The onus is not on the Accused person to satisfy the Court that the alibi on such evidence is established but for the prosecution to disprove the alibi.

I am bound by this decision because the testimony of the PW5 was that “all these events happened in the presence of the youths president Augustine Ogbonnaya Egwu and his deputy, Inya Agu, Nkaa Egwu and others…” This to my mind does not elicit the appellant’s participation in the alleged crime; it only shows that he was present at the scene of the crime and nothing more. The evidence of PW5 is not credible as it is wrought with inconsistencies; his extra-judicial statement contradicts his testimony in Court. The PW5 explicitly stated on page 12 of the Supplementary Record that;

“As at the time I made my statement to the police, all about the incident was not fresh in my memory because as a result of the head injury that was inflicted on me, I had a mental problem… Before I signed my statement which was recorded for me by a policeman called Ojukwu because of the mental problem I had, it was not read to me. I stated to the police the name of Igwe Oko and Inspector Egwu Oku as those that encouraged the youths by buying them drinks from where they moved to go and kill my brother. The police made a mistake by including their names as part of those that killed my brother.”

Going by the mental state of PW5, it is risky to rely on his evidence and testimony as it is obviously unreliable. The respondent shot itself on the foot by presenting the evidence and testimony of PW5 instead of that of a vital witness as Uche AIi who had an encounter with Ejike Obiangwu (the one who allegedly dealt the blow that killed the deceased). Uche Ali had narrated in his extra-judicial statement on page 20 of the Records that when he heard there was a fight, he ran to the scene and found the deceased in a pool of his own blood where he was informed that it was Ejike Obiangwu that did it so he ran in the direction that he was told Ejike Obiangwu had followed and found Ejike Obiangwu still armed with a cutlass soaked with blood. The said Uche Ali received a machete cut too when he made enquiries as to why Ejike Obiangwu killed his brother. It is curious that the Respondent did not call such vital witness to testify in Court which raises the presumption in Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 that his evidence would have been detrimental to the case of the prosecution.

The learned trial Court on page 44 of the Supplementary Records stated thus; “It is in view of this Court, that the pieces of evidence given by PW3, PW4 and PW5 sufficiently fixed the 3rd Accused person at the scene of the crime, especially as the PW3 in Exhibit D that the earliest opportunity referred to him as one of the masterminds of the killing of the deceased.”

In his extra-judicial statement, (Exhibit D), PW3 stated that:

“The people that killed my brother are (1) Ejike Obiangwu (2) Isu Ogbonnaya (3) Nka Egwu. The Youth President Amorie Ozizza is Ogbonnaya Egwu Esaa, he masterminded the whole thing with his Vice, Inya Adu Anugo”

This does not place the Appellant at the scene of the crime; rather it raises the allegation of a conspiracy. The concept of conspiracy as seen in MBANG V. STATE (SUPRA) presupposes that two or more persons came together to form the common intention to commit an offence. This means that for a charge of conspiracy to succeed, the prosecution has to show the meeting of the minds of the Accused persons and an agreement between them to commit an offence.

PW5 on page 18 of the Records in his extra-judicial statement insinuated that on the 16thof September, 2016, there was a meeting or regrouping of the youths at the instance of Inspector Oko Egwu PW5 further stated that:-

“The reason for the meeting that was called for that led to the killing of my elder brother was to discuss on the way for the youth to function again whether you agree or no”

The above statement does not connote any intention to harm or even kill anybody. It does not reveal any conspiracy to commit an offence neither does it reveal the names of the participants of the meeting. The PW5 did not mention that he was present at the meeting which could be reasonably inferred that the information he has on the said meeting of 16/09/16 is hearsay which is inadmissible. See OJO V GHARORO (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 987) 173 S.C OJUKWU V YARADUA (2009) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1154) 50 S.C and AROGUNDADE V STATE (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1136) 165 S.C.

Furthermore, PW5 recanted this statement (Exhibit B) during his testimony in Court when he stated that the police made a mistake by including the names of Inspector Egwu and Igwe Oko. Therefore, there is no indication or evidence that any meeting took place before the date of the incident, and the meeting that was scheduled to take place never took place because of the incident. Where then is the evidence of conspiracy? None of the witness actually identified or specifically pin point what the Appellant did to kill the deceased nor did they state in clear terms the role the Appellant played in the killing of the deceased, if any. PW3 in his statement to the police which was given at the earliest opportunity did not mention the extent of the appellant’s involvement in the killing of the deceased, he only stated that the chairman of the youths and the appellant who was the vice chairman masterminded the killing of the deceased without adducing further evidence as to the alleged conspiracy. The witness is not allowed to just make a blanket statement without providing specific details to this alleged plot to kill the deceased. The statement of PW3 in this regard is a mere statement and not a statement of fact as evidence was not adduced to prove same and it is therefore not sufficient to implicate the appellant. The testimony given at the earliest opportunity is the best evidence, when the evidence and events are still fresh in the mind of the witness and not when the witness has had ample time and opportunity to implicate others.

It is a long established principle of law that to be held credible and acted upon, the name of a suspect must be mentioned at the very first opportunity.

During the cross-examination, PW3 stated that he does not know whether there was a meeting of the youths. See page 187 of the Record(s) If this is the case, how then did PW3 come to the conclusion that the appellant masterminded the killing of the deceased? There is no evidence to that effect. DW1 and DW2 as elders in the community gave evidence to the effect that the elders of the community had granted permission to the youths of the community to hold the meeting slated for the 18/09/16 to discuss the way forward on the completion of lock-up stall initiated by the youths. This evidence was not contradicted, rebutted nor refuted. Therefore, the purpose of the meeting slated for 18/09/16 was slated by DW1 and DW2 and not to conspire to kill the deceased.

The Respondent failed to prove that, it was the act of the appellant that caused the death of the deceased. The only ingredient of the offence of murder that was established by the respondent ease the first ingredient which is that the deceased had died. Since the second ingredient which relates to cause of death was not established, the third ingredient and conspiracy theory goes to no issue. Having a corpse as proof of death is not sufficient evidence to hang another man for the death of the deceased. The intention to kill as in the motive and the actual act of killing or ensuring the act is done, as in a conspiracy must be established beyond reasonable doubt.

The Prosecution failed to prove the 2nd & 3rd ingredients of the offence of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of a clear intention and common intention in the circumstance of this case compels one to allow the appellant the benefit of the doubt.

This appeal is allowed. The decision of the learned trial Court is hereby quashed. The appellant is discharged and acquitted and shall be released from custody immediately”.

It is against the above judgment of the Court of Appeal that the appellant herein filed a notice of appeal on 6-8-2019 commencing this appeal No. SC. 1146c/2019. The notice of appeal contains three grounds for the appeal.

Both sides have filed, exchanged and adopted their respective briefs as follows- appellant’s brief and respondent’s brief.

The appellant’s brief raised two issues for determination as follows-

I. “Whether the lower Court was right in holding that the appellant failed to prove that it was the act of the respondent that caused the death of the deceased”. (Ground 1)

II. “Whether the appellant proved its case and the lower Court was wrong in quashing the decision of the trial Court and allowing the respondent’s appeal. (Ground 2 and 3).”

I must start the consideration of the two issues raised for determination by the parties herein in their respective briefs by observing that the judgment of the Court of Appeal exposes that its review of the factual basis of the judgment of the trial Court did not follow the prescription in Section 135 of the Evidence Act thusly-

(1) If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(2) The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is subject to Section 139 of this Act, on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or not directly in issue in the action.

(3) If the prosecution proves the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of providing reasonable doubt is shifted onto the defendant.

By virtue of this provision, the Court of Appeal was bound to find out if the evidence of the prosecution on its own established a case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt and if it finds that it did, then proceed to find out if the evidence of the defence proved reasonable doubt in the case established by the evidence of the prosecution. The judgment must prima facie reflect this approach in dealing with the evidential basis of the decision. The judgment of the Court of Appeal shows that the Court did not direct itself on the appropriate approach to adopt in its appellate review. It went straight to picking out what it adjudged as faults in the evidential basis of isolated parts of the judgment of the trial Court.

The judgment of the trial Court was based on findings of facts that were largely founded on the credibility of witness testimonies and the trial Court’s belief of the said witness. Therefore, an appellate review of the evidential basis of such findings of fact must be limited to finding out if the findings of facts were perverse in the sense that they were not supported by any evidence at all, or are contrary to the logic of the evidence or are unreasonable.

It is obvious from the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeal that its decision that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt is the result of its understanding of the evidence before it and the inferences and conclusions it drew from the said evidence and not the consideration of the validity of the findings of facts by the trial Court. The law is settled by an unending line of judicial decisions that an appellate Court cannot interfere with the findings of facts by a trial Court or its belief of witnesses that have not been shown to be perverse because it holds a different view of the evidence. The appellate Court cannot substitute its own views for those of the trial Court, especially where the issue turns on the credibility of witnesses. Once, as in the present case, there is sufficient evidence on record from which the trial Court made its findings of facts, the appellate Court cannot interfere. This is because the reception and evaluation of evidence are primarily the functions of the trial Court. See for example Efe V The State (1976)11 SC 75, Okonofua V The State (1981) 6-7 SC 1 @ 14, Bamgboye V University of Ilorin (1999) 6SC (Pt.ii) 72 and Fasikun V Oluronke (1999) 1 SC 16.

In the light of my foregoing holding, this appeal succeeds without the need to further into the issues raised and argued in the briefs herein. Be this as it is, let me still consider them for whatever such exercise is worth.

Learned Counsel for the appellant in his brief has argued extensively that the said inferences and conclusions by the Court of Appeal are not supported by the evidence. Learned Counsel for the respondent in his brief argued in support of the said inferences drawn by the Court of Appeal from the evidence before it.

Let me now consider the merits of these arguments.

Let me start with the finding of the Court of Appeal that:- “None of the other Accused persons mentioned the Appellant as one of those who went to compel the other youths to attend the meeting in their extra-judicial Statements, neither did they mention it in their testimonies before the learned trial Court. Furthermore, there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution placing the appellant at the scene of the crime.”

​This finding by the Court of Appeal is contrary to the evidence. PW5 in Exhibit B, his extra-Judicial Statement made at the police station during investigation before trial, stated that the respondent was present amongst the youths at the scene of the crime when the deceased, his elder brother was attacked and killed by the youths and that Ejike Obiangwu inflicted the machete cuts that killed the deceased and Chukwu BenbeIla inflicted the machete cut on PW5’s head. The exact portion of the exhibit B that contains his statement reads thusly – “The deceased Ali Agha ‘m’ is my immediate elder brother. It was at about 8am of 18-9-2016, I was coming out from my father’s compound when I saw my younger brother Agha Pius crying, I asked him what the problem was that made him to be crying and he replied that he was flogged by the youths of our village by names (1) Umeh Agwu ‘m’ (2) Chukwu Benbella as I was still standing with my younger brother, the youth made up of the following people came; Umeh Agwu ‘m’, Chukwu Benbella Ogbonna Egwu ‘m’, Aka Esa, ‘m’, Ejike Obiangwu ‘m’, Eko Chukwu ‘m’, Moses Onyia ‘m’, Sunday Ogbonaya Oko Aka Dede ‘m’, Oko Akpu ‘m’ Irem Chukwu ‘m’, Inspector Egwu Oko ‘m’, Igwe Oko ‘m’ and others whose names I cannot remember but if I see them, I will recognize them. There came from same village with me. They were all armed with cutlasses and sticks. It was when they entered inside my father’s compound that the deceased, my elder brother, Ali Agha warned them that they should stop beating his younger brother again, at that point, Sunday Ogbonnaya, Oko Chukwu, Aka Dede and that my brother Ali Agha has insulted the youths, that he should either lied down to be given twenty strokes of cane or he will go to the village play ground to face the punishment but my brother refused and that was when they started cutting him with cutlass all over his body. The name of the person that actually cut him at his face and back that led to his death is one Ejike Obiangwu ‘m’.

The truth is that the people I saw that killed my elder brother are (1) Ejike Obiangwu and Chukwu Benbella ‘m’. It was even Chukwu Benbella that gave me a machete cut on my head. All this events happened in the presence of the youth president Augustine Ogbonannya Egwu and his deputy Inya Agu, Nkaaa Egwu and others. This is my statement.”

​The PW5 testified in open Court in examination in chief thusly:

“I know one Ali Agha. He is my elder brother. He is dead now and in the mortuary. I know how he died. On 18/9/2016 in the morning hours which was a Sunday that people go to church. Then as I was coming out of my father’s compound, I saw my younger brother one Pius Okpara Agha, that is the PW3 as he was crying. I asked him why he was crying and he told me that these Accused persons in the dock and some who are on the run trooped into his shop and started beating him in his said shop. As we were still talking my elder brother late came out of the house and also asked him why he was crying and he started narrating the incident to him. As we were still asking him, I heard a noise and that noise was from a great crowd who were singing war song which does not tolerate the presence of women. In a short while I saw this crowd of people coming into our compound holding machetes and sticks. As they came in, the 1st Accused who is the chairman of the task force asked my brother the deceased to come to the village square. The deceased now stated that he had warned them not to come into our compound and beat my brother. At that point the 1st Accused person, stated that he had insulted the youths. As he asked my brother to come out, that the youths would give him 20 strokes of cane and my brother refused to come out. The 1st Accused person now ordered the youths to take hold of my brother. As the 1st Accused gave this order, that Nicholas Olughu the 5th Accused person came into our house and started dragging the deceased out of the house forcefully. (This Nicholas Olughu was wearing Jonathan Goodluck 2015 T. shirt.)”

When the deceased saw that the youths were serious about him coming out, he ran away. These Accused persons and others on the run pursued him. As I saw this and reasoned that the youths could kill my brother I ran after them. As I ran a little the 7th Accused person held me while the 4th Accused person inflicted a machete cut on my head. The scar still on my head, if the Court so desires, the Court can see it. (The Court actually observed the head of the PW5 and saw a scar reminiscent of a machete cut). As I looked up, I saw the youths had entangled my brother the deceased with their legs and he fell down. They now stated inflicting machete cuts on him as if he was a tree. When they saw that he had become weak and dead, they left him and ran away still chanting their war song to the village square. I started carrying the deceased thinking that he was still alive and I did this in conjunction with the PW3. As we were doing that I also saw that the PW3 was also given a machete cut. I also saw that PW4 had also been inflicted with machete cut on her face. I also saw that one Uche Ali had a machete cut. I now carried my brother the deceased on a motor bike and took him to Mater Hospital where a medical Doctor examined and confirmed him dead. I left that hospital and went to the Police Division in Afikpo and lodged a complaint. The police now accompanied me to the Mater Hospital. As we were going to the hospital, the police engaged the services of a photographer. As I saw that I was bleeding profusely, I left for Afikpo Medical Center for treatment. After, the treatment the following day I went to the police at Abakaliki and made a statement.

Under cross-examination he testified thusly –

Q – In your statement of 19/9/2016, that is Exhibit B, you stated: “The people that I saw that killed my elder brother are

(1) Ejike Obiangwu and (2) Chukwu BenbeIIa ‘m’?

A – The Accused persons and those still on the run are those that killed my brother, I even listed their names in a paper.

Q – You told police in this Exhibit “B” also: “The name of the person that actually cut him at his face and back that led to his death in one Ejike Obiangwu?

A – I was not myself when I made Exhibit B but I started that it was Ejike and others that killed my brother.

Q – Having mentioned Ejike as the person that killed your brother, you just started mentioning other persons that they were there in order to rope them

A – Ejike and the Accused persons came to the scene of crime together and it was Ejike and these Accused persons and others still on the run that killed my brother; if Ejike did not kill my brother why is he running away.

PW3, Pius Okpara Agha in exhibit D, his extra-judicial statement made at the police station during investigation mentioned the respondent as one of the masterminds of the attack and killing of the deceased. The exact text of exhibit D reads thusly-

“It was on the 18th of September, 2016 when I went to my shop at about 0700 hours and started work as a hair stylist. As I finished barbing the first person and was about to barb the second person, the youth of Amorie Ozizza led by one Oko Chukwu Dede M. came to me and asked if I had no heard the bell that was ranged calling us for a meeting, I told them that I did not hear any bell, that I slept at Amaike Ozizza. They then told me that I should come out and receive twelve strokes of cane, at that point, I told them that it is too early that people are going to church, they started beating me, after which they left me and went to Ogo. After sometime, they came back to me at my mother’s place Eziukwu Amorie Ozizza. On getting there, they saw me and late Ali Agha, one of the … the Ogo for the meeting, my brother late Ali Agha told them that we are going to church. They left us and went back. After some time, the youths came back now singing a war song popularly sang in the village when there is problem, they armed themselves with cutlasses and sticks and started destroying the roof of the house at one Ugo Euo and after that we ran for our dear lives and they pursued us and met my brother late Ali Agha and started cutting him with cutlasses all over his body in the process, I went to rescue late Ali Agha and was cut with a cutlass by Chukwu BembeIIa and Umeh Agwu M all of the same village with me. The people that killed my brother are (1) Ejike Obiahu M. (2) Isu Ogbonnaya ME and (3) Nka Egwu. The youth President of Amorie Ozizza is Ogbonnaya Egwu Esaa M, he masterminded the whole thing with his vice Inya Adu Aringo. This is my statement”.

​His testimony in examination in chief in Court reads thusly-

“It was on the 18th day of September, 2016 at about 7am on that Sunday, I and the deceased were living at Amikp in the house of my grandfather. On that Sunday morning, we came to Amaorie, that is, Eziukwu Amaorie. The deceased now decided to go and see our mother in that our compound to greet her. I went and opened my barbing salon as I opened the shop, the first customer came. I barbed his hair and went to the second customer. As I was barbing the second customer, these Accused persons who are youths of Amaorie and others still on the run came and surrounded me and said: are you hearing the traditional gong being sounded? I now said that I did not hear it because I live at Amikpo. They told me to come out that they would administer to me twelve strokes of the cane. I told them that today is Sunday and that after barbing the second person that I will start going to church. As I was still telling them that, they all started flogging me, all over my body with sticks. After flogging me, they now started going to the village square. I now closed my barbing salon and started going to my mother’s house because I was no longer myself. As I now was in my mother’s house, the deceased, myself and my mother were discussing in her house. As we were there discussing, all these Accused persons and others decided to come to my mother’s house and asked us what we were still doing there. The deceased now told them that what are you people doing here? That today is Sunday and that we were preparing to go to Church. They now went back to the village square. As they were going, I told the deceased that theses Accused persons and others had been to my barbing salon and beat me up. As we were still in my mother’s house, these Accused persons and others still on the run started advancing towards my mother’s house chanting war songs such that a female who hears must take to flight. They were holding sticks, machetes and axe. As they got to my mother’s house, they commanded the deceased to come out from the house for them to give twenty strokes of the cane for neglecting them. The deceased said that he will not come and that he was even a Counselor in Oziza and how come they have come to intimidate him. At this point they now rushed in to the said house to grab him and the deceased took to flight and I followed him in that flight. As both the deceased and I ran out of the house we ran toward different directions, with the deceased running towards where the elders of Amaorie perform the traditional rite while I hid myself. As I was in that hiding place, I started hearing the shouting of the deceased. As a result of the shouting emanating from the deceased, because he was my elder brother I decided to come out of my hiding place to know what was happening to him. As I came out, I saw these Accused persons and others on the run inflicting machete cuts on the deceased jointly. As I saw what the Accused persons were doing to the deceased, because the deceased was my elder brother, I could not bear what was happening to him, I braced up myself and rushed towards him, in a bid to rescue him from theses Accused persons and others still on the run, as I made this attempt, the 4th Accused person inflicted a machete cut on my arm. (The Court took a look at the said left arm and saw a scar that is reminiscent of a machete cut).

As I still attempted the rescue mission of the deceased one of the youths who was with the Accused persons and who is still on the run inflicted another machete cut on my hand, close to the wrist. They now jointly violently shoved me aside as a result of which I crash landed to the ground with my mouth and which inflicted injury on my lips which caused same to be stitched. Before I could get up, they had completely killed the deceased. I then stated shouting. As I was shouting another of my elder brother called Alum Agha Geoffrey started running towards where I was with injury on his head which the youths had also inflicted on him. The youths also inflicted a head injury on one Uche Ali. I now told these people whom I mentioned above who also had injuries on them, but whose injuries were lighter than that of the deceased and one Ugochukwu Evo who had also gotten to the scene to assist me in carrying the deceased so that we could take him to where he could get medical attention. They assisted me and we placed the deceased on motorcycle that took him to the Mater Misericordiae Hospital with the deceased foot daggling on the road.

As we got to the said Hospital people scampered for safety and I started pleading with the people I saw around to please call for any medical doctor, the medical doctor examined the deceased and confirmed him dead. I then moved from the said Hospital to the Afikpo Divisional Police Headquarters and reported the incident. They now followed me and also invited a photographer who accompanied them and we now got to the said hospital and the policemen then assisted in depositing the body of the deceased in the mortuary after taking his photographs.

The police after depositing the body of the deceased in the mortuary, asked me to follow them to their station. As we got to the said police Division, the police men now called all other police stations within including the Police Stations at Unwana and Akpoha and Area Command Afikpo. Policemen from the above mentioned stations gathered and told me to take them to Amaorie Oziza. As we got to the market square at Amaorie Oziza, these Accused persons and others still on the run used tyres to make burn fire on the roads as a result of which the said police men were compelled to park their vehicles at that market square and moved on foot to the Elu Amaorie where we all saw the Accused persons with the blood stained machete they were still holding and which they all held into air and were singing and dancing to the war song saying that nothing will happen. They now started hauling stones on the advancing policemen as a result of which the police retreated for the safety of them and me. As we were making retreat, the police now called the Police State Command and reported the incident on account of which Police from the Ebonyi State Command Headquarters used three vehicles and came to Amaorie Oziza.

Before the arrival of these police from Abakaliki, the Accused persons and others had dispersed. Since these Accused persons and others had dispersed, the police from Abakaliki now took me along with them to Abakaliki where I now made statement to them stating what happened”.

This testimony was not challenged or shaken in cross-examination, PW4, Regina Chukwu Evo, in her testimony in examination in chief, stated that

“I can recall the event of 18/9/2016. On that 18/9/2016, a Sunday in 2016, I was in my house carrying a baby when I heard the Youths of Amaorie with their sing song or war song marching towards the house of Mama Ali Agha the mother of the deceased carrying machetes, Axe and sticks and met the deceased in the house of his mother and chased him out of said house and he started running and these Accused persons obstructed his speed by using their feet to entangle his legs and he fell down and they started inflicting machete cuts on him. Then I started begging them not to kill him that he is a human being o, then one of them called Ejike used the machete he was holding and inflicted machete cut on my face and I started bleeding profusely. I now immediately rushed to a patent medicine store where I was treated with stitches on my face.

After this, as I was returning, I now saw the deceased Ali Agha as he was being conveyed to the hospital on a motor bike and I also saw Okpara and Alum who are the younger brothers of the deceased and one Uche Ali who were carrying various injuries on their bodies. It is Ogbolsu and Ejike who are still on the run and these Accused persons that collaboratively killed the deceased. I made statement to the police in Abakaliki, Ebonyi State.”

Under cross-examination she testified that

“Q- Between today and when you made your statement, when was the incident fresher in your memory?

A- I have stated what I know what happened. It was these Accused persons that killed the deceased. I have stated the whole thing I know. It is these Accused persons that killed the deceased and inflicted machete cut on my face and I became unconscious and fell down.

Q- You said in Exhibit E that it was Ejike Obiahu that used a cutlass and cut Ali Agha all over his body that caused his death?

A- It was not only Ejike Obiahu that inflicted machete cuts on the deceased. All the Accused persons and those still on the run inflicted machete cuts on the deceased and also inflicted machete cuts on my face. You see my face, it is stitched.

Q- I am putting it to you that you have come to tell the Court lies by departing from your statement to the police?

A- These people in the dock, if you want me to start mentioning their names, I will. They are the people that killed Ali Aghas I am not telling a lie. Is it because Ejike Obiahu is not on trial that they are now alleging that it was Ejike alone that killed the deceased my brother.

Q- Were you forced in the police station to mention only Ejike Obiahu?

A- I never stated that it was Ejike Obiahu alone that killed the deceased.

Q- Where precisely did his killing of the deceased take place?

A- It was at Obu Amaorie that the Accused persons killed the deceased.

Q- From your house to where the incident took place, can you give an idea as to the distance?

A- The distance between my house and the Obu where the deceased was killed is about 1 pole.

Q- At the time of the happening of this incident, you told the police that you were in your house?

A- I was in my house carrying a little child when the incident started. But when they chased after the deceased, I came out and started pleading with them to leave him alone and they refused.

Q- You observed that day that it was the deceased who first inflicted a machete cut on Ejike Obiahu who then over-powered him and took the machete from him and then inflicted a cut or cuts on the deceased?

A- It is a lie. They are now alleging as above because Ejike is not here in Court. They are the people who killed the deceased.

Q- How was the deceased related to you?

A- The deceased was a member of my maternal family.

Q- You are now telling the Court lies because of that relationship that you had with the deceased?

A- I have not come to this Court to tell this Court lies. It is these Accused persons that killed the deceased. The deceased that they killed was not holding any wood or stick including myself that they inflicted machete cuts on my face.

Q- In Amaorie Oziza, Youths had always been meeting for the good of the community before they stopped for a while?

A- I do not know.

Q- That meeting that was called on 18/9/2016 was not for the killing of Ali Agha but for the purpose of the development of Amaorie Oziza?

A- I do not know. But if it was for the development of the Community, why did they kill my brother on that day.

Q- Between what you told the police in your statement, that is, Exhibit E and what you have told this Court; which do you want the Court to believe?

A- It is these Accused persons that killed the deceased, inflicted machete cuts on the deceased’s brothers and myself.

Q- How many people were present in the house of Ali Agha’s mother’s house when the Amaorie Youths went to the house?

A- There were many people there in the Ali Agha’s mother’s house. But when the Youths came with their war song, they ran away”.

It is glaring that PW3, PW4 and PW5 stated that the respondent was present at the scene of crime as part of the youths that went to the deceased house to force him to attend the youth meeting at the village square.

​The decision of the Court of Appeal that PW5’s testimony that the President of the youths and the respondent who was his deputy were present when crime was committed does not show that the respondent participated in the crime, as it only shows that he was present at the scene of crime and nothing more, is not correct in fact and in law considering the provisions of Section 8 of the Criminal Code Law and the facts that he was there as part of the joint action of the Youths task force for the unlawful purpose of forcing the deceased by flogging with cane to attend their meeting and the deceased was killed in the process.

The decision of the Court of Appeal that none of the witnesses actually identified or specifically pin point what the respondent did in killing of the deceased show that the Court did not address its mind to the law on joint responsibility for an offence committed during a joint enterprise to carry out an unlawful purpose. The basis of responsibility for the crime is participation in the joint enterprise with the common intention to carry out a purpose that is unlawful. The specific role played in the commission of the offence that occurred in the joint enterprise is not a relevant consideration for joint responsibility by all members of the group for the crime.

The decision of the Court of Appeal that PW3’s testimony did not give specific details of how the respondent masterminded the killing of the deceased disregards the admitted facts that it was the youths association and Youths Task Force that decided that the Youth Task Force should go out and force the deceased to attend the meeting of the association holding that day at the village square and that the youths went to the house of the deceased to force him to attend the meeting and that the respondent as Vice President or Chairman of the Youths Task Force and his President was at the house of the deceased that day for that purpose.

Their leadership of the Youths Task Force and their presence at the deceased’s house when the invasion of the house and the killing of the deceased took place relieves the prosecution of any duty to prove any other overt acts of their mastermind of the attack.

It is not disputed on the evidence of both sides that when the Youth Association meeting scheduled to hold that day was about to start, it was observed that some of the youths were not present. On the direction of the President Youths Association, the Youth Task Force went out to compel the absent youths to attend the meeting. The absent youths would be flogged 20 strokes of cane for failing to attend the meeting voluntarily before they are compelled to attend the meeting. It has never been in dispute that the youths, with the common intention to force the deceased to attend the said meeting, went out on 18-9-2016 to actually force the deceased to attend the meeting.

The question of whether they conspired to kill the deceased is irrelevant in the circumstances of this case. The Court of Appeal did not direct itself on the proper question to ask on the evidence. The proper question is whether there is evidence of a common intention of the group of youths to go and force the deceased to attend the meeting.

The case of the prosecution is not that the youths conspired to go and kill the deceased. Its case from the evidence is that they formed a common intention to go and force him to attend the meeting and that in the process of executing or carrying out that unlawful purpose as a group, the deceased was killed by the machete cuts of one or more member of the group. Those facts are not in dispute on the evidence.

The part of the judgment of the trial Court that held that the evidence of PW3, PW4 and PW5 eye witnesses of the crime sufficiently fixed the respondent at the crime scene, reads thusly-

“It is view of this Court, that the pieces of evidence given by PW3, PW4 and PW5 sufficiently fixed the 3rd Accused person at the scene of the crime, especially as the PW3 in Exhibit D at the earliest opportunity referred to him as one of the masterminds of the killing of the deceased”.

In his extra-judicial statement, (Exhibit D), PW3 state that;

“The people that killed my brother are (1) Ejike Obiahu (2) Isu Ogbonaya (3) Nka Egwu. The Youth President of Amorie Ozizza is Ogbonnaya Egwu Esaa, he masterminded the whole thing with his Vice, Inya Adu Anugo”.

The Court of Appeal reproduced the above part of the trial Court judgment in its judgment and held thusly- “This does not place the appellant at the scene of crime, rather it raises the allegation of a conspiracy”. This holding is glaringly wrong as it is not supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeal drew the wrong conclusions from the said evidence.

​The decision of the trial Court is that the evidence given by PW3, PW4 and PW5 fixed the respondent at the scene of the crime. The Court of Appeal had earlier in its judgment held that the testimony of PW5 showed that the respondent was present at the scene of crime at the time the crime was committed. Having held that the testimony of PW5 showed the presence of the respondent at the crime scene, the Court of Appeal contradicted itself when it held that the prosecution were bound to investigate the claim of the respondent in his extra-judicial statement at the police that he remained at the village square and did not follow the Youths Task Force to go and force the deceased and other youths to attend the meeting and so was not at the place where the youths attacked and killed the deceased.

It is a recurring judicial restatement of considerable antiquity that where eye witness testimony or other evidence has fixed the accused at the crime scene when the crime was committed, and the evidence is believed by the trial Court, the fact that the police did not investigate the claim of alibi becomes irrelevant. Whereas in this case the respondent was mentioned by three eye-witnesses, as being amongst the youths they saw attack and killed the deceased in his house, it becomes a straight issue of credibility of the witnesses and once the trial Court believes the witnesses as happened in this case, the trial Court’s reliance on such testimonies as evidence of his presence at the scene of crime cannot be faulted. Even the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial Court that the evidence of PW5 show that the respondent was present at the scene of crime. See Ezekiel Adekunle v. The State (1989) 12 SCNJ 184 at 190, Obiode v. The State (1970) 1 All NLR 35 and Mathew Obakpolor v. The State (1991) 1 SCNJ 91.

I find it difficult to agree with the decision of the Court of Appeal that “the onus is not on the accused person to satisfy the Court that the alibi on such evidence is established, but for the prosecution to disprove the alibi”.

In a situation where during trial three witnesses for the prosecution testified that the respondent was among the youths that came to the deceased’s compound, attacked him and killed him and that the respondent was present when the deceased was attacked and killed, the respondent cannot safely rely on his mere assertion that he did not follow the youths to the deceased’s house and that he remained at the village square for his defence to the testimonies of the three prosecution witnesses fixing him at the scene of crime.

As this Court held in Obakpolor V The State “It is no proof of alibi for an accused person merely to assert, as in this case, that he was not at the scene of crime and could not have been there because he was elsewhere. He must lead credible evidence. The evidential burden of adducing evidence to support a defence of alibi is on the accused person raising such defence because the facts upon which the defence of alibi rests are facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused person raising such a defence”.

Apart from stating in exhibit K, his extra-judicial statement at the police station and in his testimony in open Court that he remained in the village square and did not follow the youths to go to force the deceased to attend the meeting, he did not mention the names of any person in whose company he was or that saw him at the village square at the material time.

​His statement in exhibit K reads thusly-

“My name is Inya Adu M. AKA Ringo, I am a native of Agba Amorie Ozizza in Afikpo North LGA of Ebonyi State. Born into the family of late Mr Adu Egwu and late Mrs Uzo Inya. I am the last born in the family. I am married with five children. A fisher man by profession. I had my primary education and secondary education at comprehensive secondary school Ozizza but I stopped in JSS 3. I know the deceased late Ali Agha. We are from the same village. I am the vice chairman of Amorie youth association. We have task force members of the youth. The chief task force is Sunday Oko Chukwu M. AKA DEDE. Other members of the task force are 1. Eko Chukwu M. 2. Elem Oyari M. Inya. 3. Ogbonnia Obure M. AKA Consider. 4. Anderson Agwo Ume M. 5. Ewa Olughu M, 6. Chukwu Bembella M, 7. Ejike Obiahu M. The task force members are empowered to use cane in the course of their duties. It is equally the duty of the task force members to go to the village and force members of the youth who refused to come for meeting to attend. In case they force any member to come for meeting and he refuses, they now use their cane on such person. On the 18th of September, 2016 we the youth members of Amorie Ozizza scheduled a meeting to be held at the village square Amorie. At a time while the meeting was going on, we discovered that some members were not present, so we sent the task force members to go and force them to come. As the task force members came back, they reported to us that some people like Evo Chukwu m, Okechukwu m, Elem Ali m, Uche Ali m, and others whose names I cannot remember refused to come for the meeting. We then instructed them to go back and force them to come for the meeting, after some time, they came back and reported that when they got to them, they met one Ali Agha M, who told them that they should go, that they have formed their own group. After reporting that to us, we the entire youth members of Amorie Ozizza then resolved to go and bring the said Ali Agha and his group to the meeting but I did not go with them. The next thing I heard was that as reported by the Chief task force Sunday Oko Chukwu M, was that as they reached, Ali Agha collected machete and gave Ejike Obiahu a cut on his body which caused him harm, that was when Ejike Obiahu collected the cutlass and gave him several cuts on his body but he did not die instantly, it was when he was rushed to the hospital that he was confirmed dead. It was Ejike Obiahu that killed Ali Agha. We did not have any meeting to kill Ali Agha. As Ali Agha died, the police came and started arresting people. So I ran away to Ekok Cameroun. It was there at Cameroun that I was called by my people to come back that running will not solve my problem. I don’t know where Ejike Obiahu is now. I don’t have his phone number. This is my statement”.

His testimony in examination in chief as DW5 in open Court reads thusly-

“On 18/9/2016, what I know about this charge is that I returned home on 16/9/2016 because of the burial of the mother of Inspector Oko Egwu. So after the said burial which took place on 17/9/2016, then on 18/9/2016 in the morning hour I heard the bell of the community toll and I came to the village square which is the usual place of our meeting. As I got to the village, I observed that other youths who presumably heard the bell also were also advancing towards the village square. At that village square all the youths that had gathered were waiting for the task force members who were in-charge of the ringing of the bell and who after the ringing of the bell would move round the village to ensure that all the youths attended the meeting. As we were still waiting at the village square for the arrival of the task force members who on their own split themselves into two groups for efficient discharge of their duties, one of these two groups of the task force members arrived the village square first. The youth then started waiting for the arrival of the second group so that the meeting would commence. The second group of the taskforce members eventually arrived the village square and informed the youths that there were some youths who stated that they would not attend the meeting. The task force members were asked to go back and bring those youths who said they would not attend the meeting. There was also the information from the second group of the task force to the effect that the deceased Ali Agha told them they the youths at the village square could go on with their meeting that they themselves had formed their youth association and would be holding their own meeting since Amaorie youth association is not more than one in Amaorie, the whole task force members were now asked to go back and bring those youths. While at the village square, we did not know that there was any problem, what we saw next was the 4th Accused person coming to the village square with a machete cut on his head and blood flowing there-from. We became dumb founded because we were aware that the task force members do not use machete to accomplish their assignments. We then decided to go to the chairman of Amaorie Development Union and tell him what was happening. It was while we were at the chairman’s place that we heard that Ejike had inflicted machete cut on the deceased. We did not sing any war song.”

The assertion without more did not sufficiently raise an alibi. The statement in exhibit K did not provide particulars of facts that police should verify. His testimony in open Court suffers the same lack of particulars of facts that may cast reasonable doubt in the testimonies of PW3, PW4 and PW5 that they saw him at the scene of crime amongst the youths that attacked and killed the deceased. The belief of the testimonies of PW3, PW4 and PW5 is justified even by the content of the respondent’s statement in exhibit K and his testimony as DW5 in open Court.

​Let me consider the holding of the Court of Appeal that the prosecution failed to prove that it was the act of the respondent that caused the death of the deceased and that the prosecution failed to prove common intention and a clear intention in the circumstances of this case. This holding is clearly wrong. The Court of Appeal judgment was silent about the findings of facts by the trial Court that it is the several machete cuts inflicted on the deceased by the youths that attacked him in his house on 18-9-2016 that caused the death of the deceased. The trial Court relied on the evidence of the witnesses of both sides and documentary exhibits Q, Q1 and Q2 (order for post mortem examination, Death Report to coroner and Report of Medical Practitioner) in making these findings of fact. The judgment of the Court of Appeal did not consider if the findings are perverse and did not impeach them. It was silent on the medical evidence that the several machete cuts of the deceased caused his death, which evidence is contained in exhibit Q, Q1 and Q2 and the testimony of PW2, the medical officer that examined his corpse and issued exhibit Q2 and in the testimonies both prosecution and defence witnesses. It is obvious from the evidence of both sides that the death of the deceased and the fact that it was caused by the several machete cuts inflicted on him by the youths in his house is not in dispute on the evidence.

​It is not in dispute on the evidence of both the prosecution and the defence, that the Amaorie Ozizza Youths Association Task Force with common intention to go and force the deceased to attend the youth association meeting holding at the village square, proceeded to his house for that purpose and that in the process, some members of the youths Task Force inflicted machete cuts on the deceased killing him. It is not in dispute on the evidence of both sides that when they set out to go and compel the deceased to attend their meeting, their common intention was to compel him by flogging him with canes and not to kill him, even though they were armed with axe, machete and sticks. The respondent stated in exhibit K that it is their duty as task force members to use cane on any youth who refused to attend meeting, that on 18-9-2016, task force members reported that some youths refused to attend meeting, “that when they received report that the deceased refused to come and said he had formed his own group, “we the entire youth members of Amorie Ozizza then resolved to go and bring the said Ali Agha and his group to the meeting, but I did not go with them”.

​The trial Court believed the testimonies of PW3, PW4 and PW5 that they saw the respondent at the scene of crime when the crime was committed.

Apart from the evidence of PW3, PW4 and PW5 that they saw him amongst the youths that came back to force the deceased to attend the meeting, but who ended up attacking and killing him, his statement that he and others directed or instructed the youths to go and forcefully bring the deceased and his splinter group to their meeting, further makes him culpable and responsible for any crime committed by any member of youth groups in the process of executing the instructions of the respondent and others. This is so by virtue of Section 9 of the Criminal Code Law of Ebonyi State which provides thusly – “When a person counsels another to commit an offence, and an offence is actually committed after such counsel by the person to whom it is given, it is immaterial whether the offence actually committed is the same as that counseled or a different one, or whether the offence is committed in the way counseled or in a different way, provided in either case that the facts constituting the offence actually committed are a probable consequence of carrying out the counsel.

In either case the person who gave the counsel is deemed to have counseled the other person to commit the offence actually committed by him.”

What the respondent directed them to do include to lash the deceased and other youths that had refused to attend the youth meeting 12 strokes of the cane for not attending the meeting voluntarily and forcefully drag them to the meeting. Forcefully dragging or compelling a person to the meeting is obviously a physical assault of a person for the purpose of forcing him to attend the meeting. This is clearly the crime of assault. Lashing a person 12 strokes of cane obviously inflicts grievous bodily harm on him, which is another crime. So the respondent directed the youths to commit crimes to compel the deceased to attend the meeting he was unwilling to attend.

​It is not in dispute that the deceased resisted his being caned and being forcefully taken to the meeting and took flight from his house with the rampaging youths in hot pursuit of him. When they caught up with him, they inflicted multiple matchet cuts on him resulting in his death. In the light of these facts, it is impossible to relieve the respondent of joint responsibility for the murder of Ali Agha by the youths he sent to cane him and force him to attend the youth meeting. It is immaterial that in committing the offence he counseled them to commit, they killed Ali Agha, clearly a probable consequences of carrying out the counsel of the respondent. The respondent who gave the counsel is deemed to have counseled the other person to commit the offence actually committed by him.

The Court of Appeal did not fault the decision of the trial Court that forcing the deceased and others to attend the meeting of the youth association is unlawful and unconstitutional. The decision therefore subsists as correct and conclusive and binding.

The conviction of the respondent for the murder of the deceased, even though he did not personally inflict machete cut on the deceased, is justified by Ss. 8 and 9 of the Criminal Code Law, Cap 33, Volume 1 Laws of Ebonyi State which provides that

  1. “When two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence.
  2. When a person counsels another to commit an offence, and an offence is actually committed after such counsel by the person to whom it is given, it is immaterial whether the offence actually committed is the same as that counseled or a different one, or whether the offence is committed in the way counseled or in a different way, provided in either case that the facts constituting the offence actually committed are a probable consequence of carrying out the counsel. In either case the person who gave the counsel is deemed to have counseled the other person to commit the offence actually committed by him.”

This Court has in a long line of cases applied these provisions. InMbang v. The State (2009) LPELR 1852 (SC), this Court held thusly- ” …In Ogbali & Anor v. State (1983) N.S.C.S. 156 at pp. 157 to 158, this Court considered the implication of Section 8 of the Criminal Code dealing with common intentions. Bello J.S.C (as then was) said: “The only issue worthy of consideration on both appeals, in my view is the question as to whether the convictions can be sustained under Section 8 of the Criminal Code which provides: when two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence. “I may point out straightaway that to render two or more persons liable for murder by virtue of the provisions of the section, there must be evidence of the three elements that constitute the offence under the section. Firstly, there must be evidence showing that the accused persons had formed a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose together; secondly, that in furtherance of the execution of the unlawful purpose a person was killed in circumstances amounting to murder; and thirdly that the death of that person was a probable consequence of the prosecution of the unlawful purpose.”

In Nwankwoala & Anor v. The State (2006) LPELR-2112 (SC), this Court held thusly- “Where more than one persons are accused of joint commission of a crime, it is enough to prove that they all participated in the crime. What each did in furtherance of the commission of the crime is immaterial. The mere fact of the common intention manifesting in the execution of the common object is enough to render each of the accused persons in the group guilty of the offence. See Patrick Ikemson & 7 Ors. V. The State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 455 at 466. Where common intention is established, a fatal blow or gunshot though given by one of the party, is deemed in the eyes of the law to have been given by all those present and participating. The person who actually delivered the fatal blow is, in such a case, no more than the hand by which others also struck. See Ofor v. Queen (1955) 15 WACA 4 at 5; Adekunle v. The State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 505 at 518. And in practical terms, common intention is incapable of positive proof. Its existence can only be inferred from the circumstances disclosed.”

​Where the common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose is not expressed by the group, it can be inferred from their joint execution of the unlawful purpose. In our present case, the task force of the Youth Association clearly stated their common intention to collectively go and physically compel the deceased and others to attend the community youth meeting.

The crime committed in the joint execution of an unlawful purpose need not be the common purpose that was commonly intended by the joint action. But if the crime so committed in the joint execution of the unlawful purpose is a probable consequence of the execution of the unlawful purpose, every participant in the joint execution of the unlawful purpose commits the crime irrespective of their specific role in the joint execution of the unlawful purpose.

​It is not in dispute on the evidence of the prosecution and the defence that the Youths Task Force agreed to go out and physically compel the deceased. The respondent and others proceeded in their joint enterprise armed with sticks and machete and invaded the home of the deceased, chanting war songs. None of the members of the youth task force was merely present in the deceased’s house on the fateful day. They were not there by accident or as persons innocently passing by or as persons living there or as friendly visitors. So their presence there could not be rightly described as a mere presence. They came from the village play ground with the common intention to come to the house of Ali Agha and compel him to attend their meeting.

Instead of going there in a peaceful manner, they invaded the house armed with sticks and machetes, chanting war songs. The trial Court found as a fact that the deceased was killed by the members of the task force youths that invaded his home to force him to attend their meeting and that he died on the spot during that invasion due to the several machetes cuts inflicted on him by the youths task force members,

​The trial Court found as a fact that PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6 who were eyewitnesses of the killing of the deceased by the members of the Youths Task Force that invaded his home gave direct evidence of the death of the deceased during the invasion. PW3, PW4 and PW5 mentioned some of the persons they saw inflict machete cuts on the deceased. Exhibit Q2, the report of post mortem examination of the deceased’s corpse state that there were 8 multiple cuts on the body corroborating the testimony of PW2, the medical officer that examined the corpse, that-

“from observation, there were several cuts on the body of the deceased and their depths and lengths were dangerous to life. From the number of cuts on the deceased body, he died as a result of acute loss of blood both internally and externally. Those cuts could not have been self-inflicted because most of the cuts were on the lateral part of the body which is usually used for defence.

The trial Court found as a fact that – “Page 49: Undoubtedly, on 18/9/2016, the accused persons embarked on the enterprise of going to the house of the deceased to compel him to come to the village square of Amaorie Ozizza to attend the youths meeting. There can be no modicum of doubt that death of the deceased is the unusual consequence of that enterprise. It is therefore clarion and crystal clear that the 1st to the 9th accused person are all enmeshed in the mire of the acts that abruptly and prematurely sent the deceased- Ali Agha to his creator”.

​In our present case the common intention to carry out that joint enterprise is established by the evidence of their decision to go and compel the other youths including the deceased to attend the meeting and the evidence of their participation in the joint invasion of the deceased’s residence to force him to attend their meeting. By their joint invasion of the home of the deceased to force him to attend their meeting, each of them became responsible for anything done by any member of the group to force the deceased to go and attend their meeting. In Eyorokoromo & Anor vs. The State (1983) LPELR-1188 (SC), Ubierho vs. The State (2005) 2 SC (Pt. 1) 18, Alarape vs. The State (2001) 2 SC 164, Mohammed vs. The State (1980) 3-4 SC 56 and several other cases this Court has repeatedly held that in a concerted attack to prosecute an unlawful purpose, it is not the law to look for the person who struck the lethal blow. Everyone who partakes in the attack is equally guilty of the crime committed during prosecution of the unlawful purpose.

​The question whether each individual participant in the joint invasion had the intention that Ali Agha should be killed or injured during the invasion or process of compelling him to attend the meeting is irrelevant in determining the criminal responsibility of each member of the group for the killing or injury of Ali Agha by their acts to force him to attend their meeting. The prosecution has no burden to prove that each member of the group intended that Ali Agha should be killed or injured by their actions to force him to attend their meeting. The principle underlying criminal responsibility in cases where a person is accused or alleged to have on his own, singly committed an offence cannot apply to cases where a person is accused of committing a crime that occurred during the joint execution of an unlawful purpose that he and other persons had formed a common intention to prosecute.

​What the prosecution must prove to establish the guilt of each member of the group for the killing of Ali Agha, is that the killing was a probable consequence of what the group did to force the deceased to attend their meeting. Once the evidence establishes that the killing of Ali Agha was a probable result of their actions to force him to attend their meeting, each of them is responsible for killing him, irrespective of who took what specific action amongst them and the individual intention of each of them concerning what should or can result from the actions of each member of the group.

The trial Court in its judgment found thusly- “Consequently the firm view of this Court is that based on the pieces of evidence of PW3, PW, and PW5, it is all the accused persons in this charge that perpetrated the acts of inflicting the deceased with the machete cuts that abruptly sent the deceased to his maker.

The PW2 who is the medical practitioner gave evidence to the effect that the deceased Ali Agha had multiple injuries and bled from several blood vessels and most of these multiple injuries were on the lateral part of the deceased which are used for defence.

The view of this Court that these multiple injuries on the deceased could not have been inflicted on the deceased by Ejike Obiahu alone while the other accused persons stood. Even if all the accused persons stood akimbo while Ejike Obiahu was inflicting cuts on the deceased, having come to the scene of crime with Ejike Obiahu for compelling the deceased to attend the proposed meeting of the youths of 2016, that would still have amounted to a criminal omission under Section 7 of the Penal Code (supra).

The further view of this Court that even if it was only Ejike Obiahu that inflicted the cuts on Ali Agha which killed him as harped and parroted by all the accused persons on the authority of Nwankwoala v. State (supra), Ejike Obiahu would only be the … which the other accused persons struck.

The firmly entrenched law that where persons have embarked on a joint enterprise are liable criminally for the act done in pursuance or furtherance of the joint enterprise unusual consequences arising from the execution of the joint enterprise.

Undoubtedly, on 18/9/2016, the accused persons embarked on the enterprise of going to the house of the deceased to compel him to come to the village square of Amaorie Ozizza to attend the youths meeting. There can be no modicum of doubt that the death of the deceased is the unusual consequence of that enterprise.

It is therefore clarion and crystal clear that the 1st to the 9th accused persons are all enmeshed in the mire of the acts that abruptly and prematurely sent the deceased — Ali Agha to his creator.

Consequently, the finding of this Court that the death of the deceased was caused by the acts of the accused persons.

Attention of this Court now swivels to the third ingredient of murder which the prosecution must prove in order to shout eureka. That is, that the act or omission of the accused persons which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge of death or grievous bodily harm was the probable consequence.

This Court has painstakingly enunciated the evidence of prosecution witnesses to the various accompaniment of exhibits which clearly disclose that multiple injuries were melted on the deceased by the accused persons with the aid of machetes. The only rationale that can stem from the acts of all the accused persons on the uncontradicted documentary and oral evidence before the Court is that the acts of the accused persons which caused death of the deceased were intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its natural or probable consequence.”

​Considering the nature of the things done by the invaders during the execution of their unlawful purpose of forcing the deceased to attend their meeting, their killing him was clearly a probable consequence of their execution of the unlawful purpose. They had set out for the execution of that purpose armed with sticks, machetes and axe. They invaded the deceased’s home, commanded him to come out for them to lash him twenty strokes of the cane for refusing to honour their summons for the meeting. When the deceased refused to come out, they rushed into the house to hold him. The deceased escaped from the house and took flight. They followed him and inflicted several machete cuts on him. PW3, PW4, PW5 and one Uche Alli who tried to rescue the deceased from the youths’ task force members was also inflicted machete cuts.

After inflicting multiple machete cuts on the deceased till he became weak and lifeless, the members of the youth task force left, continued chanting war songs and proceeded to the village square. PW3, PW5 and one Ugochukwu Evo arranged and immediately carried the deceased on a motorcycle to the hospital. The medical doctor immediately examined the deceased and confirmed him dead. Exhibit Q2, the medical report of the examination of the deceased states that the corpse was received at the mortuary on 18-9-2016 at 1400 hrs (2pm), that the deceased died on 18-9-2016, that the corpse was examined on 25-11-2016 at 11.30 hrs (11.30am) and that the cause of his death was multiple machete cuts and hemorrhagic shock. PW2 the medical doctor that conducted the examination testified that-

“from observation, there were several cuts on the body of the deceased and their depths and lengths were dangerous to life. From the number of cuts on the deceased body, he died as a result of acute loss of blood both internally and externally. Those cuts could not have been self-inflicted because most of the cuts were on the lateral part of the body which is usually used for defence.”

The fact that the task force members invaded the deceased’s home armed with sticks, machetes and axe show that they invaded the house with the intention to inflict violence of any degree for the purpose of overcoming his resistance and force him to attend their meeting. It is clear from the foregoing facts that killing the deceased was a probable consequence of all that they did for the purpose of forcing the deceased to attend their meeting. As this Court held in State v. Oladimeji (2003) 7 SC 108 “if several persons embark on an enterprise to commit a felony and have also the preconceived common intention to use violence of any degree, if necessary, for the purpose of overcoming resistance, and death results from such violence, all are guilty of murder”.

Since the killing of Ali Agha is a probable consequence of what the respondent and other members of the youth task force did in the joint prosecution of their unlawful purpose, each member of that youth task force is guilty of the murder of Ali Agha, irrespective of which of them inflicted the actual machete cut that killed him. The law is settled that when two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose, an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is guilty of committing the offence. See Ubierho v. The State (2005) 2 SC (Pt. 1) 18 and Nwankwoala & Anor v. The State (supra).

In the light of the foregoing, the lone issue framed herein for the determination of this appeal is resolved in favour of the appellant.

​This appeal has merit. It is hereby allowed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting in Enugu in Appeal No.

CA/E/131C/2018 delivered on 1-8-2019 is hereby set aside. The judgment of the High Court of Ebonyi State at Afikpo, in Charge No. HAF/24C/2017 delivered on 15-10-2018, convicting the respondent for the murder of Ali Agha and sentencing the respondent to death by hanging by the neck is hereby restored and shall take effect accordingly.


SC.1146C/2019

Stanbic Ibtc Bank Plc V. Longterm Global Capital Ltd & Ors (2021) LLJR-SC

Stanbic Ibtc Bank Plc V. Longterm Global Capital Ltd & Ors (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

ABDU ABOKI, J.S.C. 

By a Motion on Notice filed on the 21st of September, 2020, the Appellant/Applicant prayed this Court for the following:

A. An Order enlarging the time within which the Applicant may file an additional ground of appeal bordering on law alone as contained in Ground One of the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal attached to the affidavit in support of this application.

B. An Order granting leave to the Applicant to file an additional ground of appeal bordering on law alone as contained in Ground One of the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal attached to the affidavit in support of this application.

C An Order granting the Applicant leave to raise a fresh issue on appeal bordering on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, Lagos Judicial Division (“Trial Court”) to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012, which culminated in this appeal [as contained in Ground One of the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal attached to the affidavit in support of this application].

D. An Order granting leave to the Applicant to further amend the Amended Notice of Appeal dated 18/02/20 and filed on 02/03/20 to incorporate the additional ground of appeal bordering on lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the trial Court as shown in the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal.

E. An Order granting leave to the Applicant to re-number the grounds of appeal as shown in the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal.

F. Such further or other Order or Orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the grounds upon which this application is brought are as follows:

(a) By Section 233(2)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), this honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal which is predicated on the proposed additional ground of appeal contained in Ground One of the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal;

(b) By Section 27(2) of the Supreme Court Act, the Applicant had three months from the date of the delivery of the judgment of the Court of Appeal to appeal to this honourable Court;

(c) The period of three months within which the Applicant may appeal as of right in respect of Ground One of the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal has lapsed;

(d) The Applicant’s failure to appeal in respect of the jurisdictional challenge within the prescribed time is as a result of inadvertence of counsel;

(e) The proposed new ground of appeal touches on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012, which culminated in this appeal;

(f) The Appellant’s proposed additional ground will bring before this honourable Court a fundamental issue which goes to the foundation of the proceedings of the trial Court and Court of Appeal regarding this appeal;

(g) This application discloses exceptional circumstances; and

(h) This honourable Court has the power to grant all the prayers in this application.

The application was supported by a 21 paragraph affidavit, deposed to by one Babatunde Ige, a Legal Practitioner in the Law Firm of Olaniwun Ajayi LP, Counsel to the Applicant and six exhibits marked Exhibits A-F. Paragraphs 12-16 of the affidavit are pertinent, and are hereunder reproduced:

“12. Upon further review of the processes filed on this matter, especially the Statement of Claim dated 22/11/12, filed by the 1st-4th Respondents, the Applicant’s Counsel discovered that the substance of the claim of the 1st-4th Respondents at the trial Court was to rescind the contracts for the sale of shares between the 1st-4th Respondents and the 5th Respondent on the basis of alleged vitiating factors – misrepresentation and illegality.

  1. Further to Paragraph 12 above, the Applicant’s Counsel resolved to file this application in order to obtain the leave of this Honourable Court to challenge the decision of the Court of Appeal on a fresh and additional ground of appeal bordering on the lack of the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383 which culminated in this appeal.
  2. The failure to include a ground of appeal bordering on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012 in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal dated 09/03/18 (Exhibit C) and the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal dated 18/02/20 and was filed on 02/03/20 (Exhibit D) was occasioned by inadvertence of counsel.
  3. The period provided by the Rules of this honourable Court has expired.
  4. The proposed additional ground of appeal is set out in ground 3.1 of the Proposed Amended Notice of Appeal. The said ground borders on the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/12 which culminated in this appeal. Now shown to me and marked Exhibit E is the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal.”

In reaction to the Applicant’s Motion, the 1st-4th Respondents, filed a 28 Paragraph counter-affidavit, deposed to by one Babatunde Osinbajo, a Legal Practitioner in the Law Firm of F.O. Fagbohungbe & Co, Counsel for the 1st-4th Respondents, with annexures. I consider Paragraphs 12-18 to be relevant and I reproduce them hereunder:

“12 – I know that the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the 1st to 4th Respondents’ claims in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012 was raised by the Appellant as 1st Defendant, in Paragraph 15 of its Amended Statement of Defence and also by the 5th Respondent, as 2nd Defendant, which eventually filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection to that effect in the said Court. A copy of the Appellant’s Amended Statement of Defence dated 4/12/2014 as reproduced at pages 585 to 595 in Volume II of the Record of Appeal is attached hereto and marked Exhibit “LT2”.

13 – In a well-considered ruling delivered by the Federal High Court, per Honourable Justice J. T. Tsoho (now Chief Judge) on 15/1/2014, in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012, it was held by the Federal High Court that based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the 1st to 4th Respondents’ case, the Federal High Court had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “LT3” is a copy of the said ruling as reproduced at pages 381 to 397 in Vol. II of the Record of Appeal.

  1. – I know that after the ruling of the Federal High Court was delivered as aforesaid, both the Appellant and the 5th Respondent voluntarily and/or deliberately elected not to appeal against the said decision to the Court of Appeal.
  2. – I also know that the Appellant and the 5th Respondent herein voluntarily elected to submit to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court before the matter proceeded to plenary trial.
  3. – The Appellant also deliberately and/or voluntarily elected not to appeal against the ruling relating to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the suit filed by the 1st to 4th Respondents even after the Federal High Court delivered its final judgment in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012 on 14/12/2015.
  4. – The same set of Counsel and/or law firm which represented the Appellant at the Federal High Court when the Federal High Court delivered its ruling on 15/1/2014 were also the set of Counsel and/or law firm which represented the Appellant in Appeal No. CA/L/427/2016 at the Court of Appeal, in respect of the appeal against the final judgment of the Federal High Court from which the present appeal emanated.
  5. – I know that the failure of the Appellant to appeal against the ruling delivered by the Federal High Court on 15/1/204 to the Court of Appeal was a voluntary and/or deliberate act on the part of the Appellant and due to any inadvertence.”

The Applicant, in its 13 paragraphed reply affidavit, averred thus at Paragraph 10:

“10 – Contrary to the averments in paragraph 14, 15 and 16 of the BO Affidavit, I state as follows:

10.1 – The Appellant did not appeal the ruling because the Notice of Preliminary Objection dismissed by the trial Court was filed by the 5th Respondent and not the Appellant.

10.2 – The Appellant did not conceal the existence of the ruling from this honourable Court. The ruling forms part of the records transmitted to this honourable Court and is set out at pages 381-397 Vol. 2 of the Record of Appeal.

10.3 – The jurisdictional issue in respect of which the Appellant seeks the leave of this honorable Court borders on the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012.

10.4 – The Appellant was precluded from consenting or acquiescing to the trial Court’s jurisdiction to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012, and

10.5 – Upon a re-examination of the 1st-4th Respondents’ Statement of Claim filed on 22/11/12 and the characterization of the relationship of the Appellant and the 5th Respondent by the Court of Appeal as a master-servant relationship in page 54 of the judgment of Court of Appeal delivered on 09/03/18, the Appellant decided to seek the leave of this honourable Court to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012 via the Appellant’s application filed on 21/09/2020. Now shown to me and marked as Exhibit UU1 is a certified true copy of the Statement of Claim.”

In its written address in support of the motion on notice, the Applicant submitted a sole issue for this Court’ determination, to wit:

“Whether the Applicant is entitled to the prayers sought in the Application”

For the 1st-4th Respondents, the following two issues were submitted for determination, that is:

  1. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, whether this Honourable Court can validly exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the issue relating to the competence of the Federal High Court to hear and determine the 1st-4th Respondents’ suit?
  2. Having regard to the fact the Appellant’s present appeal is incompetent ab initio, whether this Honourable Court can grant leave to the Appellant to further amend the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 2/3/2020?

​Looking at the reliefs sought and the affidavit filed in the application however, the real question that requires answer in the application in my view is: – ‘Whether the Applicant is entitled to the prayers sought in the Application?”

Arguing in support of its Motion dated 21/9/2020, it is submitted for the Applicant that this Court has numerously held that to enable the discretion of this Court to be properly exercised in its favour, an Applicant in an application for enlargement of time to appeal or to seek leave to appeal, must adequately explain the cause of the delay in making the application and give cogent reasons why the application was not made within the time prescribed by the Supreme Court Act. The case of Williams v. Mokwe (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 249 at 268, was cited.

​Learned counsel for the Applicant invited the attention of this Court to paragraph 14 of the affidavit in support of the motion, and posited that the failure to appeal on the issue of jurisdiction of the Trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012, which culminated in this appeal, as contained in Ground One of Exhibit E (The Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal), within the period stipulated in Section 27(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act, was occasioned by inadvertence of counsel, and this Court has held in a plethora of authorities that the mistake of counsel should not be visited on his client. He called in aid, the case of Iroegbu Okwordu (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) 649 at 667, amongst others.

It is the argument of learned counsel for the Applicant that the Applicant, via paragraph 14, has satisfied the first condition laid down in the case of Williams v. Mokwe (supra), adding that the Applicant has demonstrated in paragraphs 12, 13 and 16 of the affidavit that the proposed additional ground of appeal has reasonable chances of success before this Court, especially as it relates to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/20, which culminated in this appeal. Reliance was placed on the case of Sebastian Adigwe v. FRN (2015) LPELR- 24694 (SC).

Learned counsel for the Applicant opined that by the provisions of Section 233(2) of the CFRN, 1999 as amended, an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court on grounds of law alone does not require the leave of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.

​According to him, the ground which complains about lack of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action, is a ground of law, for which no leave is required. He placed reliance on the case of Ogbechie v. Onochie (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 484 at 492.

It is the Applicant’s position that the Applicant’s Ground One of Exhibit E (the Proposed Further Amended Notice of Appeal) is a substantial issue, which has good chances of success.

This Court is urged to so hold and grant the application.

Contrariwise, it is submitted for the 1st-4th Respondents that as conspicuously shown in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the 1st-4th Respondents’ counter-affidavit, and as borne out of Exhibits LT2 and LT3 attached thereto, the issue relating to the jurisdiction and/or competence of the Federal High Court to entertain the 1st-4th Respondents’ suit was previously raised by the Applicant/Appellant at the Federal High Court and effectively resolved by the trial Court.

Learned Senior Counsel for the 1st-4th Respondents drew the attention of this Court to paragraph 15 of the Applicant’s Amended Statement of Defence at the trial Court, and noted that the issue of jurisdiction was adequately dealt with by the trial Court and cannot therefore qualify as a fresh issue. He alluded to pages 388-390 in Vol. II of the Record, where the trial Court held that issues relating to the sale and allotment of shares of a public company, fall within the purview of the Federal High Court.

It is the further submission of learned Silk that the purported “fresh issue” sought to be raised by the Applicant in this Court as contained in Ground One of Exhibit E, is not a “fresh issue” at all, as the said issue has been raised, considered and pronounced upon by the trial Court. He maintained that having failed to appeal to the Court of Appeal, against the interlocutory decision of the trial Court and having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, the Applicant cannot validly appeal against the decision of the trial Court, to this Court, without appealing first to the Court of Appeal. He relied on Section 240 of the CFRN 1999, as amended adding that the ruling of the trial Court on jurisdiction was never put before the Court of Appeal for consideration and therefore ought not to be entertained by this Court. Reliance was placed, inter alia, on the following cases:

Idagu v. State (2018) LPELR 44343 (SC)

Bello v. FRN (2018) LPELR 44465 (SC)

Ibori v. Agbi (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt. 868) 78

Learned senior counsel for the 1st-4th Respondents opined further that the Applicant’s original Notice of Appeal filed on the 9/3/2018, was void ab initio as the said Notice of Appeal contained grounds of mixed law and facts, for which no leave was sought for and obtained. The case Obayuwana v. Adun (2020) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1741) 371, was cited.

​He maintained that save for Ground one of the original Notice of Appeal filed on the 9/3/2018, all the other grounds of appeal relate to the concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal, for which leave was required, as contemplated by Order 2 Rule 32 of the Supreme Court Rules and Section 233(3) of the CFRN 1999 as amended. The consequence of the foregoing according to him, is that since the original Notice of Appeal filed on 9/3/2018 was void ab initio, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain any amendment to the Notice of Appeal, or the appeal. Reliance was placed on a host of authorities, including the locus classicus case of Madukolu & Ors v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341, and the case of Tsokwa Motors (Nig.) Ltd V. UBA PLC (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 347.

This Court is urged in the circumstance, to refuse and dismiss the application to further amend the Amended Notice of Appeal.

In reply, it is submitted for the Applicant that the arguments of learned senior counsel on behalf of the 1st-4th Respondents, on the meaning of “fresh issue”, is flawed.

Relying on the case of Olalomi Ind. Ltd v. NIDB Ltd. (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 266 @ 286, learned counsel for the Applicant posited that a fresh issue is an issue which was not canvassed at the lower Court and pronounced upon by the lower Court. He maintained that going by the definition of “fresh issue” by this Court in Olalomi Ind. Ltd v. N.I.D.B Ltd (supra), the Applicant’s jurisdictional issue relating to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No: FHC/L/CS/1383/2012, is a fresh issue because the issue as to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No: FHC/L/CS/1383/2012 was not raised at the Court of Appeal.

​On whether the grounds in the Applicant’s original Notice of Appeal filed on 9/3/2018 contained grounds of mixed law and facts, for which no leave was sought for and obtained, learned counsel for the Applicant contended that contrary to the arguments of senior learned counsel for the 1st-4th Respondents, all the grounds in the original Notice of Appeal are grounds of law, for which no leave was required. He relied on the case of Chrome Air Services Ltd & Ors v. Fidelity Bank (2017) LPELR 43470 (SC), and argued that where there exists at least one ground of law in a Notice of Appeal, such a ground of law is capable of sustaining the appeal. He argued further that as borne out of the records before this Court, the Applicant filed an application for the trinity prayers and this Court granted the Order on 11/02/2020. The effect of the Order, according to him, is that any defective ground in the initial Notice of Appeal has been regularized by this Court.

Consequently, this Court is urged to discountenance the submissions proffered on behalf of the 1st-4th Respondents, and grant the Applicant’s application.

​My Lords, from the foregoing submissions of counsel on both sides, it is apparent that the hurdle before us is a determination of whether or not, the Applicant is entitled to a favourable exercise of our discretion, to wit: granting the Applicant leave to further amend its amended Notice of Appeal, by the addition of a new ground one which reads as follows:

GROUND ONE

The lower Court erred in law when the lower Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal High Court that lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the 1st-4th Respondents’ claim.

PARTICULARS

i. In paragraph 15 of the Amended Statement of Defence dated 14/01/13, the Appellant raised the lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the 1st-4th Respondents’ claim.

ii. The Federal High Court is a specialized Court with limited jurisdiction,

iii. The 1st-4th Respondents’ claim of rescission of sale of shares transactions on the allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation, as constituted in their Statement of Claim (SoC), is rooted in contract.

iv. The Court of Appeal found that the Appellant and the 5th Respondents were joint tort feasors liable to the 1st-4th Respondents.

v. Contractual and tortious claims do no fall within Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.

vi. The absence of subject matter jurisdiction renders the whole proceedings of the Federal High Court and the lower Court a nullity.

It has been argued by learned senior counsel for the 1st-4th Respondents that the complaint of the Applicant is not a fresh issue. According to learned Silk, the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial Court was raised via the Preliminary Objection filed by the 2nd Defendant, now 5th Respondent, and all the parties, including the Applicant herein made extensive arguments thereto, before the trial Court made a pronouncement on the issue of its jurisdiction, as follows:

“It is on record that the learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant referred to paragraph 14 of her Statement of Defence (paragraph 15 of the Amended Statement of Defence) which averred that she shall during or before trial contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ suit. He therefore stated, having completely aligned himself with the submissions of the 2nd Defendant (sic)… Upon perusal of the entire reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs as contained in their Statement of Claim in this Suit dated 22nd November, 2012, I hold the respective view that the Plaintiffs’ cause of action borders on allotment of shares of the 2nd Defendant, by way of private placement. This, in my humble opinion is a transaction arising from the operation of CAMA. To that extent, the subject matter of the Plaintiffs’ claims falls within the purview of Section 251(1)(e) of the CFRN 1999… Pursuant to this Constitutional provision, the Federal High Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction in respect of such issue as sale or allotment of company shares, which in my humble view, is a transaction that arises from the operation of CAMA …”

As can be garnered from the Applicant’s motion paper, I agree with the arguments of learned SAN that the -issue classified as “fresh issue” relates to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the suit filed by the 1st-4th Respondents. The issue as to the jurisdiction/competence of the Federal High Court was raised and effectively resolved by that Court. The settled position of the law is that a “fresh issue” is a new point of law, which was not canvassed or ventilated by any of the parties at the trial Court and decided upon before it is raised at the appellate Court.

In the instant application, the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the 1st-4th Respondents’ claim was raised and determined at the trial Court and cannot therefore qualify as a fresh issue.

The next point made by learned Silk is that based on the general rule, a ground of appeal against a decision must relate to the decision and should constitute a challenge to the ratio of the decision. Any ground of appeal that does not relate to the judgment of the Court, is incompetent.

​I am ad idem with learned senior counsel that the well settled proposition of law is that grounds of appeal are not formulated in abstract. For grounds of appeal to be competent, they must be predicated on the ratio of the decision appealed against. In other words, the grounds of appeal must be based on the decision of the lower Court, which should in turn be based on the issues joined by the parties in their pleadings, evidence adduced in support thereof and the submissions of counsel on the law applicable to the facts so established by evidence. See:

Sogunro & Ors v. Yeku & Ors (2017) LPELR 41905 (SC)

Egbe v. Alhaji (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 546

Chami v. U.B.A. Plc (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt.1191) 474 @ 502.

I must however point out that where a ground of appeal questions the jurisdiction of a Court, it does not matter whether the issue of jurisdiction constituted the ratio of that decision or not, such a ground of appeal cannot be said to be incompetent by reason that it does not arise from the decision or constitute a challenge to its ratio decidendi. See:

FSB International Bank Nig. Ltd v Imano Nig. Ltd (2000)11 NWLR (Pt.678) 620 at 639,

A.G. Kwara State & Anor v. Lawal & Ors (2017) LPELR- 4234 (SC);

Madubuike v Madubuike (2001)9 NWLR (Pt.719)698 at 707.

That being said, the proposed additional ground of appeal, being a jurisdictional issue, can be raised at any stage of proceedings, including this Court for the first time.

In FHA v Kalejaiye (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt.1226) 149 at 164 para b, this Court, per Rhodes Vivour, JSC said:-

“The issue of jurisdiction can be raised for the first time in any Court and at any stage of the proceedings and in the Supreme Court for the first time. Jurisdiction is a threshold issue and it is so fundamental in that where a Court has no jurisdiction to determine an issue, the entire proceedings and judgment will be an exercise in futility. Once the issue of jurisdiction is raised, the Court is bound to examine whether it is spurious or genuine ground …”

Another point made by learned Silk is to the effect that the Appellant’s original Notice of Appeal filed on the 9/3/2018, was void ab initio and cannot be a valid plank upon which any amendment can be sought for and granted.

With due deference to learned senior counsel, and as rightly submitted by the Applicant’s counsel, it is impermissible to raise the issue of competence of a Notice of Appeal in a counter-affidavit. The proper approach, where the competence of an appeal is being challenged, is to raise a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal, based on the alleged incompetent grounds of appeal. In the instant case, the submissions made on behalf of the 1st-4th Respondents ought to be limited to opposing the prayers sought in the Applicant’s application. It should not be extended to attack the competence of the Applicant’s appeal.

In the extant application, it is trite law that any Appellant is at liberty either to file additional grounds of appeal on receipt of the records or even to substitute new grounds for the original grounds filed before the receipt of those records. The aim being that an Appellant should feel quite free to urge, agitate and canvass any point or points which he thinks will help the Court to arrive at a just determination of the appeals See:Unilag & Anor Aigoro (1985) LPELR 3418 SC.

It is of utmost importance however that when applications for leave to file and argue additional grounds of appeal or for leave to argue grounds of law and mixed facts and law or facts alone are being entertained, the Court should scrutinise the grounds and satisfy itself that such grounds of appeal are competent, and that the Applicant has adduced cogent reasons for the favorable exercise of the Court’s discretion. See Peters & Anor v. State (1992) LPELR 2914 SC.

​Looking closely at the relevant averments in the Applicant’s supporting affidavit as reproduced above, (particularly Paragraph 14 thereof), it can be said that the Applicant seemed to have attributed his failure to include a ground of appeal bordering on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1383/2012 in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal dated 09/03/18 (Exhibit C) and the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal dated 18/02/20 and was filed on 02/03/20 (Exhibit D), to “the inadvertence of counsel”.

It is an established principle of law, that Courts do not normally punish a litigant due to the mistake of his counsel. Mistake or inadvertence of counsel is neither magic nor sacrosanct such that once raised as the cause of a lapse, the Court must accept or waive it in favour of the claimant of such excuse or as reason to condone or overlook such lapse. It however must be proved that it is a genuine mistake. The Courts must be satisfied not only that the allegation of the fault of counsel is true and germane, but also that it is availing, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case.

​In this instant case, the Applicant has not demonstrated to this Court what occasioned the inadvertence on the part of counsel. Courts of law do not embark on conjecture or guess work as same can hardly produce a just and equitable decision. Where an Applicant prays the Court to exercise its discretion in his favour judicially and judiciously, it is his duty to place before the Court sufficient materials upon which the Court will rely in granting his application. This Court has held in several authorities that the exercise of discretion is not based on the mere figment of the person doing so but upon facts or circumstances necessary for the proper exercise of that discretion. In other words, it is not an indulgence of a judicial whim, but the exercise of judicial judgment based on fact guided by the law or the equitable decision. See:

Adigwe v. FRN (2015) LPELR 24694 SC;

General & Aviation Services Ltd v. Thahal (2004) LPELR 1317 SC.

​Thus, the mere making of whimsical statements which do not supply convincing, satisfactory, concrete and cogent reasons in explaining away the delay or tardiness, can hardly be acceptable to this Court. Even if the complaint of mistake or inadvertence of counsel is correct, the averments of the Applicant in the supporting affidavit clearly showed lack of diligence, carelessness and/or indifference on the part of both Counsel and Applicant.

From the averments of the Applicant, I am not convinced that they constitute special circumstances as would justify this Court to exercise its discretion to grant the application to seek leave to file an additional ground of appeal. With regard to the additional ground of appeal contained in the proposed further amended notice of appeal, even if the grounds of appeal might appear to show prima facie good cause, the failure of the Applicant to meet the other condition of establishing special circumstances will render the application incompetent and therefore liable to be refused.

Accordingly, the application filed on 21/09/2020 has no merit and is therefore dismissed.


SC.644/2018(R)

Southbeach Co. Ltd & Anor V. Williams (2021) LLJR-SC

Southbeach Co. Ltd & Anor V. Williams (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.S.C.

Based on a sub-lease agreement between respondent, the sub-leasor, and the appellants; as sub-lessee, the respondent had sued the appellants before the High Court of Lagos State, sitting at Ikeja (trial Court) in suit No. LD/1631/2010 and claimed as follows:

“(a) A declaration that the defendants’ wrongful destruction and devastation of 3 bedroom bungalow together with the appurtenances situation and known as 30 Oladipo Bateye Street GRA Ikeja Lagos (the property) and/or the structures thereon either personally or through their servants, agent assigns or howsoever as set out in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the statement of claim constitutes trespass to property.

(b) Damages for trespass and related claims in the total sum of N475,000,000.00 (Four Hundred and Seventy Five Million Naira) comprising.

(i) The sum of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) being cost of reinstatement of the destroyed property to a tenantable and habitable condition pursuant to paragraph 23 of the statement of claim.

​(ii) The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) per annum from 5th September 2010, with a 20% per annum increase thereof until when the property is reinstated to a tenantable and habitable condition.

(iii) The sum of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) on the footing of aggravated and/or exemplary damages pursuant to paragraphs 18, 20, 21 and 22 of the statement of claim.

(iv) The sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) for used and occupation of the property from 1st March 2010 to 5th September 2010 pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of the statement of claim.

(v) The sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) for breach of covenants in the lease dated 15th December, 2004 pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15 and 20 of the statement of claim.

(vi) The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) estimated cost of this action pursuant to paragraph 19 of the statement of claim.

(vii) Interest on the above sums at the rate of 28% per annum compounded and chargeable from the date of filing this action until judgment and 10% thereafter until full payment.

(viii) An order of perpetual injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents or otherwise howsoever from doing any other thing following or continuing to:-

(a) destroy the three-bedroom bungalow together with all appurtenances situate and known as 30 Oladipo Bateye Street, G.R.A. Ikeja, Lagos and the structures thereon.

(b) enter into, remain on, or trespassing thereon in anyway whatsoever.”

The appellants denied the claims and the matter went to trial after which the trial Court in a judgment delivered on 19th December, 2015, granted all the aforenamed claims against the appellants.

Aggrieved by that judgment, the appellants approached the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division (lower Court), for a review of same on two grounds of dissatisfaction contained on the notice of appeal dated and filed on the 22nd December, 2015.

The lower Court in the judgment delivered on the 5th July, 2017, allowed the appeal in substantial part in the following terms:-

“In the final analysis the appeal succeeds in part and it is hereby allowed. The award of NGN474,000,000.00 (Four Hundred and Seventy Four Million Naira) damages by the trial Court has no legal basis and same is hereby set aside. In its place, the respondent is awarded the sum of NGN10,358,310.00 (Ten Million, Three Hundred and Fifty-Eight Thousand, Three Hundred and Ten Naira) plus NGN3,083,330.00 (Three Million, Eighty-Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Thirty Naira) against the appellants being the cost of reinstating the leased premises to its original state as well as the 6 months’ rent for staying back which bring it to a total of NGN13,441,600.00 (Thirteen Million, Four Hundred and Forty-One Thousand and Six Hundred Naira) with 10% post-judgment interest. Parties to bear their respective costs.”

Once more, not satisfied with the above decision of the lower Court, the appellants brought this further appeal vide the notice of appeal dated and filed on 25th July, 2017 containing three grounds.

​In the appellants’ brief filed on the 8th December, 2017, an issue was formulated from each of the grounds as follows:-

“2.01 Whether the lower Court correctly evaluated the facts contained in the writ of summons, statement of claim and statement of defence filed in the suit and the evidence of the parties for it to hold that the 2nd appellant is a necessary party to this suit?

2.02 Whether the lower Court correctly applied the principles of law relating to pleadings when it relied on exhibit A – a valuation report which was not pleaded in the statement of claim and filed in the reply to the statement of defence as the costs of reinstating the damaged property and at a time the defendants/appellants were not able to provide a response to the same by the rules of pleadings, to ground the award in the appeal?

2.03 Whether the evidence adduced by the claimant/ respondent justifies the grant by the lower Court of the total sum of N10,358,310.00 (Ten Million Three Hundred and Fifty-Eight Thousand, Three Hundred and Ten Naira only) and NGN3,083,333.00 (Three Million and Eight-Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Thirty-Three Naira) as claims maintained by the respondent in the suit?

For the respondent, a notice of preliminary objection (NPO) and the respondent’s brief were filed on the 31st July, 2018.

​Two issues are said to arise for determination on the merit of the appeal, thus:-

“(a) Whether the 2nd appellant was rightly adjudged as a necessary party by the lower Courts without whom the suit could have not been successfully determined.

(b) Whether the valuation report that was pleaded by the respondent in his reply to the defendant’s statement of defence was properly pleaded and considered by the trial Court.”

​In line with established practice, I would consider the preliminary objection first as it seeks to terminate the life of the appeal at its stage. The objection prays for an order dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the part of the Court to entertain it on the following grounds, as set out on the notice of preliminary objection:-

“1. The grounds of appeal as couched on the notice of appeal filed on the 25th day of July, 2017 initiating this appeal bothers on issues of mixed law and facts and the appellant failed to seek leave of Court before commencing the appeal.

  1. The appeal offends the provisions of Section 233(3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which requires the leave of this honourable Court or the lower Court before appeals of this nature can be commenced.
  2. That the grounds of appeal are incompetent for the following reasons:-

The signatures on the notice and ground of appeal (Court processes) are undecipherable as to whom of the two solicitors, to wit:

Sivbone Edu Esq. or Mobolade Sanni Esq. signed the document; see Alex and Dr. A. M. Ibeanu (Infra).”

The learned counsel for the respondent moved the objection at the oral hearing of the appeal and referred to the arguments thereon at pages 5-14 of the respondent’s brief.

The arguments are to the effect that all the grounds on the notice of appeal complain about or are against the exercise of the lower Court’s discretion and concurrent findings of the two lower Courts. That the grounds are of mixed law and facts which require prior leave of Court to be competent and for the Court to have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Section 233(3) of the Constitution (as amended) as well as National Employer Mutual Gen. Ltd. v. Uchay (1973) 4 SC 1 and Faith Ent. Ltd. v. B.A.S.F. (Nig.) Ltd. (2010) 1 MJSC (Pt. 1) (no page provided) reported as B.A.S.F. (Nig.) Ltd v. Faith Ent. Ltd. (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 104 are cited and all the grounds of appeal were set out in support of the contention that they are of mixed law and facts.

​In addition, Metal Contr. (W.A.) Ltd. v. Migliore ​(1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 299 on the law that a ground of appeal challenging the exercise of a lower Court’s discretion is one of the fact and at best of mixed law and facts and Thor Ltd. v. F.C.M.B. Ltd. (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 757) 427 are referred to, among other cases, and the Court is urged to uphold the objection.

In the appellants’ reply brief filed on the 26th February, 2018, it is submitted, after reference to Section 233(2) of the Constitution (as amended), the case of Okorocha v. P.D.P. (2014) LPELR-22058 (SC); (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1406) 213 on the interpretation of the provisions and Anukam v. Anukam (2008) LPELR-500 (SC); (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1081) 455 on the distinction between a ground of law alone and of mixed law and facts, that the appellants are not challenging the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts, but the application of principles of law on pleadings and award of damages on settled facts of the case.

Alternatively, relying on Bassil v. Fajebe (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 592, it is submitted that the Court can interfere with concurrent findings of the two lower Courts where they are found to be perverse.

Learned counsel maintains that the grounds of appeal are of law alone and so do not require leave of Court for the appeal to be brought or for it to be competent. He also says the notice of appeal was duly signed by Sivbone Edu, Esq. who affixed his NBA seal and stamp thereon and urged the Court to dismiss the objection of lacking in merit.

Resolution:

Now, the law on when an appeal from the decision of the lower Court to this Court requires prior leave of Court as a condition precedent for its validity and competence as prescribed under the provisions of Section 233(3) of the Constitution (as amended) and when such an appeal does not require or need leave of Court in situations set out in the provisions of Section 233(2), is firmly settled and trite. Briefly, an appeal in which the grounds raise or involve questions of law alone, is one as of right and so does not need or require prior leave of Court to be brought or filed by virtue of the provisions in Section 233(2). An appeal in which the grounds do not fall or are not within the situations enumerated in the provisions of Section 233(2), is an appeal which, by the operation of Section 233(3) mandatorily needs or requires prior leave of Court, as a condition precedent, for it to be validly brought or filed and for it to be competent so as to vest the requisite jurisdiction on the Court to adjudicate over it. See Faith Ent. Ltd. v. B.A.S.F. Nig. Ltd. (supra) also, reported in (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 104, Maigoro v. Garba (1999) 7 SCNJ 270 at 279; (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 624) 555; Yaro v. Arewa Constr. Co. Ltd. (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1063) 333; Opuiyo v. Omoniwari (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) 415; Ogbolosingha v. B.S.I.E.C. (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1455) 311.

On the determinants of when a ground of appeal can be said to be one of law alone or of mixed law and facts, guidelines have been set down by this Court in many decisions for easy identification even though the line of distinction between the two is admittedly, thin. For instance in Ogbechie v. Onochie (1986) NSCC 443; (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 484, it was stated that:

“There is no doubt that it is always difficult to distinguish a ground of law from a ground of fact but what is required is to examine thoroughly the grounds of appeal in the case concerned to see whether the ground reveals a misunderstanding by the lower Tribunal of the law, or misapplication of the law to the facts already proved or admitted, in which case it would be question of law. Where however the grounds are such that would question the evaluation of facts by the lower Tribunal before the application of the law that would amount to question of mixed law and fact. The issue of pure fact is easier to determine.”

​More guidelines were stated and re-stated in later cases including Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 718, Anoghalu v. Oraelosi (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt. 634) 297; F.B.N. Plc v. Abraham (2008) 36 NSCQR 1058; (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 172; Anukam v. Anukam (2009) 12 SC 32; (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1081) 455; F.B.N. Plc v. T.S.A. Ind. Ltd. (2010) 4-7 SC (pt. 1) 228; (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 247, on how to identify and distinguish between a ground of law alone and one of mixed law and facts for the purpose of the requirement of leave to appeal.

In this appeal, the three grounds contained on the notice of appeal, without the particulars, are as follows:-

“Ground One

The lower Court erred in law when it held that the 2nd appellant (being the Managing Director of the 1st appellant and without more) is a necessary party to a contract between the 1st appellant and the respondent.

Ground Two

The lower Court misdirected itself in law when it relied on exhibit A – a valuation report which was not pleaded in the statement of claim and filed in the reply to the statement of defence and a time the defendants were not able to provide a response to the same by the rules of pleadings.

Ground Three

The judgment is against the weight of evidence.”

Apparently, the question raised in ground one is on the application of the principle of law on who a necessary party is in an action to the admitted fact that the 2nd appellant is the Managing Director of the 1st appellant.

The ground is therefore one of law alone which requires no prior leave of Court to be brought or filed. See Calabar Co-Op. Ltd. v. Ekpo (2008) 1-2 SC 229 at 273 – 5; reported as C.C.C.T.C.S. v. Ekpo (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 362; Faith Ent. Ltd. v. B.A.S.F. Nig. Ltd. (supra), also reported in (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 518) 840 at 862; (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 104.

​Ground 2 on its part, challenges the admissibility of the valuation report in question, as evidence and alleged reliance there on by the lower Court. The issue or question raised in the ground is one of law alone. See Olarenwaju v. Ogunleye (1997) 1 KLR (Pt. 47) 225 at 232; (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 485) 12 Okorocha v. PDP (supra). It requires no leave of the Court.

For ground 3, as an omnibus ground, it is one which involves question of facts. See C.S.C. Bookshops Ltd. v. R.T.M.C.R.S. (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 992) 530 at 557; F.M.H. v. C.S.A. Ltd. (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1145) 193; Akinlagun v. Oshoboja (2006) 5 SC (Pt. II) 100; (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60. The ground is one which mandatorily requires the prior leave of Court to be competent.

In the result, the objection succeeds only in respect of the omnibus ground 3 on the notice of appeal and is upheld in respect of the ground which is liable to be struck out.

The objection fails in respect of grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal, and it is dismissed.

​Since the ground 3 of the notice of appeal is found to be incompetent for want of the requisite prior leave of Court, the issue 3 raised and argued in the appellants’ brief, are contiguously infected by the incompetence and so liable to be discountenanced. See John Holt Ventures Ltd. v. Oputa (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 407) 101; Ononiwu v. R.C.C. Ltd. (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 406) 214; U.B.A. Plc v. Akparabong Comm. Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 320) 1099 at 1121.

I now go to consider the arguments of learned counsel on the two surviving issues raised in the appellants’ brief which are derivable from the grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal.

Issue 1:

Appellants’ Submissions:

Citing Mogaji v. Mogaji (1986) LPELR-1891(SC), reported as Re: Mogaji (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 759; Mbanefo v. Molokwu (2014) LPELR-22257(SC); (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1403) 377 and Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480, on who a necessary party is in an action, it is submitted that the respondent’s S/claim and evidence placed before the trial Court did not show that the 2nd appellant had any personal interest or acted at any time in a personal capacity or is likely to be personally affected by the result of the action. According to learned counsel, there is no privacy of contract between the respondent and the 2nd appellant, who is an employee of the 1st appellant, and acted at all times, in his official capacity as the Managing Director (MD) and agent of the 1st appellant.

He argued that if the 2nd appellant was not made a party to the suit, there is no way it will affect its effectual and complete adjudication. Salomon v. Salomon (1987) AC 22 at 51 and Marina Nominees Ltd. v. Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 48 at 61 are cited on the law that an incorporated company is independent and a legal personality distinct and separate from the people who formed or incorporated it. It is further submitted that the law is settled that an employee acting in an official capacity in his employment as an agent of the employer, a known principle, incurs no liability, as expressed in Latin; “qulfacir peralum facit perse a sam facere unide pur” on the authority of Faith Ent. Ltd. v. B.A.S.F. (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 714) 242 at 244.

The Court is urged to resolve the issue in favour of the 2nd appellant.

Respondent’s Submissions:

The arguments on the issue are to the effect that the appellants seek thereunder to challenge the concurrent findings of the two (2) lower Courts that the 2nd appellant is a necessary party in the action which can only be interfered with where the findings are shown to be perverse, resulted from violation of some principle of law and procedure or occasioned a miscarriage of justice, as stated in Enang v. Adu (1981) 11-12 SC 25. It is contended that the appellants have failed to show the exact portion of the findings by the lower Courts that is perverse or has occasioned miscarriage of justice for the Court to interfere with them and reliance is placed on Buhari v. Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 841) 446 at 508. Learned counsel says that at the trial, 2nd appellant had explained, under cross-examination, that he played an integral part in the negotiation of the contract in question, from the beginning to the end and even signed/executed it. In addition, he submits that under the provision of Order 13 Rule 6(1) of the trial Court’s Rules, 2002, it was not a requirement for a claimant to have a specific claim against all the defendants in the suit and that once a prima facie case is made against defendant, he would be adjudged a necessary party. The Court is urged to hold that the 2nd appellant is a necessary party.

The submissions contained in the appellants’ reply brief on the issue are mere repetition and further arguments contained in the appellant’s brief and not answers to fresh or new points arising from the respondent’s brief.

Resolution:

The learned counsels are right that the law on who is a necessary party in a legal action before a Court of law, is firmly settled by judicial authorities of this Court. Simply put, a necessary party to a suit is one who is not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings, but in whose absence the suit could not be fairly, completely and effectually adjudicated upon and all material issues finally settled therein by the Court. In Anabaronye v. Nwakaihe (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 482) 374; Adio, JSC, described a necessary party to an action concisely thus:-

“A necessary party to a case is a person whose presence is necessary for the effectual and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the cause or matter.”

​See also Awoniyi v. The Reg. Trustees, AMORC, Nigeria (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 522; (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 103; B.O.N. Ltd. v. Saleh (1999) 9 NWLR (pt. 618) 331; Uku v. Okumagba (1974) 3 SC 35; Ojo v. Ogbe (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 542; E.F.P. Co. Ltd. v. N.D.I.C. (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1039) 216; Osun State Govt. v. Danlami Nig. Ltd. (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 818) 72; Green v. Green (supra).

In addition, in law, the main or primary reason for making a person a party to legal proceedings of a Court of law is so that he should at the end, be bound by the result, orders, decision or judgment of the Court in the action. See Olawoye v. Jimoh (2013) LPELR-20344(SC); (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1371) 362; Azubuike v. P.D.P. (2014) LPELR-22258(SC); (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1406) 292; In Re: N.D.I.C. (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1032) 54.

In this appeal, I have observed that even though the issue of whether 2nd appellant was necessary in the action before the trial Court was raised as issue 15 in the final address, by the learned counsel for the appellants filed on the 8th March, 2014, the trial Court did not pronounce or decide on it, in its judgment. I have also noted that the appellants’ notice of appeal against the decision/judgment of the trial Court, dated and filed 22nd December, 2015 did not contain a ground of appeal on either failure by the trial Court to make a pronouncement on the issue or a complaint that the 2nd appellant was not a necessary party to the action. The notice of appeal appears at pages 500-503 of vol. 1 of the record of appeal and contains two grounds of appeal, which without the particulars, are as follows:-

“Ground One

The learned trial Judge erred in law and on the facts in deciding that the claimant proved his case by a preponderance of evidence as required by the rules of this honourable Court and was entitled to the heads of claims listed in the statement of claim, when the claimant did not prove before the Court either of special damages of aggravated and/or exemplary damages under the heads of claim and the valuation report on the damage/destruction of the property – exhibit A (not forming part of the claim but produced in claimant’s reply to the statement of defence), showed only the sum of NGN10,358,310.00 (Ten Million, Three Hundred and Fifty-Eight Thousand, Three Hundred and Ten Naira only).

Ground Two

The judgment is against the weight of evidence.”

​In the appellants’ brief filed on 6th May, 2015 before the lower Court by the appellants’ counsel, the two issues distilled from the above grounds of appeal and submitted to that Court for determination, were in the following terms:-

“2.01 Whether the learned trial Judge correctly evaluated the fact and evidence and considered the principles of laws guiding the award of special damages, aggravated and/or exemplary damages in a case of breach of contract or agreement when it awarded to the respondent (claimant at the lower Court) the total sum of NGN475,000,000.00 (Four Hundred and Seventy-Five Million Naira) under the heads of claim including damages for breach of covenants and pre and post-judgment interest, without proof of same and against the established principles laid down by superior Courts of record? (Distilled front ground one of the notice of appeal)

2.02 Whether the evidence adduced by the claimant justifies the grant of the total sum of NGN475,000,000.00 (Four Hundred and Seventy-Five Million Naira) as claims/claimed and if the evidence at trial established a case against the 2nd appellant? (Distilled from ground two of the notice of appeal)”

Apparently, the question whether or not the 2nd appellant was a necessary party to the action before the trial Court, was not raised or submitted to the lower Court for decision by the appellants in the appeal against the decision/judgment of the trial Court.

However, at paragraphs 10.18 on page 30 to paragraph 10.26 on page 30(i) of the appellant’s brief (which appear at pages 679-680 of vol. II of the record of appeal), the learned counsel surreptitiously introduced and argued that the 2nd appellant was not a necessary party to the action.

It should be noted that the issue 2 submitted to the lower Court in the appellants’ brief that the respondent did not make a case against the 2nd appellant at the trial Court is not the same as challenging the capacity, status of standing of the 2nd appellant as a party to the action.

​In the absence of ground of an appeal complaining about or against the failure by the trial Court to pronounce or decide the issue of whether the 2nd appellant was a necessary party to the action or a ground of appeal which directly raised the issue before the lower Court, that Court lacks the jurisdiction to go outside the grounds of appeal and issues properly raised and placed before it for determination in the appeal. The lower Court cannot properly base its decision, finding or pronouncement on issues merely raised in arguments of counsel for the parties to an appeal but which are not traceable and derivable from the grounds of the appeal. See Osinupebi v. Saibu (1982) 7 SC 104; Okeke v. Oruh (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 606) 175; A.C.B. Plc v. Emedo (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 828) 244; Oje v. Babalola (1991) 5 SCNJ 110; (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 185) 267; R.E.A.N. Plc v. Anumnu (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 815) 52; Longe v. F.B.N. Plc (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 189) 1. The issue of whether the 2nd appellant was a necessary party to the action before the trial Court did not arise from any of the two grounds contained in the appellants’ notice of appeal in the lower Court and so was an incompetent issue over which that Court could not validly adjudicate and so liable to be struck out in this appeal.

​The decision by the lower Court on the issue, at page 770 of vol. I of the record of appeal, was that:-

“Learned counsel also contended that the 2nd appellant was not a necessary party in the suit leading to this appeal. There is no gainsaying that the 2nd appellant being the Managing Director, is undoubtedly the engine room of the 1st appellant. He was the ubiquitous player who played a pivotal role in execution of the agreement in the case leading to this appeal. At page 445 of the record of this appeal, he admitted being the person who entered into the said agreement and that he signed it. He is by no means, a necessary party. A necessary party is that who is not only interested in that subject matter of the proceedings but also who in his absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. See Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 6) 480 and O. K. Contract Point v. Progress Bank (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 631 at 634.”

There is no dispute that the 2nd appellant is the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of the 1st appellant, who directs and runs its affairs and business, as a company, and so its alter ego, directing mind and will under the law. In the case of Longe v. FBN Plc (supra), this Court per Oguntade, JSC, stated the position that-

“The truth of course, is that under any definition, a Managing Director is the directing mind and will and the alter ego of the company through which the company acts.”

See also Ramanchadam v. Ekpeyong (1975) 5 SC 29; Trenco Ltd. v. African Real Estate Ltd. (1978) 4 SC 9; Delta Steel Nig. Ltd. v. A.C.T. Incorp. (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 597) 53; Marine Management Assoc. Inc v. National Maritime Authority (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 678) 790; (2012) LPELR-20618 (SC); (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 506.

Ordinarily, the 1st appellant as an incorporated or registered company is a separate or distinct legal entity and personality with the requisite legal capacity to sue and be sued in legal actions from the 2nd appellant. See Yesufu v. Kupper Int. N.V. (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 446) 17; A.I.B. Ltd. v. Lee and Tee Ind. Ltd. (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 819) 366 at 395; Okolo v. U.B.N. Plc (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 859) 87. The law is also known that a company being an artificial person and a legal and juristic entity, can only act through natural persons such as its alter ego, officers, servants or agents. Kate Ent. Ltd. v. Daewoo Nig. Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 116; Standard Trust Bank Ltd. v. Interdrill (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) LPELR-9848; Leventis Tech. Ltd. v. Petrojessica Ent. Ltd. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 224) 459; Saleh v. B.O.N. Ltd. (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 316; Ishola v. S.G.B. Nig. Ltd. (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 488) 405.

In Yesufu v. Kupper Int. N.V. (supra) it was held by this Court, per Kutigi, JSC, (as he then was) that:

“Where a Director enters into a contract in the name of or purporting to bind the company, it is the company – the principal – which is liable on it, not the Director. The Director is not personally liable unless it appears that he undertook personal liability.”

Then in N.N.S.C. v. Alhaji Hamajoda Sabana Co. Ltd. (1988) 3 SCNJ (Pt. 130; (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 74) 23, Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, stated that:-

“A company, it has been said, is an abstraction. It therefore acts through living persons. But it is not the act of every servant of the company that binds the company. Those whose acts bind the company are their alter ego – those persons who because of their positions are the directing mind and will of the company, the very ego and corporate personality of the company. See Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd v. Asiatic Retroleunt Co. Ltd. (1915) AC 7055 Per Viscount Hablane at page 713.”

In the above premises of the law, a contract entered into by the Director or Managing Director of a company in name of the company and acting in his official capacity for the company, incurs no personal liability under the contract, unless, of course, there is evidence that he undertook personal liability in making the contract.

In the appellants’ case, the agreement/contract, by way of a sub-lease dated 15th December, 2004 (which appears at pages 48-51 of vol. 1 of the record of appeal) was entered into between the respondent, as the sub-leasor, and the 2nd appellant its Managing Director who signed as “director” and the secretary of the 1st appellant.

There is no term or condition of the sub-lease which shows or even suggests that the 2nd appellant pledged or undertook personal liability in the agreement in order for personal liability to attach to him.

​The 2nd appellant and the secretary of the 1st appellant who represented the 1st appellant acted in their official capacities as director and secretary respectively, for and on behalf of the 1st appellant as officers or agents authorized to carry out or conduct its affairs in the discharge of their ordinary duties. The agreement/contract was made and entered into in the name of and for the 1st appellant by the 2nd appellant and secretary and so it was a contract entered into or made by the 1st appellant; a disclosed principal, who is primarily bound by the terms and conditions set out therein. It is the 1st appellant who derived rights and was under the obligations and liabilities agreed to by the parties to the sub-lease and not the representatives or agents through whom it acted. See Trenco Nig. Ltd. v. African Real Estate & Inv. Co. Ltd. (supra) also reported in (1978) All NLR 124; S.T.B. Ltd. v. Interdrill Nig. Ltd. (supra); Ramanchadam v. Ekpenyong (supra).

If for the above reasons, the 2nd appellant is not liable or does not incur liability under the sub-lease agreement/contract entered into between the respondent and the 1st appellant, can he then be said to be a necessary party to the action before the trial Court on the basis of the breach of the terms, conditions and covenants agreed to in the sub-lease between the parties thereto?

​It may be remembered that a necessary party to an action is a party in whose absence, the material issues in the case cannot fairly, completely, effectually and finally be decided by the Court. Without any difficulty, it is clear that although the 2nd appellant may be interested in the subject matter of the action against the 1st appellant due to his position as the directing mind and will, all the material issues or questions involved in the action can be effectually, completely and finally decided by the trial Court, fairly, in his absence. He cannot therefore rightly be described as or held to be a necessary party to the action merely because he represented the 1st appellant in transaction that eventually led to and participated in signing of the sub-lease agreement in question, for and on behalf of the 1st appellant; as one of its agents. The finding by the lower Court that the 2nd appellant was/is a necessary party to the action before the trial Court is erroneous in law and liable to be set aside.

The issue is resolved in favour of the appellants.

Issue 2

Appellants’ Submissions:

The pith of the arguments on the issue is that the valuation report alluded to in paragraph 19 of the respondent’s statement of claim was filed by the respondent when the appellants had no right of response under the rules of pleadings and evidence, having been filed in the respondent’s amended reply to the appellants’ amended statement of defence. Also, that the valuation report (exhibit A), has no nexus with the amount claimed as costs of rebuilding the structures destroyed and that the respondent did not claim the sum awarded by the lower Court as costs of reinstating the damaged property and there was no evidence to support the award. The case of Achike v. Osakwe (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 630, a decision of the lower Court. Olubodun v. Lawal (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1115) 1 at 20; Ughutevbe v. Shonowo (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 899) 300 and Amoo v. Aderibigbe (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 324) 92, are cited on the statement that a reply cannot be used to raise a new cause of action or issue not contained in the statement of claim.Spasco Vehicle & Plant Hire Co. Ltd. v. Alraine (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 655 at 670 on when a reply is necessary in an action is also referred to and the Court is prayed to resolve the issue in appellants’ favour.

Respondent’s Submission:

The fulcrum of the submissions is that by rules of pleadings and the provisions of Orders 3 Rule 2 and 15 of the Rules of the trial Court, the reply filed by the respondent formed part of the pleadings of the parties in the case and the valuation report in question was properly pleaded to make it admissible as evidence in the trial. Amaechi v. INEC (No. 3) (2007) 18 NWLR 18 NWLR (Pt. 1065) 79, on the contents of pleadings and Bassil v. Fajebe (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 592 on the law that parties are bound by their pleadings are cited and the Court is urged to hold that the valuation report admitted as exhibit A in evidence was pleaded and properly admitted by the lower Court.

The arguments in the appellants’ reply brief on the issue are not answers to any fresh or new point/s raised or arising from the respondent’s brief, but rather made in the appellants’ brief.

Resolution:

From the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, the real complaint under the issue is that the respondent’s reply to the amended statement of defence raised or introduced a new or fresh claim, different from the ones in the statement of claim, on the ground only, that exhibit ‘A’ was annexed thereto. Exhibit ‘A’, which appears at pages 184-191 of vol. 1 of the record of appeal, is titled:

“Survey Report on Damages and Remedial Works on the Property at No. 30 Oladipo Bateye Street, GRA, Ikeja Belonging to Dr. Charles Oladeinde Williams”

was referred to and pleaded in paragraph 1(j) of the respondent’s reply to the appellants’ amended statement of defence dated and filed on the 6th March, 2012, as one of the documents to be relied on by him, at the trial of the action. In brief, exhibit ‘A’ provides details of the professional assessment and estimated costs of restoration of the property, the subject of the report, “to a tenantable state” as at the date thereof. As can be seen, the appellants’ argument is that, by exhibit ‘A’, the respondent had introduced a new cause of action, claim or issue outside and different from the claims pleaded in the statement of claim, which is not permitted, by the authority of Olubodun v. Lawal (supra) among other cases. However, as expressly admitted by the counsel at paragraph 4.02 on page 9 of the appellants’ brief, the averment/pleadings at paragraph 19(a) of the respondent’s statement of claim are thus:-

“4.02 It is contained in paragraph 19 of the respondent’s statement of claim dated the 2nd December, 2010, the following:-

Paragraph 19:

“By reason of tire matters set out in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18 above, the claimant has been greatly discommoded and inconvenienced and has suffered loss and damage(s).

Particulars:

(a) Cost of rebuilding the destroyed structures on the property and reinstatement of the property to the original design and structure in 2004, when it was leased to the defendant is in the sum of NGN200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) as witness relevant reports from experts.”

The fact in the above pleading is that the costs of rebuilding and reinstatement of the destroyed property to the state it was in when it was leased out to the appellants was N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) as shown by the reports from experts.

​The respondent had therefore claimed in the statement of claim, the costs for the restoration and reinstatement of the property in question, on the basis of reports from experts. The reports from experts on the actual costs of the restoration and reinstatement of the property was the evidence to be relied on in proof of the claim for the sum of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) by the respondent. The law on pleadings is that it is only facts and not the evidence by which such facts are to be proved, that are to be pleaded, deposed to or averted in pleadings. Order 15 Rule 2 of the Rules of the trial Court, 2012 provides that

“Every pleading shall contain a statement summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claims or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved and shall, …” (Italics provided)

See also Nwadiaro v. S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) at 333 – 4; Auto Import Export v. Adebayo (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 44; Abubakar v. Joseph (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 104) 307; Olubodun v. Lawal (supra), also reported in (2008) 6-7 SC (Pt. 1) 1; (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1115) 1; Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227; (2008) 33 NSCQR (Pt. 1) 332. In addition, the law is now trite that documents do not need to be specifically pleaded before they can be admissible or admitted in evidence so long as the relevant facts which the document seek to establish are set out clearly in the pleadings. See M.C.C. v, Azubuike (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 136) 74; Amadi v. Olumati (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 410) 739 at 752; Susano Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Sol Pharm. Ltd. (2000) FWLR (Pt. 10) 1595 at 1601 – 2; (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 60; F.B.N. Plc v. Tsokwa (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 866) 271; Ojoh v. Kamalu (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 523 at 555 – 6; Zenon Pet. & Gas Ltd. v. Idrisiyya Nig. Ltd. (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 312) 2121; (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 982) 221.

​As can be seen easily in the pleadings in paragraph 19 of the respondent’s statement of claim, he did not only plead the material facts which show the existence of exhibit’ A’, but specifically stated that he was going to rely on same. In addition, in paragraph 1(j) of the reply to the amended statement of defence, the respondent specifically pleaded the said exhibit ‘A’ as one of the documents to be relied on in proof of the claim made. In the circumstance, it is gross misconception by learned counsel for the appellants to say and insist that pleading, production and admission of exhibit ‘A’ in evidence was setting up, raising or making a completely new or fresh claim by the respondent outside the claim. Exhibit ‘A’ was not a new pleading, but one which goes to the proof of the claims made for the costs of the restoration and reinstatement of the respondent’s property in question in the statement of claim which the appellants had the opportunity to and indeed, reacted to in their amended statement of defence. The rules of the trial Court and judicial authorities all recognize and permit the right of a plaintiff/claimant to file a reply to statement of defence in order to answer to new or fresh points raised and canvassed by a defendant therein. See Order 15 Rule 1 of the trial Court’s Rules as well as Ishola v. S.G.B. Nig. Ltd. (1997) LPELR-1547 (SC); (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 488) 405; Akeredolu v. Akinremi (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 164 at 172, Oshodi v. Eyifunmi (2000) 7 SC (Pt. II) 145, (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298.

Exhibit ‘A’ was in law rightly pleaded by the respondent, properly admitted in evidence and made use of or relied on by the lower Court in the assessment of the claims of restoration and reinstatement of the property in question, as proved by the credible evidence adduced in support thereof at the trial Court.

Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the sum awarded by the lower Court as the costs for the repairs or restoration of the property was not claimed by the respondent either on the writ or statement of claim and so, accordingly to him, it was against the weight of evidence. However, a party may make claims in his pleadings, which the law imposes a burden on him to prove by credible and sufficient evidence if judgment was to be entered for him by the Court. See Sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Olusesi v. Oyelusi (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 634; Balogun v. Labiran (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 66; Jallco Ltd v. Owoniboys Tech. Serv. Ltd. (1995) 4 SCNJ 256, (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) 534, and the Court has power and authority to enter judgment in his favour in respect of the claim(s) whether in whole or in part, which is satisfactorily proved by such evidence as required by law. Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91 at 93; Balogun v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 247) 336; Bello v. Aruwa (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 615) 454. The law is also known that a Court can award to a party less than what he claims if the evidence adduced by him proves and established the award. See Haston Nig. Ltd. v. A.C.B. Plc (2002) 7 SC (Pt. II) 54; (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 782) 623 wherein, Ogundare, JSC, in the lead judgment of this Court stated the position that:-

“Surely, the law is trite that where a plaintiff claims more than he can prove, he is awarded the lesser amount.”

See also Ajayi v. Texaco Nig. Ltd. (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 62) 577; Nwachukwu v. Dungba (2009) LPELR-8414 (CA), Makanjuola v. Balogun (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 192; Carlen Nig. Ltd. v. University of Jos (1994) 13 NWLR (Pt. 323) 631; Nwankwo v. Nzeribe (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 422; Simpton (Nig.) Ltd. v. Pamil Ind. Ltd. (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 714) 49.

​In the present appeal, since the respondent had claimed the sum N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) as costs of restoration and reinstatement of the property in question in his statement of claim, but was only able to satisfactorily prove and establish, through exhibit ‘A’, that the actual costs as assessed by the experts engaged by him to do so, the lower Court was on “terra frema” (firm terrain) of the law to have awarded him the lesser amount which was proved by the evidence placed before the trial Court, as the costs of the restoration and instatement even though the sum or amount was less than that and was not specifically claimed by the respondent in his pleadings. The fact that the sum or amount claimed by the respondent in his pleadings is different from the lesser sum or amount awarded by the lower Court does not make the claim and evidence to be in conflict or contradiction. The claim was for costs of restoration and reinstatement and the evidence adduced and the award are both for the same claim, as proved in line with the requirement of the law.

In the result, I do not find merit in the appellants’ arguments under the issue which is resolved against them.

​On the whole, the appeal succeeds in respect of the appellants’ issue 1 and it fails in respect of the appellants’ issue 2

Consequently, the appeal is allowed in respect of issue 1 and the finding by the lower Court that the 2nd appellant is a necessary party to the action, is hereby set aside. The appeal fails in respect of the appellants’ issue 2, it is dismissed and the decision by the lower Court on the awards made in favour of the respondent is hereby affirmed.

There shall be costs of Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N500,000.00) awarded in favour of the respondent and to be paid by the appellants.


SC.1014/2017

Skypower Express Airways Ltd V. Uba, Plc & Anor (2022) LLJR-SC

Skypower Express Airways Ltd V. Uba, Plc & Anor (2022)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.S.C. 

This appeal is against the judgment of the Lagos Division of the Court of Appeal (lower Court) delivered on the 25th November, 2015 in favour of the 1st Respondent who was the Appellant therein.

Briefly, the facts which led to the appeal before the lower Court are that the Appellant had sued the Respondents before the Lagos State High Court (trial Court) vide a writ of summons dated 11th May, 2000 and claimed the following reliefs:

“1. A Declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of and entitled to the various sums of money totaling N9,071,650.00 (Nine Million Seventy One Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty Naira only) paid into the 2nd Defendant’s Account No. 201-01874-2 with the 1st Defendant between 24th November and 2nd December 1998 on the inducements of the 1st Defendant.

  1. A Declaration that the failure, refusal and or neglect by the 1st Defendant to refund or pay back the said sum of N9,071,650.00 (Nine Million Seventy One Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty Naira only) to the plaintiff amounts to unlawful conversion of or an improper dealing with the plaintiff’s fund and a breach of trust as well as a breach of contract.
  2. A Declaration that the purported transfer by the 1st Defendant of the plaintiff’s N9,071,650.00 (Nine Million Seventy One Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty Naira only) paid into the 2nd Defendant’s Current Account No. 201-01874-2 on the inducement of the 1st Defendant to Allied Internal Ltd, if true is improper, irregular, wrongful, null and void.
  3. AN ORDER setting aside the purported transfer of the Plaintiff’s funds being N9,071,650.00 (Nine Million Seventy One Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty Naira only) kept in the 2nd Defendant’s Current No. 201-01874-2 to Allied International Ltd, on the purported mandate of the 2nd Defendant’s Managing Director Alhaji Yunusa.
  4. AN ORDER directing the 1st Defendant to refund and pay back to the plaintiff the sum of N9,071,650.00 (Nine Million Seventy One Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty Naira only) which the 1st Defendant induced the plaintiff to pay into the 2nd Defendant’s Current Account No. 210-01874-2 to be held in trust for purpose of transfer to the Plaintiff’s Account No. 201-019366 when finally established, the sum with interest at 21% per annum, being the current bank rate from 3rd December, 1998 until date of judgment and thereafter till final payment.

Alternatively

The sum of N9,071,650.00 (Nine Million Seventy One Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty Naira only) against the 1st Defendant being monthly had and received by the 1st Defendant for purposes of opening a Current Account for the Plaintiff, which purpose has failed, with interest at 21% per annum from 3rd December, 1998 until final judgment and thereafter until final payment.

  1. N10 million being damages for deceit and fraudulent representations and or misstatements, improper inducements and unlawful deprivation of the use of legitimate funds further to which the plaintiff may suffer damage.”

The claims were denied by the Respondents in their respective Statements of Defence and at the end of trial, judgment was entered in favour of the Appellant on the 30th May, 2008 by the trial Court.

​Aggrieved, the 1st Respondent appealed against that judgment to the lower Court, which, as stated above, allowed the appeal on the ground that the originating processes, i.e; the writ of summons and the Statement or Claim were both signed in the name of a Law Firm and not by the Legal Practitioner known to law and so incompetent.

The appeal was brought vide the Notice of Appeal dated the 3rd December, 2015 on seven (7) grounds and in the Appellant Brief filed on the 17th March, 2016, six (6) issues are set out for determination as follows:-

“i. Whether the lower Court was right by striking out the appellant’s preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal as well as the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the same and assuming jurisdiction over the matter. This relates to grounds one of the grounds of appeal.

ii. Whether the lower Court was right and did not act in excess of its jurisdiction when it held that the suit was not initiated in accordance with or by the due process of law and as such the suit was incompetent ab initio thereby rendering the judgment delivered by the Court on 30th May 2008 null and void. This issue is relative to grounds 2 & 3.

iii. Whether the lower Court was right when it failed to distinguish the case from the cases of Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1043) 521, SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (pt. 1252) 317 and FBN, Plc v. Maiwada ​(2013) 5 NWLR (pt. 1348) 444 as well as apply the principle in Ogundele v. Agiri (2009) 18 NWLR (pt. 1173) 219 and hold that the signature ‘J. O. Esezoobo’ makes it an exception to the cases. This is relative to ground 4.

iv. Whether the lower Court was right and did not violate the appellant’s fundamental right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, when it held that ground one of the 1st Respondent’s Further Amended Notice of Appeal dated 17th October 2012 was competent and required no leave of the Court to validate it. Relative to ground 5.

v. Whether the lower Court properly came to the conclusion that “the Appellant’s complaint (in ground two) flows from the decision of the lower Court wherein the Court decided in favour of the 1st Respondent that the transfer of the money in contention was wrong” and consequently holding the appeal competent. Relative to ground 6.

vi. Whether the lower Court was right and did not violate Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, by failing to hear the case within a reasonable time until seven (7) years from 2008 to 2015 such as renders the judgment of the lower Court a nullity. This is relative to ground 7 of the Notice of appeal.”

Three (3) issues are said to arise from the grounds of the appeal for decision by the Court, in the Amended 1st Respondent’s Brief filed on the 10th September 2021, they are in the following terms:-

“(i) Whether the lower Court was right when it held that the Appellant’s action at the lower Court was incompetent ab initio having been initiated by a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim which were not signed by a legal practitioner?” (Grounds 2, 3 and 4).

(ii) Whether the lower Court was right when it struck out the Appellant’s preliminary objection dated 24 March, 2014?” (Grounds 1, 5 and 6).

(iii) Whether the length of the proceedings as the lower Court amount to a breach of the Appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing?” (Ground 7).”

There is no record that the 2nd Respondent, who was duly served with all the material processes in the appeal, filed a brief of argument or any other process for the prosecution of the appeal. The 2nd Respondent was also not represented at the oral hearing of the appeal on the 12th October, 2021 when the learned counsel for the Appellant and 1st Respondent adopted their respective briefs. The Appellant also filed the Appellant’s Reply Brief on 26th September, 2018.

As stated above, the lower Court allowed the appeal by the 1st Respondent on the sole ground that the originating processes were incompetent for being signed in the name of a Law Firm and not a legal practitioner. The suit was struck out for incompetence and want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial Court to entertain and adjudicate over it.

The crucial issue which requires determination first, is whether the lower Court is right in law in that decision. Although, the appellant also challenges the competence of the 1st Respondent’s Notice of Appeal in the lower Court, in the absence of or without the requisite jurisdiction on the part of the trial Court, if it turns out, to entertain and conduct proceedings in the Appellant’s suit initially, then the issue or question of an appeal; competent or incompetent, against the outcome of the purported proceedings conducted in the suit, would not arise. This Court, per M. D. Muhammad, JSC, in the recent case of NNPC v. Roven Shipping Ltd. (2019) NWLR (pt. 1676) 67 at 92, restated the law that:-

“A decision arrived at a Court without jurisdiction, being null and void, can never be the basis of a competent appeal or further litigation.”

His lordship referred to and relied on the decisions in Fadiora v. Gbadebo (1978) 3 SC, 219 and Bamishebi v. Faloye (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 54) 51.

The very intrinsic and extrinsic nature of the issue of jurisdiction in judicial proceedings of a Court of law and the fatal consequence on the part of a Court to entertain an action, are of considerable antiquity to be elementary in our judicial jurisprudence now. Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR, 587, (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 is the decision often referred to and relied on for the fundamental and crucial nature of the issue of jurisdiction in judicial proceedings of a Court of law and, named by many, as the “Locus classicus” on the issue.

The law is also firmly established that it is never too late in the course of the proceedings of all Courts in a matter, at all stages of the judicial ladder, for any of the parties or the Courts to raise the issue of jurisdiction, in any form, and that once raised or it arises, it should be decided first before further steps are taken on other issues in the matter in order to avoid an exercise in futility. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra), Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 7 SC, 158, (1983) 1 SCNLR, 1172, U.D. U.S. v. Kraus Thoumpson Org. Ltd. (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 376) 305, Obiuweubi v. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (pt. 1247) 46, Bankole v. Dada (2003) 11 NWLR (pt. 830) 174, NDIC v. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (pt. 766) 272.

The Appellant’s arguments on the issue, which is argued under the Appellant’s issues two and three at pages 7 – 14 of the Appellant’s Brief, are to the effect that the person who signed page 2 of the Record of Appeal is identifiable by the name written on it and not in doubt and that the lower Court was wrong to have relied on the decisions in Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1252) 317 and FBN, Plc v. Maiwada (2013) 5 NWLR (pt. 1348) 444 to hold that the Appellant’s suit was not initiated by due process of the law to deprive the trial Court of the jurisdiction to entertain it. Learned counsel pointed out and maintains that J. O. Esezobo who signed page 2 of that Record of appeal and all other processes, is different and clear from J. Odion Esezobo & Co. written thereunder and so the facts in the aforenamed decisions are distinguishable from the facts in the Appellant’s case. He argues that where the signature is the name of counsel, as in the Appellant’s case, it cannot be ascribed to a law firm since it is not a mere mark or contraption that is not identifiable. Dankwambo v. Abubakar (2016) 2 NWLR (pt. 1495) 157 at 180/184, 187 and 194/196 was referred to. It is his further argument that with the signature “J.O. Esezobo” being clearly the name of the person who signed, the identity of the person who appended the signature was no longer in doubt, citing Hamzat v. Sanni (2015) 5 NWLR (pt. 1453) 486 at 498 — 499 and 505 — 507 on the difference between “shall sign” and “shall endorse” in respect of processes of Court provided for in the Rules of the trial Court.

Learned Counsel urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant.

The 1st Respondent’s arguments on the issue are that the law is settled that only a legal practitioner entitled to practice law under the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA) can sign processes to be filed in Court and that a process signed in the name of law firm is incompetent. Reliance was placed on Peak Merchant Bank Ltd. v. NDIC (2011) 12 NWLR (pt. 1261) 253 at 201 – 202, SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (pt. 1252) 317, the facts of which are said to be similar to the Respondents’ case, FBN v. Maiwada (supra), Framphino Pharm. V. Jawa Int. Ltd. (2013) 5 NWLR (pt. 1348) 444 and SPDC Ltd. v. Sam Royal Hotel Nig. Ltd. (2016) 8 NWLR (pt. 1514) 318. Learned counsel referred to Order 17 Rule 4 of the Trial Court Rules and contends that the arguments of the Appellant do not appreciate the purport of the decisions in SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC and Okafor v. Nweke (both supra) in which, contrary to the arguments, do not create “exceptions and borderline cases” but restated the law that an originating process signed in the name of a law firm, is incompetent. He maintains that the Appellant’s writ and Statement of Claim issued by “J. Odion Esezobo & Co.” did not come before the trial Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfilment of a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction and so incompetent. That a party cannot condone or waive lack of jurisdiction on the part of a Court to entertain and action, on the authority of Ugo v. Okafor (1996) 3 NWLR (pt. 438) 542 and Ijebu-Ode Local Government v. Adedeji (1991) 1 NWLR (pt. 166) 136, Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9 – 10 SC, 31 at 49, 51 – 52 and Kasikwu Farms Ltd. v. A. G. Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 19) 693 at 703 – 704.

In the Appellant’s Reply Brief, it is maintained that the facts in FBN, Plc v. Maiwada (supra) are not similar to the Appellant’s case.

RESOLUTION:

The law is now firmly settled beyond arguments, and the learned counsel for the parties acknowledge and agree, that an originating Court process employed or used for the invocation of a Court’s jurisdiction over an action or matter which was signed in the name of a Law Firm is incurably incompetent and incapable of igniting or invoking the requisite jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the action or matter for being in contravention or breach of the provisions of Sections 2 (1) and 24 of the LPA and Rules of Courts.

​This is the position established, stated and restated in the decisions in Okafor v. Nweke, SLB Consortium v. NNPC and FBN, Plc v. Maiwada (all supra) and the underlining principle decided by this Court in these cases is that once a Court process is signed in the name of Law Firm and the person whose signature was appended cannot be identified to be a legal practitioner entitled to practice law by virtue of the provisions of Sections 2 (1) and 24 of the LPA, then such a process is incurable incompetent. The import of the decisions is that non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 2(1) and 24 of the LPA, as a matter of substantive law, affects and deprives a Court of the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate over such a Court process, as an initiating process, which is therefore liable to be struck out. Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra), Ebhodagbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 12 SCNJ, 106, Obi v. INEC (2007) 7 SC, 268.

​The question whether a Court process filed in Court was signed in the name of an identifiable person or in the name of a law firm is and can easily be determined by a physical view, close look and consideration of the process itself by the Court.

​The Court processes in this appeal are the writ of summons at pages 1 – 3 and the statement of claim at pages 4 – 11 of vol. 2 of the Record of Appeal, which appear thus:-

“ … “

Even a casual and passing glance at these processes would clearly show, beyond reasonable argument, that each was signed with a signature above, for and on the name of “J. Odion Esezobo & Co.” indicated to be counsel plaintiff. It is plain that the signature does not reveal, signify or identify, precisely, the name of the person who appended the signature or signed for the law firm, said to be the counsel to the plaintiff on any of the processes. The signature itself does not portray the name of the person who inscribed it for the purpose of accurate identification and proper authentication. “Signature” is defined in the 9th Edition of the Black’s Law Dictionary, page 1507, to mean, among others:-

“1. A person’s name or mark written by that person or at the person’s direction.

“the signature to a memorandum may be any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of this signer.” The word “sign” is also defined on the same page, to mean, inter alia:-

“To identify (a record) by means of a signature, mark, or other symbols with the intent to authenticate it as an act or agreement of the person identifying it.” See also Onward Ent. Ltd. v. Olam Int. Ltd. (2010) All FWLR (pt. 531) 1503 at 1512.

In SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC, (supra) this Court, per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC underscored the importance of the way counsel chooses to sign a Court process and how all processes to be filed in Court shall be signed by Counsel. His Lordship explained that:-

“Once it cannot be said who signed a process, it is incurably bad, and rules of Court that seem to provide a remedy are of no use as a rule cannot override the Law (i.e. the Legal Practitioners Act). All processes filed in Court are to be signed as follows:-

First, the signature of counsel, which may be any contraption.

Secondly, the name of Counsel clearly written.

Thirdly, who counsel represents.

Fourthly, name and address of Legal Firm.”

This position was restated by the Learned Law lord in the case of Nigerian Army v. Samuel (2013) 14 NWLR (pt. 1375) 446 at 485 to settle the appropriate manner, way or mode for proper and valid signing of all Court processes by Counsel representing parties recognised by the law. Any Court process not signed by a legal practitioner representing a party as specifically stated and in the specified manner, is not a Court process signed in accordance with or recognised by law since it will not be a process signed by an identifiable person who could be attributed the competence to sign same.

The undeniable fact in the case of the Appellant in this appeal is that both the writ of summons at page 2 and the statement of claim at pages 4 – 11 of vol. 2 of the Record of Appeal, which clearly and expressly, though mutedly, speak for themselves, are signed by way of a contraption as a signature, over, for and in the name of the law firm of “J. Odion Esezobo & Co.” The contraption or signature is not/does not represent the name of any identifiable person. In his brief of argument, the learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously contended that the signature is the name of counsel for the plaintiff and it is not just a contraption. However, an objective look at the signature shows not even a semblance of a specific and identifiable name, which by the prescription of the Court in SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC and Nigerian Army v. Samuel (above, supra) is required to be “clearly written” in addition to any contraption which may be inscribed or appended as a signature of counsel to the processes. On the two (2) processes, only a signature appears and was inscribed without any name specifically, distinctly and clearly written so as to identify the person who made the contraption of the signature thereon.

The signature was inscribed or appended, as a contraption, over or on top of the name of the Law Firm of “J. Odion Esezobo & Co.” clearly indicating and showing that they were both signed on behalf of and in the name of the said law firm, as counsel for the plaintiff. In the words of Mukhtar, JSC (later CJN) in SLB Consortium Ltd v. NNPC (supra):-

“It is instructive to note here that the requirement for the name of the Legal Practitioner to be given, is necessary and important. The emphasis here is on the name together with the signature.”

Rhodes-Viviour, JSC, concluded that:-

“A signature without the name is incurably bad. ”

In the foregoing premises, the facts of the appellant’s case on the competence of the initiating processes filed at the trial Court are substantially similar, even the same, as those considered and decided upon by this Court in the cases of Okafor v. Nweke, SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC and FBN, Plc v. Maiwada referred to and relied on by the lower Court to hold that the said processes for being signed in the name of Law Firm, are incurably bad and incompetent and the action for not being initiated in line with due process of the law, was incompetent and liable to be struck out.

Perhaps, I should state that since the two (2) processes in the Appellant’s case have been demonstrated to have been signed in the name of a law firm and not by a Legal Practitioner known to law, the issue of the provisions of the trial Court’s Rules as to who has the duty to issue and “sign” or “endorse” a writ of summons is non-sequitur in the determination of the competence of the processes in question. The case of Hamzat v. Sanni (supra) therefore becomes irrelevant in the circumstances.

I resolve the issue in favour of the 1st Respondent and against the Appellant.

​The resolution of the issue has effectively and completely subsumed the other issues raised in the appeal since in the absence of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and conduct valid proceedings on the part of the trial Court, no competent issue could arise for consideration out of the action.

In the final result, the incompetent initiating processes are hereby struck out and the appeal dismissed.

Parties shall bear their respective costs of prosecuting the appeal.


SC.80/2016

Skyblind (Nig) Ltd V. New Life Cooperative Society Ltd & Ors (2021) LLJR-SC

Skyblind (Nig) Ltd V. New Life Cooperative Society Ltd & Ors (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

MUSA DAITIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C. 

The appellant herein, as plaintiff, commenced suit No. KDH/KAD/117/2010 against the respondents, the defendants, at the High Court of Kaduna State for:-

“(i) A declaration that the act of the defendants constitutes trespass and continuous trespass against the plaintiff.

(ii) An order of injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, employers and any other person(s) from obstructing or further obstructing, blocking, entering without consent, and interfering with the plaintiff’s use and occupation of the property consisting of the ground floor and all its appurtenances situate and lying at plot L5, Ahmadu Bello Way Kaduna which the plaintiff holds and occupies as a lawful tenant of the defendants.

(iii) N6 million only as general damages and

(iv) Cost of instituting the action”.

The respondents not only contested appellant’s claim, they counter-claimed thus:-

“a. A Declaration that the 1st Defendant is entitled to immediate, exclusive and outright possessions of the property situate, lying and being at plot No. L5 Ahmadu Bello Way Kaduna covered by certificate of Occupancy No. KD5155, dated 26th June 1998 and Registered as No. 16 at page 16 in volume 83 (Certificate of Occupancy) of the Kaduna State Land Registry Kaduna having lawfully purchase same from ALHAJI GIDADO IDRIS (the former owner) on 18/09/1009.

b. A Declaration that the Plaintiff is a tenant at sufferance and a Trespasser in the premises.

c. A CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER of this Honourable Court ejecting the Plaintiff forthwith from the 1st Defendant’s property or premises known situate, lying and being at plot No. L5 Ahmadu Bello Way Kaduna.

d. AND for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.”

Pleadings were ordered, filed and exchanged. The respondents particularly averred and led evidence that appellant is seeking to relitigate the very claim heard and determined by the Federal High Court in suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010 between the appellant’s Managing Director, as plaintiff, against the police and the 3rd to 5th respondents as defendants.

​In its judgment at the end of trial, see page 147 of the record of appeal, the trial Court inter-alia held:

“Appellant’s claims have been a subject of previously concluded litigation and cannot be relitigated … the claim is incompetent while the defendants’ counter-claim is undefended and granted…” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).

Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, the lower Court, on a notice containing four grounds filed on 14th June 2012.

In dismissing the appeal and affirming the trial Court’s decision, the lower Court concluded its judgment at page 188 of the record, thus:-

“This Court finds and holds that the lower Court was correct in its finding that the judgment of the Federal High Court in suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010 constituted res judicata in the present case.” (Underlining mine for emphasis).

The instant appeal, vide appellant’s amended notice deemed filed on 20/6/18, is against the foregoing concurrent findings of the two Courts.

​Parties have filed, exchanged, adopted and relied upon their respective briefs of argument for and against the appeal. The two issues formulated at paragraph 3.1 of the appellant’s amended brief of argument as arising for the determination of the appeal read as follows:-

“(i) WHETHER the claim and parties to suit No. PHC/KD/CS/33/2010 are the same as this suit to constitute res judicata against the present suit as held by the lower Court. (Distilled from grounds 1 and 2 of the amended notice of appeal). (Underlining mine for emphasis).

(ii) WHETHER Appellant validly appealed the trial Court’s findings on trespass before the lower Court so as to be entitled to judgment reversing same in this Court. (Distilled from grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the amended notice of appeal).”

The two similar issues distilled at paragraph 2.00 of the respondents’ brief for the determination of the appeal are:-

“1. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the reliefs sought at the lower Court same having been determined and dismissed by the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010. (Underlining supplied for emphasis).

ii. Whether the Appellant appealed against the trial Court findings on trespass against the Respondents before the lower Court.”

​Under its first issue, the appellant argues that for the plea of estoppel per rem judicatam to succeed, the party relying on it must prove:-

(1) The parties or their privies are the same in both the previous and present proceeding;

(2) The claim or the issue in dispute in both proceedings is the same.

(3) The res or subject-matter of the litigation in the two cases is the same.

(4) The decision relied upon to support the plea of estoppel per rem judicatam must be valid, subsisting and final; and

(5) The Court that gave the previous decision relied upon to sustain the plea must be a Court of competent jurisdiction.

The plea succeeds, it is submitted, only where these five preconditions are jointly met. Appellant inter-alia places reliance on EZEOKONKWO V. OKEKE (2002) FWLR (PT. 109) P. 1652 at 1674, OKE V. ATOLOYE (1985) 1 NWLR (PT. 15) P. 241 and OKPOSIN V. ASSIAM (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 282) P. 1863 SC.

​In the case at hand, learned appellant’s counsel submits, the two Courts below are wrong, given respondents’ failure to establish the first two preconditions, to sustain respondents’ plea of estoppel per rem judicatam. The appellant was neither a party to the previous suit nor, it is further contended, are the reliefs in the present suit same as in the former. Citing DIKE-OGU V. AMADI (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 438) 276, COKER V. SANYAOLU (1976) 9-10 SC, MEZU V. CO-OP & COMM BANK NIG PLC (2012) ALL FWLR (PT 655) 262 and ALADE V. ALIC NIG LTD (2011) ALL FWLR (PT 563) 1849, learned counsel submits that the appellant, a corporate personality, which has a separate and distinct existence from either its employees or alter ego, is never a privy of any of the two. The issue, learned counsel concludes, be resolved against the respondents.

On their 1st similar issue, learned respondents’ counsel agrees that a plea of res judicata succeeds only if the five preconditions the Supreme Court stipulates are conjunctively met. An appellate Court is permitted to peruse the pleadings, proceedings and judgment of the lower Court in deciding whether or not the plea succeeds. Learned counsel cites in aid OMIYALE V. MACAULAY (2009) 7 NWLR 597, DANIEL TAYAR TRANSPORT ENTERPRIESE NIG CO LTD V. BUSARI (2011) 8 NWLR (PT 1249) 387, AYUYA V. YONRIN (2011) NWLR (PT 1254) 135 and AGBASI V. OBI (1998) 2 NWLR (PT 531).

​Learned counsel further submits that in the case at hand, parties in suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010 are not only the same as those in the suit that brought about this appeal, same witnesses have testified in the two suits. The parties in both suits are privies to each other being of same and direct interest in the subject matter of the dispute. It is clear from the evidence on record, learned counsel further contends, that the appellant is a direct beneficiary of the reliefs in both suits and had had the opportunity of attending Court to protect its interest in the earlier suit.

​The reliefs in the two suits, learned respondents’ counsel submits, even though differently couched, are substantially the same. It is immaterial, it is contended, as to the capacity in which a particular party feature in any of the two suits, whether as a plaintiff or defendant. It is the interest the party sets out to protect, vis-a-vis that of the rival party, that determines the sameness of the claims in the two suits. Once it is clear from the facts on record that same questions are substantially in issue in the two suits and between the same parties and/or their privies, estoppels subsists to rob the Court from proceeding on the subsequent suit same claims having been previously determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Further relying on FALEYE V. OTAPO (1995) 3 NWLR (PT 381) 1, MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 and ABUBAKAR V. BEBEJI OIL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS LTD NWLR (PT 1066) 319, learned respondents’ counsel urges that both Courts below are right to have sustained respondents’ plea of res- judicatun in the instant suit. He prays that the issue be resolved against the appellant and the appeal be dismissed.

Now, the issue at hand is whether the lower Court’s affirmation of the trial Court’s decision declining jurisdiction to proceed on appellant’s suit because of a valid subsisting decision in an earlier action, suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010, on the same subject matter between the same parties and/or their privies, is right. While learned appellant’s counsel contends that concurrent as the findings of the two Courts are, their decisions are perverse. Learned respondents’ counsel submits to the contrary. Certainly both cannot be right.

​My lords, the principle of estoppel per rem judicata, the appeal agitates, postulates that if the merit of an action between the parties have been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction and a final decision given thereon, no person shall, in a subsequent litigation, be allowed to raise the very same questions that have earlier been decided. The doctrine insists on putting an end to litigation by estopping any party to the dispute or their privies to relitigate the matter which has been finally and judicially determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction. See YOYE V. OLUBODE (1974) 10 SC 209 and ALFRED ASAGBA & ANOR V. ONOWHA OGAJE & ANOR (1972) LPELR- 571 (SC). In the latter case this Court per Sowemimo, JSC (of blessed memory), cited with approval the decision of Fatayi-Williams J (as he then was) in FABUNMI FAMILY V. DELEGAN AND OTHERS (1965) N.M.L.R. 369 where at page 373 of the report his lordship set out the preconditions a Court applies in determining the success or otherwise of the plea of res judicata and the consequence of a successful plea of the defence thus:-

“The issue before the Grades B and A Customary Courts, to my mind, was one of law. It was whether the plea of estoppel based on the judgments in Exhibits C and E could be sustained or not, the factual evidence of ownership as given by both parties notwithstanding.

It is therefore immaterial whether the plaintiffs/applicants called their boundary man to give evidence or whether the defendants/respondents did not call such evidence.

In my view, the Grade B Customary Court was quite right in finding for the defendants/respondents on the issue of estoppel and consequently dismissing the plaintiffs/appellants’ claim. So also is the learned President of the Grade A Customary Court”.

In ABUBAKAR V. BEBEJI OIL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS LTD (2007) 18 NWLR (PT 1066) 319 at 373-374 a case and passage alluded to by the lower Court, Tobi JSC proffered as follows:-

“In considering the application or applicability of the principle or doctrine, the Court should remind itself of the tricks the parties, at times, play to beat its application. This is the only way to meet such parties’ full length rather than half-length … There are times when parties play. with words to present a camouflage that the issues are different when in reality they are not. The trial Judge, in the use of the eyes of an eagle, will be able to remove the chaff from the grain and decide whether the principle or doctrine of res judicata is applicable or inapplicable.” (Underlining mine for emphasis).

See also DZUNGWE VS GBISHE (1985) 2 NWLR (PT 8) 528 and DAGACI OF DERE VS DAGACI OF EBWA (2006) 7 NWLR (PT 979) 382.

Learned appellant’s counsel insists that the parties in suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010 and the instant suit No. KDH/KAD/177/2010, wherein the respondents raised the plea of res judicata, are not the same. He suggests also that the subject matter in the two suits are neither the same nor substantially so. Learned respondents’ counsel is on a firm terrain in contending that the appellant, on the authorities, cannot be taken seriously.

​Who are the parties in the two suits and what are the reliefs they approached the Courts for?

Answers to these questions would determine whether or not the Court whereat the plea is raised has the jurisdiction to proceed to determine the action the parties place before it. The plea of res judicata is invariably a challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction the determination of which is done by comparing the claims in the two suits. If the plea succeeds, the subsequent action, suit No. KDH/KD/CS/33/2010 wherein the plea is raised, becomes incompetent as the claim it seeks to enforce has earlier been litigated and determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction and between the same parties or their privies. See AGNES DEBORAH EJIOFODOMI VS. H. C. OKONKWO (1982) LPELR-1070 (SC), AG FEDERATION V. GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS LTD & ORS. (1999) LPELR-3162 (SC) and COLE V. JIBUNOH & ORS. (2016) LPELR-40662 (SC).

On the two overriding questions the trial Judge, see pages 143-146 of the record of appeal, inter-alia enthused thus:-

“l have seen case No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010 and there is no doubt, it was between the same parties and the subject matter is the same. The reliefs are as follows.”

The Court particularly referred to reliefs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the statement of claim in the earlier suit reproduced hereinunder for ease of reference:-

“3. A declaration that the forceful sealing and locking of the applicant’s place of business and blocking of the entrance to the said place of business with a truck by the 5th to 7th respondents with the active connivance of the 1st to 4th respondents, their agents and servants, constituted a violation of the applicant’s rights to privacy as enshrined in Section 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

  1. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the respondents, their agents, servants proxies and/or any person acting for or on their behalf from further interfering, arresting, detaining, threatening to arrest and/or detaining the applicant in connection with their use and occupation of the property at L5 Ahmadu Bello way or in furtherance of the complaints made by the 5th to 8th respondents for recovery of the said premises.
  2. A further order restraining the respondents from further sealing locking, blocking or invading the business premises of the applicant and/or violating the privacy of the applicant without a valid Court order or in accordance with the provisions of the law.
  3. Exemplary damages in the total sum of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) only against the 5th to 8th respondents for instigating 1st to 4th respondents and participating in the violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as set out in paragraphs A-C herein.”

​The Court then proceeded as follows:-

“From the above, it would appear the issue of sealing, locking sand invading the plaintiff’s premises was entertained and I agree with the submissions of learned counsel to the defendants that the issues in this case were presented to the Federal High Court by way of fundamental rights proceedings for breach of privacy dignity of person as well as injunction. The Federal High Court absolved the present defendants and only found against the police. I think that this issue cannot be relitigated here again.”

The lower Court in affirming the foregoing findings of the trial Court at page 185 of the record held firstly as follows:-

“It was not in dispute that the fifth to the eight defendants in suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010 are the same Respondents in the present suit. It was also not in dispute that prayers (iii), (iv), (v) and (vii) in the suit were directed at the fifth to the eight defendants therein, the respondents herein, it is trite that the principle that for the defence of res judicata to succeed there must be sameness of parties does not mean that all the parties in the previous suit must be made parties in the later suit. It is sufficient, where there are several parties in the previous suit, that those of the parties who are necessary parties to the issues in the previous suit are the same as in the later suit … It is the view of this Court that the parties in the two suits are the same parties within the definition of ‘parties’ for the purpose of res judicata.” (Underlining mine for emphasis).

The Court further dwelt on parties’ pleadings in the two suits and added at page 186 of the record thus:-

“The bulk of these facts were the exact same facts relied upon by the Appellant to prosecute his claims before the lower Court in this matter and the issues stated above were the exact same issues presented for determination before the lower Court. It is trite that once it is made clear that the self same question was substantially in issue in the two suits, the precise form in which either suit is brought or the fact that the claimant in the one case was the defendant in the other is immaterial estoppel subsists between the parties …

Additionally, looking at the facts relied on in the two suits, it cannot be contested that the same evidence was required to prove the claims in both suits. The Courts have stated that one of the criteria of identity of two suits in considering a plea of res judicata is the enquiry whether the same evidence would support both.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).

The Court’s concluding finding at page 188 of the record of appeal reads:-

“This Court finds and holds that the lower Court was correct in its finding that the judgment of the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/KD/CS/33/2010 constituted res judicata in the present case …”

Appellant’s first issue for determination of this appeal is against the foregoing concurrent findings of both Courts below which learned counsel insists should be set-aside as same are perverse. Are they? I think not.

Learned appellant’s counsel needs to be reminded that finding of fact or decision is said to be perverse when it runs counter to pleadings and evidence on record and/or where the Court wrongly applies legal principle to correctly ascertained facts, a lapse which amounts to miscarriage of justice. See UBN PLC V. CHIMAEZE (2014) LPELR – 22699 (SC) and ABEGUNDE V. ONDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS (2015) LPELR-24588 (SC).

The concurrent findings the appellant seeks to overturned in the instant case, which, as demonstrated, draw from the pleadings, evidence on record and on account of correct application of legal principle, must persist. This explains why appellant’s first issue is hereby resolved against him.

I must stress in conclusion, the needlessness of considering appellant’s 2nd issue for determination. Appellant’s incompetent suit does not give rise to any issue worthy of our consideration. The 2nd issue is hereby struck out.

On the whole, the appeal lacks merit. Same is accordingly dismissed. Respondents are entitled to cost put at N300,000.00k against the appellant.


SC.114/2014