INEC’s Responsibility and Accountability for the Failure of IReV and BVAS; A Legal Overview

INEC’s Responsibility and Accountability for the Failure of IReV and BVAS; A Legal Overview

INTRODUCTION 

In the mighty time of 2023 general elections, the nation’s political scale weighted witness of a flood-tiding event; the astonishing collapse of the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) and the Bimodal Voter Registration Systems (BVAS). Was it a technical issue, a negligent act or a deliberate move? As the digital infrastructure crumbled under the weight of uncertainty and expectation, with several questions rumbling in voter’s heart, doubts crept in, echoing across the nation’s political landscape. 

Prof. Attahiru Jega, the former Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), seized the center stage, urging for answers in an intriguing interview on Channels Television News. His touching remarks reflect  the urgency needed in questioning the counts. Painting a dark light on the very foundation of Nigeria’s electoral integrity and efficiency. 

Now, as the rain settles, a farmer need to search for his seedlings in order to taste the fertility of his land. that is to invite accountability to question but not just mere explanations, but a reassurance for the very soul of our democracy. that is the need for INEC to provide explanations regarding the failure of these technological systems. 

Legal Overview

As Enshrined in Section 52(1) of the Electoral Act; providing the fundamental mandate of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to establish and maintain an electronic database for the registration of voters, conduct of elections, and transmission of results.

This digital imprint stands as the bedrock for voter registration, the coherence of elections and the transmission of results. A critical look at this particular section and sub section; provide a guiding light towards the nexus of modernity in democratic dispensation. 

Also, Section 78(1) of the Electoral Act empowers the INEC to use electronic voting machines or any other method of voting as it may deem fit in conducting elections. 

All these are to the effect; that technological systems should be robust and secure to prevent any form of manipulation or interference.

In the case of Adeleke v. INEC (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1732) 511, the Nigerian Court of Appeal emphasized the importance of transparency and integrity in electoral processes. It held that the INEC has a duty to ensure that the electronic devices use in the process are secure from any form of manipulation or interference. 

As observed under the Electoral Act, INEC is entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the integrity and transparency of elections through the deployment of suitable technological solutions. 

The introduction of IReV and BVAS aimed to enhance the credibility of the electoral process by providing voters with access to real-time results and improving voter registration mechanisms.

General Overview

Prof. Attahiru Jega’s remarks suggest that the failure of these systems might have resulted from the infiltration and sabotage by “reckless politicians” who seek to manipulate the electoral outcome in their favour. This highlights the nefarious attempts by certain political actors to subvert democratic principles for personal gains. 

He called for a thorough public inquiry that aligns with the principles of accountability and transparency in governance. INEC owes Nigerians a comprehensive explanation regarding the technical glitches and vulnerabilities that led to the failure of the IReV and BVAS systems. Such an inquiry would facilitate a robust assessment of the systemic challenges facing Nigeria’s electoral infrastructure and inform strategic reforms to mitigate future risks. 

Conclusion

The failure of the IReV and BVAS systems during the 2023 general elections maze the INEC electoral prowess to conduct a free, fair, and credible elections. And thus question the accountability and transparency of their pillars. So, the INEC must proactively address the lapses that marred the electoral process. To fight back the spirit of our democratic stance. A collaborative effort between stakeholders, organizations, legal experts, political actors, and the public in safeguarding the integrity of Nigeria’s electoral democracy.


Background Image credit: Leadership News


About Author

Salisu Abdulazeez Lawal is a 200 level law student at the prestigious Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. A Writer, A Poet & A Researcher.
Email: [email protected]
Phone: 08139952399

Enhancing The Participation Of Women In The Evolving Creative And Innovative Sectors: The Role Of Intellectual Property

Enhancing The Participation Of Women In The Evolving Creative And Innovative Sectors: The Role Of Intellectual Property

Empirical Research has substantiated the claim that women are starkly underrepresented in the field of innovation compared to men. Research shows that less than 10% of patent applications are held by women.

A survey published by the European Union further discloses that only about 17% of people working in technological fields are women. Worse still, according to the same study, the few women who find themselves working in the technological fields do not earn as much as their male counterparts.

In developing countries particularly, women find themselves in disparate living conditions with the many adverse effects. They tend to be limited by factors such as gender stereotype, unequal and fettered access to resources, illiteracy, unemployment, inadequate support system, and so on.  Intellectual Property certainly will be instrumental in mitigating these short-comings as it has been observed that countries that value, protect and invest in intellectual property rights are the ones with the best environment for women.

The imperative nature of intellectual property rights has necessitated its recognition as human rights by virtue of its codification in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The provision states that “everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”.

China seems to understand the importance of intellectual property as a study revealed that an average Chinese person knows what intellectual property entails. Old and young minds, men and women even the free and imprisoned in China are all educated on their Intellectual Property rights, especially patents. And we see situations where their prisoners create things and are sometimes freed on the basis of their creations. This has made China thrive in terms of innovation and creation today.

However, in Africa, the story is vastly different as Africa contributes an insignificant 0.5 percent to global inventions. And for Nigerian women, it is doubly worse as many factors tend to inhibit their potential for innovation. These factors display themselves in the form of gender bias, unsupportive work environments and woeful under representation of women in patent intensive fields.

Reasons for low participation of women in creative and innovative sectors

The reasons for low participation of women in creative and innovative sectors are not farfetched, and include:

Gender Stereotypes

From an early age, the gender stereotype of boys being better at science and technology is instilled in the female folks; thus, while their male counterparts are given toys that can spur their creativity, the girls are gifted with mere dolls and teddies, and are taught that they belong in the kitchen.

In High School, these girls with this kind of upbringing naturally yearn towards the art courses; so youd find them in the Home Economics lab and not in the Introductory Technology or ICT labs. The story does not change in the tertiary institution as the girls outnumber their male counterparts in the Humanities department while the hosts of young men flood the STEM faculties (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics). Little wonder in later life, many women are not involved in patent intensive fields.

Under-representation of Women

The capacity of women with respect to creativity and innovations is not in doubt.  The windshield wiper patented by Mary Anderson and the frequency hopping technology patented by Hedy Lamarr laid the groundwork for Bluetooth and Wi-Fi technology. In the same vein, Prof. Omowumi Sadik, a Nigerian inventor has a number of patents on biosensors. Her creativity yielded the invention of microelectrode biosensors which are used for drug and bomb detection. To mention but very few.

Despite the milestones and the contributions of many women in various sectors of innovations, it appears that adequate recognitions are not ascribed to them. Learning the history of computers in school, students were only given anecdotes of men who achieved tremendous things in this field. Terms such as “Fathers of computers was effortlessly acceptable but the term “Mothers of computers” was inconceivable as it sounds alien. 

This lack of representation limits women’s opportunity for mentorship and sponsorship and makes it difficult for prospective women to feel inspired to join the creative and innovative sectors. And when they try to do, they find themselves trailblazing their own paths.

Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment is a common menace women face in their careers and in their working environments. Women have reported being harassed by employers, colleagues, clients and strangers in the course of their career pursuit. This can hamper their creativity and innovation, for no person is optimally productive in an uncomfortable environment or circumstance.

Ways to enhance participation of women in creative and innovative sectors through Intellectual Property

The field of Intellectual Property can be explored as a means for enhancing participation of women in creative and innovative sectors through the following:

Education and enlightenment on Intellectual Property

Intellectual Property education should be incorporated into every area of schooling. It should be taught in the secondary schools and in the universities, and not be restricted to the law faculties alone. It should be discussed on radio programmes and on social media platforms, and should be discussed in simple terms everybody will understand.

Intellectual Property clubs should be formed in schools. Intellectual Property should be made something girls are familiar with just like cooking, only then will they become fully aware of their rights and the benefits of inventing which will in turn spur them to create, because they know that they can fully defend their rights in case of any infringement.

Beyond primary education, women should be encouraged to engage in programs that will enable them think innovatively. For instance, the Qualcomm Thinkabit Lab of the United States offers tuition-free daylong STEM programs for elementary and secondary schools targeted at exposing the students to careers in science and technology. These kinds of programs should be incorporated in Nigeria as it will ensure that girls learn about STEM opportunities early.

Ensuring that Intellectual Property rights owners get adequate compensation for their labour

The Intellectual Property field of law has the primary objective of protecting the proprietary rights of creators and inventors. It does so by ensuring that creators reap the economic benefit of their intellectual labour and as well retain the moral rights of their creations. In essence, intellectual property field of law can enhance the participation of women in the creative and innovative sector by ensuring effective implementation of the laws and policies so that female creators and inventors get adequate compensation for the expression of their intellectual labour.

A good illustration of unfair compensation is the case of Onyeka Onwenu v IROKING FHC/L/CS/1486/2017. Upon the expiration of the existing contract between the parties, the defendant continued to sell and make profits from the music of the plaintiff.  In an action for infringement, a lean and inadequate sum of 500 thousand naira damages was awarded in the plaintiffs favour.

In effect, by efficient dispensation of justice, the judiciary also has a role to play in encouraging women to get involved in innovations and creativity. By granting women the exclusive right to the economic gain of their creations, Intellectual Property law ensures that their efforts are not taken advantage of by others who exploit the work without the owners consents. By these strategies, continuity in creations and innovations are encouraged.

Sharing of Knowledge/Mentorship

While Intellectual Property law grants creators and inventors the right to enjoy the economic benefit from their work, it also encourages the sharing of knowledge and ideas. This is the point where Intellectual Property tries to strike a balance between the rights of creators and sharing of knowledge by fair dealing.

Thus, Intellectual Property law allows others to use, build upon, or adapt creative works, provided they obtain the proper permissions and give proper acknowledgement to the original creators. This sharing of knowledge and ideas is essential for innovation, as it allows new ideas to be built and improved upon, leading to even more innovations and creativities.

Effective implementation of Intellectual Property Laws

One of the problems creators face in Nigeria is that the laws are not adequately tested. Hence, even in the face of violation of Intellectual Property rights, the rights owners seem powerless. This, in turn makes them not willing to create, for one would be wondering the essence of exerting the requisite labour for creation in the first place if the protection of those rights are not guaranteed.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Intellectual property law plays a vital role in promoting innovation and creativity. It provides creators and inventors with the legal means to protect their expressed ideas and creations, thereby affording them their right to reap the economic benefits of their work.

This protective role of the law operates as motivation and incentives daring the citizens to develop, invest in, and leverage on their intellectual properties and their concomitant rights. In turn, the society also benefits. Addressing the challenges which tend to hinder women representation in the field is vehemently suggested, for this will take the society several steps forward.


About Author

Peace Achebe is a law student with keen interest in Finance, Human Rights, Intellectual property and International law. She has shown her interest in IP through her unalloyed membership of the Intellectual Property Law Club, University of Nigeria, Nsukka and the Nigerian Intellectual Property club, where she has consistently worked as member of the research teams of the respective clubs. In her spare time, she enjoys working to achieve the United Nations SDGSs, playing basketball and watching movies.

Embracing Artificial Intelligence in Intellectual Property: Challenges and Prospects – Chiamaka Emeka-Emman

Embracing Artificial Intelligence in Intellectual Property: Challenges and Prospects

ABSTRACT

The constantly changing world of technology has brought Artificial Intelligence (AI) to the forefront, transforming industries and society as a whole. As AI progresses, its impact on intellectual property (IP) is becoming more significant. AI has become a powerful tool for innovation, significantly simplifying the creative process in areas such as software development, drug discovery, and content creation. This brings up crucial questions about ownership, inventorship and the legal framework surrounding AI-generated works as traditional notions of authorship are put to the test. This necessitates legal adaptations to accommodate the unique challenges posed by non-human creators.

Additionally, the increased use of AI in content creation has led to complex copyright issues, as it has become challenging to differentiate between original works and derivative works. This article aims to explore AI’s multifaceted impact on intellectual property, along with the challenges and opportunities that arise in this digital era.

Introduction

Artificial Intelligence is a field that combines engineering and science to create computer systems that can make decisions and solve problems without human intervention. It involves the use of algorithms and commands to enable machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence. The term “AI” was first introduced by John McCarthy during a conference in 1956.[1]

An example of AI in action is the recent launch of Microsoft’s Bing AI and ChatGPT, which is a natural language processing tool that can simulate human-like conversations, answer questions, conduct research, compose music, write documents, and even write lines of code. Mauritius was the first country to develop an AI strategy in Africa, followed by Egypt.[2] However, South Africa is currently leading the continent with the highest number of companies focused on AI, followed by Nigeria.[3]

Nigeria has been actively involved in the field of AI by establishing the first National Center for AI and Robotics in Africa and gearing up to roll out the National Policy on Artificial Intelligence.[4] The impact of AI is also being felt in the nation’s creative industries. For instance, in January 2023, designer and filmmaker Malik Afegbua was able to create a fashion show consisting of AI-generated images of older individuals.[5]

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a rapidly developing field that has been revolutionized by technologies such as machine learning, natural language processing, and computer vision. These technologies have enabled AI systems to interact with humans through speech, text, and visual interfaces, and to learn from their experiences and improve their performance over time. The impact of AI on various industries is unprecedented, and it is driving significant developments in fields such as healthcare, transportation, and urban planning. For instance, in healthcare, AI is being used to develop personalized medicine by analyzing large amounts of patient data and identifying patterns that can help diagnose diseases and develop treatment plans.[6]

In transportation, AI is being used to develop autonomous vehicles that can improve safety, reduce congestion, and minimize environmental impact. In urban planning, AI is being used to develop smart cities that can improve the quality of life for inhabitants by optimizing energy consumption, reducing pollution, and enhancing public safety. Given the potential of AI to transform various industries, companies are investing heavily in AI research and development.

Protecting the intellectual property generated by these innovations has become a top priority, as it can provide a competitive advantage and ensure long-term sustainability. As a result, patents, trademarks, and copyrights are being used to safeguard AI innovations and prevent infringement by competitors.

Application of Artificial Intelligence to Intellectual Property

1. Patents

Patents are essential for protecting AI innovations. Companies and inventors can apply for patent protection for new algorithms, software implementations, and hardware configurations that are considered AI advancements. The patent system provides exclusivity, which allows inventors to recover their investments and encourages further innovation.

2. Copyrights

Copyright protection applies to the original manifestation of ideas in a physical form. In the world of AI, copyrights may protect source codes, datasets, and creative works such as music or art produced by AI algorithms. However, determining ownership and the extent of copyright protection for AI-generated works can be complicated, leading to legal questions about authorship and creativity.

3. Trade Secrets

In order to preserve their competitive edge, it’s not uncommon for companies to classify certain elements of their AI technology as trade secrets. This requires the safeguarding of confidential information to ensure its protection. As AI systems continue to evolve, it’s become all the more essential to safeguard proprietary algorithms, training data, and other crucial components.

The integration of AI into various industries has brought about numerous advantages and potential which include the ability to revolutionize many aspects of life, even in the universe of intellectual property. However, the advent of artificial intelligence technology has also presented a host of challenges and raised several issues within the intellectual property industry on creativity, innovation, and the protection of intellectual assets. Highlighted below are the prospects and challenges of AI on IP.

Impacts of Artificial on Intellectual Property: Emerging Prospects

1. Accelerated Innovation

AI is a driving force behind innovation, advancing various fields, facilitating research and development, and leading to the creation of novel products and services. This acceleration can contribute to economic growth and technological progress.

2. Enhanced Ip Protection Tools

AI-powered tools help protect intellectual property, with automated copyright enforcement and AI-driven patent analytics that enable IP professionals to safeguard intellectual assets more efficiently.

3. Data as a Strategic Asset

In today’s age of Artificial Intelligence, data has become a valuable resource. Organizations are recognizing the significance of data as a strategic asset, particularly in the field of intellectual property. Since companies rely on data for AI training and decision-making, they are likely to invest in data protection measures. This will foster a culture of responsible data management while also improving data privacy and cybersecurity. The recognition of data as a strategic asset requires a reevaluation of intellectual property strategies to include not only traditional intellectual property but also data-related assets.

4. Improved Trademark Enforcement

AI-powered tools are revolutionizing trademark and brand protection by analyzing online content and detecting potential infringements, enabling companies to safeguard their brand integrity more efficiently.

Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property: the Flip Side

1. Authorship and Ownership Ambiguity

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to create artistic works independently raises questions about the ownership and authorship of such works.[7] While AI algorithms are capable of producing music, art, and literature, it is important to consider copyright ownership. Typically, copyright is vested initially in the author or “commissioner” of a work who is granted exclusive rights to that work.[8]

However, the involvement of AI raises the question of who owns the rights to a piece of art created by an AI system – the developer, the user, or the AI itself? A U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit case, Thaler v. Vidal,[9] attempted to answer this question. In the ruling, AI did not qualify as a human and therefore could not be named as the inventor on a patent. Some AI research tools, such as OpenAI, have taken a step further to resolve this ambiguity by stating on their policy page that the company does not own the output of the program.[10]

2. Infringement of Intellectual Property

It is well-known that artificial intelligence machines can access all the information available on the internet, which means they might reproduce copyrighted material and infringe on someone’s intellectual property rights. In such situations, the person responsible for using the content without permission may face legal action, be required to remove the content, and possibly compensate the copyright or trademark holder. Countries like the US[11], South Korea, and Japan[12] have established copyright laws to protect publishers from copyright infringement by AI.

In 2020, Shein, a Chinese fast-fashion company, faced dozens of lawsuits alleging design theft. Stussy,[13] a streetwear company based in Irvine, California, filed a lawsuit in March 2021, claiming that Shein sold shirts and shoes with almost identical copies of its logo without permission. The lawsuit alleges trademark infringement, counterfeiting, dilution, and unfair competition.

3. Liability Challenges

In situations where artificial intelligence (AI) violates intellectual property (IP) rights, it can be challenging to determine who is liable for the infringement. Depending on the circumstances and the jurisdiction, the responsibility may rest with the creator of the AI program, the platform, or the content publisher.

If the AI-generated content contains plagiarized passages, uses a trademark without permission, or incorporates an artwork based on an image or other media taken by the AI creator without proper consent, then the creator of the AI algorithm might be held responsible. However, if the AI functions autonomously and learns to create beyond predictability, then the liability can fall upon the AI itself.[14]

4. Issues Related to Legislation

Many Intellectual Property laws do not have enough provisions to regulate the innovation created solely by an artificial intelligence machine. For example, the Nigerian Copyright Act lacks any provision regulating the interplay of AI on copyright. Therefore, lawmakers need to enact laws that determine which parties are entitled to such creations and recognized as the owners of Intellectual Property resulting from the use of artificial intelligence. It is recommended that every state recognizes the same boundaries and aspects for creating artificial intelligence and establishes legislation covering each country’s remedies and regulatory framework.

Conclusion

The impact of AI on intellectual property and how liability can be determined is an important issue that requires proper legislative measures. As society adapts to an AI-driven era, there is a complex interplay between opportunities and challenges. Therefore, it is crucial to address legal, ethical, and sociological considerations to ensure that innovation can flourish while protecting the rights of creators and innovators. Finding a reasonable balance will be key to unlocking the full potential of AI in a way that ensures adequate protection of IP rights.


[1] Legal Specs Journal of Research and Legal Studies ‘AI’s Impact in IP Laws: Challenges and Solutions’ (2023) < https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ais-impact-ip-laws-challenges-solutions > accessed 3rd December, 2023.

[2]  Chinwe Michael, “AI strategy: Nigeria in global hunt for its best minds” Business Day Nigeria, (2023) <https://businessday.ng/technology/article/ai-strategy-nigeria-in-global-hunt-for-its-best-minds/> Accessed 5th December 2023.

[3] ibid

[4] Bolu Abiodun “AI in Nigeria has not even started crawling” – tech experts on the state of artificial intelligence in Nigeria” TechPoint Africa (July 19, 2023) <https://techpoint.africa/2023/07/19/state-of-ai-in-nigeria/> Accessed 5th December 2023.

[5] Gertrude Kitongo and Mark Tutton, “Nigerian AI artist creates a fashion show for elderly people” CNN (June 23, 2023)  <https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/malik-afegbua-elderly-fashion-ai-art-spc-intl/index.html> Accessed 5th December, 2023.

[6] Alowais, S.A., Alghamdi, S.S., Alsuhebany, N. et al. “Revolutionizing healthcare: The role of artificial intelligence in clinical practice” BMC Med Education 23,  (2023) 689 < https://doi.org/10.1186/s12909-023-04698- > Accessed 20th December, 2023.

[7] Keegan Caldwell,  “AI And Intellectual Property: Who Owns It, And What Does This Mean for The Future?” <https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2023/10/31/ai-and-intellectual-property-who-owns-it-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-future/?sh=6a6de1bd3e96> Accessed 7th December, 2023.

[8] Nigerian Copyright Act 2022, s 28.

[9] No. 21-2347 (Fed. Cir.)

[10]  Reyes Ramirez “Artificial Intelligence Raises Questions On Intellectual Property And Ownership” Texas A&M Today (October 25, 2023) <https://today.tamu.edu/2023/10/25/artificial-intelligence-raises-questions-on-intellectual-property-and-ownership/> Accessed 7th December, 2023.

[11] “Copyright laws and artificial intelligence ” American Bar Association ( December 2017) <Copyright laws and artificial intelligence (americanbar.org)> Accessed 9th December 2023.

[12] Seung Hoon Park,  “Copyright Issues for AI and Deep Learning Services: A Comparison of U.S., South Korean, and Japanese Law(2021) Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property <Copyright Issues for AI and Deep Learning Services: A Comparison of U.S., South Korean, and Japanese Law – Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property (northwestern.edu)> Accessed 9th December, 2023.

[13] Stussy, Inc v Shein et al 8 (2022) CV -00379-CJC-KES <Stussy, Inc. v. Shein et al 8:2022cv00379 | US District Court for the Central District of California | Justia> Accessed 10th December 2023.

[14] Vividh Jain, “Intellectual Property of an AI: Issues and Challenges” < https://blog.ipleaders.in/intellectual-property-ai-issues-challenges/ > accessed 22 December 2023


About Author

Chiamaka Emeka-Emman is a diligent and principled 500-level law student currently studying at the University of Nigeria Nsukka. Her areas of interest include Intellectual Property and Data Protection, Arbitration, and Taxation. Chiamaka has acquired significant experience through her association with several top-tier law firms in Nigeria. Her dedication and work ethic have been integral to her academic and professional growth in the legal profession.

Digital Disruption in the Banking and Financial Sector: Creating a Sustainable Framework – Fathia Olamiji Adetola

Digital Disruption in the Banking and Financial Sector: Creating a Sustainable Framework for the Future of Banking in Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

In August 2023, Akeem Lawal, the Managing Director of Payment Processing & Switching at Interswitch Purepay, reported an astounding 86% growth within the span of the last six months, underscoring the sector’s expanding influence within the nation.1 The rapidly changing financial services industry, driven by new technology, is transforming the market.

What was once an infant sector, the Nigerian Financial Technology (FinTech) industry has since evolved into a prominent force within the African financial landscape.2 Given these impressive developments and the ongoing transformation within this sector, there arises a compelling necessity for legal intervention. This article highlights legal regulation’s vital role in the industry, stressing integrity, compliance with banking laws, and preventing infractions. Digital Disruption in the Banking Industry: An Overview.

Traditionally under the Nigerian banking landscape, branches and tellers, serve as the cornerstone of the nation’s financial system.3 However, it is not without its flaws as the system burdens customers with mounting expenses.4

As such, a notable shift is occurring, as banks move from traditional to digital services. This change is gaining traction, prompting financial institutions to adopt new technologies for competitiveness and utilize data analytics and AI for improved customer services.5 Prominent examples of digital disruption span the fintech landscape, encompassing online payments, digital banking, alternative funding, insurtech, blockchain technology, and digital currencies. All these facets have exerted substantial influence over the banking sector, shaping its future landscape.

Navigating the Legal Terrain Amidst Digital Disruption: Establishing a Sustainable Framework

Renowned legal scholar Lester Lawrence Lessig III once proclaimed in his article “Code is Law” that the design of digital technologies carries immense influence over society, yielding both promising opportunities and formidable challenges.

Within this context, these disruptions not only redefine established business paradigms,6 they simultaneously open the gates to cyber threats, data breaches, and financial malfeasance.7

A startling revelation from a November 2022 Businessday article8 exposed a staggering 178% surge in cyberattacks in the nation.

This vividly underscores the pressing need for a sustainable framework to navigate the evolving terrain of banking in Nigeria. Without a robust legal framework and effective compliance mechanisms, unscrupulous individuals could exploit the nascent digital services with impunity.

Recognizing this, the National Assembly has expanded its purview to encompass the banking and finance sector,9 embracing the technological innovations propelling the industry forward.

In pursuit of a more adaptable and responsive regulatory environment, the Central Bank of Nigeria’s scope of authority has expanded to include the regulation of technological innovations within the sector, with a vision of establishing a framework that is not only apt for the present but also sustainable in the long run. They devised a spectrum of guidelines with the overarching objective of safeguarding the stability of the financial system. These guidelines encompass a wide array of functions, including the regulation of mobile money services and electronic wallet operators,10) the establishment of conformity standards for switching companies operating in the nation,11 oversight of payment services providers (PSPs) and other payment facilitators,12 and the establishment of minimum operational standards for electronic payment services.13 Each of these guidelines addresses specific aspects of the evolving financial landscape, ensuring a comprehensive regulatory approach.14

One of Nigeria’s notable regulatory innovations is the “regulatory sandbox.” This platform encourages experimentation while providing guidance for regulatory frameworks to adapt to emerging technologies.15 Launched on January 25, 2023, this initiative, embraced by over 50 nations, showcases Nigeria’s dedication to creating a sustainable digital disruption framework in finance. Tailored to its needs, it joins a lineup of innovative regulatory measures.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the surge in demand for digital financial services in Nigeria reflects the confluence of technological advancements and evolving consumer preferences, charting a new course for the country’s banking sector (Carstens 2018, FSB 2019). With the global banking landscape undergoing a tech-driven transformation, regulatory bodies must swiftly adapt to remain relevant in this ever-changing landscape.16

To establish a sustainable framework for digital banking in Nigeria, it’s crucial for the government and regulatory authorities to strike a delicate balance. This equilibrium should encourage innovation while concurrently safeguarding the interests of consumers and the financial system.7

This approach not only ensures the stability of the banking industry but also positions Nigeria as a progressive contender in the global fintech arena.17

In essence, it’s a strategic imperative to embrace digital disruption and steer it toward a prosperous and secure future for banking in Nigeria.18


Image Credit: Nairametrics


About Author

Fathia Olamiji Adetola, a final-year law student at Lagos State University, is a distinguished legal writer, accomplished public speaker, and dedicated tutor. With multiple awards to her credit, she has a particular focus on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Intellectual Property Law, and Financial Technology.
For further communication, you can reach her at [email protected].
Connect with Fathia on LinkedIn: Fathia Adetola.

  1. Justus Adejumoh, ‘Nigeria Recorded over 86% Growth Digital Transactions in 1H 2023 – Expert’ (Independent.ng3 August 2023) <https://independent.ng/nigeria-records-over-86-growth-digital-transactions-in- 1h-2023/> accessed 26 August 2023. []
  2. Nwafor, ‘FINTECH NIGERIA: Digital Payment Users May Hit 146.10m in 2027’ (Vanguard NewsJune 2023) <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/06/fintech-nigeria-digital-payment-users-may-hit-146-10m-in-2027/> accessed 26 August 2023. []
  3. Nicholas Idoko, ‘The Shift from Traditional Banking in Nigeria’ (Professions in Nigeria29 June 2023) <https://professions.ng/traditional-banking-in-nigeria/> accessed 29 August 2023. []
  4. In addition, although they provide in-person service, problem-solving can be slow and bureaucratic. Plus, traditional banks have limited operating hours, forcing customers to rely on online support or wait until the next business day. []
  5. HP Singh, ‘How Digitization Is Shaping the Future of Banking’ (Times of India Blog18 March 2023) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/how-digitization-is-shaping-the-future-of-banking/> accessed 29 August 2023. []
  6. ‘The Impact of Fintech on Financial Inclusion in Nigeria – Vazi Legal’ (Vazi Legal5 February 2023) <https://vazilegal.com/impact-of-fintech-on-financial-inclusion-innigeria/#:~:text=Presently%2C%20there%20are%2048%25%20of,network%20coverage%20in%20those%20ar eas.> accessed 26 August 2023. []
  7. ‘Mitigating Digitisation Risks in Banking Sector – THISDAYLIVE’ (Thisdaylive.com2021) <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/11/03/mitigating-digitisation-risks-in-banking-sector> accessed 1 September 2023. [] []
  8. BusinessDay, ‘Nigeria Recorded a 174% Increase in Cybercrimes in Six Months, Here’s Why You Should Be Bothered’ (Businessday NG18 November 2022) <https://businessday.ng/news/article/nigeria-recorded-a-174- increase-in-cybercrimes-in-six-months-heres-why-you-should-be- bothered/#:~:text=In%20Africa%2C%20the%20peril%20of,reported%20on%20August%203%2C%202022.> accessed 1 September 2023. []
  9. These legislations, such as the Banking and Other Financial Institutions Act of 2020, the CBN Act, the Investments and Securities Act, the Nigeria Communication Act, the Patent and Designs Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations of 2013, the Foreign Exchange Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, and the Money Lenders’ Act, collectively serve to regulate technological innovations within the banking and financial industry. []
  10. CBN Guidelines on Mobile Money Services in Nigeria 2021 (the “Mobile Money Guidelines” []
  11. Guidelines on Transaction Switching in Nigeria []
  12. Guidelines on Electronic Payments and Collection for public and Private Sectors in Nigeria. []
  13. Global Legal Group, ‘Fintech Laws and Regulations – Nigeria’ [2023] International Comparative Legal Guides International Business Reports <https://iclg.com/practice-areas/fintech-laws-andregulations/nigeria#:~:text=In%20January%202021%2C%20the%20CBN,to%20their%20being%20launched%20 publicly.> accessed 1 September 2023. []
  14. Other established guidelines include: CBN Guidelines for Licensing and Regulation of PSBs in Nigeria 2020 In 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the Rules on Issuance, Offering Platforms, and Custody of Digital Assets (the “Rules”) as part of ongoing efforts to regulate digital and virtual assets, including crypto assets, in Nigeria. []
  15. ‘Global Experiences from Regulatory Sandboxes’ <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/912001605241080935/pdf/Global-Experiences-from- Regulatory-Sandboxes.pdf>. []
  16. Ibrahim Alley, ‘BOFIA 2020 and Financial System Stability in Nigeria: Implications for Stakeholders in the African Largest Economy’ (2022) 24 Journal of Banking Regulation 184 <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41261-022-00192-6> accessed 29 August 2023. []
  17. ‘Digital Disruption in Financial Markets – OECD’ (Oecd.org2019 <https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/digital-disruption-in-financial- markets.htm#:~:text=Digital%20disruption%20is%20changing%20the,costs%2C%20or%20high%20transaction%20costs.> accessed 26 August 2023. []
  18. ‘Digital Disruption in Financial Markets – OECD’ (Oecd.org2019)<https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/digital-disruption-in-financial- markets.htm#:~:text=Digital%20disruption%20is%20changing%20the,costs%2C%20or%20high%20transaction%20costs.> accessed 26 August 2023. []

An Appraisal of the Constitutional Power or Otherwise of a Governor to Suspend or Remove the State Chief Judge – Akanmu Jamiu

An Appraisal of the Constitutional Power or Otherwise of a Governor to Suspend or Remove the State Chief Judge

Introduction

The removal of judicial officers from office over misconduct by the executive is not new, and there are myriad precedents at both the federal and state levels. Sometimes around January 2019, the formal President Muhammadu Buhari suspended the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Walter Nkanu Samuel Onnoghen, over an allegation of false declaration of his assets, an action in contravention with the provisions of the constitution, and he was immediately replaced by Justice Tanko Muhammad as the acting chief justice.

This action, which seems invidious to some parts of the people, generated quite a lot of constitutional crisis, while the nub of the issue surrounding the controversy was whether the suspension was in fact executed in accordance with due process.

This suspension, however, does not indicate an end to further removals, whose their validity and legality are subject to debate. The same recurred at the state level.

In Kwara State, around 2009, the then Kwara State Chief Judge, Justice Raliat Elelu Habeeb, was suspended by Governor Bukola Saraki during his administration. Abia State Chief Judge in 2018, Justice Theresa Uzokwe was also suspended over judicial misconduct, an allegation that was later affirmed and was subsequently sacked by the National Judicial Council. The recent faction between the judiciary and the executive in Osun State over the purported suspension of the State Chief Judge, Justice Oyebola Ojo, for alleged gross misconduct is another.

This particular issue has sparked different public reactions and preconceptions on the legality of her suspension by the governor.

The essence of this article is to unravel and examine the constitutional validity or otherwise of the power of the governor to appoint and suspend the Chief Judge of the State.

The doctrine of checks and balances

The three branches of the government, in the process of discharging their functions, have been subjected to different allegations of misconduct, embezzlement, and excessive abuse of authority, which, if go unchecked, is capable of bringing about the total breakdown of the rule of law.

 Hence on the basis of the doctrine of checks and balances, which arises as an outgrowth of the classical theory of separation of powers, the powers of the three branches of the government are not absolute and are subject to review and checks.

The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that governmental powers will not be used in an abusive manner, checks and balances are the constitutional controls that separate branches of government to ensure that they have limiting power over each other so that no branch will become supreme or encroach on and exercise the power of another, and each arm serves as a check on the misuse of power by the other, hence, in all of our constitutions, the judiciary, executive and legislature are clearly separated and entrusted to a separate organ or body, for instance,

Section 4 vests the legislative powers of the Federation in the National Assembly, which consists of a senate and a House of Representatives.

Section 5 vests executive powers in the presidents and the governors.

Section 6 vests judicial powers in the courts established by the constitution.

The Constitutional Power of a Governor to Appoint a Chief Judge of a State

The governor of a state wields and enjoys a great deal of significant executive powers, such as the power of appointment and removal, prerogative of mercy, making of regulations, and immunity from legal proceedings among others.

It is necessary at this stage to ask whether the powers of the governor also extend to the power to appoint, suspend, or remove a Chief Judge of a State.

The virtue of the provisions of Sections 270(2)(a) and 271(1) of the 1999 Constitution establish the office of a State Chief Judge, whose appointment shall be made by the Governor of the state on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, subject to confirmation of the appointment by the House of the Assembly of the State.

Section 271 states that;
(1) The appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, subject to confirmation of the appointment by the House of Assembly of the State.

The wording of the above section attests to the fact that a governor lacks executive power to directly or single-handedly appoint anyone of his choice as the State Chief Judge unless the National Judicial Council first recommends such and the House subsequently consents and confirms the same.

The National Judicial Council is an integral part of the judicial system in Nigeria according to Section 158 and paragraph 21 of the third schedule of the 1999 constitution, which grant provisions for the powers and functions of the National Judicial Council such as,

Recommending the appointment of judicial officers

Exercising disciplinary action over judicial officers; and

 Recommending the removal of judicial officers among others.

Hence, an appointment of a Chief Judge of a State by a governor without the above process remains invalid, unconstitutional, and cannot stand.

Now that the governor’s power to appoint the Chief Justice of the state in conformity with the provisions of the constitution has been established, it needs to be further stretched here to determine whether such power should be construed to include the power to remove or suspend the Chief Judge of the state.

And since it is not new that the executive branch is usually the body that appoints and inaugurates natural persons to office, therefore, it is not far-fetched to say that where any appointee conducts himself in a manner that the appointor finds unacceptable, the latter may not hesitate in his power to fire him. However, there are instances where an appointor cannot directly remove a default officer without first recourse to another body.

Removal of judicial officers from office

The removal of judicial officers from office is one that this illustration resonates with, in the sense that the executive, either the President or the Governor of a State, is bereft of the power to suspend or remove any judicial officers without first report to or notify some other bodies.

In this case, it is crucial to consider Section 292 of the Constitution, which clearly expresses the conditions for removing judicial officers by the governor.

The provisions of Section 292 provide, thus

(1). A judicial officer shall not be removed from his office or appointment before his age of retirement, except in the following circumstances:

(a) in the case of

(i) Chief Justice of Nigeria, President of the Court of Appeal, Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, etc., by the President acting on an address supported by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

(ii) Chief Judge of a State, Grand Kadi of a Sharia Court of Appeal, or President of a Customary Court of Appeal of a State, by the Governor acting on an address supported by two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly of the State, praying that he be so removed for his inability to discharge the functions of his office or appointment (whether arising from infirmity of mind or of body) or for misconduct or contravention of the Code of Conduct;

(b) in any case, other than those to which paragraph (a) of this subsection applies, by the President or, as the case may be, the Governor acting on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council that the judicial officer be so removed for his inability to discharge the functions of his office or appointment (whether arising from infirmity of mind or of body) or for misconduct or contravention of the Code of Conduct.

The above provisions are self-explanatory and clearly unambiguous, and  must be given their literal meaning.

Condition that must be satisfied in the process of removing a judicial officer by the Governor

Therefore, the first condition that must be satisfied in the process of removing a judicial officer is that the Governor, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Council, that the judicial officer be so removed for his inability to discharge his functions arising either from infirmity of mind or body or for misconduct or contravention of the code of conduct.

However, where there is no such recommendation of the National Judicial Council, the governor shall be acting on an address supported by a two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly of the State, praying that he be so removed for his inability to discharge the functions of his office or appointment arising either from infirmity of mind or of body or for misconduct or contravention of the Code of Conduct.

Hence, any removal or suspension of the judicial officers with disregard to the above mandatory process will be void and be pronounced unconstitutional notwithstanding the provisions of Section 11 of the Interpretation Act  which confers upon an appointor the power to appoint as well as the power to remove or suspend at the same time as this Act is of no any effect and totally irrelevant to this instant case having regard to the supremacy of the constitution over any other statute or act and being the groundnorm by the virtue of Section 1(3) of the 1999 constitution as amended with which other enactments derive their validity from, and as such that any inconsistency with it shall be declared void.

 The Court in Oke V. Atoloye affirms the irrelevance of the Section 11 of the interpretation act in interpreting the power of suspension over judicial officers since the constitution contains express provisions on the disciplinary power over judicial officers.

The proper approach of the court to interpretation of statutory provisions, as held by the Court of Appeal in the case of VISITOR IMO STATE UNIVERSITY V. OKONKWO&ORS 2014, is that it is trite law that provisions of a constitution or statute must be construed literally, giving the words in such a constitution or statute their ordinary grammatical meanings, unless that would lead to some absurdity.

There are considerable numbers of precedents in support of the compulsory constitutional requirements the governor must satisfy before proceeding to remove or suspend the Chief Judge of the State.

The law is settled in the case of Elelu-Habeeb & Anor v. A.G. Federation & Anor (2012) (12 NWLR). The Supreme Court held that the Chief Judge of a State cannot be removed under any guise without recourse to the National Judicial Council.

Also in Nganjiwa v. FRN (2017) LPALR-43391, the court reiterates that any misconduct attached to the office and functions of judicial officers must first be reported to and determined by the National Judicial Council.

In other words, an unlawful and unconstitutional removal that is either politically motivated, malicious, or for other ludicrous and unreasonable excuses that is not within the ambit of the laid down procedures enshrined in the constitution is a blatant violation and abuse of the rule of law, a judge in Nigeria shall not be removed without the involvement of the National Judicial Council, the Senate, or the State House of Assembly, as the case may be, regardless of the level of the allegations of misconduct.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the significance of the provisions of Section 201 and 292 in the administration of government  is to offer transparency in the process of the operation of  law and to ensure strict adherence to the rule of law and the means of upholding the rule of natural justice by holding the defaulters accountable and facing the consequences of their act of insubordination in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.

The judiciary being the last  hope of the masses in the pursuit of justice must be fair and free from every misconduct and impropriety and must be ready to portrays and upholds the course of law to ensure proper dispensation of justice, a judicial officer occupies a very unique and sacred position in the society, occupying this position means that a high level of integrity, honesty and accountability is expected from judicial officers.

References

1. The provisions of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution
2. Interpretation Act
3. Administrative Law (NOUN)
4. a. Visitor Imo State University, v. Okonkwo & Ors.
b. Oke v. Atoloye
c. Elelu-Habeeb & Anor V. A.G. Federation & Anor (2012) 12NWLR
d. Nganjiwa V. FRN (2017), LPALR-43391.


Image Credit: Blueprint Newspapers


About Author

Akanmu Jamiu is a legal researcher and a 400-level undergraduate law student at Osun State University.

Pre-election Matters Under Nigeria’s Electoral Act, 2022 and the ‘burden’ of Qualification of Candidates for Elective Positions

Pre-election Matters Under Nigeria’s Electoral Act, 2022 and the ‘burden’ of Qualification of Candidates for Elective Positions

Abstract

Pre-election matter from its name are cases whose cause of action arise prior to the main election of candidates who occupy public office. They are litigated in the regular courts particularly the Federal High Court being court of first instance. The 1999 Constitution (as amended) has clearly defined and prescribed matters of contest as pre-election case, while the Electoral Act, 2022 further expatiates grounds or issues that should underline such action such as qualification of candidates, amongst others. This paper examines the said grounds and other issues under these laws and their interpretation by our Courts. It also highlights and discusses the roles of political parties, candidates and the Independent National Electoral Commission in ensuring that the laudable objectives of the law are actualised in the progressive march towards credible elections and good governance in Nigeria. The paper also makes recommendations on the way forward. Doctrinal method of research is adopted in the paper.

Introduction

The 1999 Constitution (as amended) defined pre-election matters in a clear and lucid manner in a bid to avoid conjecture, under section 285(14) thereof.

It refers to ‘any suit by an aspirant wherein he complains that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating the conduct of the primaries of political parties and the provisions of the guidelines of a political party for the conduct of party primary has not been complied with by a political party in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates for an election’.

It is also any suit by an aspirant challenging the action, decision or activities of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in respect of his participation in an election or who complains that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other law regulating elections in Nigeria has not been complied with by INEC in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates and participation in an election. By section 285(14)(c) of the Constitution, a political party may also bring an action challenging the action, decisions and activities of the Commission on grounds of either disqualifying its candidate from participating in the election or a complaint that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other applicable law has not been complied with1).

Recall that under the repealed Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), one of the five grounds of presenting an election petition is ‘that the petitioner or its candidate was validly nominated but was unlawfully excluded from the election’. By removing this ground of petition from being raised after election to an earlier stage (pre-election) the law will safeguard elections which could ordinarily have been voided or cancelled based on such inadvertence, failure or neglect of the Commission, as absence of party logo from ballot paper, exclusion of candidates’ names from displayed names published for election, etc.

Pre-election matters under the present regime must be commenced within 14 days from the date of occurrence of facts or decisions complained of, otherwise it becomes statute barred.

Thus, pre-election matters essentially emanate from the conduct of primary election by political parties, as well as action and decisions of INEC arising from such primaries, and/or as part of preparation for the main election. The qualification for each elective position has also been clearly provided under the Constitution, and it behoves on political parties and individuals vying for such positions to ensure they meet such requirements of law. The paper considers these and related issues of frequent arguments under the present legal regime in Nigeria.

Locus Standi in Pre-election Matters: the Osagie Case

The question of who can sue in pre-election matters and the grounds of such suit has been a legal burden in Nigeria until it was laid to rest following a Constitutional amendment to that effect and the enactment of the present Electoral Act, 2022. Section 285(14)(a),(b) and (c) mentions ‘any aspirant’ to the party primary and the political party itself affected by a decision of INEC. This is also re-enforced by section 84 of the Electoral Act.

With respect to aspirants, the decision in Osagie & Ors v. Enoghama & Ors2 illustrate and explain the position of law. The facts are straight-forward: the appellants were elected as Ad-Hoc delegates of PDP (the 5th respondent) from the 192 Wards of Edo State in their Ward Congresses. But their names were later replaced with that of the 1st – 4th respondents.

They therefore approached the High Court and obtained an order restraining the 5th and 6th respondents from recognising the said 1st – 4th respondents as Ward delegates. The issue for determination before the Supreme Court, among others, is whether, upon proper construction of the provisions of Article 15(2)(e) of the constitution of the 1st defendant (as amended in 2017), Article 1(b)(i) of Part 1 and Article (xii) of Part 2 (Page 9) of the Electoral Guideline for Primary Election of 13/3/2022 of the 1st defendant as well as section 85(5)(a)-(e) and (8) of the Electoral Act, 2022, a person who was not duly elected at the Wards Congress of the 1st defendant can be presented by the 1st defendant as an Ad-Hoc Delegate? The apex court had this to say with respect to the locus standi of the parties to the action:

‘It is the selection of the party’s candidate in a primary election without complying with the Electoral Act and the party guideline that create the cause of action under section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022 and vesting in an aspirant a right of action for redress. In this case, no primary election has been held before the suit was filed and no candidate had been elected from any primary election contrary to the Electoral Act, the party constitution and guidelines… there was no cause of action under S. 84(14) of the Electoral Act. The appellants, not being aspirants in any primary election that had selected a candidate of the party for an election contrary to the Electoral Act and the party Guideline, have no right of action concerning any such primary election. The appellants filed this suit leading to this appeal for the purpose of protecting or preserving their status as the 1st respondents ward ad hoc delegates elected on 30-4-2022 from the 192 wards of Edo State and protect their right to vote as such delegates during the May 2022 primary elections of the 1st respondent’s candidates for 2023 general elections. There is no law that gives delegates elected to vote in a primary election of candidates of a political party for a general election, the right of action to protect or preserve their status as such delegates or protect their right to vote during such primary elections. The refusal of their political party to recognise them as such delegates or to allow the vote in primary election to elect the party’s candidates, would not give such delegates legal cause of action by an aspirant in the primary election after a candidate has been selected under section 84(14) of the Electoral Act’3.

The Court also referred to an earlier decision in Ardo v. Nyako4 where it held that pre- primary matters are within the domestic and internal affairs of political parties which courts have no jurisdiction to entertain. Thus, pre-election matters under section 84(14) of the Electoral Act are limited only to aspirants, political parties and the electoral umpire as parties having capacity to sue and be sued5.

Clearly, a political party or its candidate cannot challenge the primary election of another political party or its candidates, under the present legal regime.

Examining Sections 29 and 84 of the Electoral Act, 2022

Section 29 of the Electoral Act, 2022 deals with the submission of list of candidates and their affidavits by political parties to INEC. The candidates must have been elected from a valid primary election of the party, and the list must be submitted within 180 days before the general election in the prescribed form, and shall be accompanied with an affidavit sworn to by the candidate at a High Court, showing that he has fulfilled all conditions by the Constitution for the respective position. Section 29(4) and (5) then provides:

(4) Any person may apply to the Commission for a copy of nomination form, affidavit and any other document submitted by a candidate at an election and the Commission shall, upon payment of a prescribed fee, issue such person with a certified copy of the document within 14 days.

(5) Any aspirant who participated in the primaries of his political party who has reasonable grounds to believe that any information given by his political party’s candidate in the affidavit or any document submitted by that candidate in relation to his constitutional requirements to contest the election is false, may file a suit at the Federal High Court against that candidate seeking a declaration that the information contained in the affidavit is false.’

From the above quoted provisions, it may be observed that whereas certified copies of documents submitted to INEC by candidates for an election may be obtained by ‘any person’ upon application and payment of prescribed fees, only ‘aspirants’ who contested or participated in the party primary can challenge same in court. Obviously, the grounds to challenge a candidate’s emergence must be based on any of the constitutional requirements and qualification for the particular office. And that must also be the basis of the court’s decision in affirming or disqualifying the candidate.

To explain further, in the case of office of Governor for instance, section 177 of the Constitution provides that the candidate shall (a) be a citizen of Nigeria by birth; (b) have attained the age of thirty-five years; (c) is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party; and (d) he has been educated up to at least School Certificate level or its equivalent. Thus, a gubernatorial aspirant from the same political party who challenges the documents and qualification of another aspirant must bring such suit under the conditions in section 177 or prove the facts of disqualification under section 1826.

In comparison with the repealed Electoral Act, 2010, one of the grounds of election petition under section 134(1)(e) of that law was ‘that the person whose election is questioned has submitted to the Commission affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification for the election’.

The present law does not contain any such ground. By enacting section 29 as it is, it achieved three important objectives: First, objections on false or misleading information or misrepresentation in affidavit of candidates for any public office can only be litigated as pre-election stage, which must be commenced within 14 days of the submission of the alleged false particulars and documents to the Commission otherwise the action will abate.

It has been held (and indeed settled) that cause of action in such in such case arises from the date the defendant submitted the alleged documents to INEC, including the date of such submission, and not when the plaintiff became aware of the false information or misrepresentation7. Secondly, action of such nature bordering on false information of any candidate can only be instituted by fellow aspirants from within the same political party. A contestant outside that political party have no right of action, just as other members of the public. They may, if they so wish apply to INEC for documents submitted by aspirants for knowledge’s sake, but cannot question same. Although it is to admitted that the objective of this provision is to prevent litigation from all quarters against prospective aspirants, the implication may be far- reaching. Where for instance, there is a consensus candidate (as is usually the case) in a political party, whose information submitted to INEC is questionable, he may ascend to public office unchallenged as the conscience of the people.

Thirdly, false information of ‘fundamental nature to aid qualification’ must now relate only to “constitutional qualifications” for the particular office concerned, and no other. The constitutional qualifications are those contained in sections 66, 67, 106, 107, 131, 137, 177 and 187, which are essentially the same qualifications across board for the elective positions in the country. By law, a political party shall not impose any nomination qualification or disqualification criteria, measures, or conditions on any aspirant or candidate for any election in its constitution, guidelines, or rules for nomination of candidates for elections except these basic qualifications outlined above8.

Section 84 on the other hand provides for nomination of candidates by political parties, and also the qualification for candidates with reference to the Constitution. The crucial provision here is section 84 (14), which provides as follows:

‘Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court for redress.’

Again, this provision affirms and preserve the right of ‘an aspirant’ of a primary election to sue in court for redress in the event of non-compliance with the Electoral Act or guidelines of the political party concerned. It is immaterial that the constitution of the political party contains provisions which prohibits any aspirant from suing other contestants of the party or the party itself. Thus, the above provision and indeed, the entire sections 84 and 29 of the Electoral Act, 2022 creates exceptions to the principle of party supremacy9. The justification for this statutory provision is obvious: that a court will not allow a political party to act arbitrarily as it likes to the injury of its members10.

The redress in this case will be to declare the candidate with the second highest number of valid votes cast at the election as the winner since the court has no jurisdiction to stop a primary election, or even stop a general election11. Reading through the provisions of section 84, it is obvious a court may order a fresh primary in the event or irregularity and where the general election has not been conducted.

The recent decision of the apex court in PDP v. Lawal while interpreting the provisions of section 84(14) is instructive. The facts are crucial. As part of preparations for the 2023 general elections, the 1st Appellant on 30th April, 2022, conducted ward congresses whereby ad-hoc delegates were elected, with a view to participating in the indirect elections of the 1st Appellant’s gubernatorial candidates in Ogun State. For the purpose of the gubernatorial exercise, the 2nd Appellant (Mr. Oladipupo Adebuto) and 1st Respondent were cleared and screened by the 1st Appellant to contest the indirect primary election. At the conclusion of the said indirect primary election, the 2nd Appellant emerged with 714 votes and was declared winner.

It is the 1 st Respondent’s contention that the 1st Appellant did not use the Register/List of democratically elected delegates, rather the 1st Appellant used a different Register/List. At the Supreme Court, one of he issues for determination was ‘Whether the Court of Appeal was right when they held that the Federal High Court has the jurisdictional competence to determine the suit of the 1st Respondent under Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act 2022 and Section 285(14) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), when the substance of the 1st Respondent’s suit was actually which list of ad-hoc delegates should have been sent (sic) to conduct the 1st Appellant’s Ogun State Governorship Primary/election of 25th May, 2022 which was not justiciable being an internal affair of the 1st Appellant’.

The Court held that section 84(14) was an exception to the non-justiciability of political parties’ internal affairs, especially as it is a jurisdiction expressly donated by the Constitution and Electoral Act. Despite the obstante clause ‘Notwithstanding anything…’ at the beginning of section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022, just as section 87(9) of the repealed Electoral Act, 2010, the court has described it as a ‘small window’ and ‘narrow confine’ for an aggrieved aspirant who complains that in the selection of its candidate, his political party did ‘not comply with the provisions of the Act or its constitution and electoral guidelines12. The provision thus, creates a right to seek redress in court and exception to the rule against court’s jurisdiction in internal affairs of political parties.

No doubt, the present legal regime is commendable, among other things, for streamlining pre-election matters and their timelines on one hand, and also properly limiting the scope of election petitions on the other hand.

The Mandatory  ‘burden’ of Constitutional Qualification: the Degi-eremienyo Case

Perhaps no other case best illustrates the need for candidates and political parties to ensure that Constitutional qualification for elective positions is met as the case of PDP & Ors v. Degi-Eremienyo & Ors13. The facts are interesting.

The 2nd respondent (David Lyon) won the nomination to contest the governorship election in Bayelsa State on the platform of the All Progressives Congress (APC). He in turn nominated the 1st respondent as his running mate. Both 1st and 2nd respondents were APC candidates for the offices of Deputy-Governor and Governor of Bayelsa State respectively. It was a joint ticket on the platform of the APC.

The APC, in compliance with Section 31(1) of the Electoral Act, 2018 (as amended) (similar to the present section 29 of the Electoral Act, 2022) submitted the names and personal information and particulars of the 1st and 2nd respondents to INEC, and the same contained in INEC Form CF001 for each of the 1st and 2nd respondents. The 1st respondents Form CF001 duly sworn to by him was published.

Pursuant to Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act, 2010, the appellants approached the Federal High Court claiming that the information contained therein were false. They sought the Federal High Court to invoke Section 31(6) Electoral Act to disqualify the 1st respondent (and consequentially the 2nd respondent) from contesting the election. They predicated their action on the fact that the 1st respondent presented false information in his Form CF001 to the 4th respondent (INEC) in support of his nomination.

They alleged inter alia that in his sworn INEC Form CF001 other than in his name: Biobarakuma DegiEremienyo.

i. The name in his First School Leaving Certificate issued in 1976 Degi, Biobragha.
ii. His WAEC/GCE, 1984 bears the name Adegi Brokumo.
iii. His first degree bears the name- Degi Biobarakuma Wangawa.
iv. In his affidavit of Correction and Confirmation of name sworn to on 9 August, 2018, he asserted that his correct name is Biobarakuma Degi.
v. In another affidavit of regularisation of name sworn to on 18 September 2018, he averred that his correct name is Biobarakuma Wanagha Degi Eremienyo.
vi. In another affidavit of 18 September 2018 deposed before an unnamed notary public on a letter heading: Stanley Damabide & Partners, he averred that while registering for WASCE examination “the alphabet “A” was inadvertently added to (his) surname to read thus – Biobarakuma Wanagba Adegi and same was captured in the certificate he obtained therefrom.
vii. In the said affidavit of 18 September 2018, he further averred that later in time he took chieftaincy title and by Nembe custom he added Eremienyo to his surname and his full name reads: Biobrakuma Wanagha Adegi-Eremienyo.
viii. On the statutory declaration of age dated 31 July 1990, it was declared that the 1st respondent bearing the name Biobarakuma Degi was born on 22 February 1959. The deponent, Henry Vanman, described himself (at page 65) as the uncle of the 1st respondent.
ix. On his Form CF001 (at page 531) the 1st respondent gave his name as DegiEremienyo, Biobarakuma Wanaghwa. x. By the change of name published in the Chronicles Newspapers of 20 July 2018, (as page 91) the 1st respondent announced the change of his name from Biobarakuma Wamagha Degi to Biobarakuma Wanagha Degi- Eremienyo.

It is on these facts not dispute (in fact admitted by the 1st respondent) that the appellant sought the Federal High Court to declare that the 1st respondent had given false information by the fact of his multiplicity of names. The trial Federal High Court agreed with the that the 1st respondent gave false information to INEC. It therefore invoked Section 31(6) of the Electoral Act and disqualified 1st respondent (and consequentially the 2nd respondent) from contesting the governorship election in Bayelsa State.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, it allowed the appeal on several grounds, wherein the appellant then approached the Supreme Court. The apex reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It concluded thus:

‘…Section 182(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), provides that no person shall be qualified for election to the office of governor of a state if he has presented a forged certificate to the Independent National Electoral Commission. The certificate used here is in small letters. It bears its ordinary natural meaning. It is here used a noun that derives from the verb: certify which means to – attest, testify, vouch, ascertain, verify. The word “forged” qualifies “certificate” in this provision. In my humble view, the word forged used here is in the context of fabricating, framing, falsifying, inventing a false attestation, vouching falsely…The sanction for presenting INEC Form CF001 containing false facts about the personal particulars or information of the candidate by virtue of section 31(6) of the Electoral Act is an order issued by the High Court disqualifying such candidate from contesting that election…The sum total is that the joint ticket of the 1st and 2nd respondents sponsored by the 3rd respondent was vitiated by the disqualification of the 1st respondent. Both candidates disqualified are deemed not to be candidates at the Governorship election conducted in Bayelsa State. It is hereby ordered that INEC, (the 4th respondent herein) declare as winner of the governorship election in Bayelsa State, the candidate with the highest number of lawful votes cast with the requisite constitutional (or geographical) spread.’

Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) is the present section 29(5) of the Electoral Act, 2022 with the amendment: ‘Any aspirant who participated in the primaries of his political party …’ replacing ‘Any person…’ in the old law. Also, the

suit is now to be brought before the Federal High Court. Being a pre-election matter, which gave ‘any person’ the locus to institute an action on grounds of false information under the enabling constitutional provisions, it empowered the appellants to commence the action14. Although only fellow aspirants in the same political party can now sue, political parties have a duty to ensure their candidates presented or nominated for elective positions meet the mandatory requirement stipulated in the law. The Constitutional eligibility for elective positions as prescribed in the law are therefore not optional or negotiable.

The Role of Political Parties, Candidates and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

The Role of Political Parties

Constitutionally, it is clearly provided as part of qualification for any elective positions in Nigeria, that a candidate must be a member of a political party registered in Nigeria, and must be sponsored by that party15). This means that there is no provision for independent candidature under our law, which makes political parties critical stakeholders in the electoral process.

Membership of political parties in most cases are ascribed to registration at Ward level in the various Local Governments Areas across the country from where recognition at State and National levels are derived.

However, more often than not, membership recognition is left at the whims and caprice of few powerful individuals to determine candidates to be sponsored in an election, which trend often leads to factions in most political parties in Nigeria. In selecting candidates for elections, it is not news that most political parties in the country lack internal democracy which leads to rancour, parallel primaries and disaffection among members of that party.

Section 84(2) of the Electoral Act recognises three modes of nominating candidates for elective positions, namely: direct and indirect primaries and by consensus. It is expected that any mode adopted by a party prior to an election should be as provided as its constitution, and well communicated to its members, and the procedure for that particular mode must be complied in line with the provisions of the Electoral Act.

For instance, by section 84(9) of the Electoral Act, a political party that adopts a consensus candidate shall secure the written consent of all cleared aspirants for the position, indicating their voluntary withdrawal from the race and their endorsement of the consensus candidate. This is mandatory, failure of which the party in question must revert to direct or indirect, with its outlined procedures in the Electoral Act16.

With respect to qualification, section 84(3) of the Electoral Act, provides that a political party shall not impose nomination qualification or disqualification criteria, measures, or conditions on any aspirant or candidate for any election in its constitution, guidelines, or rules for nomination of candidates for elections, except as prescribed under sections 65, 66, 106, 107, 131, 137, 177 and 187 of the Constitution.

Thus, even where a party adopts a consensus candidate, such candidate still needs to be screened to ensure he or she possess the basic qualification, such as education, citizenship, etc. which has constantly become a subject of contention in courts, and which may in fact, lead to disqualification at the election petition stage.

Political parties have a duty to constantly educate their members and delegates to party Congresses in particular, on their responsibility to the nation which should be placed above personal interests and gains. Political parties in Nigeria should also ensure they stick to clear-cut ideologies which must be tied to deliverable and realistic campaign promises.

The Role of Candidates

Aspirants and candidates vying for elective positions must look at the Constitutional qualifications for that particular office. The issue of forged educational certificate or other certificates which has become common place in almost all pre-election and election cases must be tackled.

It can only take a false or fraudulent individual to misrepresent facts or figures, all in a bid to win an election. A candidate for elective position (and indeed all category of leaders in the society) must be sincere to themselves, and ensure they possess the qualification outlined by law. They must play the game by the rules. They also have a duty to place national interest above personal and party interest.

Candidates who lose as primary elections should also rally support for the winner to ensure their party’s victory at the general polls, and avoid pre- election litigations that prove needless point.

The Role of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

The Commission must ensure adequate supervision of primaries of political parties, to ensure conformity to the Electoral Act, and Guidelines released for the election. This is especially with regards to each procedure for nominating a candidate to represent the parties concerned.

The Commission has a duty to scrutinise documents of candidates submitted to is, to ensure they are valid. A primary election fraught with irregularities, disputable factions and malpractices should not be recognised, just like candidates that emerge therefrom, even if it is the party in power.

It is suggested that, to ensure credible and true credentials, the Commission may independently verify their authenticity, and make its findings public in the interest of the nation. Also, staff and representatives of the Commission should at all times be seen to be impartial and neutral in the implementation of the provisions of the electoral law.

Recommendations/conclusion

The amendments to the 1999 Constitution so far and the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2022 are indeed commendable, particularly with regards to the timelines for both pre-election matters and their appeals and the election petition itself. However, more still needs to be done. Sections 76(2), 116(2), 132(2) and 178(2) of the Constitution provides for the period within which election into the various positions must be conducted.

It is recommended that the above provisions be amended, to provide for sufficient time for all pre-election and election matters to be concluded before the duly elected and affirmed candidates take oath of office. At the moment, although almost all pre-election matters are being conclusively determined with their appeals before election before elections, some still linger after the election into respective office have been concluded, but usually before swearing in.

Timely conclusion of pre-election matters before elections will aid the candidate in concentrating on their campaigns and the job ahead, in addition to help the Commission and political parties channel its resources and energies towards the election with all its demands.

Secondly, section 29(6) of the Electoral Act, 2022 provides thus: ‘Where the Court determines that any of the information contained in the affidavit is false only as it relates to constitutional requirements of eligibility, the Court shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate and the sponsoring political party and then declare the candidate with the second highest number of valid votes and who satisfies the constitutional requirement as the winner of the election.’ This provision as it is, appear to be ambiguous, and ought to be amended by deleting the phrase ‘and the sponsoring political party’, in order to make the order of court declaring the candidate with second highest number of valid votes of the same party, contemplated by the sub- section, to be meaningful. Since a court cannot recognise the runner-up of a political party it has disqualified, the order disqualifying the winner of the primary for lack of constitutional eligibility should affect him alone, and not with his party.

Thirdly, section 115(1)(k) of the Electoral Act, 2022 provides that: ‘Any person who signs a nomination paper consenting to be a candidate at an election knowing that he or she is ineligible to be a candidate at that election, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a maximum term of imprisonment for two years.’ Thus, presenting oneself as a candidate for an election without qualification is an offence under the law.

In addition, section 29(8) provides that a political party which presents to the Commission the name of a candidate who does not meet the qualification stipulated in this section, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of N10,000,000.

This means candidates who are disqualified on grounds of non-eligibility ought to be charged and tried for such offences by the authorities concerned, chiefly INEC or the ICPC. At the moment. it is unheard of any reported case of charges against a candidate for an election who was disqualified by the court. This will serve as a deterrent to others, and reduce the tendency towards fraud and falsification of documents prevalent in the electoral process.

There is the need for synergy between the relevant institutions and stakeholders in the country such as, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), political parties and their candidates, the courts, and others, in ensuring that the objectives of the relevant laws are actualised, in a bid to advance Nigeria’s growing democracy.


Image Credit: commowealth


About Author

Chidiebere A. Akalugwu studied law at University of Abuja, Nigeria, and the Nigerian Law School, and was subsequently called to the Nigerian Bar. He has been engaged in rigorous legal practice since then. He holds a Master’s degree in law, and is currently a serving Magistrate with the Imo State Judiciary. He was appointed in 2019.
Email: [email protected]
Contact: +2347037781823.

  1. Aguma v. APC & Ors (2021) LCER-40458 (SC []
  2. SC/CV/980/2022. Delivered on 30/9/2022 []
  3. Per Agim, JSC []
  4. (2014) 14 NWLR (Part 1416) 591 []
  5. Wushishi v. Imam (2017) LCER-32297 (SC); A.P.G.A. v. Anyanwu & Ors. (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1407) 541; Uwazurike v. Nwachukwu (2013) 20 WRN 52; (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1342) 503 at 526, PDP v. Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 85 at 148 C – D, Lado v. CPC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 607) 598 at 622 – 623. The apex court held repeatedly while interpreting sections 31 and 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) similar to the present sections 29 and 84 of the Electoral Act, 2022, that a complainant must bring himself squarely within the ‘narrow confines’ of the provisions, that is, he must be an aspirant, and his complaint must arise from non- compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act and the Guidelines of the political party. []
  6. PDP & Ors v. Degi-Eremionyo & Ors (2020) LLJR-SC []
  7. Shittu v. INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR-59826 (SC); Abdullahi v. Loko & Ors (2022) LPELR-57578 (SC); Karshi & Ors v. Gwagwa & Ors (2022) LPELR57544 (SC): Bello v. Yusuf & Ors (2019) LPELR- 47918 (SC); Eze v. Umahi (2022) LPELR-59157 (SC) []
  8. Section 84(3) Electoral Act, 2022 []
  9. Party supremacy is the principle to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction over domestic and internal affairs of political parties. See also Ardo v. Nyako (supra); Lado v. C.P.C. (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 689; P.D.P. v. Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 85; Gwede v. I.N.E.C. (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) 56. Issues bordering of pre- primary are still outside court’s jurisdiction. []
  10. Osoh v. APC & Ors (2023) LCER-48016 (SC) []
  11. Section 84(15) Electoral Act, 2022 []
  12. Kente v. Bwacha & Ors (2023) LCER-48018 (SC); Uba v. Moghalu (2022) LPELR-57876 (SC); Lau v. P.D.P. & Ors. (2017) LPELR – 42800 (SC); Agi v. P.D.P. (2016) LPELR-42578 (SC). []
  13. (2020) LLJR-SC []
  14. Dide v. Seleketimibi (2009) LPELR-4038 (CA) []
  15. See also sections 65(2)(b), 106(d), 131(c) and 177(c) CFRN 1999 (as amended []
  16. Section 84(10) Electoral Act, 2022 []

Admissibility of Uncertified Public Documents Attached to Affidavit- Andoakaa V. Obot – Oyebanjo Yussuf Akinola

Admissibility of Uncertified Public Documents Attached to Affidavit- a Look at the Supreme Court’s Decision in Andoakaa V. Obot

ABSTRACT

This paper critically examines the inconsistent and/discordant tone of the Courts, particularly the Court of Appeal towards the admissibility of secondary evidence of public documents prior to the decision of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Andoakaa v. Obot & Ors. The particular focus of this paper is a review of the different attitudes of the Court of Appeal in admitting secondary evidence of public documents attached to affidavits and a consideration of whether the Supreme Court have now settled the position by virtue of its decision in Andoakaa v Obot & Ors.

The opening part of this paper is dedicated to an assessment of the difference(s) between public and private documents and the effect of the distinction on the admissibility of documents. In the conclusion and recommendation part, this paper recommends a consistent attitude of courts towards the admissibility of public documents in conformity with the reality in legal practice and technological advancement towards the attainment of a reliable judicial precedence.

Introduction

In the discharge of the adjudicatory functions with which Judges are saddled, they are often faced with litigants presenting different evidence in proof and disproof of the existence or non-existence of particular set of facts placed before the court for determination, all in attempts to sway the Court to believe their version of the story presented for adjudication. Litigants in practice often rely on either documents containing information reinforcing their position or on their viva voce oral account of what they consider to be the true account of the matter presented before the Court.

In relation to viva voce or oral evidence, which is often subjected to cross-examination, the problem appears to be minimal when compared with documentary evidence which is prone to all forms of distortion. The problem becomes more pronounced when documents emanate from an authority other than the person who desires to tender and/or rely on such document in Court. The likelihood of alteration of the document by the person who desires to move the Court to rely on such document to give judgment in his favour has made it necessary that patent assurance in form of endorsement i.e. certification, is made on the document by the issuing authority.

However, the length of time it takes to secure the endorsement/certification by the issuing authority and the bureaucratic procedure involved in having such endorsement on the document has become a militating factor which has necessitated a relaxation of the rule on the endorsement/certification by the issuing authority in certain situation i.e. Affidavit evidence/proceedings. The propriety and/or workability of the relaxation of the rule without defeating the purpose of the endorsement is the crux of this paper and shall be critically examined, anon.   

Oral and Documentary Evidence

It is settled law and as clearly provided in section 83 of the Evidence Act1 that, in any proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document which seems to establish that fact shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact upon the fulfillment of the conditions stated in the section. It is also settled that where oral and documentary evidence are placed before the Court, the Court will, unless there are conditions rendering the documents unreliable, place premium on the documentary evidence over and above oral evidence.

Lending a voice to the superiority of documentary evidence, learned author, Uglow Steven2 stated thus:

“Documentary evidence is of considerable importance in both civil and criminal proceedings… Reliance on documentary evidence is often worthwhile as it is regarded as having greater weight. Often the information has been compiled closer to the events, and unlike a witness, a document will not be shaken by cross-examination”

Also, in recognizing the reliability of documentary evidence over and above oral evidence, the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Ibrahim vs. Abdallah3 held as follows:

“Documentary evidence is the best evidence. The document is the best proof of its contents. There is credibility of documentary evidence over oral evidence, which would require that a witness is put on oath and examinations for the Court to deduce the truth in his testimony. On the other hand, the contents of a document speak for itself (A-G, Rivers vs. A-G Bayelsa (2013)3 NWLR (Pt. 1340)123, Ogologo vs. Uche (1998)4 NWLR (Pt. 572)34 referred to)”.

While documentary evidence have always been considered to be the more reliable form of evidence when compared with oral evidence or account, the nature of documentary evidence which is admissible in different proceedings before the court has however generated a degree of controversy and birthed divergent stand points by different Judges/Justices of superior courts in Nigeria. One of such controversy include the nature of public document(s) admissible in Court proceedings in the absence of the original public document issued by the public authority. This paper shall critically appraise the admissibility of public documents attached to affidavits, taking into focus the divergent decisions of superior courts on the subject-matter with a view to proffer a way forward based on the decisions which accord with the recent developments in technology and in line with the doctrine of stare decisis which will engender stability in judicial decisions.

Definition of Public Documents

Before proceeding into the consideration of admissibility of uncertified public documents attached to affidavits which is the fulcrum of this paper, it is imperative to observe that documents are generally divided into two(2) i.e. Private and Public Documents. While section 103 of the Evidence Act, 2011 defines private documents as all documents other than public documents, Section 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011 in defining what constitutes public documents provides ipse:

102. The following documents are public documents:

(a) Documents forming the official acts or records of the official acts of-
(i) The sovereign authority,
(ii) Official bodies and tribunals, or
(iii) Public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of Nigeria or elsewhere; and

(b) Public records kept in Nigeria of private documents.

In consonance with the above definition of public documents as provided in section 102(a) & (b) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the following have been held by Courts as forms of Public Document, to wit:

Forms of Public Documents

Newspaper

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kubor vs. Dickson,4 newspaper publications are public documents which require certification to be admissible in Court. The issue of certification is mandatory notwithstanding that the newspaper is an online printout generated from a computer. Putting the point trenchantly, the Court held in Kubor’s case thus:

“The only admissible secondary evidence of a public document is a certified true copy of same. In the instant case, exhibit “D” which was an internet print out of the public newspaper, was by nature a secondary evidence of the original by reason of the provisions of section 85 and 87(a) of the Evidence Act, 2011. On the authority of section 90(1)(c) and section 102(b) of the Evidence Act, it is only the certified true copy of the document as secondary evidence and none other that was admissible. Therefore, the absence of certification rendered exhibit “D” a worthless document and inadmissible.  

Private documents forming part of a public record

Another notable form of public documents are private documents forming part of a public record. A practical example of this can be seen in the case of petitions written by private individuals to the Police. In the case Onwuzuruike vs. Edoziem & Ors5) Onnoghen, J.S.C., (as he then was) held thus:

“In the case of Tabik Investment Ltd v. G.T.B (2011)ALL FWLR (pt 602) 1592 at 1607 this Court held that a private petition sent to the police, as in the instant case, formed part of the record of the police and consequently a public document within the provisions of Section 109 of the Evidence Act. The Court held as follows:- “By the provision of Section 318(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Section 18(1) of the interpretation Act, a police officer is a public officer and so all documents from the custody of the police, especially documents to be used in Court are public documents.”6

Gazette and other statutory instruments

Court documents

Court documents no matter how insignificant it might appear to be, is a public document which requires certification before it can become admissible7 Onobruchere vs. Esegine8 case.

Without further going through the labyrinth of combing judicial decisions on what amounts to public documents, it is safe to say that whatever document emanating from or authored by a public officer, which forms part of public or official records in Nigeria can be conveniently classified as a public document.9)

Who Can Tender Public Documents and Weight to Be Attached Thereto

The original copy of a public document is admissible in evidence upon its production. Once a public document is signed and certified as required by section 110 and 112 of the Evidence Act, it becomes admissible on production, and it is not necessary to call a witness to prove custody or to verify the document. Such a document can be tendered from the bar by counsel who produced it. This is because court presumes such a document to be genuine under section 114 and of the Evidence Act.10

Where it is desirable that a public document is to be tendered through subpoena duces tecum issued by the Court on a public officer who has custody of such public documents, the procedure laid down by the Court in the case of Famakinwa vs. University of Ibadan11 is undoubtedly the appropriate procedure to adopt in such circumstance. For clarity, the Court of Appeal held at page 624 – 625 of the report as follows:

“Section 192 of the Evidence Act merely authorizes a subpoena duces tecum to be issued to a person to deliver to the court a document. That person could do so personally or through another person he considers suitable for the assignment and once such a document is delivered or caused to be delivered to court, his obligation is discharged and he cannot be sworn or cross-examined. It then remains for the party at whose instance the subpoena was issued to discharge the burden of proving the document by having it admitted in evidence by tendering it through a person who has capacity to do so. In other words the person subpoenaed to court to produce a document merely places the document before the court where they could be identified and made use of by witnesses.”12

Public Documents Attached to Affidavits

The paramount question which is perhaps the crux of the instant article is “if any of the public documents alighted above is intended to be attached by a party in proceedings commenced by affidavit, that is, Originating Summons proceedings, or if a party in an interlocutory application desires to rely on any of the documents highlighted above, is it a compulsory requirement that such document(s) must be certified to be admissible in prove of the facts sought to be established or can the need for certification be dispensed with and the court seized of the matter proceed to determine the suit or the application on the fate of such document without certification?”

As basic as the above poser appears to be, a consideration of the authorities on the use of uncertified public documents in proceedings before the Courts remain largely unsettled and the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Andoakaa vs. Obot & Ors appears not to have settled the troubled waters in this regard. A critical assessment of the authorities decided before the decision in the case of Andoakaa vs. Obot & Ors will be reviewed vis-à-vis the decision in the Andoakaa’s case.

To begin with, one of the foremost authorities which has perhaps been relied upon by lower courts to substantiate the position that public documents do not require certification where they are to be attached to affidavits in proceedings -interlocutory or substantive suits notwithstanding- is the Supreme Court decision in the case of Ezechukwu vs. Onwuka13. Both Trial Courts and the Court of Appeal have often found succor in the words of Peter-Odili, J.S.C. where the Learned Justice of the Supreme Court held at page 562 as follows:  

“The stance of the appellants is that exhibit R being a public document and a photocopy not certified should be expunged by the court which would result in the collapse of the case of the respondent from the trial court up. That position of the appellants is not for our purpose herein as it is not disputed that only certified copies of public documents are admissible in evidence in legal proceedings and any objection to the admissibility of copies of public documents not properly certified can be raised during a trial.”  

There were proofs of service of the hearing notices exhibits R, S1 and S2 returned by Mr. M. T. Shior who effected service which documents were in the court records and since the court has the power to look at its record to convince itself of the truth of the service alleged, the fact of non-certification of the said documents are therefore a non-issue since the court is allowed to take judicial notice of same being in its custody. See section 74 of the Evidence Act.”

Specifically, the Court of Appeal in the case of Jukok Int’l Ltd V. Diamond Bank Plc (( (2016) 6NWLR (Pt. 1507)55)) where the Court was faced with the question of the admissibility of deed of appointment of a receiver/manager, notice of appointment and a certification of registration of appointment of the receiver/manager being public documents, held thus: 

“By virtue of sections 89, 90 and 105 of the Evidence Act, 2011, only a certified true copy of a public document is admissible as secondary evidence of its contents. However, copies of public documents attached to an affidavit as exhibits need not be certified true copies because the documents already form a part of the evidence adduced by the deponent before the court, and are available for the court to use once it is satisfied that they are credible. Furthermore, such documents need not be certified true copies where the contents of the documents are not in dispute as in this case because the 2nd appellant did not disown his signature on the documents which the appellants contend ought to have been certified.

Noteworthy from the above decision of the Court of Appeal is the fact that the admissibility of the uncertified public documents was not based solely on the principle of law that documents attached to affidavit form part of the affidavit but also on the fact that the party against whom the documents were sought to be tendered did not disown the documents particularly his signature which appeared on the documents. The effect of these rationales will be discussed later in this article.

In another decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of AYABAM v. C.O.P. BENUE STATE (((2019)LPELR-47283(CA))) were the question of the admissibility of uncertified public documents fell for determination, in holding that uncertified public documents attached to counter-affidavit just like in affidavits are admissible failure of certification notwithstanding. EKANEM, J.C.A stated in page 138 of the report as follows:

“It is the contention of the appellant that the letter along with the attachment is inadmissible in evidence, being uncertified photocopy of original public document and that the trial Court did not consider the objection. It is my view that the fact that the trial Court did not consider the point raised by the appellant is of no moment. This is because the document was attached to a counter-affidavit and so the question of its admissibility did not arise. In Jukok International Limited v. Diamond Bank Plc (2016)6NWLR (Pt. 1507)55, this Court held that an uncertified copy of an originating summons cannot be rejected by the Court simply because it is not certified. The trial Court therefore rightly took cognizance.

(Italics for emphasis)

It needs to be noted that the decision in the case of Ezechukwu vs. Onwuka(Supra) was not decided solely on the provisions of Sections 89, 90 and 105 of the Evidence Act, 2011, but the decision which like every other decision of Courts was decided on its peculiar facts and with proper cognizance taken of Section 74 of the Evidence Act, 2011. This is reflective of the decision of the Court in the words of Peter-Odili, J. S. C., where the Learned Justice of the Apex held thus:

“There were proofs of service of the hearing notices exhibits R, S1 and S2 returned by Mr. M. T. Shior who effected services which documents were in the court records and since the court has the power to look at its record to convince itself of the truth of the service alleged, the fact of non certification of the said documents are therefore a non issue since the court is allowed to take judicial notice of same being in its custody. See section 74 of the Evidence Act. Also, the presumption of validity is prescribed covering any judicial or official act which has been shown to have been done substantially in a regular way. See Fannami v. Bukar & Ors (2004) FWLR(PT. 198) 1241.”   

Further, the Supreme Court in Ezechukwu’s case emphasized the age-long position of law that the only admissible secondary evidence of public documents are certified true copy of the public documents and no other form of secondary evidence can be admitted in place of the Certified true Copy. ((See Peter-Odili, J.S.C., at page 562 of the judgment.))

Another point that is worthy of note is that while the case of Jukok vs. Diamond Bank has gained reputation for being the authority for admissibility of uncertified public documents, heavy reliance as often time been placed on the case without proper regard being had to the rationale for the Court’s arrival at the decision. This is because the decision for the admission of the public document without certification was reached based on the fact that the content of the (public) documents were not challenged. In our humble view, it appears that if the Appellant in JUKOK’s case had raised an objection to the content of the public documents before the Lower Court, the Court (i.e. the appellate Court if not both the Lower and Appellate Courts) would have taken a different stance on the admissibility and reliance on the said documents.

While the above position that uncertified secondary evidence of public documents are admissible remains the position maintained by some Justices of the Court of Appeal, there are other factions of Justices of the Court of Appeal who are stern on the position that only certified secondary evidence of public documents are admissible. They have continued to maintain this stance when the public document(s) were given in evidence during interlocutory or substantive proceedings of the Court. This school believes and has held in many cases that an uncertified secondary evidence of a public document remains inadmissible regardless of the nature of the proceedings- interlocutory or substantive. 

One of the notable decisions of the Court of Appeal on this point can be seen in the case of Gov. Kwara State vs. Lawal (((2007)13 NWLR (PT. 1051) 347)) where Sankey, J. C. A. in stating the position held thus:

“Where a public document, as opposed to a private document, is produced in an attempt to prove facts in issue before a court of law, before it can be considered admissible in evidence, it must be duly certified as required by law, irrespective of whether such a document is being used in an interlocutory application or at the hearing of a substantive suit. In other words, only a certified true copy of a public document must be tendered. Apart from Federal or State Gazettes and documents printed by order of government, which are prima facie proof of any fact of public nature, all other forms of official documents not duly certified are inadmissible in evidence.”

Also, in the case of Daniel Tayar Transport Enterprises Co (Nig) Ltd vs. Busari & Anor14) where the Court of Appeal was faced with the question of the admissibility of (uncertified) photocopies of public documents attached to a counter-affidavit, in rejecting the uncertified secondary evidence of the public documents in evidence, Olayiwola Aderemi, J.C.A, held thus:

“As I have observed (supra) exhibits A, B, C and D annexed to the counter-affidavit are by its (counter-affidavit) tenor and the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents, held out to be public documents in the sense that they are judicial documents – that is processes already filed in the Court… Indeed, a document which is a photocopy of a certified true copy of proceedings of a Court of law is admissible in evidence once the document of which it is a photocopy is an authentic document of a Court duly certified as the true copy of the original issued with the seal of the Court… But a photocopy of a deed of conveyance is inadmissible in evidence so also is inadmissible in evidence a photocopy of a writ of summons or any other process. See Ojo v. Adejobi (1978)3 SC 65. From the foregoing I am in agreement with Mr. Anozia that exhibits A, B, C and D aforementioned are inadmissible and I do not countenance them.”  

The Court of Appeal, Abuja Judicial Division in the case of Bayawo vs. NDLEA & Ors (((2018)LPELR- 45030 CA)), when appraising the authorities where Courts have taken cognizance and admitted uncertified public documents and coming to the conclusion that the only admissible secondary evidence of a public document is the certified copy of the public document held as follows:

“As shown in the summation of arguments, appellants grouse in issue 1 is with the lower Court’s decision that his failure to certify the 3rd November, 2010 Letter (Exhibit AB16) of the former Attorney-General of the Federation to respondents to reinstate him rendered the said letter, an uncontested public document, inadmissible in evidence. The first prong of his argument is that the said Exhibit AB16 being a document attached to an affidavit is admissible in evidence even if not certified. He relied principally on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ezechukwu v. Onwuka (2016) 5 NWLR (PT. 1506) 529 @ 562 and the decision of this Court in B.A.T. Nig. Ltd v. International Tobacco Plc (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1339) 493 @ 520-521 for this proposition. I am afraid neither decision supports appellant’s counsel’s argument. In respect of the apex Court’s decision, counsel cited the contribution of Odili, J.S.C., at p. 562 but called it ‘lead judgment’ in his brief of argument (at para. 3.5) and wrongly credited it to I.T. Mohammed, J.S.C., who was not even in the panel that decided the case (the real lead judgment of the case was actually read by M.D. Mohammed, J.S.C.). The fact however is that the apex Court, including Odili, J.S.C., never said that a public document attached to an affidavit is admissible in evidence even if not certified as required by Sections 89 (e) and (f) and 901 (c) of the Evidence Act 2011 that says only a certified true copy ‘but no other evidence’ is admissible as proof of secondary evidence of public documents. The only admissible secondary evidence of public document is a certified true copy and nothing else. That is so even if the proceeding is an interlocutory application let alone one like the instant originating summons that was the substantive suit: see Imoh v. Imoh (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 659) 1114 @ 1138-1139 Para B-C; Ajiboye v. Duro (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 507) 136 @ 176… In Imoh v. Imoh it was said (at p.1139 B-C) that an uncertified public document remained inadmissible regardless of whether parties objected to it, as parties cannot by consent render an inadmissible evidence admissible. Odili, J.S.C., in her contribution in Ezechukwu v. Nwadinobu at page 562 paragraphs referenced by appellant’s counsel did not say anything different; all His Lordship said there was that Exhibit R in issue, a Hearing Notice, was part of the records of the Court so it could rely on the copy in the records of court so “the fact of non-certification of the said documents are therefore a nonissue since the Court is allowed to take judicial notice of same being in its custody”: see page 562 paragraphs G-H of Ezechukwu v. Nwadinobu supra. Secondary evidence of public documents, to be admissible and used in evidence, must be certified, even more so in a substantive action like the instant one in which appellant sought to use Exhibit AB16. Of course, if a piece of evidence that is inadmissible in any circumstance like Exhibit AB16 somehow slips into the proceedings without objection, the Court is still bound to reject it in its judgment, like his Lordship the President of the National Industrial Court did in this case: Shanu v. Afribank Plc (2002) 17 NWLR (PT. 795) 185. It is not a matter on which the Court has to call for further addresses from counsel, a point confirmed by even the arguments and cases cited by appellant in his brief of argument.”

As evident in the above judgment of the Court, the Supreme Court case of Ezechukwu v. Onwuka which has often been cited as authority for the admissibility of uncertified secondary evidence of public documents clearly does not decide what it is professed to be the authority for. It therefore suffices to state that the conflicting authorities on admissibility of uncertified secondary evidence of public documents are basically judgments of the Court of Appeal.  ((It must be noted that there are two schools of thought on the course opened to a lower court when faced with conflicting decisions of a higher court. First school, which postulates that the lower court is at liberty to pick and choose which one to follow, while the second advocates that the lower Court should follow the later in time. The problem with the later school lies in the possibility of the later decision in time being a decision reached per in curiam. For the purpose of this paper, the former school of thought will be the basis for the writer’s recommendations and conclusion. See the cases of SHELL PET. DEV. CO.(NIG.) LTD. vs. MAXON (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 541; OJUGBELE vs. LAMIDI (1999)10 NWLR (Pt.621)171.))

It is our humble view that when the rationale for the certification secondary evidence of public documents is strictly considered, particularly in light of advancement in technology and the possibility of alteration of documents, the decision in the cases of BAYAWO v. NDLEA (Supra) and the other cases decided in the same line, appear to be better and preferable judgments/authorities the authorities decided in the contrary. This is because, since the essence of certification is to confirm authenticity15), the fact that documents attached to affidavits form part of the affidavit16) cannot be a reason cogent enough to dispense with the need for certification of secondary evidence of public documents before the court can admit the public documents and act on them as credible evidence in giving its judgment or ruling.

The Supreme Court’s Decision in Aondoakaa V. Obot & Anor17

The 1st Respondent in the appeal emerged as the winner of the Peoples’ Democratic primary election held in Uyo State and was duly presented to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as the party’s candidate. A dispute however arose when the 1st respondent’s name was substituted with the name of another candidate and a suit was instituted to challenge the substitution.

The Court of Appeal, Calabar Division delivered judgment in favour of the 1st Respondent and ordered the President of the Court of Appeal to set up a new Tribunal to try the 1st Respondent’s petition in Uyo. The Appellant at the time was the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister for Justice (AGF). It was the 1st Respondent’s contention that in his capacity as AGF, the Appellant wrote to the President of the Court of Appeal (PCA), urging His Lordship not to comply with the judgment ordering the constitution of a new panel in view of a petition he had received from the person who had been substituted for the 1st Respondent. The PCA however went ahead and complied with the order of the Court.

​The new panel ordered that the 1st Respondent be sworn into the House of Representatives as the member representing Uyo Federal Constituency. An appeal was filed to the Court of Appeal which was however unsuccessful. The appeal was dismissed with an order that INEC should issue a Certificate of Return to the 1st Respondent. The Appellant again wrote to the Chairman of INEC, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives urging and advising them not to obey the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Consequent upon the letters written to the Chairman of INEC and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the 1st Respondent was neither issued with his Certificate of Return nor sworn into office. He therefore instituted an action at the Federal High Court vide an originating summons, against the Appellant and 2nd Respondent. The Appellant was sued in his capacity as Attorney General of the Federation as 1st Defendant and in his personal capacity as 2nd Defendant. The letters written by the Appellant were attached as Exhibits to the affidavit in support of the originating summons.

The learned trial Judge entered judgment in favour of the 1st Respondent and made the declarations and orders sought in his favour. The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision and filed an appeal at the Court of Appeal. However, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Federal High Court. The Appellant, still dissatisfied, further appealed to the Supreme Court. In its appeal the appellant contended that the letters attached as exhibits to the affidavit in support of the originating summons were secondary evidence of public document which were not certified and urged the court to discountenance the documents.  

The Supreme Court ruled against the Appellant and held that the uncertified public documents attached to the affidavit were admissible and that the court could act on the documents

A close look at the decision in the case of Aondoakaa V. Obot & Anor18) would show that the authority is nothing more than a compendium of the decisions of Court of Appeal on admissibility of uncertified public documents attached to affidavits.

Taking a cue from the dictum of Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC where the Learned Justice of the Apex Court reproduced a seeming re-enactment of the previous decisions of the Court of Appeal at pages 74 – 77 of the judgement as follows:

“The appellant had taken exception to the admissibility of Exhibits B, C, D since they were photocopies of public documents. The point has to be made that, copies of public documents attached to an affidavit as exhibits need not be certified, true copies because the documents already form part of the evidence adduced, by the deponent before the Court and are available to the Court to use once it is satisfied that they are credible. Again, to be said is that such documents need not be certified true copies where the contents of the documents are not in dispute as in this case because the appellant did not disown his signature on the document he is contending ought to have been certified. I refer to Onobruchere v. Esegine (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 799; Nzekwu v. Nzekwu (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 104) 373; Araka v. Egbue (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 848) 1; Ogu v. M.T. & M.C.S. Ltd (2011) 8 NWLR Ltd (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1249) 345; Ojuya v. Nzeogwu (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 427) 713; Ilorin East L.G. v. Alasinrin (2012) LPELR 8400; B.A.T. (Nig.) Ltd. V. Int’l Tobacco Co. Plc. (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 493.” 

Again, in a recognition of the fact that where a party against whom an uncertified public document(s) is sought to be used against in a proceeding involving affidavit evidence objects to the admissibility of such affidavit evidence, it will be incumbent on the Court to either direct that the document be certified or reject same in evidence, the Supreme Court held in AONDOAKAA’s case as follows:

“It is of note that the appellant never denied authoring those documents. It would have been a different thing if the appellant had denied that he did not write and sign the said Exhibits. In any event, the appellant quarrelled seriously with the trial Court admission of Exhibits B, C and D and opined that since the documents were not certified, they ought not be admitted. It is the law that any documents attached to an affidavit need not be certified. See B.A.T. (NIG.) LTD. V. INT’L TOBACCO CO. PLC. (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1339) P. 496 at 520-523 PARAS A-E. “…certificate of registration of Dorchester trademark, certificate of assignment of the trademark and certificate of renewal of the trademark, respectively at the state. For the purpose of the application, Exhibits W01, W02 and W03 must certainly true copies, since the applicant was expected to photocopy the originals of those documents given to them by the issuing registry, as exhibited copies for this application. One cannot expect the applicant to have taken the documents (photocopies) to the issuing registry for certification before using the same for this application. Only recently, we had cause to explain, in a well-considered judgment, that public documents, exhibited as secondary copies in affidavit evidence cannot, necessarily, be certified true copies, and that documents exhibited to an affidavit evidence which a Court is entitled to look at, and use. See the unreported decision of this Court in the case of Ilorin East L.G. v. Alh. Woli Alasinrin & Anor – CA/IL/38/2011, delivered on 20/2/2011 wherein we state thus:- “I do not think the issue of certification of a secondary evidence (photocopy) as in exhibit C, can rise in this case, being one sought on affidavit evidence and the respondents not claiming to have obtained it from the appellant, lawfully…”  

From the above, it is evident that the case of Aondoakaa V. Obot & Anor (supra) has not altered the position of law on admissibility of uncertified public documents attached to affidavits. It suffices to state that where the exceptions recognised in the case relating to a challenge to the public document is raised, a court would be on firm footing to reject the document in evidence. 

It is also believed that like a panel of the Court of Appeal in Bayawo v. NDLEA (supra) departed from the general opinion of the justices of the Court of Appeal by holding that uncertified public document must be rejected in evidence, the Supreme Court will also depart from the position in Aondoakaa’s case in future.  

Recommendations and Conclusion

Firstly, it is a fact of common knowledge that affidavits – whether in interlocutory proceedings and substantive hearing; such as Originating Summons proceedings- are susceptible to distortion of facts, as deponents to affidavits are capable of giving false statements under oath19 and taking into perspective the fact that unless where differences in opposing Affidavits are irreconcilable, the Court would naturally not call for oral evidence or require the presence of a deponent in proof of facts stated in an affidavit which makes it improbable that the authenticity of the uncertified secondary evidence of the public document will be inquired into. 

This position is even more compelling considering the fact that where there are documents annexed to one of the conflicting affidavits, the court may resolve the difference in favour of the affidavit to which the document is attached20). The question that readily comes to mind and perhaps makes the certification of secondary evidence of public document more indispensable, therefore, is “What if the document(s) attached to one of the conflicting affidavits that makes it more formidable is the uncertified secondary evidence of public document?” The consequent injustice capable of being meted by this procedure is better imagined than experienced.

To underscore the need for certification of secondary evidence of public documents and where the need arises, the re-certification of photocopies of certified copies of secondary evidence of public documents, Niki Tobi, J.S.C. in ARAKA v. EGBUE (((2008) ALL FWLR(Pt. 420)603))

A photocopy of a CTC of a public document must be re-certified because in this age of sophisticated technology, photo tricks manipulation cannot be ruled out and secondary evidence produced in the context of section 97(2)(a) of the Evidence Act could be tutored and therefore not authentic. In the process of copying original document, it could be manipulated with the result that the copy, which is secondary evidence, does not completely and totally reflect the original and therefore not a carbon copy of the original. The Court has not the eyes of an eagle to detect such tricks.21

Another considerable raison d’être which the writer finds very compelling is the need to maintain stability and/or equilibrium in the judgment of Courts in Nigeria. Taking into focus the fact that authorities are almost settled –particularly authorities on election petition and trial proceedings based on Writ of Summons- on the point that except the original public document itself, the only admissible secondary evidence of public documents are the certified true copies of secondary evidence of public documents. It is necessary to maintain this stability and consistency in our jurisprudence. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EMEKA vs. CHUBA-IKPEAZU22, is a clear illustration of the position as it relates to the attitude of the Court to uncertified public documents in election petitions where NWEZE, J.S.C. stated the position as follows:

“Although the original copies of public documents themselves are admissible, the only pieces of secondary evidence in respect of the original of such public documents that ere admissible are the certified copies thereof but no other secondary evidence. Put differently, in the absence of the original documents themselves, only such properly certified copies are admissible as secondary copies of such public documents but no other kind of secondary evidence.”

On a final note, it is humbly opined that in light of the expositions on the position of law as it relates to admissibility of secondary evidence of public documents made above, it is desirable that secondary evidence of public documents attached to affidavits – whether in interlocutory applications or in the substantive suit- to be admissible and used by the court in its judgment or ruling, such public documents should be certified as only this can assure the court of the fact that the copy of the public document sought to be placed before the Court is the authentic secondary evidence of the public document.


About Author

Oyebanjo Yussuf Akinola – LL.B (Lagos State University), BL (Nigerian Law School, Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria). Associate in the law firm of Streamsowers & Kohn, Lagos State.

  1. Evidence Act, 2011, CAP., E14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2011. []
  2. Uglow Steven, Evidence: Text and Materials,(2006), London, Thomson Sweet and Maxwell, p, 187 []
  3. (2019)17 NWLR (PT. 1701) Page 293 particularly the words of Okoro, J.S.C. at pages 310, para. F, 316-317 para. H-A. []
  4. (2013) 4 NWLR (PT. 1345) 534 []
  5.  (2016) LPELR-26056(SC []
  6. See pages 10-11, paras. F-B []
  7. It is necessary to note however that where the document(s) is a Court process filed in a suit and it is required that the attention of the Court be drawn to the existence of the process in the Court’s file, the need for certification may be dispensed with since it is already before the Court. This was the decision of the Court in Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No 2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30 SC. Similar principle also apply to documents which have already been filed in the Course of a proceeding intended to be relied upon at another stage of the same proceeding by the party who has earlier filed the documents as held in the case of Agbaosi v. Imevbore(2014)1 NWLR (Pt.1389) 556 CA. []
  8. (1986)1 NWLR (Pt. 19)799 []
  9. It is however necessary to state that the custody from which a public document is produced is no longer a ground for its admissibility or otherwise, as that only raises the issue of presumption. See Torti v. Ukpabi(1984)LPELR-3259(SC []
  10. See the cases of Aaregbev. Oyinlola(2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1162) 429; Anatogu v. Iweka II (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 415) 547; Agagu v. Dawodu (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 56; Anyakora v. Obiakor (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 130) 52; Ogbunyiya v. Okudo (1979) 6-9 SC. 32. []
  11. (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 255) page 608 at page 624 -625 []
  12. See also: R v. Gilmore(1961) NZLR. 384 []
  13. (2016)5NWLR(Pt. 1506)529 S.C []
  14. (2000)LPELR-5541(CA []
  15. See: Adekeye, J.S.C. in GOODWILL & TRUST INVESTMENT LTD. & ANOR V. WITT & BUSH LTD (2011) LPELR-1333(SC):“Section 111(i) of the Evidence Act describes what amounts to certification and the nature of certified copies of public document. Section 112 stipulates that: “Such Certified True Copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purported, to be copies. In effect the essence of the demanding for a Certified True Copy of a public document is to assure the authenticity of the document vis-a-vis the original. There is emphasis in the Evidence Act and under the Company and Allied Matters Act, that every public officer who has custody of a public document shall do the certification.” (P. 42, para. C-E []
  16. See the case of Ezechukwu v. Onwuka(supra []
  17. (2021) LPELR-56605 SC []
  18. (supra []
  19. See the provision of section 117, 118 and 119 of the Criminal Code Act, Cap. C38, LFN, 2010, as well as on provisions relating to the offence of Perjury, created to punish deponents who make false depose in affidavits. []
  20. See Ezechukwu v. Onwuka(supra []
  21. Page 20-21, para. G – A []
  22. (2017)15 NWLR(PT. 1589)345 []

Litigation as a Tool for Environmental Protection in Nigeria – Oluyemi Ayooluwa Mabel

Litigation as a Tool for Environmental Protection in Nigeria

Environmental Litigation as a Tool for Environmental protection is very important in Nigeria, as it serves as a means whereby Nigeria’s Environmental is being managed and protected for the well being of the citizens.

Abstract

Nigeria is currently facing many environmental challenges and is even vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to its geographical local, and anthropogenic activities.

However, victims of environmental damages occasioned by anthropogenic activities or laxity in its regulatory frontier rarely get a remedy compared to other jurisdictions. This article examined the essence of environmental litigation as a tool for environmental protection in Nigeria. It highlighted the opportunities and challenges attendant to it and suggested ways forward.

Introduction

The environment is fundamental to humans, animals, and plants; this means that the environment must be protected at all costs. Our environment is vital and can play a crucial role in our health. Nigeria is an Oil producing country is one of the major emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs). 

Nigeria is the 5th highest gas flaring nation on earth.1 

The environmental cost of gas flaring in Nigeria amounts to #28.8 Billion annually.2 Victims of environmental mishap occasioned by the reckless activities of Oil Companies, mineral mines, industries, ignoble uses of peoples’ properties among others rarely secure remedy and these activities remain largely unabated.

However, there exist very few environment-centered litigations (both criminal and civil) in Nigeria. This is due to lack of expertise in Environmental laws by both the Bar (both the prosecutors and private practitioners) and the Bench. Also, many judicial officers have placed economic benefits above environmental concerns.3

The judiciary until recently had adopted a passive approach to environment-related cases.4 Most remedies of environment related claims are accessed through the common tort remedies which are not specifically designed to address such claims.2 Hence the need for Environmental Litigation as a Tool for Environmental protection.

The essence of Environmental Litigation in Nigeria

Human beings and society, for good or for bad, are largely dependent on the environment. Human development and technology have introduced large scale degradation of the environment5.

Such degradation includes pollution which by its nature causes extensive damage to the environment, human lives and property as well as means of livelihood. Laws for the protection of environment may be preventive or remedial or a combination of both.2 Such environmental laws put in place mechanisms to protect the environment and victims and create liability in the event of any breach of their provisions.

Issues of liability and compensation to environmental damage is reflected in Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration which provides that States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damages within their jurisdiction.2

The domestic environmental laws are also not left out in providing for compensation in the event of environmental damage which come in the form of civil or criminal liability.2

On paper, environmental protection and regulation in Nigeria have no doubt received considerable attention.2 The Government has consistently declared its commitment to the pursuit of people centred environmentally sound regime 1112. The average citizen understands that a clean and healthy environment is in his best interest as anything short of that is a risk.6

However,7 where such remedies seem to exist, the remedies available are grossly inadequate due to lack of a recognisable environmental right for pollution victim, litigation hurdles, and ineffective regulatory regime to rescue the course of these victims. Courts usually award damages that are laughable and most times, not enough to even settle legal fees, and allow some reasonable recompense to accrue to the plaintiff and also serve as a deterrent to the defendant.8

For instance, in Sam Ikpede v. Shell BP (Nig. Ltd),9 the plaintiff’s ponds, lakes and farmlands were damaged as a result of escape of oil waste previously collected in a pit burrowed by and in control of the defendants. Only N5, 100 was awarded as compensation even though a total claim of N15,000 was made by the plaintiff.

Where the judiciary is assertive, innovative and inspirational, it will consistently keep the executives and the legislature on their toes in the implementation of appropriate environmental strategies.10

Environmental litigation is not only vital for inducing the state to implement or enforce the provisions of environmental regulations; it also serves as a strategy for holding polluters responsible for the adverse environmental consequences of their activities.2

However, litigating the right to a healthy environment & environmental wrongs in Nigeria is largely dependent on the access of the victims of environmental pollution to Court, which is usually dependent on a recognized legal right and the procedural gateways created by law for the enforcement of such rights.11

Environmental Litigation In Nigeria

Environmental litigation12 is the process of resolving disputes concerning protecting and maintaining the environment by instituting a complaint in court.
There are three stages when it comes to Environmental litigation in Nigeria,

  1. Pre-colonial Era
  2. Colonial Era
  3. The Era of independence
    These 3 Eras witnessed varying degrees of Environmental degradation;

Pre-Colonial Era

During this time, the state of the environment was primarily based on customs, for example some parts of the state, do not fish because some of them believe that fishes are gods, while some believe that in a particular river in Ijebu Ijesha, the fishes do not cooks no matter the time it stays on fire. While some states in the south worship snakes, some even lions, this acts one way or another, preserving the environment.

Colonial Era

During this time, there was a lack of awareness about environmental issues. Environmental litigation was more or less a tool for sanitation. A significant motivation driving colonialism was the desire to secure access to the natural resources of the colonies.

Without specific environmental laws, remedies for environmental violations were sought within the English common law torts negligence, strict liability, public nuisance, and trespass. To illustrate, the English case Rylands v. Fletcher established the doctrine of strict liability. In this no-fault liability, responsibility is imposed for damage caused by a defendant’s actions, regardless of intent. This principle has provided an important precedent in subsequent Nigerian cases, including Umudje v. Shell British Petroleum. The country is premised on a duty of care. This case has been adopted as a binding precedent in subsequent Nigerian cases.

The Era of Independence

Environmental litigation marked a chance after Independence. Due to our leaders’ focus on other things when we had just newly gained Independence, laws on the
environment were a minor topic. Koko Crisis In August 1987, an environmental catastrophe ignited and energized efforts to pass meaningful environmental legislation.

An Italian company imported several tons of toxic industrial waste and deposited it in Koko, Delta State, within Southern Nigeria. The waste leaked into the surrounding environment and resulted in the endangerment of some13 residents of that community. AllarIrou v. Shell B.P. In that case, the judge refused to grant an injunction in favour of the plaintiff whose land and fishpond had been polluted by the defendant’s operations. also, in NNPC v Sele, which has similar facts to Adediran v Interland Transport Ltd, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the Appellants on the ground that a claim of special damage cannot be sustained in a representative action.

Environmental Litigation from a Global Perspective

Urgenda Foundation V State of Netherlands: This case has to do with the Netherlands’ commitment to UNFCCC to reduce their emission, but the Government went on to introduce policies and projects, which means that they were going 23 back on the commitment under UNFCCC, the matter went up to the Supreme Court of Netherlands, the court held that if the Government fails to meet the obligation under the UNFCCC that the human right of the people will be affected.

Legharia V Republic of Pakistan, in this case, an ordinary farmer, challenged the failure of the Pakistan government to implement its national policy on Climate change, saying that the failure to do so is a breach of articles 9, 14, and 23 of the Pakistan Constitution The court held that Environmental right is at the center of the Pakistan constitution and therefore Allowed the claim of the farmer.

The cases above are very important because they show how even a mere farmer was able to challenge a whole government, part of the problems in Nigeria is how difficult litigation can be because of status . The cases above shows how pragmatic Environmental Litigation can be were issues like corruption is removed.

Current issues with environmental litigation and ways forward

Factors that limited Environmental Litigation in Nigeria and their remedies ; Poverty; Government should fund litigation by creating accessible lawyer , who are paid by the Government, in order to reduce the cost of litigation . Illiteracy; because of this factor people tend to fall into bribery, where they feel like the little change they get is worth the rights given to them is being violated.
Lack of enlightenment of the civilians; Government or Organizations should enlighten civilians on their rights14

In Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

The plaintiff claimed for the restoration and reinstatement of the affected community, especially the people of the Ineh and Aku streams whose environment was polluted by a spill of crude oil in their community; provision of drinking water for the community and the compensation of the victims of the spill. trial court and the Court of Appeal struck out the suit for want of locus standi on the part of the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court in a landmark decision allowed the appeal and held that an NGO has the requisite locus standi to sue in an environmental matter. The Court noted that other common law jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and Australia have long departed from a restricted and rigid application of the doctrine of locus standi.

Conclusion

Environmental Litigation as a Tool for Environmental protection is very important in Nigeria, as it serves as a means whereby Nigeria’s Environmental is being managed and protected for the well being of the citizens.

References

  • Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) 2018. Assessing the Impact of Gas Flaring on the
    Nigerian Economy. Retrieved on May 15, 2023
  • A.I. Olatunbuson & K.O.N. Onu (2020) Liberalization of the Concept of Locus Standi in Environmental Suits in Nigeria
  • Olanrewaju F. 2012.Mournful Remedies Endless Conflicts and Inconsistencies in
    Nigeria’s Quest for Environmental Governance: Rethinking The Legal Possibilities for Sustainability Abuja: NIALS Press.
  • Michael R. A., Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor People in the LDC, Paper for Discussion at WDR Meeting, 16-17 August 1999,
  • TOYIN FALOLA. A HISTORY OF NIGERIA 93 (Frank W. Thackeray & John E.
    Findling eds. 999).
  • Rebecca Bratspies, Do We Need a Human Right to a Healthy Environment?, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 31, 46 (2015).
  • THE LIBERALIZATION OF LOCUS STANDI IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES IN NIGERIA Adeniyi I. Olatunbosun and Kingsley Osinachi N Onu.
  • THE JUDICIARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATIONS IN NIGERIA Onu, Kingsley Osinachi N
  • Michael R. A., Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor People in the LDC .
  • Onyeabor, E. Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus.
    Lecture Series on Environmental Law.

About Author

Oluyemi Ayooluwa Mabel is a 500L Law student at Adeleke University, Ede, Osun state, Nigeria.

  1. Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) 2018. Assessing the Impact of Gas Flaring on the Nigerian Economy. Retrieved on May 15, 2023 from https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/gas-flaring-impact1.pdf.1. []
  2. Ibid. [] [] [] [] [] [] []
  3. Irou v.SPDC,unreported Suit No: WW/89/71. []
  4. Ibid. See also A.I. Olatunbuson & K.O.N. Onu (2020) Liberalization of the Concept of Locus Standi in Environmental Suits in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Supreme court’s Decision in the Case of Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v. NNPC [2019] 5 NWLR (pt. 1666) 518, The Gravitas Review of Business & Property Law, 1-11. Link: https://gravitasreview.com.ng/shop/liberalisation-of-locus-standi-in-environmental-cases-in-nigeria/ []
  5. Onyeabor, E. Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus. LectureSeriesonEnvironmentalLaw. []
  6. Olanrewaju F. 2012.Mournful Remedies Endless Conflicts and Inconsistencies in Nigeria’s Quest for Environmental Governance: Rethinking The Legal Possibilities for Sustainability. Abuja: NIALS Press. []
  7. Example is the militancy that happened and is still being experienced in Nigeria Delta region. []
  8. Is was the case in R, Mon &Anor v. Shell B. P, where the Court the awarded the sum of N200 as a fair calculation of the damage suffered []
  9. (1973) MWSJ 61 []
  10. Olanrewaju F., 2012. Mournful Remedies Endless Conflicts and Inconsistencies in Nigeria’s Quest for Environmental Governance: Rethinking The Legal Possibilities for Sustainability. Abuja: NIALS Press. []
  11. Michael R. A., Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor People in theLDC, Paper for Discussion at WDR Meeting, 16-17 August 1999, , available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/DfiD-Project-Papers/anderson.pdf []
  12. Cornell’s DICTIONARY []
  13. TOYIN FALOLA. A HISTORY OF NIGERIA 93 (Frank W. Thackeray & John E. Findling eds. 999). []
  14. Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act. 2004 []

A Critical Examination of the Effects of Delays in Electoral Cases in Nigeria – Chidiebere A. Akalugwu

A Critical Examination of the Effects of Delays in Electoral Cases in Nigeria

ABSTRACT

Delays in the determination of political and electoral cases in Nigeria has been the bane to her political development since the second republic. Electoral cases by their nature are sui generis, and thus ought to be decided timeously hence, protracted cases arising from elections can undermine the process of good governance and the laudable objective of the statutory provisions made thereon. This paper has attempted a critical examination of the effects of such delays using Nigeria as a case study. It appraised the constitutional timeline for the hearing of such cases. Some effects discussed include, staggered elections, instability in governance and uncertainty in the law, subversion of the people’s will, corruption and host of others. Recommendations on the way is also made. The research methodology used is doctrinal method.

Introduction

Electoral cases are by their nature sui generis. This is not just because of its role in the democratic process but also because of its impact in the change of key leadership responsibilities and political offices in Nigeria, chiefly, the office of President/Vice, Governor/Deputy, and National and State Houses of Assembly. The time for the conclusion of such cases in one way or the other, is affected by law and practice and other technicalities which follow them, as well as injunctions by courts and tribunals. This paper will attempt a critique of the effect of delays in the final determination of all the issues in the various electoral cases from tribunals to the apex court. It also examines the sources of the problems in Nigeria’s democratic process, and makes recommendations, particularly towards expediting such cases within the timelines provided by law.

Meaning of Political and Electoral Cases

Political cases refer generally to pre- and post-election cases. They are court cases challenging the validity or otherwise of persons or parties elected into a public office or contestable positions.

Pre-elections cases are cases which border on primaries of political parties, and/or choice and change of candidate for elections. Section 285(14) of the Constitution defines pre-election matters as ‘any suit by an aspirant wherein he complains that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating the conduct of the primaries of political parties and the provisions of the guidelines of a political party for the conduct of party primary has not been complied with by a political party in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates for an election.

It is also any suit by an aspirant challenging the action, decision or activities of Independent National Electoral Commission1 Thus, pre-election matters may be commenced by an aspirant against his/her party, such aspirant against INEC and a political party against INEC.

Post-elections cases on the other hand, also called election petitions, arise from the conduct of elections into public office, and often is inter party. Political cases may also include cases on the eligibility or otherwise of candidates for executive and legislative positions in the various political parties.

As can be seen, political cases often arise from the conduct of elections, either at party levels or by state institutions, at Federal or State levels charged with such responsibility by statute. In Progressive Peoples Alliance v. Sariki2 while interpreting section 137(1)(b) of the Constitution, the court described elections as ‘the process of choosing by popular votes a candidate for a political office in a democratic system of government’.

The outcome of elections into public office is what is contested in elections petitions usually beginning at the designated tribunal or court, whereas party elections are litigated at the regular courts (usually the High Court). It must be noted that elections into public offices does not refer exhaustively to the polls, as the court has observed. The casting of votes by the electorate on the day of the polls is just part of the electoral process. Under the Electoral Act, Part IV, the word election is a generic term comprising among other things, submission of list of candidates and their affidavit by political parties, nomination of candidates, conduct of the polls, etc.

Political cases, particularly, election petitions by their nature have its unique characteristics. Post election cases in particular are accorded special treatment and status, and besides having its separate rules of procedure and practice, it is governed by timeline which is provided for under the constitution directly, and constantly under scrutiny to ensure compliance. It is also sui generis because it is concerned with access to justice in respect of political rights and obligations of the entire citizenry. People whose political rights have been injured by the electoral process have access to justice at the expense of technicalities of law.

Election petitions are also treated in a unique manner because it is not the candidates’ interest alone that is at stake, for the electorate could be denied their right of choice or disenfranchised altogether.3 Hence, they are usually distinguished or divorced from civil and criminal matters, as a special proceeding.4

Since elections allows a degree of communication between the rulers and the ruled and further provides a means of legitimizing the rights of the rulers to govern,5 an electoral case is a complaint of an undue return or undue election lodged before a competent forum pursuant to the provision of the Constitution and the Electoral Act.

To a large extent, its rules are strictly observed to ensure the timely conclusion of such cases. In Orubu v. INEC6 the court described election petition as not being the same as the ordinary civil proceedings. It is a special proceeding because of the nature of elections which, by reason of their importance to the well-being of a democratic society are regarded with aura that places them above the normal day to day transactions between individuals which give rise to ordinary or general claim in court.

As a matter of deliberate policy to enhance urgency, election petitions are expected to be devoid of the procedural clogs that cause delay in the disposition of the substantive dispute.7) The need to avoid undue delays is thus buttressed which is in fact, the touchstone of its specialty. In Olawepo v. Saraki,8 the Court highlighted this essence further:

The spirit of the law relating to election petition is that as much as possible, petitions should be given expeditious adjudication to enable the parties to know the result of the election in which they participated. And compliance with statutory provision as to time within which to file an election petition is a fundamental pre-condition a breach of which is incurable and failure to comply with the statutory provision is fatal. In such a case the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition or cause. See also; Balogun v. Odumosu (1999) 2 NWLR Pt. 592 at 590, Nnonye v. Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR Pt. 101 at 110, Paul Osakpamwan Ogbebor v. Daisy Ehanre Danjuma & Others (2003) 15 NWLR Pt. 842, 403 at 489.9

Thus, compliance with the statutory provision as to time within which to file a pre-election matter as well as election petition is a fundamental pre-condition, the breach of which has been held to be incurable. This breach also takes away the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition.10

In PDP & Ors v. CPC & Ors,11 the Supreme Court held that the 60 days allotted for the disposal of appeals arising from election petitions includes Saturdays, Sundays, public holidays and even Court vacations. Clearly, the judiciary protects the sanctity and sustenance of democracy being an avenue to correct/rectify the wrongs following the conduct of election which is basically the foundation of democracy as it affords the people the chance to choose their government.

Constitutional and Statutory Timelines of Electoral Matters

It is important to note that the period statutorily provided before the conduct of an election is crucial in understanding the timeline for the commencement of an election petition.

In the case of pre-election matters, such matters must be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained in the suit.12 Thus, actions outside this time frame are liable to be dismissed for being statute-barred.13

By section 285 (10) of the Constitution, pre-election matters shall be heard and determined not later than 180 days from the date of filing of the suit. Appeal from decision in a pre- election matter must be filed within 14 days from the date of delivery of the judgment appealed against, while the appeal itself must be heard and disposed of within 60 days from the date of filing of the appeal.14

With respect to electoral matters, the Constitution provides for the period for the conduct of elections for members of the National Assembly, to be not earlier than 150 days and not later than 30 days before the House stands dissolved. Similar provision is also made in respect of a House of Assembly of a State under section 118.

Section 132 also provides that the election to the office of President shall be held not earlier than 150 days and not later than 30 days before the expiration of the term of the last holder of that office. Similar provision is made in section 178 in respect of the office of Governor of a State. By section 285(5)15 of the Constitution, an election petition shall be filed within 21 days after the date of the declaration of the result of the elections. By subsection (6) an election tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of filing of the petition.

Subsection (7) provides that an appeal from a decision of an election tribunal or court of appeal in an election matter shall be heard and disposed of within 60 days from the date of delivery of the judgment of the tribunal or court of appeal. It must be noted that subsection (5) did not differentiate the elections referred to therein, which clearly included both Executive and Legislative elections.

The requirement of 21 days within which to commence such action is sacrosanct by this provision, otherwise the legal action lapses by limitation of time,16 and the claim or relief is lost. With the exception of the time to file a petition, a court or tribunal may extend the time within which to do any other thing under the Electoral Act,17 such as service by substituted means, etc.

It should also be noted that the rule under subsection (6), that is, the requirement of 180 days within which a tribunal is to deliver its judgment includes where there is trial de novo ordered on appeal.

In emphasising the settled and unbending nature of this provision, the Supreme Court in ANPP v. Goni18 held that the 180 days required for the conclusion of hearing of a petition is to be calculated from the date of filing. It cannot be extended or expanded or elongated or in any way enlarged. If what is to be done is not done within the time so fixed, it lapses as the court is robbed of jurisdiction to continue to entertain the matter.19 The breach is thus incurable.20

Interestingly, the time provided above for filing also include amendment of contents of the petition or reply as the case may be.21 Furthermore, is has also been held that the 60 days period allotted for the disposal of appeals arising from election petitions includes Saturdays, Sundays, public holidays and even Court vacations.22

It is obvious that the aim of these provisions is to cure the mischief of prolonged pre-election contests and election petitions which could see a party who rode to power illegitimately remaining in office at the detriment of the rightful owner of the mandate.

Background to the Problem of Timelines in Electoral Cases

With the clear aim to fast-track electoral cases in Nigeria, the Electoral Act of 1982, sections 129(3) and 140(3) provided the time-frame to hear and determine all electoral cases from the High Court (which was the court conferred with jurisdiction to hear such matters, including petition on election into the office of President/Vice President and members of Legislative Houses) to the apex court of the land.

The Act further provided that a petition filed before the High Court in respect of any election shall be disposed of by the Court not later than 30 days from the date of such election and any election petition not so disposed of shall be time-barred and such petition shall be deemed null and void.

An appeal from a decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal shall be disposed of within 7 days, while a further appeal to the Supreme Court shall also be heard and determined within 7 days, otherwise such appeals become abated in each case.

The opportunity to test this law presented itself in the famous case of Unongo v. Aku & Ors (((1983) 2 SCNJ 232)) and Kadiya v. Lar & Ors23 which emerged from the governorship election held throughout the country on 13th July, 1983. The facts of Unongo’s case are summarised as follows: the appellant contested the election with the 1st respondent who was then the incumbent governor of Benue State.

The 1st respondent was returned as having been elected as the winner of the election by the 3rd respondent. Aggrieved, the appellant lodged a petition at the High Court, Makurdi, claiming that the 1st respondent was not duly elected, and that he ought to have been declared winner instead. Several objections were raised and heard and eventually, the High Court struck out the petition on the grounds that the joinder of the governor was unconstitutional since he enjoys immunity under the constitution.

The court equally stated that the non-inclusion of the name and address of the petitioner for service was fatal to the petition. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellate court upturned the decision of the High Court on all grounds. However, the court could not grant the consequential relief of “restoring the petition and ordering a resumption of hearing in the trial court” on the ground that such an order would run foul of the provisions of section 140(2) of the Electoral Act, 1982, which prescribed a time limit for the determination of an election petition.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the effect of section 140(2) of the Electoral Act 1982 on the jurisdiction of the court and the principle of separation of powers were strongly canvassed. The Supreme Court did not hesitate to declared as null and void and unconstitutional the provisions of sections 129 and 140(3) of the 1982 Electoral Act on the grounds that it constituted an affront to the right to fair hearing of a petitioner, in addition to not allowing the court sufficient time to hear such matters within a reasonable period. This is pursuant to sections 1(3), 4 (8), 6 (6) (a) and (b), section 33(1) of the 1979 constitution which is in pari materia with section 1(3), 4 (8), 6 (6) (a) and (b), and section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). The apex court consequently ordered a retrial of the petition at the High Court.

In Kadiya’s case, the petition was filed on 29/8/83. Efforts to serve it personally on the 1st respondent (that is the incumbent governor) proved unsuccessful, hence, the petitioner applied for substituted service through a newspaper publication which was granted by the court. The order was made on 7/9/83 and the necessary publications appeared in the newspaper the following day.

The case was fixed for hearing on 12/9/83 which was the last day it could validly be heard, having regard to the stipulation in the Electoral Act for the petition to be disposed of within thirty days from the date of the election (in this case; 13/8/83). When the case came up for hearing on 12/9/93, objection was taken on behalf of the 1st respondent that it was not ripe for hearing because the 1st respondent had not filed his reply, which he was allowed six days to do from the date of service of the petition on him under section 135 of the Electoral Act.

The six days would not expire until 14/9/83. The objection was upheld by the election tribunal. The petition was accordingly struck out. On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the court held that they could have ordered a rehearing in the High Court, but for the provisions of sections 129(3) and 140 (2) of the Electoral Act 1982 to the effect that all such proceedings would abate after 30 days.

The issues created by the two cases, particularly Unongo case include the Supreme Court’s decision that any provision of the law limiting the time within which election petitions must be determined is unconstitutional. The subsequent amendments to the electoral law, chiefly, the Electoral Act of 1993, 2006 and 2010 as well as the 1999 constitution did not provide any time limit within which to finally dispose of electoral cases.

This development created another problem, resulting in protracted delays of such cases, that became the bane of democratic advancement of the nation. This problem among others led to the subsequent amendment to the Constitution which has now embodied the strict timelines outlines above.24

Delay in the dispensation of electoral justice leaves a sour taste in our electoral process.25 The cases of Ngige v. Obi,26 Fayemi v. Oni27 and Aregbesola & Ors v. Oyinlola & Ors among other famous decisions illustrate this challenge clearly, some of which are discussed below.

Critical Examination of the Effect of Delays in the Determination of Electoral Cases

Delays in the determination of political and electoral cases in Nigeria especially before now has had a lot of political and social effects. The consequences are quite overwhelming, although it may be argued by some that the effects may have also helped in the democratic advancement of the country one way or the other.

i. Staggered Elections

This is one of the striking effects arising from the protracted delays in the final determination of electoral cases from the judicial decisions emanating therefrom on the issue. This is a situation whereby States in the country have different dates or calendars for their gubernatorial elections, in what is now called off circle elections. The case of Chris Ngige v. Peter Obi28 highlights this problem clearly.

The appellant and respondent contested for the office of governor of Anambra State in the 2003 general election. However, the appellant was declared winner, and the respondent, who contested on the platform of the All Progressives Grand Alliance then headed to court to challenge the outcome.

His petition was filed on the 16th day of May, 2003 and he called 45 witnesses to prove his case. The Appellant on the other hand contested on the platform of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and called 425 witnesses.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) called 12 witnesses bringing the total to 437 witnesses for the defence of the petition. In all, 482 witnesses testified before the tribunal. The tribunal took more than two years to hear all the witnesses and delivered judgment on the 12th day of August, 2005.

The appeal came up for hearing on the 23rd day of January, 2006 and judgment was delivered on the 15th day of March, 2006. The Supreme Court nullified the election of the appellant and declared the respondent as the duly elected candidate. It also held that the tenure of the respondent would commence from the date he took oath of office in 2006.

This case lasted 35 months before it was finally determined which has brought about the staggered elections in Anambra as well other States with similar experience including Bayelsa, Edo, Osun, Ekiti, among others.

ii. Instability in Governance and Uncertainty in the Law

Delays in concluding electoral cases leads to instability on governance. Normally, electioneering campaigns comes with tensions in the polity arising from the struggle for power by the different political parties. After the elections have been conducted and a winner is announced, it is expected that stability will return.

However, where electoral cases arising from the election prolong in the courts, it usually heightens tensions as to a possible removal of a government newly inaugurated. This often leads to chaos and at times violence. There is also the problem of uncertainty in the law.

For instance, for a long time, there was uncertainty arising from misinterpretations as to real date of the commencement of the term of four years stipulated in the constitution for the office of governor where he takes oath of office on a date that runs short of four years for another round of general election. This was resolved in the Obi’s Case discussed above, leading to subsequent amendments of the constitution and judicial decisions that followed on the issue before it was finally laid to rest.

iii. Subversion of the People’s Will

A situation where a candidate who was not duly elected by the people is allowed to remain in office due to delay in determination of the rightful winner, is a subversion of the people’s will and choice of who governs them.

A government that does not emerge from credible election and popular acceptance cannot be said to be the people’s will. It is a hijack of power which is often the case, through violence, rigging and other malpractices. These irregularities constitute an afront to the tenets of democratic norms as obtainable all over the world.

Representative democracy as practiced in other climes recognises that sovereignty belong to the people from where government derives its legitimacy and authority. Legitimate governmental power must arise from the ballot and not through subversion or perversion. It also allows riggers and those with dubious mandate to hang on to power31.

Where electoral cases are concluded on time at least before handover, it will enthrone the rightful candidate and give him ample time to enjoy the mandate given him by the people who elected him.

iv. Corruption

When electoral cases are allowed to prolong in court, it breeds corruption and abuse of office especially where the government was not duly elected by the majority of the people as obtained in decent democracies. The institutions of government are often used to witch-hunt perceived enemies and opponents, suppress evidence, and threaten violence.

In order to prevent a lawful challenge of the election, some even go the extent of declaring a public holiday on a day when a judgment or ruling by an electoral panel suspected not be in their favour will be delivered.

Where time frame is fixed for election cases as in the present dispensation, such cases go on even on public holidays which may be excluded in order to meet up with the constitutionally allotted time to conclude such matters.

v. Loss of Confidence in the Electoral Process

A system which leaves room for uncertainty will often lead to loss of confidence by the electorate as to whether the ends of justice will indeed be 31 Kari, A.G.U., ‘Issues in Election Petition Adjudication in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: A Sociological Critique of the Role of the Judiciary’, Global Journal of Politics and Law Research, Vol.5, No.7, pp.75-87, December 2017, accessed last on 23/8/2021 at www.eajournals.org served. It makes those who are aggrieved or their supporters to seek alternative means of airing out their grievances. A learned writer captured it thus:

‘An electoral dispute resolution mechanism that is slow and technically inclined and does not deliver substantial justice adds to the pains of the people and slows down the entrenchment of democracy. It also corrupts the electoral process and leads people towards alternative and unconstitutional means of resolving electoral disputes’29.

This is in addition to the apathy in the entire trial process that is prone to needless delays. On other instance, the judiciary itself is put on trial as to whether it can indeed be able to salvage the system from collapse.

The win-at- all-cost syndrome of politicians and some legal practitioners puts the pressure on the judiciary which if not handled carefully will lead to total systemic breakdown.

Having considered the effects of delays in the determination of electoral cases, it is important to observe that electoral and political cases when concluded on the timelines provided has the capacity to aid in better understanding of democratic culture in Nigeria, in addition to enriching our political jurisprudence.

Sources of Delays in Determination of Electoral Cases in Nigeria

Some factors have been identified and discussed herein which are responsible for the problem of delay or prolonged electoral cases. Despite the recent amendments to the constitution, these challenges persist, and if not addressed, they will continue to undermine the electoral process in the country.

i. Constitutional Timeline for Conduct of Elections

Section 132 of the constitution provides that an election to the office of President shall be held on a date to be appointed by the Independent National Electoral Commission, and such date shall not be earlier than 150 days and not later than 30 days before the expiration of the term of office of the last holder of that office. Similar provision is also contained in section 178 in respect of the office of Governor of a State.

With these provision in minds, where an election is conducted 30 days before the expiration of the tenure of the current holder of the office for instance, even the tribunal is left with insufficient time of the 180 days provided to conclude a petition before the rightful winner assumes office. Put differently, with 180 days at the election Tribunal and a subsequent 60 days at the apex court (making it total of 240 days or about 8 month), a new government would have come into power whose mandate is being contested in court.

The mischief created by this provision leaves room for a candidate who rigged his way into political office and who eventually losses out to enjoy a part of the tenure belonging to the rightful winner, and at times even using the powers therein to oppress or challenge the candidate with the people’s mandate.

In most cases, with the resources of State, power, weight and prestige of the office, it is often difficult to upturn their election in favour of the right candidate.

According to Ubanyionwu, if statistics were to be taken of the number of petitioners who succeed against sitting governors, it will be found that a very infinitesimal number of petitioners achieve success in their election petition against sitting governors; none has ever succeeded against a sitting president.30

ii. The Electoral Body

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the body charged with the responsibilities and powers to organise, undertake and supervise all elections into specific political offices in Nigeria, that is, election to the office of President/Vice-President, Governor/Deputy Governor and members of Federal and State Legislative Houses.31)

In the discharge of this statutory functions, the electoral body is also the custodian of all documents and materials used by it in the conduct of elections. To prove its case on all grounds such as irregularity or corrupt practices for instance, a petitioner will require credible evidence to succeed.

In the bid to challenge the outcome of an election, a petitioner usually will join INEC as a party thus bringing its activities in the electoral process under scrutiny. One of the problems of the tribunals usually is the delay in the release of documents in INEC’s custody. In most cases until the close of the petitioner’s case such documents are never sited. This has affected the tribunal from properly delivering justice.32

In view of the practice of frontloading of documentary evidence and time limitation, this challenge becomes a bane of the system, and thus, most cases are often dead on arrival or needlessly delayed in search of evidence. Unfortunately, there have been allegations in the past that INEC wilfully withholds certain documents which may indict the Commission. While it is undeniable that INEC also has a duty to defend its action and activities including the conduct of elections, it is submitted that it has a legal obligation to maintain neutrality and assist the tribunal and court to discharge the mandate before it.

iii. Large Volume of Cases/Documents and Capacity of Panel Judges

Due to the nature of electoral cases, it is not uncommon to find a petition or their replies running into hundreds of pages, while appeals therefrom runs into thousands of pages and several heavy volumes stacked in sacks and bags as processes before the tribunals and court. All these voluminous documents are expected to be read and properly perused by the electoral panels before giving a ruling or final decision in a matter before it.

Most judges appointed to man the tribunals are rotated and most times find themselves unfamiliar with the practice and conduct of election petition tribunals. Although electoral cases are similar in many ways with the regular civil matters that come before the judges, lack of experience may affect justice delivery in view of the nature and technicality of documents and evidence which are presented before them, coupled with the short time within which the matter must be concluded. This is more so as the hearings are expected to conducted from day to day usually sitting until evening.

There is therefore the dire need for training and retraining of judicial officers regularly before electioneering seasons for optimum performance especially judges of High Court who are appointed chairman/members of respective panels. There is also the need to provide adequate facilities and materials to enable the judges perform well. For instance, provision of electronic facilities and well-equipped library with modern features is also key for their efficiency.

iv. Attitude of the Bar and Parties

The Bar no doubt plays an important role in the conduct of election petition as they represent the interest of litigants and parties. The Bar is therefore a crucial stakeholder in justice delivery.

One of major challenges faced by the tribunal is frivolous and baseless allegation and accusations from some lawyers. At times these leads to re-shuffling of the panel. And when this occurs, the new panel may have to start afresh to meet the requirement of law.

At other times, lawyers are caught in ploys aimed at wasting precious times, such as evasion of service, filing of frivolous processes, and appeals, and a host of others. The tendency of win at all cost by politicians and lawyers is another major problem which must be tackled.

v. The Tribunal Registry

The Registry of electoral tribunal is responsible for the administrative duties of the tribunal, which includes receipt of petition and other processes for filing, service of court processes timeously on parties, issuances of hearing notices, preparation of court proceedings and orders, custody and safekeeping of tribunal documents and exhibits, compilation of records, among others.

Some challenges associated with tribunal registry include ruthless demand for very high sum of monies for processing court orders and compilations, in some cases, needless delays in compilation of records, omission of important documents, unwillingness to carry out the tedious task associated with election petitions coupled with perception that election tribunal work is an opportunity to make money, hence, they are ready only to work with the higher paying side, which brings about partiality and affects the integrity of a panel. There is also the challenge of inadequate staff and absence of materials required for work, especially modern office facilities.33

Recommendations

Delays in the electoral process in Nigeria is the result of both systemic, social and direct human factors which can be tackled to bring about the much talked about reform in governance.

Looking at the sources of the problems highlighted in this paper, the following recommendations are made to that effect: First, an amendment of the constitution (particularly sections 76, 116, 132 and 178).

The amendment is basically to provide sufficient time in the electoral calendar to allow for conduct of the elections, the hearing of cases arising therefrom up to the point of appeal to the final court of law, before the expiration of the term of office of the current of holder of that office. This will prevent a situation where the term of a rightful owner as affirmed or declared by the court is encroached upon and expended during protracted election petition that linger into his term of office.

Similarly, the electoral calendar released by INEC should be early enough so that party primaries can be conducted timeously to allow sufficient time to pre-election matters to be concluded up to the apex court. it is suggested that there is need for an amendment of section 285(6) of the Constitution, to provide for exceptions to the 180 days rule for conclusion of petitions at tribunal level. The exception should accommodate rehearing and trial de novo. This will ensure that cases deserving extension of time to conclude them are not shut out which may clearly be due to no fault of the litigants and/or their counsel.

Secondly, the urgent to aggressively prosecute electoral offenders is hereby advocated. The Electoral Act 2022 proscribed several of such offences including under-age voting, voter intimidation, violence, improper use of voter’s card, disorderly conduct on election day, among others.34 The recent trends of vote buying and selling right at the polling centre, must be confronted headlong.

In some cases, security personnel posted at the boots turn a blind eye at such malpractices, and/or collude with politicians and their supporters. It is recommended that a special court just like the Election Tribunal be established in the Constitution to try such offenders, with a timeline within which the matter must be concluded.

To this end, a special Unit should be established under INEC to investigate electoral Offences and prosecute same or such unit may be established under the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) or Independent Corrupt and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). This will aid the reduction of growing electoral malpractices in Nigeria.

Thirdly, the need for the INEC to be responsive to its duties under the law cannot be over-emphasised, especially with regards to logistics and preparations for elections in Nigeria. The experience during the 2023 presidential election showed several lapses.

For instance, the inability of INEC to display the results on its IReV portal from the Collation Centres after being announced, scanned and sent, as stipulated in its Guidelines35 cannot be excused.

Whether arising from system breakdown, technical hitches, or other problems, it was avoidable, in view of the huge budgetary provisions for the elections. It cannot be over- emphasized that display of result as stipulated would promote transparency and boost confidence in the electoral process.

There is also the need to effective training of ad-hoc staff deployed for the election, as experience shows that some of them do not know hot properly use the relevant devices provided for the elections.

Fourthly, provision of secure and conducive environment for election tribunal members to sit and discharge their functions is also key as well as providing modern facilities and equipments for the registry.

The place of training and re- training of staff of the registry cannot also be over-emphasised. Above all, the parties who come before the courts must view themselves as stakeholders in the match towards enthronement of sound democratic culture in the body polity. To this end, needless and baseless allegations and petition must be avoided.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine the effect of delays in electoral cases in Nigeria. Some of the factors identified as responsible for the trend include timeline for elections, the challenge from electoral body, the volume of cases and document, capacity of electoral tribunals, etc.

The effect of delays includes staggered elections being witnessed in several States in the country, instability in governance and uncertainty in the law, subversion of the people’s will, corruption and host of others. Recommendations have also been made on the way forward in order to address the problem, particularly with regards to an amendment of relevant provisions of the constitution and the Electoral Act.

References

1. Okoye, F. “Do Elections Count?” Final Report of The 2003 General Elections in Nigeria Abuja: Transition Monitoring Group

2. Kari, A.G.U., ‘Issues in Election Petition Adjudication in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: A Sociological Critique of the Role of the Judiciary’, Global Journal of Politics and Law Research, Vol.5, No.7, pp.75-87, December 2017, accessed last on 23/8/2021 at www.eajournals.org

3. Oni, E.O., Fagbadebo, O.M., & Yagboyaju, D. A., ‘Democratic Practice and Governance in Nigeria’ accessed last on 23/8/2021 at www.researchgate .com

4. Tarfa, R. SAN, ‘Key Issues and Challenges of Electoral Tribunals in Nigeria’ assessed last on 21/10/2021 at www.rickeytarfa.com

5. Ubanyionwu, C.J., ‘Election Petition Cases and the Right to Fair Trial Within a Reasonable Time in Nigeria’ accessed on 23/8/2021 at google.com.


Image Credit: United Nations Development Programme


About Author

Chidiebere A. Akalugwu studied law at University of Abuja, Nigeria, and the Nigerian Law School, and was subsequently called to the Nigerian Bar. He has been engaged in rigorous legal practice since then. He is currently a serving Magistrate with the Imo State Judiciary. He was appointed in 2019.

  1. NEC) in respect of his participation in an election or who complains that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other law regulating elections in Nigeria has not been complied with by INEC in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates and participation in an election. ((It includes any such suit by a political party against INEC relating to non-compliance with the law of the election. []
  2. (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 456 []
  3. Omoiregbai v. Ogedengbe (2009) 44 WRN 136 at 162 []
  4. Chief Collins Obi v. Mbakwe (1984) NSCC Vol. 15, 127,326 []
  5. http://www.international-peace-and-conflict.org/Profiles/blogs/election []
  6. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 94) 323 at 347 []
  7. Ibid, per Uwais CJN (as he then was). See also the case of Abdulahi v. Elayo (1993) 1 NWLR 332, per Oguntade JCA (as he then was []
  8. (2009) 45 WRN 80 at 145 []
  9. Owoade JCA []
  10. Nnonyev.Anyichie(1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 60) 32. []
  11. (2011) 9 SCM 37 []
  12. Section 285(9) CFRN 1999 (as Amended); Garba v. APC (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1708) 345 at 360 []
  13. Toyin v. Musa (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1676) 22 []
  14. Section 285(11) and (12) CFRN 1999 (as amended); Toyin v. Musa (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1676) 22 []
  15. Amended by section 9 of the Second Alteration Act, 2010 []
  16. Kamba v. Bawa [2005] 4 NWLR (Pt. 914 43; Moghalu v. Ngige [2005] 4 NWLR (Pt. 914) 1 []
  17. Paragraph 45(1), 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022 []
  18. [2012] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1298) 147 []
  19. Nnonye v. Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR Pt. 60 at 32 []
  20. Oni, E.O., Fagbadebo, O.M., & Yagboyaju, D. A., ‘Democratic Practice and Governance in Nigeria’ accessed last on 23/8/2021 at www.researchgate.com []
  21. Paragraph 12, 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 []
  22. PDP & Ors v. CPC & Ors (2011) 9 SCM 37 []
  23. (1983) 11 SC 209 []
  24. See the First and Second Alteration Acts to the 1999 Constitution. []
  25. Ubanyionwu, C.J., ‘Election Petition Cases and the Right to Fair Trial Within a Reasonable Time in Nigeria’ accessed on 23/8/2021 at google.com. []
  26. (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1 []
  27. (2010) 48 WRN 30 []
  28. supra []
  29. Okoye, F. “Do Elections Count?” Final Report of the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria Abuja: Transition Monitoring Group []
  30. Ubayionwu, C.J., op. cit p. 10 []
  31. Paragraph 15, Part 1 of Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (As Amended []
  32. Tarfa, R. SAN, ‘Key Issues and Challenges of Electoral Tribunals in Nigeria’ assessed last on 21/10/2021 at www.rickeytarfa.com []
  33. Tarfa, R. SAN., op.cit. []
  34. See generally, sections 114 – 129, Electoral Act, 2022 []
  35. See particularly, Paragraph 38 of the Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, 2022. []

An Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine From an International Humanitarian Law Perspective – Muhammed Ceesay

An Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine From an International Humanitarian Law Perspective

ABSTRACT

The conflict in Ukraine has been raging for more than a year now, and it has resulted in deaths and injuries of thousands, destruction of critical infrastructure, and the halting fundamental services in Ukraine. It shall, therefore, be this paper’s object to analyse the conflict in Ukraine from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). International Humanitarian Law, also called jus in bello, seeks to protect those not or no longer participating in the hostilities, and further regulates the conduct of the parties to the hostilities by proscribing excessively injurious means and methods of warfare.

In analysing the conflict in Ukraine from an IHL perspective, special focus shall be had to the incidents in hotspots of the conflict in Ukraine, such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, among others, with great consideration to the basic principles underpinning IHL, including but not limited to distinction, limitation, precaution, and proportionality. In furtherance of this analysis, the paper shall further examine the legality or otherwise of the means and methods of warfare employed by the parties, especially in relation to engagements in civilian settlements. In particular, the paper shall point out some prohibited methods of warfare employed in Ukraine, such as sexual violence, pillaging and unlawful internments.

It shall as well identify the use of use of prohibited weapons such as cluster munitions and the effects of same on civilians. The paper further assesses the parties’ respect for protections accorded to cultural objects and the natural environment. The paper concludes that there indeed have been grave breaches of IHL in Ukraine, and has consequently, proffered several recommendations, including but not limited to further investigation as well prosecutions both at local and international judicial fora.

KEYWORDS: Civilians, Combatants/military, Armed conflict, International Humanitarian Law, Vladimir Putin, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Legality, Protected persons, Weapons

Introduction

This paper seeks to analyse the conflict in Ukraine from an International Humanitarian Law perspective. In so doing, regard shall be had to applicable laws such as the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, their Additional Protocols and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons among others; reports of human rights institutions as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, and such other works of eminent scholars pertinent to the subject under review.

Overview of International Humanitarian Law and its Application

Before analysing the conflict in Ukraine from an International Humanitarian Law perspective, it is imperative to first give an overview of International Humanitarian Law and its application. International Humanitarian Law, also called law of war, law of armed conflicts or jus in bello, can be defined as the body of law governing the conduct of armed conflict.1 International Humanitarian Law forms a major part of public international law and it comprises rules which, in times of war or armed conflict, seek to protect people who are not or are no longer taking part in the hostilities, and to restrict the means and methods of warfare employed.2 For humanitarian reasons, this body of law seeks to restrict the right of the parties to a conflict to use the means and methods of warfare of their choice, and protect people and property affected or liable to be affected.3 Thus, it could be said that International Humanitarian Law is a body of law that seeks to minimise suffering caused by war.4 International Humanitarian Law does this by protecting those not, or no longer, taking part in in the hostilities.4 This includes the sick and wounded, those caring for them, prisoners of war, and the civilian population.

International Humanitarian Law equally forbids belligerents from using weapons or tactics that will inflict unnecessary suffering on their enemies.5 Fundamentally, the principles of International Humanitarian Law are embodied in the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the Hague Conventions and customary international law. Geneva Convention I seeks to protect and accord basic guarantees to soldiers in the battlefields while Geneva Convention II operates in a similar fashion at sea. Geneva Convention III seeks to protect prisoners of war; it principally prohibits torture and other acts of cruelty on prisoners of war. Geneva Convention IV operates to protect the civilian populations in times of war, and in particular, prohibits acts of torture or violence against civilians. Addition Protocols I and II further widen and strengthen the protections in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The Hague Conventions, on the other hand, regulate the means and methods of warfare, principally means and methods that cause superfluous or unnecessary injury. These principles contained in the Geneva and Hague Conventions are further supplemented by the customary international law, which fills the gaps in existing principles, especially those touching on non-international armed conflict.

As defined in the preceding paragraph, International Humanitarian Law or jus in bello, as opposed to jus ad bellum, is concerned with regulating the conduct of armed conflict, rather than its commencement. International Humanitarian Law is not concerned with how a conflict started or who was to blame for it. Rather, it stipulates what forms of conduct are permissible once an armed conflict is going on. The distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum is of great significance. The objective of International Humanitarian Law is to set up a body of rules that applies consistently to all parties to an armed conflict. It thereby avoids the need to draw difficult and controversial distinctions between just and unjust conflict; it as well avoids passing judgements as to who is right and who is not. It simply applies the same fundamental principles—guarantees and responsibilities—to all of the parties to the conflict. For this reason, my analysis of the conflict in Ukraine shall not, therefore, be on the justness or otherwise of the conflict; instead, it shall fundamentally be on the conduct of the parties to the conflict.

Background of the Conflict in Ukraine

On 24th February, 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, declared the launching of a “special military operation” to “seek the demilitarisation and de-Nazification” of Ukraine.6 On the same date, the Russian armed forces crossed various border points into Ukraine, including from Belarus, and launched a full-scale land, sea and air invasion of Ukraine.7 Shortly thereafter, missile and shelling attacks began against multiple Ukrainian cities. In a distinct statement on the 22nd February, 2022, President Putin claimed that goal of the goal of the operation was to demilitarise8 Although these grievances included the long simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the shape of post-Cold War security architecture in Europe, Putin’s speech centred on a much more fundamental issues, such as the identity and statehood of Ukraine.4 In the preceding days, Mr. Putin had recognised the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, in eastern Ukraine, as independent republics. It was after this bizarre move that the Federation Council of Russia subsequently approved the military operation in Ukraine.9

Following the Russian Federation’s declaration of war and launching military offensives in Ukraine, there had been several calls for cessation of the hostilities from international organisations, States, and provincial bodies.10 At the United Nations level, for instance, after a draft resolution demanding that the Russian Federation cease its military offensive against Ukraine failed to pass in the Security Council due to a veto by the Russian Federation, the General Assembly, in its resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022, demanded that the Russian Federation immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all its military forces from the territory of Ukraine. ((ibid, supra note 14)) On March 16th, 2022, the International Court of Justice ordered in unequivocal terms the Russian Federation to suspend its military operation in and against Ukraine. ((ibid)) States and provincial bodies have equally condemned the operation, called for an immediate cessation and imposed far-reaching sanctions on and other measures against the Russian Federation.4

However, notwithstanding the condemnations and calls for cessation, the hostilities in Ukraine rages.11 In response, the Ukrainian authorities had declared martial law and ordered a general mobilisation.12 Military strikes using explosive weapons, such as cluster munitions, had been launched by the armed forces of the Russian Federation across Ukraine, including in areas situated far from the frontlines, causing significant civilian casualties and large-scale destruction of residential buildings and critical infrastructure.4 Civilian casualties continue to grow.13 Since the beginning of the war in February, 2022, thousands of civilians have been affected by the war—have either been displaced, wounded or killed—and critical civilian objects have been destroyed or damaged.14 As at 17th October, 2022, United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights had recorded 6,306 people killed and 9,602 wounded in all of Ukraine since 24 February 2022. From 24th February to 31st March 2022, in the four provinces Kyiv, Kharviv, Chernihiv and Sumy, 1,237 civilians, including 112 children, were killed, according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk. Actual figures are likely to be much higher.4

In Ukraine, months of fighting have gravely impacted the country’s infrastructure, with thousands of residential buildings, as well as medical and education facilities, destroyed or severely damaged.4 As of mid-October, 2022, millions had lost homes and livelihoods, and were forced to flee. Over 7 million people from Ukraine have sought refuge abroad and over 6 million are internally displaced.15 In most of the affected areas within Ukraine, essential supplies are lacking, and there are access challenges for humanitarian assistance. The foregoing facts apparently establish prima facie violation of International Humanitarian Law, particularly its basic principles of distinction, limitation, proportionality, and necessity among others.4 In this respect, the subsequent parts of this paper shall be devoted to analysing the conflict in Ukraine, mindful of the facts by the investigative bodies, from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law. Evidently, the ongoing hostilities have hampered people’s enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.4 Countless allegations of violations and abuses of International Humanitarian Law and related crimes have been reported.4 On 28 February 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened an investigation into allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.4 Numerous other international and national entities have initiated investigations of allegations of violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in Ukraine.4

Does the Conflict in Ukraine Qualify as an ‘Armed Conflict’?

The application of the principles of International Humanitarian Law is conditioned on the existence of an armed conflict. In the jurisdiction case of Prosecutor v. Tadic,16 the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted that for International Humanitarian Law to apply, “there must be an armed conflict.”17 In light of the foregoing, it is, therefore, imperative to first establish whether or not the conflict in Ukraine qualifies as an armed conflict before analysing the said conflict from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides that the Geneva Conventions (the core treaties on International Humanitarian Law) apply to “all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them.” ((Article 2 Common to all the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949)) Common Article 2 further states that the provisions of the Conventions also apply in cases of total or partial occupation of a State party’s territory, even if the occupation is not met with resistance. Clarifying the definition under Common Article 2, the ICTY Appeal Chamber, in the case of the Prosecutor v. Tadic,16 noted that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed force between States…”18 Given the fact that there is resort to armed force between Russia and Ukraine—coupled with President Putin’s formal declaration of war on 24th February, 202219—there is indeed an armed conflict in Ukraine, which, by virtue of the parties involved, is of an international character, and for this reason, parties to the hostilities in Ukraine are fully bound by the principles of International Humanitarian Law, particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols as well the Hague Conventions20 and the relevant customary international law principles. In particular, parties to the hostilities in Ukraine are obliged to ensure humane treatment of vulnerable groups, and refrain from the use of excessively injurious means and methods of warfare.

Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine from the Perspective of IHL

Under International Humanitarian Law, there are some cardinal principles that regulate the conduct of the belligerents in a situation of armed conflict.5 These principles, among others, include distinction, proportionality, precaution, and humanity—all of which are embedded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, as well as customary international law. My analysis of the conflict in Ukraine shall, therefore, be underpinned by a great and coherent consideration of the principles of International Humanitarian Law:

Distinction

First and foremost, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, it is my observation that the principle of distinction has not been fully respected by the parties to the conflict.21 This fundamental principle obliges military commanders to distinguish, in their operation, between civilians and civilian objects on one hand and combatant and military objectives on the other hand.22 Article 48 of Additional Protocol I makes it clear that this principle takes the form of an absolute prohibition. Article 48 provides that the parties to an armed conflict “shall at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives and […] shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” ((Article 48 of Additional Protocol I)) Based on the report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine23 and the statement of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 3rd March, 2023 at the 52nd Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, I believe that the principle of distinction has not been complied with so far as the conflict in Ukraine is concerned. According to its report, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, for instance, highlighted that“[r]esidential buildings, schools and hospitals, among other parts of civilian infrastructure, have been damaged or destroyed.”24 The Commission further found that Russian armed forces “had shot at civilians attempting to flee, and during the conduct of hostilities, the parties had deployed their military assets and troops in ways that endanger civilians, in contravention of international humanitarian law.”4 Apparently, the foregoing facts, as accounted by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, constitute a grave violation of International Humanitarian Law, particularly the principle of distinction, which, as codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, requires distinction of military and non-military objectives from civilians and civilian objectives. Further, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk, recognised that severe violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have become shockingly a routine [in the conflict in Ukraine].25 Part of the “severe violations”4 of “international humanitarian law” ((ibid)) High Commissioner Volker Turk referred to was the violations of the principle of distinction, confirming my averments above. According to High Commissioner Turk, his Office (i.e the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) has “verified more than 8, 4000 civilian deaths, and over 14, 000 civilians wounded, since 24 February 2022.”4 He further stated that most of the “casualties”4 resulted from Russian forces’ use of wide-impact explosive weaponry in “residential neighbourhoods.”4 Corroboratively, the investigations of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine also revealed that that “[a]ttacks with explosive weapons had a devastating effect on buildings and infrastructure. Thousands of residential buildings, schools, hospitals and facilities hosting essential infrastructure in the four provinces have been damaged or destroyed.”26 The said Commission further observed first-hand the extent of the damage in all twenty-seven (27) settlements it visited.4 In Chernihiv, for instance, the Commission observed dozens of houses and other buildings that had been destroyed or damaged during the attempt by Russian armed forces to take the city. In Kharkiv, similarly, explosive weapons devastated entire areas of the city. ((ibid))

Additionally, on 16th March, 2022, several munitions, including unguided rockets, struck an area in Chernihiv where more than two hundred (200) civilians were queuing for bread near a supermarket and killed at least fourteen (14) civilians and injured twenty-six (26).27 Furthermore, significant civilian harm, both in terms of casualties and damage to buildings and infrastructure, resulted from indiscriminate airstrikes using multiple unguided bombs in populated areas. On 3rd March, 2022, an airplane dropped several unguided bombs on a residential area near the intersection of Chornovola and Kruhova streets in the city of Chernihiv, killing at least fourteen (14) civilians and injuring dozens.4 The Commission saw large craters and destruction, indicating that at least six munitions struck within an area of about 130 metres, causing significant damage to the infrastructure. Around the same time, also in Chernihiv, an airplane dropped several unguided bombs in the Podusivka district, about 2 kilometres east of the first attack, killing at least six civilians, including one child.4 The impact of the attack spanned over 500 metres and affected a large area, which included two schools and residential buildings.4 These disturbing accounts of indiscriminate use of destructive and wide-impact explosive weapons in civilian settlements and residential neighbourhood is a blatant violation of the principle of distinction, and such, a violation of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. In Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic et al.,28 the Trial Chamber of the ICTY noted that the extensive damage to civilian property and civilian infrastructure, the number of civilians displaced or forced to flee clearly indicate that the attack was carried out in an indiscriminate way, and as such, violated international law.29

Limitation

In addition to the parties’ lack of respect for the principle of distinction, from the facts revealed by investigative bodies such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, it is my observation thatthe fundamental principle of limitation has also been greatly and gravely disregarded by the parties to the conflict in Ukraine.30 The principle of limitation, in the simplest sense, seeks to restrict the parties to a conflict from resorting to means and methods of warfare that can cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering to the combatants and severe damage to the natural environment. This principle is embedded in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I,31 which provides that in an armed conflict such as the one in Ukraine, the right of the parties to choose the means and methods of warfare is not unlimited. Notwithstanding this principle, inquiries into the conflict in Ukraine reveal that means and methods with exceedingly superfluous injurious effects have been used by the parties to the conflict in Ukraine. According to its investigations of the events in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions in late February and March, 2022, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine23 established that “[t]he the relentless use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas has killed and injured scores of civilians and devastated entire neighbourhoods. The Commission documented indiscriminate attacks using cluster munitions, unguided rockets and airstrikes in the context of attempts by Russian armed forces to capture towns and smaller settlements. The Commission further noted that these weapon system caused significant harm to the civilians. Indeed, most of the verified deaths since the outset of the hostilities have been caused by these weapons”32 From the foregoing, it could be said that parties to the conflict in Ukraine, most especially the Russia forces, do not respect the principle of limitation.

Proportionality

Aside the parties’ violation of the principles of distinction and limitation, I hold the view that a close examination of the conduct of the hostilities in Ukraine also reveals that the principle of proportionality has be repeatedly, systemically and blatantly violated by the parties. According to the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic,33 the principle of proportionality is inherent in the competing requirements of humanity and military necessity, and can be derived from Articles 15 and 22 of the Lieber Code, and Article 24 of the Hague Air Warfare Rules of 1924, with Article 51 (5) (b) and Article 57(2) (a) (iii) and (b) of Additional Protocol I providing the modern conventional version of the rule. The principle of proportionality, as contained in Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol I, prohibits attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” ((Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol I)) This principle has, however, not been respected in Ukraine. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as at 24th February, 2022, his Office has recorded more than 8,400 civilian deaths, and over 14, 000 civilian wounded in Ukraine.34 Most of these civilian deaths and injuries, according to High Commissioner Turk, occurred as a result of the “relentless use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas.”4 This, apparently, violates the principle of proportionality, which, according to learned author Jonathan Crowe,35 regulates harmful side effects of legitimate military attacks.36 The doctrine of proportionality holds the status of customary international law, and it places an obligation on forces to assess the impact of an attack on civilian objects and refrain from attacking if the principle would be violated.37 In Ukraine, the principle of proportionality has violated, as there have been examples of both parties to the armed conflict, although to different degrees, failing to protect civilians or civilian objects against the effects of attacks, by locating military objects and forces within or near densely populated areas.

Precaution

Furthermore, it is also my observation that an analysis of the conflict in Ukraine also shows that the principle of precaution has not been fully adhered to by the parties to the conflict in Ukraine.38 The principle of precaution requires parties to a conflict to take constant care to spare the civilian population and civilian objects.39 In other words, the principle requires parties to take all feasible precaution to avoid, and in any event, to minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.4 In this regard, parties must carefully select their targets, means and methods of attack, time of attack as well as evaluate the effects of an attack and ensure that advanced warnings are given to the civilian population. ((ibid)) However, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, the principle of precaution has been blatantly and flagrantly offended on several occasions. In its report to the Human Rights Council, for instance, the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine noted that “several attacks with explosive weapons it investigated were indiscriminate and that feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm were not taken, in violation of international humanitarian law.”40 The said Commission41 goes further to clarify that “[i]ndiscriminate attacks are those which are not directed at a specific military objective or employ method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective or the effects of which cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law.”42 As per the account of the Commission, the principle of precaution has not been fully observed by the parties to the conflict. In the city of Chernihiv, for instance, when the Russian armed forces surrounded the city between 25th February and 31st March, 2022, multiple indiscriminate attacks with use of explosive weapons occurred.27 Similar attacks occurred in Sumy in the context of repeated attempts by Russia armed forces to seize the city through ground battles and airstrikes.4 All of these said attacks are indiscriminate and as such, violate the principle of precaution.

Military Necessity

In addition to violation the principle of precaution, an account of the facts surrounding the conflict in Ukraine further shows that the principle of military necessity has not been fully respected by the parties to the conflict in Ukraine.43 According to the principle of military necessity, a party making an attack is permitted to use only a degree of force required to achieve the anticipated military objective that will result in minimum loss of life and property.44 However, this principle has been blatantly disregarded by the parties to the conflict, particularly the Russian forces. ((ibid, supra note 80)) To illustrate, on 7th March, 2022, in the city of Sumy, an airstrike dropped at least two bombs on a residential area, killing at least fifteen (15) civilians and injuring six (6).45 The Commission saw two impact sites, where six houses were entirely destroyed. ((ibid)) Other residential buildings were significantly damaged in a radius of more than 100 meters from where the bombs landed.4 The only potential military objective identified in the vicinity was a mobilization office, which, according to residents, was not in use at that time. ((ibid)) This apparently shows that the principle of military necessity has not been fully respected by the parties at some point. In Prosecutor v. Naser Oric,46 the Trial Chamber of the ICTY noted that the doctrine of military necessity “cannot extend to wanton destruction of civilian property, such as houses, as well as barns and outbuildings.”47

Humanity

To sum it up with the principles, it is my opinion that a violations of all the above principles in Ukraine naturally results to the violation of the principle of humanity. The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.48 However, the reports and findings of investigative bodies such as the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine show prima facie violations of the principle of humanity. The Independent Commission, for instance, documented acts of torture of prisoners of war and interned civilians, extra-judicial or summary executions of the said persons, wanton destruction of civilian objects, and the use of excessively injurious means and methods, resulting to significant avoidable loss of civilian lives and property. ((ibid, supra note 86, at p. 16)) These facts, as reported, clearly violates the principle of humanity.

The Conflict in Ukraine and Protected Persons

International Humanitarian Law accords, in times of armed conflict, protection to civilians and other vulnerable groups. The protection of civilians in hands of the enemy or occupying power is addressed by Part III of Geneva Convention IV through what is known as the “protected persons regime.”49 Part III of Geneva Convention IV contains a detailed scheme for protecting the rights the rights of persons who find themselves under the control of a foreign or enemy power.4 The Protections under Part III of Geneva Convention IV extend to “protected persons”, defined in Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV as persons who “in any manner whatsoever find themselves, in the case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”50 The requirement that persons be “in the hands of Party to the conflict”4 has been interpreted broadly by international tribunals, such as the ICTY in Tadic.51 It does not require that the persons in question be physically detained. ((ibid)) It is enough that such persons are located in the territory that is under the control of a party to the conflict or another occupying power.52 The protected person persons regime aims to ensure that civilians who find themselves in the hands of the enemy power are afforded certain fundamental guarantees.4 They are entitled to respect for their person, honour, family rights, religious practices and customs. ((ibid)) They are to be treated humanely and be protected against all acts or threats of violence, insults and public curiosity. However, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, these basic protections accorded to civilians and other protected persons have not been fully respected. ((ibid, supra note 60)) The Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and the findings of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine4 reveal that civilians have been treated inhumanely, subjected to threats of violence, insults and public curiosity. ((ibid)) Worse, investigations further reveal that some civilians have been interned, tortured and even extra-judicially executed.4 In particular, violation and brutalisation of protected persons in Ukraine, among many other diverse forms, take the following forms:

Internment of civilians

In Ukraine, civilian persons have been subjected to unnecessary internments, in violation of International Humanitarian Law. ((ibid, at p. 8)) Internment of civilians was an infamous feature of World War II and led to widespread mistreatment.51 International Humanitarian Law permits the internment of civilians only in cases where it is necessary for imperative security reasons.53 Article 79 of Geneva Convention IV provides that protected persons shall not be interned except for imperative security reasons or due to the commission of an offence. However, as per the statement of the UN Higher Commissioner for Human Rights at 52nd Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva and the findings of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, there has been several unnecessary internments of civilians in Ukraine. In Yahidne and Chernihiv, for instance, some 365 civilians were confined in the basement of a school.54 This, apparently, violates Article 79 of Geneva Convention IV. Furthermore, even if the internment is justified, measures must be taken to ensure that shelter, hygiene, safety and nutrition for such interned persons.55 In paragraph 79 of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, it is documented that internees had limited access to food, water, medical care and other basic necessities.56

Displacement of civilians

Furthermore, there is also evidence of forcible transfer of civilians, which is also a violation of International Humanitarian Law.57 International Humanitarian Law protects civilians from being forcibly deported or displaced, or transferred for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians or imperative military reasons require it.58 This is a fundamental principle is set out in Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV. However, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, this principle has not been fully respected. In paragraph 80 of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the Commission recorded that after initial detention in Ukraine, several persons were forcibly and unlawfully deported or transferred through Belarus, or directly, to the Russian Federation.59 This is clearly violates Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV.

Lack of Care for Wounded and Sick Civilians

Part II of Geneva Convention IV provides special protections for the wounded and sick, and applies not only to protected persons, but to the whole population of countries in conflict.60 The application of this Part of Geneva Convention IV is not, therefore, conditioned on considerations of nationality or relationship with a party to the conflict.

Article 8 of Additional Protocol I defines sick and wounded persons as those who, due to trauma, disease or other physical or other mental disability, are in need of assistance or care and who refrain from any form any act of hostility.61 Articles 6 and 10 of Additional Protocol I extend similar protections to infirm persons and expectant mothers. In Ukraine, however, notwithstanding these rules, sick and wounded persons, including children, have not been properly assisted or cared for, owing to the parties’, mostly Russian forces’, indifference about their plights. In paragraph 102 of its Report, the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found that some seventy (70) children, some of whom sick, were confined in the basement of a school in Yahidne for 28 days without access to any form of medical assistance.62 In addition, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 9, 602 wounded in all of Ukraine since 24th February, 2022, and most of these wounded individuals were not given medical care.63

The Means and Methods: To What Extent Do the Parties Adhere to the Rules?

As outlined in the opening segment of this paper, in addition to protecting the people who are not or no longer taking part in the hostilities, International Humanitarian Law also seeks to restrict the means and methods of warfare.64 This is in accordance with Article 22 of the Hague Regulations, which provides that the means and methods of warfare are not unlimited; in particular, means and methods that cause superfluous and unnecessary injuries to civilians and/or severe damage to the natural environment are prohibited.65 However, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, this fundamental principle is largely not respected, as the parties, albeit to a varying degree, employ means and methods prohibited by International Humanitarian Law. ((ibid, supra note 60)) These prohibited means and methods employed by the parties to the conflict in Ukraine include starvation, sexual violence, forceful deportation, the use of monition clusters and the use of landmines.4 The said means and methods are distinctly examined below:

a. The Prohibited Methods of Warfare Employed in Ukraine

On the prohibited methods, Article 54 of Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks against objects essential to the survival of the civilian population. Notwithstanding this, forces in Ukraine have attacked objects that are essential to the survival of civilian population. In Ukraine, the conflict—fighting in and attacks of cities—affected a significant part of establishments indispensable to civilian survival.66 To exemplify, several hospitals, which have protected status under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, have been destroyed or damaged by shelling. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, in its report to the Human Rights Council, documented damage or destruction of five hospitals, three (3) in Chernihiv, one (1) in Sumy and one (1) in Kharkiv—four of the said hospitals were operational at the time they were hit by explosive weapons.67 In addition to this, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine revealed that the confinement of civilians by soldiers resulted to the former’s lack of access to food, water, and other basic necessities. ((ibid, at p. 14)) This is apparently against Article 54 of Additional Protocol I, which prohibits starvation as a method of warfare.

Furthermore, the use of human shields was another prohibited method of warfare employed in Ukraine. According to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, “in several cases, Russian armed forces appear to have deliberately position their troops or equipment in residential areas or near civilians to reduce the likelihood of attack.”68 In the village of Kozarovychi, for instance, in the Kyiv Province, an old woman reported that when the Russian armed forces arrived there in late February, soldiers came to her house with orders to find hiding places for their vehicles. ((ibid, at p. 20)) Similarly, in the village of Lypivka, in Kyiv Province, a woman and her daughter said that when the Russian armed forces occupied the area on 28th February, soldiers parked one military vehicle identified as a tank next to their house while the woman and her daughter hid in the basement. ((ibid)) The Russian forces used a similarly tactic in March, 2022, in the village of Yahidne, in Chernihiv Province, where they placed military vehicles between civilian houses and fired at Ukrainian positions from civilians’ backyards.4 Additionally, the soldiers also confined some three hundred and sixty-five (365) civilians in the basement of a school, while they established their headquarters on the ground-floor of the same building, and launched attacks on Ukrainian positions from the ground-floor of the school, placing hundreds of civilians confined in the building at significant risk. ((ibid, supra note 124)) This apparently amounts to the use of human shields and as such, qualifies as a prohibited method of warfare.

In addition, sexual violence was another prohibited method of warfare employed in Ukraine. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine victims, ranged from forty (40) to eighty (80) years, have been subjected to rape. (( ibid, at p. 16)) In Kyiv Province, for instance, in March, 2022, two Russian soldiers entered a home, raped a 22-year-old woman multiple times, committed acts of sexual violence on her husband and forced the couple to have sexual intercourse in their presence. ((ibid, at pp. 16-17)) Worse of it all, one of the said soldiers forced their 4-year-old to perform oral sex on him.4 In another village in Kyiv Province, at the beginning of March, 2022, a Russian soldier entered the house of a 50-year-old woman, and raped her after shooting dead her husband who tried to intervene.4 In Chernihiv and another province, the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine reported that there have been allegations of rape of 80 and 83-year-old women in Ukraine.4

Forcible deportation is another prohibited method of warfare employed in Ukraine, mostly by the Russian armed forces. In paragraph 80 of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the Commission documented that several individuals were unlawfully detained and subsequently forcibly transferred through Belarus, or directly, into the Russian Federation.69 This forcible transfer of civilians is a prohibited method of warfare and a violation of Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV.

b. The Prohibited Weapons Used in Ukraine

In addition to the use of the prohibited methods of warfare discussed above, the parties to the conflict in Ukraine equally use, although to a varying degree, weapons that are prohibited under International Humanitarian Law. ((Mary Wareham, Intense and Lasting Harm Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukrain (Human Rights Watch, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118-3299 USA) available at www.hrw.org/report/2022/05/11/intense-and-lasting-harm/cluster-munition-attacks-ukraine accessed on 4th July, 2023 at 11:05 am)) According to an investigation conducted by Human Rights Watch, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February, 2022, the Russian forces have used at least six (6) types of cluster munitions in attacks that have resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects, including homes, hospitals and schools. ((ibid)) Similarly, there is evidence of Ukrainian forces using cluster munitions at least once.4 For the Russian forces, the exact number of times they used cluster munitions is not known, but hundreds of have been documented, reported or alleged to have occurred, mostly in densely populated civilian settlements.4 In the city of Mykolaiv, for instance, Russian forces launched cluster munition rockets into densely populated areas on 7th, 11th, and 13th  March, 2022, killing and injuring civilians, and damaging civilian objects, such as homes, businesses, and private vehicles.4 The use of munition rockets on March 13 killed nine (9) people who were waiting in queue a cash machine.4 The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits the use of cluster munitions due to their indiscriminate effects and the long-lasting danger they pose to the civilian population.70 The said Convention on Cluster Munition provide a comprehensive ban on cluster weapons and require the destruction of stockpiles, clearance of the areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, and assistance to victims.71 However, as the date of writing this paper,72 neither Russia nor Ukraine is among the Convention’s 110 State Parties.73 Notwithstanding this, and with full regard to the general principle of treaty law embedded in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (non-binding nature of unratified treaties), it is my belief that the use of cluster munitions in populated areas invariably violates International Humanitarian Law in that it falls under the category of weapons that cannot distinguish or discriminate between civilians and combatants.

In addition to the use of cluster munitions, the use of landmines in Ukraine have equally been documented. According to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, a total of 98, 864 items of unexploded ordnance, including submunitions and landmines have been cleared and destroyed in the war, as at May 9, 2022. ((ibid)) The Human Rights Watch further reported that during the first week of the conflict (between 24th February-3rd March, 20222), twenty-nine (29) workers were killed while doing demining and other related work and seventy-three (73) injured. ((ibid)) According to the findings of Human Rights Watch and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Monitoring Mission, both Ukraine and Russia have use landmines in earlier conflicts in July 2014 and February 2015 in Ukraine.4 The use of such weapons is against the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997).74 Aside the said instruments, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,75 stated that States must “never use weapons that are incapableof distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”76 The ICTY has consistently followed the same approach.77

Protection of Cultural Sites, Edifices and Objects in Context of the Conflict

In addition to protecting civilians and their objects, International Humanitarian Law equally accords protection to objects and sites with that have cultural significance.78 For quite a long time, protecting culturally significant objects and buildings from warfare has been a concern of International Humanitarian Law.4 According to Article 27 of the Hague Regulations, “all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purpose [and] historic monuments.” ((Article 27 of the Hague Regulations)) Article 53 of Additional Protocol I provides for a similar protection, providing that “it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples…”79 However, in Ukraine, the said rules are not fully respected by the parties to the conflict. According to Human Rights Watch, the Russian armed forces and civilians operating under their command pillaged thousands of valuable artefacts and artworks from two museums, cathedral, and a national archive in Kherson, before withdrawing after an eight-month occupation of the said city. ((Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Russians Pillage Kherson Cultural Institutions available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/20/ukraine-russians-pillage-kherson-cultural-institutions accessed on 6th July, 2023, at 23:50)) Further, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, its armed forces have repeatedly looted cultural items—including paintings, gold, silver, ancient Greek artefacts, religious icons and historical documents—from at least five cultural institutions in Ukraine.4 When the Russian armed forces occupied the region between March 2nd to November 11th, 2022, the said forces pillaged the Kherson Regional Art Museum, the Kherson Regional Museum, St. Catherine’s Cathedral, and the Kherson Regional National Archives.4 Evidently, the forgoing accounts establish grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law and even amount war crimes as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. ((ibid)) Rule 40 of the International Commission of Red Cross Study on customary international humanitarian law provides that wilful damage, theft or vandalism of cultural property is prohibited. ((Rule 40 of the ICRC Study on customary international humanitarian law)) Similarly, Article 4 (1) of the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property obliges parties to refrain from acts that would expose cultural property to “destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict.”80

Environmental Protection in Ukraine

In addition to the protection of persons and objects, International Humanitarian Law equally embodies rules that protect the natural environment from consequences of armed attack.81 Some of these principles protect the natural environment in its own rights while others protect the environment in light of its importance to the health and welfare of civilians.4 Article 35 of Additional Protocol I prohibits means and methods of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.82 In Ukraine, although not yet established, there have been allegation of use of chemical weapons. Such allegations, if supported with the required evidence, constitute violations of International Humanitarian Law, as the use of chemical weapons is indeed a great threat to the natural environment. In addition, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights has raised concerns over a nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia being at enormous risk, with potential hazardous impact on millions of people within and outside Ukraine. Parties to the conflict should be mindful of prohibition on attacks against dangerous forces such as nuclear power plants. ((ibid, supra note 45))

Distinctive Emblems: How Respected?

Articles 39, 43, and 18 of Geneva Convention I, Geneva Convention II and Additional Protocol I, respectively, require the distinctive emblems to be displayed on the flags and other equipment of medical services. Articles 40, 42, and 18 of Geneva Convention I, Geneva Convention II, and Additional Protocol I require medical personnel to bear such emblems on armlets and identity cards. The said provisions of the Geneva Conventions accord protection to objects bearing any of the recognised distinctive emblems. This protection operates against indiscriminate attacks and wanton destruction of such objects.83 These protected objects, among others, include hospitals, medical equipment, and medical personnel.4 However, so far as the conflict in Ukraine is concerned, it is very obvious from the findings of investigative bodies that the protections accorded to these said objects bearing distinctive emblems has not been fully respected. In paragraphs 36, 40, 41 & 48 of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the Commission documented several attacks and destructions of hospitals. Some these hospitals—in regions such as Cherniv, Sumy and Kharkiv—were operational at the time they were struck by cluster munitions, and that resulted in the injury and even death of both medical personnel and their patients as well as destruction of key medical equipment.84 This clearly violates Article 18 of Geneva Convention IV, which provides that hospitals and their staff shall be protected.

Elements of Non-International Armed Conflict in Ukraine

In Ukraine, although most media reports and findings of investigative bodies are focused on the international armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, a deeper and more careful analysis of the conflict would show that, although overshadowed by the international armed conflict, there are also elements of non-international armed conflict in Ukraine.85 In 2013, protests erupted in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, against the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to reject a deal for greater economic integration with the European Union, and such protests were met with violent crackdown by the Ukrainian security agents. The protests widened, escalating the conflict, and President Yanukovych fled the country in February 2014.4 In March 2014, the crisis heightened the ethnic divisions in Ukraine, and the pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk held their own independence referendums. Armed conflict in the regions quickly broke out between the Russian-backed forces and the Ukrainian armed forces. This conflict transitioned to an active stalemate, with regular shelling and skirmishes occurring along frontlines separating and Ukrainian controlled eastern border regions. Apparently, this conflict meets the criteria of non-international armed conflict as defined in Article 1 of Additional Protocol II. In consequence, the protections under Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 fully apply. As such, the parties to the conflict are bound, as a minimum, to refrain from all acts of torture and violence against protected persons, including those placed hors de combat;86 outrages upon personal dignity;4 and taking of hostages are prohibited in the context of the non-international armed conflict.4

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, the above analysis on the conflict in Ukraine shows that there have been grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law, particularly the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949. With distinct precision and remarkable accuracy, my analysis has pointed out violations of the fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law, including, but not limited to, distinction, precaution, proportionality, limitation and military necessity. The indiscriminate bombardment and shelling with wide-area impact destructive explosive weapons of civilian settlements and objects in Ukrainian cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv among others, as documented by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, amount to grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law. Similarly, the use of means and methods of warfare excessively injurious to both humans and the natural environment is equally amounts to a violation of basic International Humanitarian Law principles. These flagrant and blatant breaches of International Humanitarian Law are not unnoticed and must not go unpunished. With a view to ensuring accountability for breaches of International Humanitarian Law in Ukraine and undoing the effects of the conflict as far as practically possible, I herein below recommend the following:

Conduct further independent Inquiry on Ukraine

In addition to the preliminary findings made by the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, I recommend, with support from the United Nations, more robust and detailed investigations be conducted on the conflict in Ukraine, with the ultimate aim of holding perpetrators to account. It is my candid opinion that further independent investigations to unearth the whole truth about what transpired in Ukraine will reveal more perpetrators that are currently identified and will ease their prosecution.

Prosecution by the International Criminal Court

After further independent investigations are conducted to establish the full extent and nature of the violations of International Humanitarian Law in Ukraine, the principal perpetrators responsible for the gravest breaches of International Humanitarian Law should be indicted and arrest warrants issued against them for their prosecution at the International Criminal Court. The findings of the independent investigative bodies referred to above reveal facts amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, all of which meet their respective elements as defined in the Rome Statute. However, I must note that there may be obstacles in relation to the territorial and temporal reach of the Court’s jurisdiction, since both the Russian Federation and Ukraine are note parties to the Rome Statute as at the day of writing this paper.

Establishment of a Hybrid Court

Where prosecutions at the International Criminal Court as recommended above proves impossible for whatever reason, I recommend, as an alternative, the establishment of a hybrid court modelled on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the prosecution of the perpetrators responsible for the most serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law. Taking into account the grate resources and expertise required for the effective functionality of such hybrid court, its success would fundamentally depend on the goodwill of the United Nations and individual States. The United Nations, as it did with the with the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone and Special Tribunal for Rwanda, would need to give technical and financial support to such hybrid court.

Prosecution by Local Courts

In addition to the above-named prosecutorial techniques, local courts of Ukraine principally and other States where perpetrators find themselves should take it upon themselves to prosecute those responsible for breaches of International Humanitarian Law over which they can assert universal jurisdiction. The Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has documented several acts of torture, and torture is one of the many violations over which universal jurisdiction can be exercised, as exemplified by the recent case against Osman Sonko, former Gambian Interior Minister, currently standing trial in Germany. ((Trial International, Universal Jurisdiction Database Ousman Sonko available at https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/ousman-sonko-2/ accessed on 6th July, 2023, at 3:00 pm))

Rehabilitation of and Support to the Victims of the Conflict

Following or alongside the prosecution of perpetrators, victims of the conflict in Ukraine should be given the required moral, financial and emotional support to get over the trauma and pain they had experienced. This support, in my opinion, will undo as far as possible or at least minimise the effects of the conflict on victims.

Memorialisation of Traces of the Conflict

After deeper independent investigations are conducted, detailing the full extent and nature of the violations of International Humanitarian Law, reports of such investigation and all other materials of evidential value should be memorialised. In my opinion, memorialisation of such would go a long way in ensuring the perpetual remembrance of the conflict, its effects and victims. Having such painted in the minds of people, particularly Ukrainians, could help forestall future similar occurrences, as it may ignite the desire to advocate against war and violation of International Humanitarian Law in the event of war.

Awareness Campaign on IHL

After the war comes to an end or while the war is still raging, efforts should be put together to ensure the spread of knowledge of International Humanitarian Law principles, particularly among soldiers and other persons directly participating in the hostilities. With this, I believe that some violations of International Humanitarian Law in this conflict or any other could be averted. It is my opinion that this campaign can be spearheaded by the International Red Cross Society and other affiliated bodies.

BIBLIOGHRAPIC REFERENCES:

A. International Instruments:

i. Geneva Convention (I) on Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and the Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949

ii. Geneva Convention (II) on the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, the Sick and Shipwrecked in the Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949

iii. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949

iv. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949

v. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, 1977 (Protocol I)

vi. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, 1977 (Protocol II)

vii. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 2005 (Protocol III)

viii. Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008

ix. Lieber Code

x. Hague Air Warfare Rules of 1924

xi. Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal Court

xii. The Convention Against Torture

xiii. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

xiv. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997

xv. The Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954

xvi. The Hague Regulations

B. Cases/Precedents:

i. Prosecutor v. Tadic Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995

ii. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 12 June 2002

iii. Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic et al., Trial Judgement, IT-95-13/1-T, 27 September 2007

iv. Prosecutor v. Naser Oric, Trial Judgement, IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006

v. ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports, 1996

vi. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Trial Judgement, IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003, para. 58

C. Books:

i. J. Crowe and K. Weston-Scheuber, Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, The Lypiatts, 15 Lansdown Road, Cheltenham, Glos GL50 2JA, UK)

ii. Iain Bonomy, Principles of Distinction and Protection at the ICTY (Torkel Opsahl Academic, EPublisher, Oslo)

iii. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, International Humanitarian Law: A Handbook for Commonwealth Parliamentarians (CPA Headquarters Secretariat, Richmond House, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A0AA, United Kingdom)

iv. Jean S Pictet et al (eds), Commentary on the Geneva Conventions (ICRC 1960) vol 4

D. Reports of international bodies:

i. Report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine

ii. Statement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at the 52nd Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva

iii. UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) and covers the period from 24 February until 15 May 2022

iv. Council of Europe’s High Commissioner for Human Rights Memorandum on the Human Rights Consequences of the War in Ukraine, available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/the-commsioner-publishes-her-memorandum-on-the-human-rights-consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine accessed on the 4th July, 2023 at 9:00 am

E. Articles:

i. Stephen P. Mulligan, The Law of War and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Congressional Research Service)

ii. Dr. Arakelian Minas, Prohibited means and methods of armed conflicts (National University “Odessa Law Academy”)

iii. International Committee of Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Questions and Answers available at www.icrc.org accessed on the 2nd July, 2023 at 11:11 am

iv. Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) available at www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict accessed on 3rd July, 2023 at 11:25 am

v. Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Russians Pillage Kherson Cultural Institutions available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/20/ukraine-russians-pillage-kherson-cultural-institutions accessed on 6th July, 2023, at 23:50

vi. Center for Preventive Action, War in Ukraine (Global Conflict Tracker, March 16, 2023) available at www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine accessed on 5th July, 2023, at 9:37 pm

vii. Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Russians Pillage Kherson Cultural Institutions available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/20/ukraine-russians-pillage-kherson-cultural-institutions accessed on 6th July, 2023, at 23:50

viii. Trial International, Universal Jurisdiction Database Ousman Sonko available at https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/ousman-sonko-2/ accessed on 6th July, 2023, at 3:00 pm


About Author

Muhammed Ceesay is currently a Barrister-at-Law (BL) Candidate at The Gambia Law School. Prior to his joining of The Gambia Law School, Muhammed attended the University of The Gambia, where he graduated Magna Cum Laude. Muhammed has great interest in International Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws, and has actively taken part in discussions on the said area both in The Gambia and outside The Gambia—in places such as Uganda, South Africa, and recently, the United Kingdom.

  1. J. Crowe and K. Weston-Scheuber, Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, The Lypiatts, 15 Lansdown Road, Cheltenham, Glos GL50 2JA, UK) at p. 1 []
  2. International Committee of Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Questions and Answers available at www.icrc.orgaccessed on the 2nd July, 2023 at 11:11 am. []
  3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, International Humanitarian Law: A Handbook for Commonwealth Parliamentarians (CPA Headquarters Secretariat, Richmond House, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A0AA, United Kingdom) at p. 4 []
  4. ibid [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
  5. ibid, supra note 3 [] []
  6. Report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine p. 6 []
  7.  ibid []
  8. ibid) and denazify ((ibid) Ukraine and end the alleged genocide of Russians in Ukrainian territory. Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech, outlining an extensive list of grievances as justification for the military operation. ((Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) available at www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict accessed on 3rd July, 2023 at 11:25 am []
  9. ibid, supra note 7 []
  10. Stephen P. Mulligan, The Law of War and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Congressional Research Service) at p. 1 []
  11. ibid, supra note 15, at p. 2 []
  12. ibid, supra note 18, at p. 7 []
  13. Council of Europe’s High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Memorandum on the Human Rights Consequences of the War in Ukraine, available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/the-commsioner-publishes-her-memorandum-on-the-human-rights-consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine accessed on the 4th July, 2023 at 9:00 am []
  14. ibid, supra note 21 []
  15. Report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, p. 8 []
  16. Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 [] []
  17. ibid, at para. 67 []
  18. ibid, at para. 70 []
  19. ibid, supra note 30, at p. 6 []
  20. The laws regulating the weapons of warfare []
  21. Findings of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry reveals an array of violation of International Humanitarian Law []
  22. ibid, supra note 1, at p. 66 []
  23. In its resolution 49/1 of 4 March 2022, the Human Rights Council decided to urgently establish an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation. The Council mandated the Commission to establish the facts, circumstances and root causes of such violations, and, where possible, to identify those responsible, as well as to make recommendations, in particular on accountability measures. [] []
  24. ibid, supra note 36 []
  25. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Commission has found an array of war crimes, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine available on https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/un-commissionn-has-found-array-war-crimes-violations-human-rights-and accessed on 6th February, 2023, at 13:00 []
  26. ibid, supra not 43, at p. 9 []
  27. ibid, at p. 10 [] []
  28. Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic et al., Trial Judgement, IT-95-13/1-T, 27 September 2007, para. 509 []
  29. ibid, at para. 473 []
  30. The Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine shows, at page 2, grave violations of International Humanitarian Law, including the principle of limitation as encapsulated in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I []
  31. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August 19449 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict []
  32. ibid, supra note 57, at p. 2 []
  33. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Trial Judgement, IT-98-29-T, 5 December 2003, para. 58 []
  34. ibid, supra note 50 []
  35. ibid, supra note 1 []
  36. ibid, at p. 60 []
  37. Article 57 (2) of Additional Protocol I []
  38. ibid, supra note 60 []
  39. ibid, supra note 68, at p. 65 []
  40. ibid, supra note 51, at p. 9 []
  41. The International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine []
  42. ibid, supra note 75 []
  43. ibid, supra note 71 []
  44. ibid, supra note 72 []
  45. ibid, at page 10 []
  46. Prosecutor v. Naser Oric, Trial Judgement, IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006, para. 587. []
  47. ibid, at paras. 606-607 []
  48. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, International Humanitarian Law: A Handbook for Commonwealth Parliamentarians (CPA Headquarters Secretariat, Richmond House, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A0AA, United Kingdom) p. 8 []
  49. ibid, supra note 72, at p. 88 []
  50. Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV []
  51. ibid, supra note 91 [] []
  52. Jean S Pictet et al (eds), Commentary on the Geneva Conventions (ICRC 1960) vol 4, p. 50 []
  53. Article 79 of Geneva Convention IV []
  54. Report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, p. 11 []
  55. ibid, at p. 14 []
  56. ibid, at p. 15 []
  57. ibid, supra note 100 []
  58. ibid, supra note 1, at p. []
  59. ibid, supra note 109 []
  60. Part II of Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Times of War []
  61. Article 8 of Additional Protocol I []
  62. ibid, supra note 112, at p. 18 []
  63. ibid, at p. 7 []
  64. ibid, supra note 74 []
  65. Also see Article 35 of Additional Protocol I []
  66. ibid, at p. 9 []
  67. ibid, at para. 41 []
  68. ibid, at p. 11 []
  69. ibid, supra note 112 []
  70. See Article 1 (1) (a) of the Convention on Cluster Munition of 2008 []
  71. ibid, at Article 1 (1) (a), (b) & (c) []
  72. 2nd July, 2023 []
  73. ibid, supra note 140 []
  74. See Article 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1977 []
  75. ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports, 1996, para. 78 []
  76. ibid, at para. 78 []
  77. Iain Bonomy, Principles of Distinction and Protection at the ICTY (Torkel Opsahl Academic, EPublisher, Oslo) p. 30 []
  78. J. Crowe and K. Weston-Scheuber, Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, The Lypiatts, 15 Lansdown Road, Cheltenham, Glos GL50 2JA, UK) at p. 68 []
  79. Article 53 of Additional Protocol I []
  80. Article 4 (1) of the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property []
  81. ibid, supra note 152 []
  82. Article 35 of Additional Protocol I []
  83. See Article 39 of Geneva Convention I; Article 43 of Geneva Convention II; and Article 18 of Additional Protocol II []
  84. ibid, supra note 133, at pp.9-10 []
  85. Center for Preventive Action, War in Ukraine (Global Conflict Tracker, March 16, 2023) available at www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine accessed on 5th July, 2023, at 9:37 pm []
  86. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 []