H.M.Singh vs Union Of India & Anr (1947) LIJR-SC

H.M.Singh vs Union Of India & Anr (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1. The appellant was commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the Indian Army on 15.6.1969. His initial induction was into the Armoured Corps. On 25.5.1983 the appellant changed his cadre. He permanently moved into the Defence Research and Development Organisation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DRDO’). Having gone through decades of rigorous military service and having consistently earned onward promotions to higher ranks, as were due to him from time to time, he was granted acting rank of Major General on 1.6.2004, after he had been approved for promotion to the rank of Major General by a duly constituted Selection Board.

2. On 31.3.2005 Lieutenant General Ravinder Nath retired from service. Resultantly a vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General became available. On 1.1.2006 the appellant claims to have become eligible for the consideration for promotion to the above vacancy. It would be relevant to mention, that at that juncture, in the cadre of Major Generals, the appellant was the senior most serving officer (as per seniority list dated 29.12.2006) eligible for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. In the Government of India gazette (published on 6.12.2007) the appellant was shown as having been promoted as substantive Major General with effect from 7.1.2004. It would also be relevant to mention, that the name of the appellant was included in the name announced by the President of India for the award of the Vishist Seva Medal on 26.1.2007. The said award was sought to be bestowed upon the appellant, for his having rendered distinguished service of an exceptional order to the nation. It is therefore, that the appellant was desirous, that his claim be considered for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. At that juncture, the appellant had not only held the rank of Major General for more 18 months, he had also earned two confidential reports in the said rank. The record appended to the pleadings indicates, that he had also been granted vigilance clearance. Despite the above, the appellant was not considered eligible for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General as he had not completed two years’ service in the rank of Major General at that time.

3. Under the circumstances mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, AVM R. Yadav, an officer from the Indian Air Force was inducted into the DRDO on 29.12.2005, against the vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General created by Lieutenant General Ravinder Nath. AVM R. Yadav retired from service with effect from 31.12.2006. As such, a vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General became available with effect from 1.1.2007.

4. On 30.4.2007, the appellant addressed a representation to the Director General DRDO asserting, that he was eligible for promotion against the existing vacancy of Lieutenant General, as he fulfilled the laid down criteria. He expressly pointed out in his above representation, that in the event of his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General his age of retirement would stand extended. As Major General he would retire at the age of 59 years, on 29.2.2008 (as the appellant date of birth is 2.2.1949). On his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General his age of retirement would stand extended to 28.2.2009 i.e., to 60 years. The appellant therefore requested the authorities, to immediately constitute and convene a meeting of the Selection Board, for considering his claim for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. For the above purpose, the appellant also met various higher authorities. On all such occasions he was informed, that the action to convene a meeting of the Selection Board was under process. In fact, in November, 2007 the appellant was assured, that the meeting of Selection Board would be held in December, 2007. He was also assured, that in the event of his being considered suitable for promotion by the Selection Board, he will actually be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, before the date of his retirement (29.2.2008) as Major General.

5. Since the date of appellant’s retirement – 29.2.2008 was fast- approaching, and because it seemed to the appellant that nothing was moving, the appellant submitted his grievance to the authorities in writing, praying for immediate action in the matter. In this behalf he also sought personal hearing, to present his case. These pleas were raised by the appellant through separate communications dated 26.12.2007 (to the SA to the Defence Minister, and to the DRDO). On 28.2.2008 he addressed a letter for the same purpose, to the Personal Secretary to the Defence Minister.

6. Two days prior to the appellant’s retirement on superannuation (29.2.2008, as Major General), on 27.2.2008 a meeting of the Selection Board for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General was convened. The Selection Board cleared the appellant for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. The Selection Board cleared only the name of the appellant for the above promotion, from out of a panel of 4 names.

7. In order to ensure that the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General is not frustrated, the President of India by an order dated 29.2.2008, was pleased to grant the appellant extension of service, for a period of three months. A relevant extract of the above order is being reproduced hereinunder:

“I am directed to convey the sanction of the President to the grant of extension in service to IC-23289 Maj Gen H.M. Singh, VSM, AC, CVRDE, Avadi a permanently seconded officer of Defence Research & Development Organisation, for a period of three months with effect from 01 Mar 2008 or till the approval of ACC, whichever is earlier.

This issues with the concurrence of MOD/Fin(R&D) vide their Dy No. 582/Fin (R&D) dated 29 Feb 2008.” (emphasis is ours) A perusal of the above communication reveals, that the aforesaid extension of service was granted to the appellant, to await the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. In this behalf it would be relevant to mention, that in the process of consideration for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, the recommendation made by the Selection Board requires the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, before it is given effect to. It is apparent that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, could not finalise the matter during the appellant’s extended tenure of three months. As such, for the same reasons, the President of India was pleased to grant the appellant a further extension in service (as Major General) for a period of one month i.e., up to 30.6.2008 or till the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, whichever was earlier.

8. On 2.6.2008, the Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training) issued a communication with the following observations:

“2. The Appointments Committee of the Cabinet has not approved the promotion of IC-23289 Maj Gen H.M. Singh, a permanently seconded officer of DRDO, to the rank of Lieutenant General.” In consonance with the order granting extension in service, the DRDO issued an order dated 3.6.2008, retiring the appellant from the rank of Major General with immediate effect. The appellant assailed the above order dated 2.6.2008 (denying the appellant promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General), and the order dated 3.6.2008 (by which the appellant was retired from service) by filing Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as ‘the High Court’). Convening a meeting of the Selection Board on 27.2.2008 i.e., just two days before the appellant was to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, as also, the consideration of the recommendation made by the Selection Board at the hands of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, more than three months after the date on which the appellant would retire from service, were vigorously referred to, to demonstrate the apathy at the hands of the authorities, which according to the appellant, had resulted in denial of promotion to him.

9. In response to the alleged delay in the matter of considering the appellant’s claim for promotion, it was pointed out that the DRDO had a large number of high value projects viz. design, development and production of Light Combat Aircraft, design and development of Kaveri Engine, design and development of Airborne Early Warning System and a number of projects related to upgradation of avionics and electronics warfare system, Sukhoi, MIG-27 and LCA; accordingly a decision was taken by the DRDO i.e., the appellant’s controlling authority, to earmark the vacancy of Lieutenant General (against which the appellant was claiming consideration), for an officer of equivalent rank from the Indian Air Force, who would be in a position to oversee, provide guidance and coordinate all the abovementioned highly sensitive and intricate projects. The above tentative determination for filling up the vacancy of Lieutenant General from the Indian Air Force was, however, subsequently reviewed in consultation with the Government of India. The Government of India on 14.2.2008 finally decided to fill up the vacancy of Lieutenant General by promotion of a permanently seconded service officer of the DRDO. It was therefore asserted, that non-holding of the meeting of the Selection Board, and the non-finalisation of the consideration of the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, could not be described as a deliberate and intentional attempt by the authorities to deprive the appellant of his promotional opportunity.

10. In its pleadings the Union of India adopt a clear stand, that the appellant having attained the age of superannuation on 29.2.2008, could not be promoted as Lieutenant General “while he was on extension”. It was also the contention of the Union of India, that since the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet had not approved the appellant’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, the same could not be challenged specially because the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet had given valid reasons to defer the recommendation of the Selection Board / Departmental Promotion Committee. The Union of India acknowledged, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was the competent authority to approve the recommendation for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General (made by the Selection Board). It was admitted, that the Selection Board in its meeting held on 27.2.2008 had recommended the appellant for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Pending approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, the appellant had crossed the age of his retirement on superannuation (in the rank of Major General, on 29.2.2008). Thereafter, the appellant was granted extension in service beyond the period of his retirement up to 30.6.2008.

11. Having considered the contentions and prayers made by the appellant, a Single Bench of the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008, recorded the following observations:

“40. When the petitioner’s extension of service was not on the ground of exigency, DRDO being mainly civilian, Rules do not permit promotion on extension. ACC’s action in not granting approval to the recommendation made by Selection Board is in accordance with the Rules and the same cannot be assailed. Petitioner cannot contend that he has been discriminated in not granting promotion while on extension.

41. There is no substance in the contention that the Petitioner having been extended his service, he ought to have been granted promotion. Extension of service does not give rise the legitimate expectation for promotion. The extensions in tenure were given to the petitioner to ensure that procedure relating to approval of competent authority on the recommendation of Selection Board was completed in an objective manner by following prescribed process. On culmination of process, ACC is the competent authority came to the decision not to promote the petitioner. As such there is not incoherence and arbitrariness in the decision warranting exercise of judicial review.” In the light of the above observations Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008 was dismissed on 5.5.2009.

12. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008, the appellant filed an intra court Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009. In the process of adjudicating upon the controversy raised in the abovementioned Writ Appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court framed two questions for its consideration. Firstly, whether the appellant Major General H.M. Singh had any fundamental right for promotion solely on the basis of the recommendation of the Selection Board. And secondly, whether Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was liable to accept the recommendation made by the Selection Board in favour of the appellant, and consequently, order the appellant’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Relying on paragraph 108 of the Regulation of Army which delineates the constitution and duties of the Selection Board, the Division Bench concluded that the recommendations of the Selection Board were merely recommendatory in nature, and therefore, answered the first question in the negative. The Division Bench further held, that a legitimate claim for the promotion would arise, only if a recommendation made by the Selection Board gets the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Relying on the judgments rendered by this Court in Dr. H. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India and others, 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 250, Union of India and others Vs. N.P. Dhamania and others, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 1, and Food Corporation of India and others Vs. Parashotam Das Bansal and others, (2008) 5 SCC 100, the Division Bench of the High Court further concluded, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was not bound by the recommendation of the Selection Board. It accordingly held, that for justifiable reasons, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet had the right to either accept, or to refuse the recommendation of the Selection Board. In sum and substance it came to be concluded, that unless it was shown that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet suffered from arbitrariness or malafides and capriciousness, the same could not be interfered with. The Division Bench of the High Court having found none of the above noted vices in the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, answered the second question also in the negative.

13. Based on its aforementioned determination, the High Court dismissed Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009, on 21.7.2009. Dissatisfied with the order dated 5.5.2009 (passed by the Single Judge of the High Court, dismissing Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2009), and the order dated 21.7.2009 (passed by the Division Bench of the High Court dismissing Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009), the appellant approached this Court by filing Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 2008 of 2010. On 11.1.2010 this Court issued notice in this matter. On completion of pleadings the matter was listed for final disposal.

14. Leave granted.

15. On 29.8.2013 while hearing the matter this Court passed the following order:

“Before we proceed for further hearing in the matter, we would like to go through the deliberations of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet [for short ‘the ACC’] by which the recommendations of the Selection Board was not accepted in the case of the petitioner.

Hence the records of the Selection Board and the final orders passed therein in the case of the petitioner be placed before the Court on the next date of hearing, i.e., 10th September, 2013.” Thereafter on 12.9.2013 this Court passed the following order:

“We have perused the record produced before us and we have also heard the arguments of learned Additional Solicitor General” Ld. A.S.G. has sought time to seek instructions.

On the next date, Ld. A.S.G. will ensure that a copy of the note put up to the A.C.C. and the decision of A.C.C. as well as a copy of the recommendation dated 27th February, 2008 of the Selection Board are made available to the Court List this matter on 23rd September, 2013.” The summoning of the record referred to in the orders extracted hereinabove, had become essential for two reasons. Firstly, the appellant did not contest the findings recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court on the two questions framed by the High Court, for the disposal of Writ Appeal No. 779 of 2009. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the determination rendered by the High Court, on the two questions framed by it, we must acknowledge that the High Court was fully justified in drawing its conclusions. We therefore hereby affirm the above findings recorded by the High Court. According to the appellant, the High Court had misdirected itself in its above determination. It was the submission of the appellant, that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, was not supported by justifiable reasons. It was asserted, that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet was arbitrary, and based on extraneous consideration. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it was the vehement submission of the appellant, that the High Court had not addressed the issue at all.

16. The solitary contention advanced at the hands of the appellant, was based on the recommendation made by the Selection Board on 27.2.2008, and the consideration of the above recommendation by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (leading to the rejection of the appellant’s claim for the promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General). For effectively understanding and determining the solitary contention at the hands of the appellant, it is essential to extract the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Board dated 27.2.2008, as also, the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Without understanding the tenor and effect of the above deliberations, it would not be possible to express our findings and the reasons. Had the above proceedings revealed sensitive material, improper for public consumption, or detrimental to national interest, we would have chosen to tread cautiously. The deliberations which resulted in denial of promotion to the appellant (to the rank of Lieutenant General), however, have no such misgivings. We have therefore no hesitation in extracting the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Board dated 27.2.2008. The same are being reproduced hereinunder:-

“MINUTES OF (1/2008) DRDO SELECTION BOARD MEETING HELD ON 27 FEB 2008 The Selection Board comprising the following, met on 27 Feb 08 in the office of the Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri, Room No. 532, DRDO Bhawan, New Delhi:-

           (a)   Shri M. Natarajan, SA to RM           - Chairman
           (b)   Shri Pradeep Kumar, Secretary (DP) - Member
           (c)   Lt. Gen. M.L. Naidu,
                 PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VCOAS     - Member
           (d)   Dr. D. Banerjee,
                 DS &  CC  R&D  (AMS)                     -  Member
           Secretary


2. Defence Secretary did not attend the meeting due to other prior commitments.

3. SA to RM briefed the Board to say that only one vacancy in the rank of Lt. Gen exists. The other vacancy in lieu of Scientist ‘H’ has been referred back to the RM for reconsideration and therefore will be considered only after a decision.

4. The Board considered the following 04 officers for promotion to the acting rank of Lt. Gen:-

           |Ser No. |IC No., Rank, Name & Corps                        |
|(i)     |MR-03539 Maj Gen J.K. Bansal, AMC                 |
|(ii)    |IC-23289 Maj Gen H.M. Singh, VSM, AC              |
|(iii)   |IC-23850 Maj Gen S.S. Dahiya, AVSM, VSM EME       |
|(iv)    |IC-24631 Maj Gen Umang Kapoor, EME                |


5. Based on deliberations and record of service, past performance, qualities of leadership as well as vision, the Board recommends IC-23289 Maj Gen HM Singh, VSM, AC for promotion.

           Sd/-                                         Sd/-
           DS&CC R&D (AMS)                         VCOAS
           Member Secretary                        Member”

                                                          (emphasis is ours)


The proceedings recorded by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet while rejecting the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General are also being set out below:-

“The Ministry of Defence has, with the approval of the Raksha Mantri proposed the promotion of IC-23289 Maj Gen HM Singh, a permanently seconded officer of the DRDO, to the rank of Lieutenant General.

2. Maj Gen HM Singh (dob: 02.02.1949) was due for superannuation on 29th February, 2008 on attaining the age of 59 years which is the age of superannuation for officers of the rank of Major Generals who are permanently seconded to the DRDO. A Selection Board which met on 27th February, 2008 to consider eligible officers of the rank of Major General permanently seconded to the DRDO for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, recommended Major General Singh for promotion. As the officer was due for retirement on 29th February, 2008 approval of the Raksha Mantri was obtained for giving him extension of service of three months in the rank of Major General or till the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet to his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, whichever is earlier. Officers in the rank of Lieutenant General retire on attaining the age of 60 years.

3. The propriety of grant of extension to the officer at the verge of his superannuation and also, that of grant of promotion to the officer while on extension has been examined. The matter has been discussed, separately, with officers from the Department of Personnel and Training; the DRDO, and also, the Ministry of Defence (Military Secretary’s Branch). This apart, a legal notice has been received alleging perjury on the basis of information secured from the Ministry of Defence under the Right to Information Act. A representation has also been received from an officer, Maj Gen PP Das, alleging discrimination.

4. In terms of the provisions of Section 16A(4) of the Army Act an officer who has attained the age of retirement or has become due for such retirement on completion of his tenure, may be retained in the service for a further period by the Central Government, if the exigencies of the service so require.

5. It is evident from the above provisions that for grant of extension in service, the requirement to be fulfilled, primarily, is the exigencies of service. In the note which was put up to the Raksha Mantri soliciting approval to the proposal for grant of extension, no such exigency has been cited. The only issue that was mentioned in support of the proposal for extension was that the officer had been recommended for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. This in the background of the provisions of the Act mentioned above, is no sufficient ground for extension.

6. The Chief Controller Research & Development with whom the matter was discussed has provided copies of orders issued in the years 1995 and 1996 when officers of the rank of Major General were granted extensions. Extensions in service were granted with the approval of the Integrated Finance Division in the Ministry of Defence though approval of the finance angle is not strictly relevant to the grant of extensions. The other two instances cited are of Shri P. Venugopalan, Outstanding Scientist in the DRDL, Hyderabad who was granted extension pending a decision on the question of his regular extension under FR.56 as a Scientist; and of the post retirement appointment of Vice Admiral PC Bhasin on contract basis in the ATVP. These two cases are not relevant to the case of Maj Gen Singh, present under consideration.

7. An instance has been cited, during discussions, of extension of service granted in the year 1997 or thereabouts to Major General Malik who was due for superannuation, and his promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen while on extension.

8. The orders issued by the Department of Personnel and Training lay down that while extension could be granted in exceptional circumstances, there can be no promotion during the period of such extension. These orders apply to the civilian establishment. The instructions which apply to the Defence forces permit extension in service only if the exigencies so demand. DRDO is mainly civilian, and the Rules, as mentioned above, do not permit promotion on extension.

9. The above apart, the plea taken the representation of Maj Gen P.P. Das, and also the legal notice needs to be kept in view. Instances of officers in the Armed Forces retiring just before the vacancies coming their way and being denied empanelment are not uncommon. Extensions motivated by reasons of promotion being close at hand can have repercussions.

10. The above part, the ACR format which is followed for the officers of this rank, seconded to the DRDO, which has been applied for recording of ACRs in the present case reveal that fitness for promotion should be specifically recorded in the ACr. A perusal of the ACR of Maj Gen Singh reveals that specific record of fitness for promotion has not been made.

11. More pointedly, two questions stand out, firstly, the doubtful authority and grounds for granting extensions, taking into account that there was no exigency and, secondly, extensions, motivated by a promotion in the offing during the extension period cannot be allowed. It cannot be ignored also that such situations trigger litigation, which should best be avoided in such instances.

12. Under the above circumstances, it would be appropriate not to approve the promotion of Maj Gen H.M. Singh to the rank of Lieutenant General.

Sd/-

                                                           Cabinet Secretary
                                                                   22.5.2008


           HOME MINISTER    Sd/-
                                  28.5.2008


PRIME MINISTER has approved Para 12 above with the direction that the observation in Paras 5 and 8 may be communicated to the MOD for the future.

Sd/-

                                                   30.5.2008
           Sd/-                                    Director
           Cabinet Secretary                       Prime Minister’s Office
           2.6.2008                                New Delhi”


                                                          (emphasis is ours)




17. The appellant points out, that the determination of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, overlooked the factual position stated in the counter affidavit, filed jointly on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2 (respondent no.1 – the Union of India, through Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet; and respondent no. 2 – the DRDO through its Director General). In this behalf our attention was drawn to paragraphs 3 (xvii) and 3 (xviii) which are being extracted below:

“3 (xvii) A meeting of the Selection Board was held on 27.2.2008 and the Selection Board recommended the name of the petitioner for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. The post of Lieutenant General then carried the pay scale of Rs.22400-525- 24500. Any appointment against this post requires the approval of Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) (Respondent No.1), which is a high power body consisting of the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India, Hon’ble Union Home Minister, Hon’ble Union Minister of Department of Personnel and Hon’ble Union Defence Minister. As such, the recommendation of the Selection Board were sent to ACC. In DRDO, the retirement age of an officer of the rank of Maj Gen/equivalent which the petitioner held at that time is 59 years. The petitioner was due to retire from service w.e.f 29.2.2008. Under these circumstances, he was given an extension of service for a period of three months or till the decision of ACC was received whichever was earlier. As the decision of ACC was not received till 31.5.2008, his service was extended further for a period of one month w.e.f 1.6.2008 on the same terms and conditions.

3 (xviii) The decision of ACC (Respondent No.1) regarding non- approval of promotion of the petitioner to the rank of Lieutenant General communicated vide letter dated 2.6.2008 was received by respondent no. 2 on 3.6.2008 and the latter had to issue orders of the petitioner’s retirement from service from 3.6.2008.” (emphasis is ours)

18. Referring to the factual position depicted in the joint counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 2, it was the vehement submission of the appellant, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the validity of the orders by which the appellant was granted extension in service. It was the submission of the appellant, that the only question before the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, consequent upon the recommendations made by the Selection Board on 27.2.2008, was in connection with the merits of the claim of the appellant, for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General.

Adding to the above contention, it was also the submission of the appellant, that the Selection Board, consequent upon its deliberations held on 27.2.2008, arrived at its findings based on the appellant’s service record, past performance, qualities of leadership, as well as, vision, that the appellant was worthy of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. The Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, during the course of its deliberations, did not find fault with the above conclusion drawn by the Selection Board. As such, it was sought to be asserted, that even the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet must be deemed to have endorsed the merit and suitability of the appellant, for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General.

19. In order to contest the submissions advanced at the hands of the appellant, learned senior counsel representing (respondent nos. 1 and 2) emphatically relied upon the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. The proceedings under reference have been extracted by us hereinabove. Referring to the above proceedings, learned senior counsel for the respondents laid great emphasis on the observations recorded in paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof. It was pointed out, that in terms of the orders issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, promotion during the period of extension was unquestionably barred. In this behalf it was the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondents, that with effect from 1.3.2008, the appellant (who had attained the age of retirement on superannuation on 29.2.2008), was on extension in service. There was, therefore, no question of his being considered for promotion during the period of such extension. In addition to the aforesaid categoric stand adopted by the learned senior counsel for the respondents, it was sought to be reiterated, that the orders dated 29.2.2008 and 30.5.2008, by which the appellant was granted extension in service, for periods of three months and one month respectively, were not sustainable in law, inasmuch as, they were in violation of Rule 16A of the Army Rules which postulates, that an officers who has attained the age of retirement or has become due for such retirement on completion of his tenure, may be retained in service for a further period by the Central Government, only if the exigencies of service so require. It was the submission of learned senior counsel for the respondents, that retention in service of the appellant was not on account of any exigency of service.

20. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the rival parties. First and foremost, we have no hesitation in endorsing the submission advanced at the hands of the appellant, that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet did not in any manner upset the finding recorded by the Selection Board, in respect of the merit and suitability of the appellant for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. On the instant aspect of the matter, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet has maintained a sullen silence. Even in the pleadings filed on behalf of the respondents, there is an ironic quiescence. Therefore, all other issues apart, the appellant must be deemed to have been found suitable for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, even by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet.

21. We have extracted hereinabove the factual position noticed by the respondents in paragraphs 3(xvii) and 3(xviii) of their counter affidavit. If the aforesaid averments are read in conjunction to the factual position, that the vacancy against which the claim of the appellant was considered, had arisen on 1.1.2007, it clearly emerges, that the appellant was the senior most eligible officer holding the rank of Major General whose name fell in the zone of consideration for promotion. The Selection Board having conducted its deliberations singularly chose the name of the appellant from the panel of four names before it. The proceedings of the Selection Board reveal, that its recommendations were based on record of service, past performance, qualities of leadership, as well as, vision. No other name besides the appellant’s name was recommended for promotion. Having been so recommended, the President of India, in the first instance, by an order dated 29.2.2008, extended the service of the appellant, for the period of three months with effect from 1.3.2008 “or till the approval of the ACC whichever is earlier”. Since the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet did not render its determination within the extended period expressed in the order dated 29.2.2008, yet another order to the same effect was issued by the President of India on 30.5.2008 extending the service of the appellant for a further period of one month with effect from 1.6.2008 “or till the approval of the ACC whichever is earlier”. The President of India, therefore, was conscious of the fact while granting extension in service to the appellant, the appellant’s case for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General was under consideration. Therefore, to ensure that the aforesaid consideration fructified into a result one way or the other, extensions were granted to the appellant twice over. The aforesaid determination at the hands of the President of India in granting extension in service to the appellant, stands noticed in the factual position expressed in paragraphs 3(xvii) and 3(xviii) of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2. It is not possible for us to accept, that the aforesaid determination in allowing extension in service to the appellant can be described as being in violation of the norms stipulated in Rule 16A of the Army Rules. It is necessary in this behalf, for us to test the above conclusion drawn by us, on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is not a matter of dispute, that the appellant was promoted to the rank of substantive Major General with effect from 7.1.2004. It is also not a matter of dispute, that the substantive vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant General, against which the appellant was eligible for consideration, became available with effect from 1.1.2007. Even though the appellant had nearly 14 months of military service remaining at the aforesaid juncture, the procedure contemplated for making promotions to the rank of the Lieutenant General was initiated for the first time just two days before the date of retirement of the appellant, on 27.2.2008. Although it is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondents, that the delay in convening the Selection Board and conducting its proceedings was not deliberate or malafide, yet there can be no doubt about the fact, that the appellant was not responsible for such delay. For all intents and purposes, he was repeatedly seeking consideration orally as well as in writing. He had been repeatedly informing the authorities about the approaching date of his retirement. In response, he was always assured, that if found suitable, he would be actually promoted prior to the date of his retirement. It was for the respondents to convene the meeting of the Selection Board. Since the Selection Board came to be convened for the vacancy which had arisen on 1.1.2007 only on 27.2.2008, the respondents must squarely shoulder the blame and responsibility of the above delay.

22. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the non- consideration of the claim of the appellant would violate the fundamental rights vested in him under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The answer to the aforesaid query would be in the affirmative, subject to the condition, that the respondents were desirous of filling the vacancy of Lieutenant General, when it became available on 1.1.2007. The factual position depicted in the counter affidavit reveals, that the respondents indeed were desirous of filling up the said vacancy. In the above view of the matter, if the appellant was the senior most serving Major General eligible for consideration (which he undoubtedly was), he most definitely had the fundamental right of being considered against the above vacancy, and also the fundamental right of being promoted if he was adjudged suitable. Failing which, he would be deprived of his fundamental right of equality before the law, and equal protection of the laws, extended by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view, that it was in order to extend the benefit of the fundamental right enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, that he was allowed extension in service on two occasions, firstly by the Presidential order dated 29.2.2008, and thereafter, by a further Presidential order dated 30.5.2008. The above orders clearly depict, that the aforesaid extension in service was granted to the appellant for a period of three months (and for a further period of one month), or till the approval of the ACC, whichever is earlier. By the aforesaid orders, the respondents desired to treat the appellant justly, so as to enable him to acquire the honour of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, (in case the recommendation made in his favour by the Selection Board was approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet), stands affirmed. The action of the authorities in depriving the appellant due consideration for promotion to the rank of the Lieutenant General, would have resulted in violation of his fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Such an action at the hands of the respondents would unquestionably have been arbitrary. We are therefore of the view, firstly, that the order allowing extension in service of the appellant for a period of three months, dated 29.2.2008, and the order allowing further extension in service by one month to the appellant, dated 30.5.2008, so as to enable his claim to be considered for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, cannot be held to be in violation of the statutory provisions. Rule 16A of the Army Rules, postulates extension in service, if the exigencies of service so require. The said parameter must have been duly taken into consideration when the Presidential Orders dated 29.2.2008 and 30.5.2008 were passed. The respondents have neither revoked, nor sought revocation of the above orders. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to question the veracity of the above orders. The above orders were passed to ensure due consideration of the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Without rejecting the above claim on merits, the appellant was deprived of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General. Besides the above, we are also of the considered view, that consideration of the promotional claim of the senior most eligible officer, would also fall in the parameters of the rule providing for extension, if the exigencies of service so require. It would be a sad day if the armed forces decline to give effect to the legitimate expectations of the highest ranked armed forces personnel. Specially when, blame for delay in such consideration, rests squarely on the shoulders of the authorities themselves. This would lead to individual resentment, bitterness, displeasure and indignation. This could also undoubtedly lead to, outrage at the highest level of the armed forces. Surely, extension of service, for the purpose granted to the appellant, would most definitely fall within the realm of Rule 16A of the Army Rules, unless of course, individual resentment, bitterness, displeasure and indignation, of army personnel at the highest level is of no concern to the authorities. Or alternatively, the authorities would like to risk outrage at the highest level, rather than doing justice to a deserving officer. Reliance on Rule 16A, to deprive the appellant of promotion, to our mind, is just a lame excuse. Accordingly, extension in service granted to the appellant, for all intents and purposes, in our considered view, will be deemed to satisfy the parameters of exigency of service, stipulated in Rule 16A of the Army Rules.

23. While dealing with the issue of consideration of the appellant’s claim for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, it is necessary for us to also conclude by observing, that had the claim of the appellant not been duly considered against the vacancy for the post of Lieutenant General, which became available with effect from 1.1.2007, we would have had to hold, that the action was discriminatory. This because, of denial of due consideration to the appellant, who was the senior most eligible serving Major General, as against the claim of others who were junior to him. And specially when, the respondents desired to fill up the said vacancy, and also because, the vacancy had arisen when the appellant still had 14 months of remaining Army service. Surely it cannot be over looked, that the Selection Board had singularly recommended the name of the appellant for promotion, out of a panel of four names. In such an eventuality, we would have no other alternative but to strike down the action of the authorities as being discriminatory and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.

24. The deliberations recorded by us hereinabove are incomplete, inasmuch as, we have not answered the pointed objection raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2, namely, that an officer is not entitled to promotion during the period of extension in service. For the instant objection raised at the hands of the respondents, it is necessary to refer to the deliberations of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, and specially paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof. A collective reading of the paragraphs 8 and 9 reveals an extremely relevant objective, namely, situations wherein an officer attains the age of retirement without there being a vacancy for his consideration to a higher rank, even though he is eligible for the same. Such an officer who is granted extension in service, cannot claim consideration for promotion, against a vacancy which has become available during the period of his extension in service. The above conclusion drawn by us is clearly apparent from the paragraph 9 of the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. In fact in the operative part of the proceedings recorded in paragraph 11, it has been noticed, that .”…extensions motivated by a promotion in the offing during the extension period cannot be allowed…” We can derive only one meaning from the above observations, namely, extension being granted for promotion against a vacancy in the offing. That is to say, retention in service, so as to consider an officer for a vacancy which has not become available prior to his retirement, but is in the offing. The above reason recorded in the operative part of the proceedings of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, is laudible and legal. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, there is no doubt whatsoever, that a clear vacancy against the rank of Lieutenant General became available with effect from 1.1.2007. At that juncture, the appellant had 14 months of service remaining. It is not as if the vacancy came into existence after the appellant had reached the age of retirement on superannuation. The present case is therefore, not covered by the technical plea canvassed at the hands of the learned senior counsel for the respondents. The denial of promotion to the appellant mainly for the reason, that the appellant was on extension in service, to our mind, is unsustainable besides being arbitrary, specially in the light of the fact, that the vacancy for which the appellant was clamouring consideration, became available, well before the date of his retirement on superannuation. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the basis on which the claim of the appellant for onward promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General was declined, by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet.

25. In view of the fact, that we have found the order of rejection of the appellant’s claim for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, on the ground that he was on extended service to be invalid, we hereby set aside the operative part of the order of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. It is also apparent, that the Selection Board had recommended the promotion of the appellant on the basis of his record of service, past performance, qualities of leadership, as well as, vision, out of a panel of four names. In its deliberations the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, did not record any reason to negate the aforesaid interference, relating to the merit and suitability of the appellant. We are therefore of the view, that the appellant deserves promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, from the date due to him. Ordered accordingly. On account of his promotion to the post of Lieutenant General, the appellant would also be entitled to continuation in service till the age of retirement on superannuation stipulated for Lieutenant Generals, i.e., till his having attained the age of 60 years. As such, the appellant shall be deemed to have been in service against the rank of Lieutenant General till 28.2.2009. Needless to mention, that the appellant would be entitled to all monetary benefits which would have been due to him, on account of his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General till his retirement on superannuation, as also, to revised retiral benefits which would have accrued to him on account of such promotion. The above monetary benefits shall be released to the appellant within three months from the date a certified copy of this order becomes available with the respondents.

26. Allowed in the aforesaid terms.


Credit: Indian Kanoon

State Of Gujarat vs Ratansingh @ Chinubhai Anopsinh Chauhan (1947) LIJR-SC

State Of Gujarat vs Ratansingh @ Chinubhai Anopsinh Chauhan (1947)

A.K.SIKRI,J.

1. The present appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 14th September 2006 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in Criminal Confirmation Case No.9 of 2004 with Criminal Appeal No.1915/2004, setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge and second Fast Track Court in Sessions Case No.4/2004 convicting the respondent under Section 376,302 and 201 IPC for the offence of rape and murder of a seven year old girl and punishing him with sentence of death. The High Court found severe loopholes and shortcomings in the prosecution story, rendering it unbelievable and thereby acquitted the respondent in the aforesaid case.

2. The prosecution case, in nutshell, was that the respondent/accused was the neighbour of the deceased girl Komal aged 7 years r/o village Bhammiya. On the day of incident i.e. 16.8.2003 the victim was playing with her two friends viz. Parul and Saroj in the courtyard of the respondent. The respondent/accused came to his house between 15.00 to 15.30 hrs. and scolded the girls for playing there. Parul and Saroj ran away whereas, however, the deceased girl was forcibly caught by the respondent and pushed her into his house and he shut the door. Shakriben Chandrasinh, a neighbour who was washing clothes, heard the cries of victim which got silent after sometimes. Thereafter Savitaben mother of the deceased girl, who returned from work at about 16.00 hrs. and not finding her daughter started searching for the victim along with Shakriben. A day after the incident, dead body of the victim was recovered from a nearby field wearing a white frock with undergarment missing, which was later found from the hedge falling between the house of the respondent and Shakriben Chandrasinh. A complaint was lodged and FIR registered by Arvindbhai Khatubhai, the father of the victim. The police started investigation and recorded the statements of witnesses. Necessary samples were also collected during the investigation and sent to FSL. The dead body of the deceased was sent for the post mortem which was conducted by Dr. Shashikant Nagori between 16.45 hrs. & 17.45 hrs. on 17.8.2003. The post mortem report mentioned following injuries:-

* Abrasion on both thighs, both knees and bruises over the legs.

* The injuries found on labia majora had a swelling of 3 x 2 cms. on right majora and abrasion on left majora, such injuries were possible in an attempted rape. There was penetration on the private parts of the victim girl.

* The presence of injuries on left mastoid region, which was bone deep and brain matter had come out of the wound.

* There was haematoma over whole skull on both parietal and frontal region and blood was oozing out of the left ear.

* There was a depressed fracture of skull on frontal and left parietal region.

The doctor opined that the injuries were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death and it was homicidal death.

3. The respondent was arrested after two days i.e. on 19.8.2003 from a nearby village, who had allegedly fled after committing the offence. On search, a suicide note purportedly written by the respondent was recovered from his pocket. Besides, blood stained clothes and blood group of the deceased was noticed on other articles. He was found to have sustained injuries on his person, which was recorded in the arrest panchnama. Upon disclosure of the accused, the grinding stone used in inflicting injuries on head of the deceased was recovered from his house. After the recovery of the stone, a panchnama of recovery of the stone was drawn in the presence of panch witnesses on 20.8.2003. Thereafter discovery panchnama of the articles was drawn which were concealed beneath the steel cupboard. After the completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed before the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Godhra on 22.8.2003. After committal, the case was registered as Sessions Case No.4 of 2004 and charge against the respondent accused was framed under Sections 376,302 and 201 of the IPC. The respondent denied the charge and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 23 witnesses in support of its case. None was examined by the accused in his defence. The statement of the respondent was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. On 7.10.2004 the learned Sessions Judge after examining the oral and documentary evidence, returned the finding of guilt and convicted the respondent for the offence of rape and murder. The learned Sessions Judge awarded capital punishment for the offence of murder u/s 302 and imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/- for the offence of rape u/s 376 and in default to undergo SI for 3 months. The record of the case was forwarded to the High Court u/s 366 of the Cr.P.C. for approval of the death sentence awarded by the Sessions Court. The accused also preferred Criminal Appeal No.1915/2004 before the High Court of Gujarat against the judgment and order dated 7.10.2004.

The Impugned Judgment:

4. As is clear from the above, the precise charge against the respondent was of raping the minor girl Komal and thereafter murdering her. The High Court, on the basis of medical evidence namely the post-mortem report of the deceased found that it was case of homicidal death. There is no quarrel about the same and this aspect is not disputed by the respondent before us as well.

5. As far as charge of rape is concerned, the High Court observed that there was no direct evidence and medical evidence was the only circumstantial evidence which could be relied upon. It discussed the evidence of Dr. Nagori to this effect, who had conducted the post mortem on the dead body. It was found that there was swelling of 3×2 cms on right labia majora and abrasion over left labia majora. It is also recorded in the postmortem notes that as per vagina examination, it was found that little finger passed with difficulty and there was no internal injury. The post mortem notes also indicated abrasions on both thighs, both knees and bruises over legs. In his deposition, the doctor has deposed, after describing the injuries, that the injuries found on labia majora were possible in an attempted rape. During cross-examination he deposed that, if there was penetration of penis in the vagina, there was possibility of internal injuries. He stated, in terms, that from the post mortem examination, in the instant case, there was no penetration of penis in the vagina.

6. On the basis of aforesaid, the High Court acquitted that offence of rape was not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and it could, at the most, be considered an attempted rape. The finding of the trial court recording the conviction for offence of rape under section 376 of the IPC has, accordingly, been set aside. It is primarily on the ground that even if it is to be accepted that in a case of rape of a minor, complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen is not necessarily to be established, in the instant case, the medical evidence clearly suggests that there was no penetration at all i.e. the factor which influenced the High Court to set aside the conviction based on section 376IPC.

7. The High Court, thus, proceeded on the basis that the deceased was murdered and there was an attempted rape on her. It then addressed the central issue viz. whether the respondent could be connected with the said murder and attempted rape. It was a case of circumstantial evidence, in the absence of any eye witness. After discussing the evidence, the High Court found that prosecution had failed to establish the chain of circumstances could connect the accused with the crime. There were material contradictions and inconsistencies in the depositions of various witnesses etc. which did not form a complete chain. The High Court has, accordingly, set aside the order of conviction of the trial court as unsustainable and acquitted the accused of the charges. It is, inter-alia, held that the evidence led by the prosecution on last seen together cannot be accepted. It is not only contradictory, inconsistent and improbable, but also suffers from vice of improvements and therefore, it sounds unreliable. As regards injuries found on chest and back of the person of accused are concerned, which the prosecution tried to show as injuries caused with nail, possibly by the deceased, the High Court has discounted this prosecution version on the ground that the Post Mortem note does not indicate presence of any traces of skin of the accused in the nail of the deceased. As per the High Court the investigation is not found to be independent, trustworthy or reliable, the evidence does not establish a complete chain of circumstances to connect the accused with the crime. There are major defects in the investigations which render it doubtful when the case is founded on circumstantial evidence. It, thus, set aside the judgment of the Trial Court on the ground that the conviction cannot be recorded on such scanty, weak and incomplete evidence.

The Arguments:

8. The learned counsel for the State argued that High Court committed grave error in holding that there was no complete chain of the circumstances connecting the respondent to the incident. He pointed out that certain samples of blood, clay etc. were collected from the spot and FSM report (Ex.54) was obtained therefrom which was duly proved in the trial court through witness No.20-Chandubhai Nagjibhai Pargi who had stated in his deposition that on receiving the message from control room on 17.8.2003 he along with FSL Mobile Van had gone to the place of incident and collected the following samples:

            -    Clay with blood from the place of incident.

      Clay bearing doubtful spot recovered from the  place  in       between
                 two legs.

           -     Control clay recovered from the place at the distance of 5
                 feet from the dead body.

           -     Clay bearing pan padiki spittle recovered from  the  place
                 at the distance of 7 feet from the dead body.

           -     One red colour knickers bearing spots from the vada behind

the house of Chandrasinh Laxmansinh Chauhan, situated in the south direction from the dead body.

9. He further drew the attention of this Court to post mortem report (Ex.7) containing external examination of the deceased. As per the said post mortem report, the following aspects were established:

|1.  |Condition of the clothes whether |                             |
|    |wet with water, stained with     |Stained with blood           |
|    |blood, soiled with vomit or      |                             |
|    |foecal matter.                   |                             |

|2. |Injuries to external genitals, |Swelling (hemetomal) 3×2 cm | | |indication of purging. |over Rt.Labia mejora abrasion| | | |over lt.labia mejora. | |3. |Surface wounds and injuries their|a.Abrasions over medical | | |natural position, dimensions |upper of both thighs. | | |(measured) and directions to be |b.Abrasions over both knee. | | |accurately stated: their probable|c.Bruises over both legs. | | |ages and cause to be noted. | |

10. He also pointed out that opinion as to the cause or probable cause of death recorded by the Medical Officer was “cause of death is shocked due to head injury leading to skull injury over brain”. He also pointed out that cloth of the deceased was stained with blood and there were abrasions over medial upper both thighs, over both knees and bruises over both legs. According to the learned counsel, this shows that the deceased was subjected to sexual assault and murdered.

11. In order to connect the accused with the said incident, the learned counsel referred to the testimony of PW12, Saroj who was playing along with Parul and deceased on the fateful day, on the courtyard of the residence of the accused when the accused reached there and scolded these girls. His submission was that there was no cross-examination by the defence on this aspect and from this testimony it stood proved that the deceased was last seen with the accused, as PW12 had categorically stated that she and Parul left the place but the deceased remained there. He further submitted that this was corroborated by the neighbour Shakriben Chandrasinh (PW16) as well.

12. In nutshell, the submission of the learned counsel for the State was that the circumstances formed a complete chain of events connecting the crime to the accused inasmuch as: (1) the victim was last seen in the company of the accused; (2) certain samples were collected from the residence of the accused including plaster bearing blood, blood taken on thread by rubbing from ground floor of western wall, support (datto) of wooden plate bearing blood spots, pieces of paper affixed on the metal barrel, bearing blood spots etc.; the blood on the aforesaid as found was of “B” Group which is the blood group of the deceased; (3)clay from thighs with semen from the deceased was collected and semen was found to be of “O” Group which is that of the accused; (4) the medical evidence, which clearly nails the respondent and there could be no other person who would have committed this crime.

Our Analysis:

13. Since it is a case of circumstantial evidence and the prosecution case starts with the theory of last seen, the first place is as to whether the prosecution has been able to conclusively and beyond reasonable doubt prove that the deceased was last seen in the company of the respondent. For this purpose, as already noted above, the prosecution has relied upon the testimonies of PW12,PW16,PW17 and PW18. The paramount question is as to whether testimonies of these witnesses is reliable. The High Court has found certain inherent contradictions in the depositions of the aforesaid witnesses on the basis of which it has come to the conclusion that it is difficult to accept their version, which is even contrary to each other about the details of the events. No doubt PW12, Sarojben was playing with the deceased and Parul on the grounds of the residence of the accused and when respondent reached the spot, he asked them to left. However, thereafter whether the deceased remained there and was not seen at all thereafter till her dead body was found , is a pertinent question. As per the prosecution version itself the deceased had left that place; elbeit at the asking of the respondent who had sent her to the market to purchase Vimal Gutka and she returned back to the respondent after purchasing the said Gutka, to hand it over to the deceased. Whether it is conclusively proved that she returned back to the respondent? Here, according to the High Court, there are various contradictions in the depositions of the witnesses. As per PW7, the shopkeeper from where the deceased had gone to purchase Gutka, the deceased had come to his shop on that date at about 3 p.m. She purchased eatable ( and not Gutka) for Rupee one and then she went away. During cross-examination, he stated that it had not happened that the victim had come to his shop to purchase Vimal Gutka. So according to him deceased had come to his shop to purchase some eatable. He also admitted that in his statement before the police on 19th August 2003, he had not stated that the deceased had come to his shop to purchase eatable. On specific question put to him in the cross-examination as to why he did not tell the police about the victim’s visit to his shop to purchase eatable, he did not give any specific reply.

14. As per PW16(Shakriben),who is the neighbour of the respondent, she had seen the three girls playing in the courtyard of the respondent. She further stated that the respondent drove away Parul and Saroj and then caught the victim and pushed her into his house. Thereafter she heard cries of the victim and then she heard sound of beating. She has further stated that she went into the house thereafter but was threatened by the respondent that if she talked to anyone in the town, he would kill her and her son. She has further stated that the accused had arrived at about 2.30 p.m. on the day of the incident and he was drunk. He tried to push open the rear door of the house. The witness said that mother of the accused, Divaliben had given the key of the house to her and, therefore, she gave the key to the accused. The witness has further stated that on the next day when mother of the victim was searching the victim, she told her that she had not seen the victim and she joined the search. During cross- examination, the witness has admitted that she had not stated in her statement before police that the accused had intimidated her. She says that she does not know whether the victim had gone to purchase Gutka packet. The distance between her house and the house of the accused is 25 to 30 feet. She says that she did not tell her husband or her son about the incident. She admits that she did not state before police that, at the time of the incident, she went into the house after washing clothes and sat in the house and, at that time, accused had intimidated her that, if she tells anyone in the village, he would kill her and her son. She admits that, on the day of incident as well as on the next day, when people were searching for the girl, she did not tell anyone about the incident.

15. Apart from the aforesaid omissions on the part of PW16 and PW17 in not mentioning to the police when they gave their statements, immediately after the incident, the High Court has also analyzed their statements along with deposition of PW12 and found them to be inconsistent and self- contradictory in the following manner:

“From depositions of these three witnesses, the prosecution has tried to establish the circumstances of the accused having been seen in company of the deceased last. But scrutiny of this evidence leads us to negative this aspect. According to PW12- Saroj, she was playing with the victim and Parul. Accused arrived around 3O’ clock and shouted “Ladidiyo” (meaning young girls). Therefore, she and Parul ran away and the victim was left behind. She says that accused sent the victim to purchase a packet of Vimal. She also says that, thereafter, she went home and was doing lesson. She saw the victim going with a packet of Vimal to give it to the accused. Therefore, necessarily, if her say is taken at face value, then also the victim was seen going to the house of accused with a packet of Vimal and if she did factually reach there, at that point of time, neither Saroj nor Parul was present.

Against the above situation emerging from deposition of Saroj, if deposition of Shakariben (Ex.49) is seen, she says that when Saroj, the victim and Parul were playing in the courtyard of the accused, the accused arrived and drove away Parul and Saroj and caught hold of the victim and pushed her into the house, whereafter she heard cry of the victim and then sound of beating, meaning thereby that when the deceased was taken into the house, that was the last point of time when she was seen in company of the accused and, at that point of time, both Saroj and Parul were present, which is just contrary to what Saroj says. Viewed from another angle, Shakariben does not speak of any even taking place before the victim was pushed into the house and thereafter the incident has occurred, as against the say of Saroj that the accused sent the victim to get a packet of Vimal. Necessarily, therefore, what Shakariben saw was not the last point of time when the victim and the accused were together. The victim was seen by Saroj at a later point of time and also by witness-Himatbhai. Parul has not been examined by the prosecution as a witness. Therefore, the evidence regarding the accused seen last in company of the deceased, as led by the prosecution, is inconsistent and self-contradictory.

That apart, the conduct of PW16 seems to be unnatural and thus unworthy of reliance. The High Court has rightly observed that it does not inspire confidence for several reasons, namely: (1) though she claims to have the witness the accused pushing the victim into the house and then hearing her cry followed by sound of beating, she did not take any steps to rescue her. (2) She did not even tell about this incident to anyone, including her husband and son till 19th August 2003 when her statement was recorded. (3) Even in her statement to the police she has omitted to state the aforesaid purported facts.(4) On the next day of the incident, when the search for the victim was on, she still kept quite and did not disclose the incident to anybody. Strangely, she joins the group searching for the victim.(5) There is no explanation as to when and why the respondent could have intimidated her. As per the sequence of events narrated by her, the respondent came; she gave him the key of his house; the respondent went to his house and shouted at girls; the two other girls went away and respondent pushed the victim into house; and thereafter she (the witness went to her house). If these sequences are to be seen, there was no occasion for the accused to intimidate her.

As far as evidence of PW12,Saroj is concerned, she stated that she had lastly seen the deceased going with packet of Vimal. She simply presumed that the victim was going to give the said packet to the accused. However, she did not see the deceased going with packet of Vimal Gutka to the respondent as she specifically stated that after seeing the deceased carrying the packet of Vimal she went home and started doing her lesson. There is no evidence to show that the deceased reached the house of the accused and met him. In fact, there is some contradiction even on the purchase of the item inasmuch as as per PW17 the deceased had purchased eatable whereas PW-12 says that she was carrying Vimal Gutka. PW17 has specifically said that the deceased had not purchased Vimal Gutka from him. From the aforesaid testimonies of Saroj Shakariben the High Court has also observed that from both the evidence taken together, prosecution story cannot be believed inasmuch as if the situation is examined from a different angle, if what Saroj says had happened, then what Shakariben says could not have happened, because according to Shakariben, on arrival, the accused shouted at the girls and drove away Parul and Saroj and pushed the deceased into the house and, if what Shakariben says is correct, what Saroj says could not have happened. The doubt assumes greater strength because of certain circumstances which would be discussed in the paragraphs to follow.

Examined from any angle, the evidence led by the prosecution on last seen together aspect cannot be accepted. It is not only contradictory, inconsistent and improbable, but it also suffers from vice of improvements and, therefore, to us, it sounds unreliable. The case is founded on circumstantial evidence. This is one of the major circumstances pressed by the prosecution. We also find that the investigation is not carried out properly and does not inspire confidence. The evidence on last seen together aspect, therefore, cannot be accepted as a link in the chain of circumstances leading to exclusive hypothesis of guilt of the accused.”

16. We are in agreement with the aforesaid analysis of the evidence by the High Court and, therefore, hold that prosecution has not been able to establish, with clinching evidence that the deceased was seen lastly in the company of the accused.

17. Even the medical evidence on which strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the State, is of no help to arrive at the conclusion that guilt of the respondent stands proved beyond reasonable doubt. When the respondent was arrested on 19th August 2003 a Panchnama (Ex.14) was drawn. In that it is recorded that the accused had abrasions on chest, back and shoulder caused by nail and also that there was swelling on his penis and swelling on skin with abrasion. Immediately after his arrest, the respondent was sent for medical check up. As per the medical report (Ex.17) there were injuries on chest and back which is described by the doctor as linear abrasions. There were no foreign particles in his nails. The doctor also admitted in his cross-examination that he did not notice any injury on the penis of the accused. Therefore, this shows contradiction between the recording of medical condition in the Panchnama and the medical examination conducted by the doctor, in so far as they relate to the injury on the penis of the respondent. High Court has rightly observed that the Panchnama has recorded abrasions and therefore it could not have disappeared within such a short time. It reflects adversely on the prosecution case. As regards injuries found on chest and back of the respondent, they are tried to be shown as injuries caused with nail of the deceased. However, the post mortem note does not indicate presence of any traces of skin of the accused in nail of the deceased. Further, comments of the High Court in the impugned judgment about the medical evidence, pertinent for our purposes, are reproduced below as we entirely agree with the said analysis:

“From the above discussion of evidence, it is clear that even according to doctor, there was no bleeding injury on penis of the accused. There was no bleeding injury to the deceased either. There were no internal injuries in the vagina of the deceased. Against this, if the results of vaginal swab are seen, presence of blood and semen is found. How this could have been found is a question which has remained unexplained and unanswered. This would cast heavy doubt about the reliability of investigation. That apart, the group has remained unidentified so far as vaginal swab is concerned.

If evidence of Shakariben is seen and, even as per prosecution case, the incident occurred in the house of the accused and this is tried to be proved through deposition of Shakariben, who says that accused pushed the deceased into his house and, thereafter, she heard cry of the deceased and then sound of beating. As per the prosecution case, blood stains of the group of the deceased were found in the house of the accused at various places. No trace of semen was found in the house of the accused. But, surprisingly, at the place where the dead body was found, semen was found on the ground. That was of the group of the accused. If the incident occurred in the house, the traces of semen ought to have been found in the house and not at the place where the dead body was found. No motive is indicated for the accused to murder the deceased immediately after pushing her into the house and, if the rape or attempted rape was committed in the house followed by alleged murder, there would have been traces of semen in the house. These factors have remained unexplained and seem to have gone unnoticed by the trial court.”

18. The High Court has also expressed its doubts on recovery of grinding stone from the house of the respondent which was allegedly used for committing murder of the deceased. It is pointed out by the High Court that evidence suggests that the officer of the FSL was summoned on 19th August 2003 who inspected the place of incident and instructed the Inquiry Officer to recover the stone which was, accordingly, recovered. It is so stated in his report as well as in his deposition. Thus, as per the deposition of the officer of FSL, stone was recovered on 19th August 2003. As against this, as per discovery Panchnama drawn on 23rd August 2003 the said grinding stone was recovered from beneath steel cupboard at the instance of the respondent. How this recovery could have taken place if the stone had already been recovered on 19th August 2003. This casts doubt about the aforesaid documents and the discovery of stone itself.

19. There is another aspect highlighted by the High Court which is very pertinent and cannot be ignored. After the incident when sniffer dog was brought to the site. The said dog had tracked to the house of PW16 and not the respondent. In fact, on this basis the son of PW 16 was even taken into custody by the police and was detained for 2 days. Thereafter, he was allowed to go inasmuch, as per the police he had not committed any offence. This version has come from the testimony of PW16 herself. On the other hand, I.O. has totally denied that son of PW16 was ever detained for 2 days. There is no such entry in the daily diary as well. From this evidence appearing on record, the High Court has concluded that investigation cannot be considered as honest inasmuch as it would indicate to two possibilities, namely:

(1) The investigating officer did not detain or interrogate the son of PW16 for 2 days. If that is so he failed in his duty when the sniffer dog tracked to the house of PW16.

(2) If I.O. had detained the son of PW16, then case diary does not record the events correctly and he is not telling the truth before the Court.

That apart, it also speaks volumes about the reliability of the investigation and evidence collected, more so when no explanation is coming forward as to why the son of PW16 was released by the police and the respondent arrested.

20. We, thus, agree with the findings of the High Court that the evidence led by the prosecution does not establish a complete chain of circumstances to connect the accused with the murder of Komal, the deceased. There are significant defects and shortcomings in the investigation; witnesses have come out with contradictory version; and have made significant improvements in their versions in their depositions in the Court. In a case of circumstantial evidence, it would be unwise to record conviction on the basis of such a scanty, weak and incomplete evidence. As the prosecution has not been able to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, agreeing with the conclusions of the High Court we dismiss the present appeal.


Credit: Indian Kanoon

Keshar Bai vs Chhunulal (1947) LIJR-SC

Keshar Bai vs Chhunulal (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by grant of special leave, is directed against the judgment and order dated 03/08/2010 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore allowing Second Appeal No. 756 of 2004 filed by the respondent.

3. Briefly put, the facts are that the appellant-landlady purchased House No. 1/2, Street No. 6, Parsi Mohallah, Indore (‘the said building’) from M/s. Pyare Mohan Khar, Hari Mohan Khar, Shayam Sunder Khar and Anil Khar predecessors-in-title of the appellant by a registered sale deed dated 26/9/1991 for a consideration of Rs. 1,70,000/-. At the time of purchase of the said building, the respondent-tenant was occupying one room (‘suit premises’) situated on the rear side of the said building as tenant. The respondent was informed by the predecessors-in-title of the appellant that the appellant is the new landlady of the said building and he should pay the rent to her. The respondent agreed to pay the rent but failed to pay it. Failure of the respondent to pay the rent resulted in a notice being sent by the appellant to him on 23/11/2002, but despite the notice the respondent did not pay the rent.

4. On 06/1/2003, the appellant filed a suit for eviction of the respondent under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (‘the M.P. Act’) on grounds of non-payment of rent, denial of the appellant’s title by the respondent, bona fide need for residential purpose and reconstruction of the said building as it had become unsafe for human habitation. It was specifically averred in the plaint that the appellant had purchased the said building vide a registered document on 26/9/1991.

5. The respondent contested the said suit and filed a written statement denying the title of the appellant as well as the grounds on which his eviction from the suit premises was sought. The respondent denied that there was any attornement between the parties and that there was a landlord- tenant relationship between him and the appellant. He claimed to be tenant of the earlier landlord Shri Khar. He contended that he had never paid any rent to the appellant. He denied the genuineness of the registered sale deed dated 26/9/1991.

6. The trial court decreed the suit under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. The suit was dismissed so far as the other grounds are concerned. The trial court’s judgment was confirmed by the first appellate court. The High Court by the impugned order set aside the eviction decree passed by the courts below holding that in the facts of the case no decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Act could be passed. The controversy, therefore, revolves around Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act in the context of the facts of this case.

7. Shri Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that both the courts having concurrently found that the landlord was entitled to a decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act and since there was no perversity attached to the said finding, the High Court ought not to have interfered with it while dealing with a second appeal, particularly, when there was no substantial question of law involved in the matter. In this connection, he relied on Deep Chandra Juneja v. Lajwanti Kathuria (dead) through LRs.[1], Yash Pal v. Ram Lal & Ors.[2] and Firojuddin & Anr. v. Babu Singh[3]. Mr. Prasad submitted that it is clearly established from the evidence on record that the respondent had denied the title of the appellant and, therefore, the case clearly falls within the ambit of Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. The eviction decree was, therefore, correctly passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court. In this connection he relied on Devasahyam v. P. Savithramma[4], State of Andgra Pradesh & Ors. v. D. Raghukul Pershad(dead) by LRs.& Ors.[5] and Bhogadi Kannababu & Ors. v. Vuggina Pydamma & Ors.[6]. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances the impugned order be set aside.

8. Shri Amit Pawan, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submitted that attornment of tenancy to the appellant is not proved. Counsel submitted that the respondent had no knowledge about the sale transaction that allegedly took place between the appellant and Shri Khar, under which the appellant is said to have purchased the suit premises. This is a case of derivative title which the tenant can deny if he had no knowledge of the sale transaction. Counsel submitted that the trial court and lower appellate court ignored this vital legal position and, therefore, the High Court rightly set aside the eviction decree. Counsel relied on Mohd. Nooman & Ors. v. Mohd. Jabed Alam & Ors.[7] in support of his submission that the issue regarding title can be decided in an eviction suit and, therefore, it was correctly raised by the respondent.

9. It is well settled by a long line of judgments of this Court that the High Court should not interfere with a concurrent finding of fact unless it is perverse. (See: Deep Chandra Juneja, Yash Pal & Firojuddin). In this case, for the reasons which we shall soon record, we are unable to find any such perversity in the concurrent finding of fact returned by the courts below warranting the High Court’s interference.

10. The trial court passed the decree under Section 12 (1)(c) of the M.P. Act on the ground that the respondent-tenant denied the title of the appellant-landlady. It was confirmed by the first appellate court. It is, therefore, necessary to reproduce Section 12(1) (c) of the M.P. Act. It reads as under:

“12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely—

(a) xxx

(b) xxx

(c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein:

Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy;”

11. The first question that arises is how denial of title falls within the ambit of Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. Under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the lease is determined by forfeiture, if the lessee denies the lessor’s title. While dealing with eviction suit, arising out of the M.P. Act, in Devasahayam, this Court has held that so just is the above rule that in various rent control legislations such a ground is recognized and incorporated as a ground for eviction of a tenant either expressly or impliedly within the net of an act injurious to the interest of the landlord. It is further held that denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. It is, therefore, covered by Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. The following observations of this Court in Devasahayam are relevant:

“27. In Sheela v. Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash[8] whereupon Mr. Nageswara Rao placed strong reliance, Lahoti, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, while construing the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 observed:

13. The law as to tenancy being determined by forfeiture by denial of the lessor’s title or disclaimer of the tenancy has been adopted in India from the law of England where it originated as a principle in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience. On enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the same was incorporated into clause (g) of Section 111. So just is the rule that it has been held applicable even in the areas where the Transfer of Property Act does not apply. (See: Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur[9].) The principle of determination of tenancy by forfeiture consequent upon denial of the lessor’s title may not be applicable where rent control legislation intervenes and such legislation while extending protection to tenants from eviction does not recognise such denial or disclaimer as a ground for termination of tenancy and eviction of tenant. However, in various rent control legislations such a ground is recognised and incorporated as a ground for eviction of tenant either expressly or impliedly by bringing it within the net of an act injurious to the interest of the landlord on account of its mischievous content to prejudice adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord.

… … … … … … … …

17. In our opinion, denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available to him by the rent control law but without disowning his character of possession over the tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability of Section 12(1)(c) abovesaid. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability.”

12. Having ascertained the legal position we will now state why we feel that the High Court is not right in disturbing the concurrent finding of fact that the respondent-tenant denied the title of the appellant-landlady.

13. There is a specific reference to the registered document under which the appellant purchased the suit building from the earlier landlord in the plaint. Yet, in the written statement the respondent denied the title of the appellant. We notice that there are several documents on record relating to the ownership of the appellant, apart from the registered sale deed, such as municipal tax receipts, ration card etc. Yet, the respondent refused to acknowledge the appellant’s title. He denied it in his evidence. This is not a simple case of denial of derivative title by a person who did not know about the purchase of the building by the landlord. Even after going through the relevant documents relating to the appellant’s title the respondent feigned ignorance about it. The High Court has accepted that in his cross-examination the respondent has stated that he was not accepting the appellant as his landlady. The High Court has, however, gone on to say that by this piece of evidence no decree of eviction can be passed against the respondent under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act because the respondent will have no occasion to establish in what circumstances he denied the title of the appellant. The High Court has further held that the respondent was within permissible limit in asking the appellant to produce documentary evidence about his title as a landlord. The High Court, in our opinion, fell into a grave error in drawing such a conclusion. Even denial of a landlord’s title in the written statement can provide a ground for eviction of a tenant. It is also settled position in law that it is not necessary that the denial of title by the landlord should be anterior to the institution of eviction proceedings. This is so stated by this Court in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishnarao(deceased) by LRs.[10].

14. The High Court has expressed that the respondent was justified in asking the appellant to produce the documents. Implicit in this observation is the High Court’s view that the respondent could have in an eviction suit got the title of the appellant finally adjudicated upon. There is a fallacy in this reasoning. In eviction proceedings the question of title to the properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally. Similar question fell for consideration of this Court in Bhagadi Kannabalu. In that case it was argued that the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question and hence could not maintain the application for eviction on the ground of default and sub- letting under the A.P. Tenancy Act. This Court referred to its decision in Tej Bhan Madan v. II Additional District Judge and Ors.[11] in which it was held that a tenant was precluded from denying the title of the landlady on the general principle of estoppel between landlord and tenant and that this principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. Section 116 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to such a situation. This Court held that even if the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question, she could still maintain the application for eviction and the finding of fact recorded by the courts below in favour of the landlady was not liable to be disturbed. The position on law was stated by this Court as under:

“In this connection, we may also point out that in an eviction petition filed on the ground of sub-letting and default, the court needs to decide whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in question, which may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally in the eviction proceeding.”

15. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on Mohd. Nooman is misplaced. In that case, the landlord had filed an eviction suit described as Title Suit No.36 of 1973 to evict the tenant. The trial court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had not been proved and since the tenant had raised the question of title the proper course would be to dismiss the suit and not to convert it into a declaratory suit because the suit was neither for declaration of title nor had the plaintiff paid ad valorem court fee. The trial court dismissed the suit as there was no landlord and tenant relationship, but, upheld the plaintiff’s claim of title. In the appeal, the first appellate court observed that by filing a suit for eviction and paying court fee on twelve months alleged rent, the plaintiff had adopted a tricky way of getting the title decided. The plaintiff, then, filed a suit on title. The trial court decreed the suit. The first appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. In the second appeal before the High Court the question was whether the judgment and decree regarding title passed in the earlier suit shall operate as res judicata between the parties on the question of title. The High Court observed that pleas taken by both parties regarding title in both the title suits are the same and answered the question in affirmative. This Court endorsed the High Court’s view and held that the issue of title was directly and substantially an issue between the parties in the earlier eviction suit, hence, the High Court was right in holding that the finding of title recorded in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. This view was expressly restricted by this Court to the facts before it. This Court clarified that ordinarily it is true that in a suit for eviction even if the court goes into the question of title it examines the issue in an ancillary manner and in such cases (which constitute a very large majority) any observation or finding on the question of title would certainly not be binding in any subsequent suit on the dispute of title. This Court further clarified that the case with which it was dealing fell in an exceptional category of very limited number of cases. Thus, in our opinion, no parallel can be drawn from Mohd. Nooman. In that case issue of title was framed. In the instant case issue of title was not even framed. Mohd. Nooman arose out of exceptional facts and must be restricted to those facts.

16. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below that the respondent had denied the title of the appellant. We are of the view that the present case is covered by Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act. It is, therefore, necessary to restore the decree of eviction. In the circumstances, we allow the appeal. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and eviction decree passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act is restored.

17. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.


Credit: Indian Kanoon

Om Prakash Chautala vs Kanwar Bhan & Ors (1947) LIJR-SC

Om Prakash Chautala vs Kanwar Bhan & Ors (1947)

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

1. Reputation is fundamentally a glorious amalgam and unification of virtues which makes a man feel proud of his ancestry and satisfies him to bequeath it as a part of inheritance on the posterity. It is a nobility in itself for which a conscientious man would never barter it with all the tea of China or for that matter all the pearls of the sea. The said virtue has both horizontal and vertical qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man is half-dead. It is an honour which deserves to be equally preserved by the down trodden and the privileged. The aroma of reputation is an excellence which cannot be allowed to be sullied with the passage of time. The memory of nobility no one would like to lose; none would conceive of it being atrophied. It is dear to life and on some occasions it is dearer than life. And that is why it has become an inseparable facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. No one would like to have his reputation dented. One would like to perceive it as an honour rather than popularity. When a court deals with a matter that has something likely to affect a person’s reputation, the normative principles of law are to be cautiously and carefully adhered to. The advertence has to be sans emotion and sans populist perception, and absolutely in accord with the doctrine of audi alteram partem before anything adverse is said.

2. We have commenced with aforesaid prefatory note because the centripodal question that has eminently emanated for consideration in this appeal, by special leave, is whether the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 12384 of 2008 commenting on the conduct of the appellant and further directing recovery of interest component awarded to the employee, the first respondent herein, from the present appellant and also to realize the cost and seek compensation in appropriate legal forum, including civil court, though the appellant was not arrayed as a party to the writ petition, and denial of expunction of the aforesaid observations and directions by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 1456 of 2009 on the foundation that the same are based on the material available on record and, in any case, grant of liberty to claim compensation or interest could not be held to be a stricture causing prejudice to the appellant who would have full opportunity of defending himself in any proceeding which may be brought by the respondent for damages or recovery of interest, is legally defensible or bound to founder on the ground that the appellant was not impleaded as a respondent to the proceeding. Be it noted, the Division Bench has also opined that the observations made by the learned single Judge are not conclusive and no prejudice has been caused to the appellant, the then Chief Minister of the State of Haryana.

3. Filtering the unnecessary details, the facts which are to be exposited are that the first respondent was working as Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies in the State of Haryana. On 4.2.2001 during a state function “Sarkar Apke Dwar” at Jagadhari constituency the appellant received a complaint from some person in the public, including the elected representative, about the working of the respondent No.1. The appellant after considering the verbal complaint announced the suspension of the first respondent during the press conference on the same day. On 06.02.2001 the first respondent was placed under suspension by the letter of the Financial Commissioner & Secretary to Govt. of Haryana, Cooperation Department, Chandigarh which was followed by charge sheet dated 27.03.2002. The first respondent filed CWP No. 16025 of 2001 against the suspension order which was disposed of on 20.03.2002 with direction to the Government. On 28.03.2002 the 1st respondent was reinstated pending inquiry. After issuance of charge sheet and revocation of the suspension order, the first respondent submitted his reply on 5.6.2002.

4. As the facts would undrape, nothing happened thereafter and he stood superannuated on 31.01.2005 and was granted provisional pension, provident fund and amount of Group Insurance Claim but pension as due and other retiral benefits like gratuity, leave encashment, commutation of other leaves, etc. were withheld due to pendency of disciplinary proceedings. On 6.2.2007 the first respondent filed CWP No. 2243 of 2007 which was disposed of by the High Court directing the government to complete the enquiry within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. As the enquiry was not concluded within the stipulated time, the employee preferred CWP No. 12384 of 2008. The learned single Judge vide judgment and order dated 20.10.2009 allowed the writ petition and set aside the charge-sheet and the punishment with further directions to release all the pension and pensionary benefits due to the first respondent within a period of one month with interest @ 10 % p.a. from the due date to the date of payment. In course of judgment the learned single Judge made certain observations against the appellant herein.

5. Grieved by the observations and inclusive directions made in the judgment the appellant preferred LPA No. 1456 of 2009. The contentions raised by the appellant in the intra-court appeal that the adverse remarks were not at all necessary to adjudicate upon the issue involved in the matter, and further when he was not impleaded as a party to the writ petition recording of such observations was totally impermissible, as it fundamentally violated the principles of natural justice, were not accepted by the Division Bench as a consequence of which the appeal did not meet with success.

6. We have heard Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Hitesh Malik, Additional Advocate General appearing for the State. Despite service of notice there is no appearance on behalf of the private respondent, that is, respondent No. 1.

7. As has been indicated earlier, the appellant was not a party to the proceeding. It is manifest that the learned single Judge has made certain disparaging remarks against the appellant and, in fact, he has been also visited with certain adverse consequences. Submission of Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel, is that the observations and the directions are wholly unsustainable when the appellant was not impleaded as a party to the proceeding and further they are totally unwarranted for the adjudication of the controversy that travelled to the Court.

8. In State of Bihar and another v. P.P. Sharma, IAS and another[1], this Court has laid down that the person against whom mala fides or bias is imputed should be impleaded as a party respondent to the proceeding and be given an opportunity to meet the allegations. In his absence no enquiry into the allegations should be made, for such an enquiry would tantamount to violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without affording an opportunity of hearing.

9. In Testa Setalvad and another v. State of Gujarat and others[2] the High Court had made certain caustic observations casting serious aspersions on the appellants therein, though they were not parties before the High Court. Verifying the record that the appellants therein were not parties before the High Court, this Court observed: –

“It is beyond comprehension as to how the learned Judges in the High Court could afford to overlook such a basic and vitally essential tenet of the “rule of law”, that no one should be condemned unheard, and risk themselves to be criticized for injudicious approach and/or render their decisions vulnerable for challenge on account of violating judicial norms and ethics.” And again: –

“Time and again this Court has deprecated the practice of making observations in judgments, unless the persons in respect of whom comments and criticisms were being made were parties to the proceedings, and further were granted an opportunity of having their say in the matter, unmindful of the serious repercussions they may entail on such persons.”

10. In State of W.B. and others v. Babu Chakraborthy [3] the principle was reiterated by stating that the High Court was not justified and correct in passing observations and strictures against the appellants 2 and 3 therein without affording an opportunity of being heard.

11. In Dr. Dilip Kumar Deka and another v. State of Assam and another[4], after referring to the authorities in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim[5], Jage Ram v. Hans Raj Midha[6], R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan[7] and Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar[8], this Court opined thus: –

“7. We are surprised to find that in spite of the above catena of decisions of this Court, the learned Judge did not, before making the remarks, give any opportunity to the appellants, who were admittedly not parties to the revision petition, to defend themselves. It cannot be gainsaid that the nature of remarks the learned Judge has made, has cast a serious aspersion on the appellants affecting their character and reputation and may, ultimately affect their career also. Condemnation of the appellants without giving them an opportunity of being heard was a complete negation of the fundamental principle of natural justice.”

12. At this juncture, it may be clearly stated that singularly on the basis of the aforesaid principle the disparaging remarks and directions, which are going to be referred to hereinafter, deserve to be annulled but we also think it seemly to advert to the facet whether the remarks were really necessary to render the decision by the learned single Judge and the finding recorded by the Division Bench that the observations are based on the material on record and they do not cause any prejudice, are legally sustainable. As far as finding of the Division Bench is concerned that they are based on materials brought on record is absolutely unjustified in view of the following principles laid down in Mohammad Naim (supra): –

“It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct.”

13. On a perusal of the order we find that two aspects are clear, namely, (i) that the appellant was not before the court, and (ii) by no stretch of logic the observations and the directions were required to decide the lis. We are disposed to think so as we find that the learned single Judge has opined that the order of suspension was unjustified and that is why it was revoked. He has also ruled that there has been arbitrary exercise of power which was amenable to judicial review and, more so, when the charges were dropped against the employee. Commenting on the second charge- sheet dated 15.3.2004 the learned single Judge, referring to the decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan[9], State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal[10], The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another[11] and P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. T.N. Housing Board[12], thought it appropriate to quash the same on the ground of delay. The conclusion could have been arrived at without making series of comments on the appellant, who, at the relevant time, was the Chief Minister of the State.

14. At this juncture, we think it apt to point out some of the observations made against the appellant: –

“Arrogance of power by the Chief Minister seems to be at play in this case” xxx xxx xxx “The petitioner is also justified in making a grievance that first the Chief Minister had suspended him on the basis of a loose talk in the press conference and thereafter the officials of the Government have attempted to justify their own mistakes on the one pretext or the other. The petitioner would term this case to be “a proof of worst ugly look of Indian democracy”. He may be an aggrieved person but his anger is justified to refer this treatment to be an ugly face of democracy. Is not it dictatorial display of power in democratic set up? Final order is yet to be passed regarding this charge sheet. It is orally pointed out that the charge sheet is finalized on 16.9.2009. It is done without holding any enquiry or associating the petitioner in any manner. How can this be sustained in this background?” xxx xxx xxx “Chief Minister was bound to inform himself of the well known maxim “be you ever so high, the law is above you”.

xxx xxx xxx “The respondents, thus, have made themselves fully responsible for this plight of the petitioner on account of the illegalities that have been pointed out and which the respondents have failed to justify in any cogent or reasonable manner. They all are to be held accountable for this. This would include even the then Chief Minister, who initiated this illegal process and did not intervene to correct the illegality ever thereafter.” xxx xxx xxx “The interest awardable shall be recovered from all the officers and including the Chief Minister, who were either responsible for placing the petitioner under suspension or in perpetuating the illegality and had unnecessarily charged and harassed the petitioner.” xxx xxx xxx “Liberty is, therefore, given to the petitioner to seek compensation for the harassment caused to him by approaching any appropriate Forum, including Civil Court, where he can seek this compensation even from the then Chief Minister.”

15. On a studied scrutiny of the judgment in entirety we have no hesitation in holding that the observations made by the learned single Judge were really not necessary as an integral part for the decision of the case as stated in Mohammad Naim’s case. Needless to say, once the observations are not justified, as a natural corollary, the directions have to be treated as sensitively susceptible.

16. In this context, it is necessary to state about the role of a Judge and the judicial approach. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal[13], Bhagwati, CJ, speaking for the court expressed strong disapproval of the strictures made by the learned Judge in these terms: –

“We may observe in conclusion that judges should not use strong and carping language while criticising the conduct of parties or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice.”

17. In A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta and others[14] the Court observed that judicial restraint and discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of justice. The duty of restraint and the humility of function has to be the constant theme for a Judge, for the said quality in decision making is as much necessary for Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Further proceeding the two-Judge Bench stated thus: –

“Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the executive and the legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.”

18. In Amar Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another[15], it has been emphasized that intemperate language should be avoided in the judgments and while penning down the same the control over the language should not be forgotten and a committed comprehensive endeavour has to be made to put the concept to practice so that as a conception it gets concretized and fructified.

19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is not to be guided by any kind of notion. The decision making process expects a Judge or an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise perceptual subjectivity, make one’s emotions subservient to one’s reasoning and think dispassionately. He is expected to be guided by the established norms of judicial process and decorum. A judgment may have rhetorics but the said rhetoric has to be dressed with reason and must be in accord with the legal principles. Otherwise a mere rhetoric, especially in a judgment, may likely to cause prejudice to a person and courts are not expected to give any kind of prejudicial remarks against a person, especially so, when he is not a party before it. In that context, the rhetoric becomes sans reason, and without root. It is likely to blinden the thinking process. A Judge is required to remember that humility and respect for temperance and chastity of thought are at the bedrock of apposite expression. In this regard, we may profitably refer to a passage from Frankfurter, Felix, in Clark, Tom C.,[16]:

“For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private views to the law of which we are all guardians – those impersonal convictions that make a society a civilized community, and not the victims of personal rule,”

20. The said learned Judge had said: –

“What becomes decisive to a Justice’s functioning on the Court in the large area within which his individuality moves is his general attitude towards law, the habits of mind that he has formed or is capable of unforming, his capacity for detachment, his temperament or training for putting his passion behind his judgment instead of in front of it.[17]”

21. Thus, a Judge should abandon his passion. He must constantly remind himself that he has a singular master “duty to truth” and such truth is to be arrived at within the legal parameters. No heroism, no rehtorics.

22. Another facet gaining significance and deserves to be adverted to, when caustic observations are made which are not necessary as an integral part of adjudication and it affects the person’s reputation – a cherished right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another[18] this Court has observed: –

“Personal rights of a human being include the right of reputation. A good reputation is an element of personal security and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property. Therefore, it has been held to be a necessary element in regard to right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 recognises the right to have opinions and the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 is subject to the right of reputation of others.”

23. In Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another[19] this Court reproduced the following observations from the decision in D.F. Marion v. Davis[20]:

“25. … ‘The right to the enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is of ancient origin, and is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an element of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.”

24. In Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal[21], although in a different context, while dealing with the aspect of reputation, this Court has observed that reputation is not only the salt of life, but also the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life. It is extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of the grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well as for the posterity.”

25. In Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh and others[22] this Court has ruled that the reverence of life is insegregably associated with the dignity of a human being who is basically divine, not servile. A human personality is endowed with potential infinity and it blossoms when dignity is sustained. The sustenance of such dignity has to be the superlative concern of every sensitive soul. The essence of dignity can never be treated as a momentary spark of light or, for that matter, “a brief candle”, or “a hollow bubble”. The spark of life gets more resplendent when man is treated with dignity sans humiliation, for every man is expected to lead an honourable life which is a splendid gift of “creative intelligence”. When a dent is created in the reputation, humanism is paralysed.

26. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others[23], while dealing with the value of reputation, a two-Judge Bench expressed thus: –

“The expression ‘life’ has a much wider meaning. Where therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of human civilization which make life worth living would be jeopardized and the same can be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair procedures. In this context one can recall the famous words of Chapter II of Bhagwad-Gita :

Sambhavitasya Cha Kirti Marnadati Richyate”

27. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern for Governance Trust and others[24].

28. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we have no hesitation in holding that disparaging remarks, as recorded by the learned single Judge, are not necessary for arriving at the decision which he has rendered, the same being not an integral part and further that could not have been done when the appellant was not a party before the court and also he was never afforded an opportunity to explain his conduct, and the affirmation of the same by the Division Bench on the foundation that it has not caused any prejudice and he can fully defend himself when a subsequent litigation is instituted, are legally unacceptable. Accordingly, we expunge the extracted remarks hereinbefore and also any remarks which have been made that are likely to affect the reputation of the appellant. Since, the appeal is confined only to expunging of adverse remarks, the same is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.


Credit: Indian Kanoon

Praful Manohar Rele vs Krishnabai Narayan Ghosalkar & Ors. (1947) LIJR-SC

Praful Manohar Rele vs Krishnabai Narayan Ghosalkar & Ors. (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 16th October, 2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the High Court has allowed Civil Second Appeal No.90 of 1992 set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal No.33 of 1987 and restored that passed by the Trial Court dismissing Regular Civil Suit No.87 of 1984. The factual backdrop in which the dispute arose may be summarized as under:

3. Manohar Narayan Rele owned a house bearing Panchayat No.105 situate in village Ravdanda, Taluka Alibag, District Raigad, in the State of Maharashtra. In RCS No.87 of 1984 filed by the said Shri Rele before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Alibag, the plaintiff prayed for a decree for possession of the suit premises comprising a part of the house mentioned above on the ground that the defendants who happened to be the legal heirs of one Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar, a Goldsmith by profession, residing in Bombay was allowed to occupy the suit premises as a gratuitous licensee on humanitarian considerations without any return, compensation, fee or charges for such occupation. Upon the demise of Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar in February 1978, the defendants who stepped into his shoes as legal heirs started abusing the confidence reposed by the plaintiff in the said Ghosalkar and creating nuisance and annoyance to the plaintiff with the result that the plaintiff was forced to terminate the licence granted by him in terms of a notice assuring for delivery of vacant possession of the premises w.e.f. 1st February, 1984. Upon receipt of the notice, the defendants instead of complying with the same sent a reply refusing to vacate the premises on the false plea that they were occupying the same as tenants since the time of Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar and were paying rent although the plaintiff had never issued any receipt acknowledging such payment. In a rejoinder sent to the defendants, the plaintiff denied the allegations made by the defendants and by way of abundant caution claimed possession of the suit premises even on the grounds permitted under the Rent Control Act of course without prejudice to his contention that the defendants could not seek protection under the Rent Act. Time for vacation of the premises was also extended by the said rejoinder upto the end of April, 1984.

4. The defendants did not vacate the premises thereby forcing the plaintiff to file a suit for possession against them on the ground that they were licensees occupying the premises gratuitously and out of humanitarian considerations. It was alternatively urged that the plaintiff was entitled to vacation of the premises on the ground of bona fide personal need, nuisance, annoyance and damage allegedly caused to the premise and to the adjoining garden land belonging to him.

5. In the written statement filed by the defendants they stuck to their version that the suit property was occupied by Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar as a tenant and upon his demise the defendants too were in occupation of the same as tenants.

6. On the pleadings of the parties the Trial Court framed as many as eight issues and eventually dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendants were gratuitous licensees. The Trial Court also held that the defendants had proved that they were occupying the premises as tenants on a monthly rent of Rs.13/- and that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he required the premises for his bona fide personal use and occupation. Issues regarding the defendants causing nuisance and annoyance to the plaintiff and damage to the property were also held against the plaintiff by the Trial Court while declining relief to the plaintiff.

7. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No.33 of 1987 before the Additional District Judge, Alibag who formulated six points for determination and while allowing the appeal filed by the plaintiff decreed the suit in favour of his legal representatives as the original plaintiff had passed away in the meantime. The First Appellate Court held that the plaintiff had successfully established that the suit premises was occupied by Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar on gratuitous and humanitarian grounds. It also held that the defendants-respondents had failed to prove the existence of any tenancy in their favour and that since the license granted to the defendants had been validly terminated, the legal heirs substituted in place of the original plaintiff were entitled to a decree.

8. Second appeal No.90 of 1992 was then filed by the respondent against the judgment of the First Appellate Court before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which was allowed by a Single Judge of that Court in terms of its judgment impugned in the present appeal. Apart from three substantial questions of law which the High Court had formulated for consideration, it framed a fourth question for consideration which was to the following effect:

“Whether the plaintiff could raise two contradictory pleas in the plaint, namely, that (i) the defendants were permitted to occupy the suit premises gratis; and (ii) that the defendants should be evicted from the suit premises under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act?”

9. Significantly, the decision rendered by the High Court rests entirely on the fourth question extracted above. The High Court has taken the view that while the plaintiff could indeed seek relief in the alternative, the contentions raised by him were not in the alternative but contradictory, hence, could not be allowed to be urged. The High Court found that the plaintiff’s case that the defendant was a gratuitous licensee was incompatible with the plea that he was a tenant and, therefore, could be evicted under the Rent Act. The High Court observed:

“It is now well settled that a plaintiff may seek reliefs in the alternative but in fact the pleadings are mutually opposite, such pleas cannot be raised by the plaintiff. There is an essential difference between contradictory pleas and alternative pleas. When the plaintiff claims relief in the alternative, the cause of action for the reliefs claimed is the same. However, when contradictory pleas are raised, such as in the present case, the foundation for these contradictory pleas is not the same. When the plaintiff proceeds on the footing that the defendant is a gratuitous licensee, he would have to establish that no rent or consideration was paid for the premises. Whereas, if he seeks to evict the defendant under the Rent Act, the plaintiff accepts that the defendant is in possession of the premises as a tenant and liable to pay rent. Thus, the issue whether rent is being paid becomes fundamental to the decision. Therefore, in my opinion, the pleas that the defendant is occupying the suit premises gratuitously is not compatible with the plea that the defendant is a tenant and therefore can be evicted under the Rent Act.”

10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The case of the plaintiff appellant herein primarily was that the original defendant and even his legal representatives were occupying the suit premises as gratuitous licensees upon termination whereof the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession. While the Trial Court found that the defendants were tenants and not licensees as alleged by the plaintiff the First Appellate Court had recorded a clear finding to the contrary holding that the defendants were indeed occupying the premises as licensees whose license was validly terminated by the plaintiff. Whether or not the defendants were licensees as alleged by the plaintiff was essentially a question of fact and had to be answered on the basis of the evidence on record which the First Appellate Court had reappraised to hold that the defendants were let into the suit property by the plaintiff on humanitarian grounds and as gratuitous licensees. Absence of any rent note evidencing payment of rent or any other material or circumstance to suggest that the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and tenant, abundantly supported the conclusion of the First Appellate Court. That finding also negatived the defence of the defendants-respondents that they were occupying the premises as tenants which assertion of the defendant- respondent was held not proved by the First Appellate Court. There is no gainsaid that while considering the question whether the relationship between the parties was that of licensor and licensee as alleged by the plaintiff or landlord and tenant as asserted by the defendants, the First Appellate Court took into consideration the totality of the evidence on record with a view to finding out as to which of the two versions was factually correct. That doubtless was the correct approach to adopt in a suit based on an alleged license where the defendant’s logical defence was bound to be that he is in occupation not as a licensee but as a tenant. There was, in that view, nothing special or novel about the plea raised in defence by the defendants-respondents. What is important is that the First Appellate Court on facts found that the defendants and even their predecessor were licensees in the premises which stood validly terminated. The High Court could not have interfered with that finding of fact leave alone on the ground that since the alternative case set up by the plaintiff in the plaint was contradictory to the primary case pleaded by him, he was entitled to relief even on proof of the primary case.

11. That apart the alternative plea of the plaintiff and the defence set up by the defendants was no different from each other. The only question that would fall for determination based on such a plea was whether the plaintiff had made out a case on the grounds permissible under the Rent Control Act. An adjudication on that aspect would become necessary only if the plaintiff did not succeed on the primary case set up by him. The alternative plea would be redundant if the plaintiff’s case of the defendants being gratuitous licenses was accepted by the Court. That is precisely what had happened in the instant case. The First Appellate Court accepted the plaintiff’s case that defendants were in occupation as licensees and not as tenants. The High Court has not set aside that finding of fact on its merits. It may have been a different matter if the High Court had done so for valid reasons and then declined to entertain the alternative case set up by the plaintiff based on tenancy. One could in that case perhaps argue that the Court had declined to go beyond the principal contention to examine the alternative plea which was contradictory to the principal plea. That, however, is not what the High Court has done. Without finding fault with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court on the question of a license and its termination the High Court has dismissed the suit simply because the plea of tenancy was, in its opinion, contradictory to the plea of license set up in the earlier part of the plaint. That was not, in our opinion, a proper approach or course to follow.

12. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. Having said that we may deal with the question whether the plea of license and tenancy could be together urged by the plaintiff for grant of relief in a suit for possession.

13. The general rule regarding inconsistent pleas raised in the alternative is settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court. One of the earliest decisions on the subject was rendered by this Court in Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Ors. AIR 1951 SC 177, where this Court observed :

“It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff’s case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs. 30,000 was advanced by way of loan to the defendant second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence. The fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material…An Appellant may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative.”

14. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul AIR 1966 SC 735 the plea of licence was accepted against the plea of tenancy although the plea of licence was not set up by the appellant. The appellant in that case contended that the land and the construction over the land belonged to him and that he had let the constructed portion to the respondent on a monthly rental basis. The respondent, however, alleged that although the land belonged to the appellant the building standing over the same was constructed by the respondent out of his own money and, therefore, he was entitled to occupy the same till his money was recovered from the appellant. Since the plea of tenancy set up by the appellant could not be proved, the Court held that the respondent was staying in the house with the leave and licence of the appellant. What is important is that the Court clearly recognised the principle that if the plea raised by the tenant in his written statement was clear and unambiguous in a suit where one party alleged the relationship between the two to be that of licensor and licensee, while the other alleged the existence of a tenancy, only two issues arose for determination, namely, whether the defendant is tenant of the plaintiff or is holding the property as a licensee. If the Court comes to the conclusion after the parties lead their evidence that the tenancy had not been proved then the only logical inference was that the defendant was in possession of the property as a licensee. This Court said:

“In such a case the relationship between the parties would be either that of a landlord and tenant, or that of an owner of property and a person put into possession if it by the owner’s license. No other alternative is logically or legitimately possible. When parties led evidence in this case, clearly they were conscious of this position, and so, when the High Court came to the conclusion that the tenancy had not been proved, but the defendant’s argument also had not been established, it clearly followed that the defendant was in possession of the suit premises by the leave and license of the plaintiff………………………………….. In our opinion, having regard to the pleas taken by the defendant in his written statement in clear and unambiguous language, only two issues could arise between the parties: is the defendant the tenant of the plaintiff, or is he holding the property as the license ,subject to the terms specified by the written statement?…. we are unable to see any error of law in the approach by the High Court in dealing with it.” (emphasis supplied)

15. In G. Nagamma and Anr. v. Siromenamma and Anr. (1996) 2 SCC 25, this Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to plead even inconsistent pleas especially when, they are seeking alternative reliefs.

16. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai 2000(1) SCC 712. In that case the appellant- defendant wanted to amend the written statement by taking a plea that in case he is not held to be a lessee, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Allowing the amendment this Court held that the plea sought to be raised was neither inconsistent nor repugnant to the pleas raised in defence. The Court further declared that there was no absolute bar against taking of inconsistent pleas by a party. What is impermissible is taking of an inconsistent plea by way of an amendment thereby denying the other side the benefit of an admission contained in the earlier pleadings. In cases where there was no inconsistency in the facts alleged a party is not prohibited from taking alternative pleas available in law.

17. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. M.R. Murali and Anr. (2002) 3 SCC 98 where this Court formulated the following tests for determining whether the alternative plea raised by the plaintiff was permissible:

“To sum up the gist of holding in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar’s case: If the facts stated and pleading raised in the written statement, though by way of defence to the case of the plaintiff, are such which could have entitled the plaintiff to a relief in the alternative, the plaintiff may rely on such pleading of the defendant and claim an alternate decree based thereon subject to four conditions being satisfied, viz., (i) the statement of case by defendant in his written statement amounts to an express admission of the facts entitling the plaintiff to an alternative relief, (ii) in granting such relief the defendant is not taken by surprise, (iii) no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, and (iv) though the plaintiff would have been entitled to the same relief in a separate suit the interest of justice demand the plaintiff not being driven to the need of filing another suit.”

18. The plaintiff-appellant in the case at hand had set up a specific case that the defendant as also his legal representative after his demise were occupying the suit premises as licensees which licence had been validly terminated. In the reply to the notice the case of the defendants was that were in occupation of the suit premises not as licensees but as tenants. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled on that basis alone to ask for an alternative relief of a decree for eviction on the grounds permissible under the Rent Control Act. Such an alternative plea did not fall foul if any of the requirements/tests set out in the decision of this Court in J.J. Lal’s case (supra). We say so because the written statement filed by the defendant contained an express admission of the fact that the property belonged to the plaintiff and that the defendants were in occupation thereof as tenants. At the trial Court also the question whether the defendants were in occupation as licencee or as tenants had been specifically put in issue thereby giving the fullest opportunity to the parties to prove their respective cases. There was no question of the defendants being taken by surprise by the alternative case pleaded by the plaintiff nor could any injustice result from the alternative plea being allowed and tried by the Court. As a matter of fact the trial Court had without any demurrer gone into the merits of the alternative plea and dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had not been able to prove a case for eviction of the defendants. There was thus not only a proper trial on all those grounds urged by the plaintiff but also a judgment in favour of the defendant respondents. Last but not the least even if the alternative plea had not been allowed to be raised in the suit filed by the appellant he would have been certainly entitled to raise that plea and seek eviction in a separate suit filed on the very same grounds. The only difference may have been that the suit may have then been filed before the Court of Small Causes but no error of jurisdiction was committed in the instant case as the finding recorded by the Civil Court was that the defendants were licensees and not tenants. Superadded to all these factors is the fact that the appellate Court had granted relief to the appellant not in relation to the alternative plea raised by him but on the principal case set up by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff succeeded on the principal case set up by him whether or not the alternative plea was contradictory or inconsistent or even destructive of the original plea paled into insignificance.

19. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is, hereby allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is set aside and that passed by the first appellate Court is restored. The respondents are granted time till 30th April 2014 to vacate the premises subject to their filing undertakings on usual terms before this Court within six weeks from today. In case the undertakings are not filed, as directed, the decree passed in favour of the appellant shall become executable forthwith. No costs.


Credit: Indian Kanoon

Ram Kishan vs Tarun Bajaj & Ors (1947) LIJR-SC

Ram Kishan vs Tarun Bajaj & Ors (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.

1. This Contempt Petition has been filed by the applicant that the respondents, who are alleged contemnors herein, have wilfully violated the judgment and order dated 5.7.2012 passed by this Court in C.A. No. 4985 of 2012 as the respondents failed to pay all consequential benefits of service as directed and thus, the respondents should be dealt with under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’) and further, to direct the contemnors to implement the order in its true spirit and fix his pension according to the post of Joint Secretary (Legal) and provide all its retirement benefits.

2. Facts and circumstances of this petition are that the applicant while working as an Under Secretary (Legal), Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as `Nigam’) was compulsorily retired vide an order dated 19.11.2003. Aggrieved, he challenged the said order by filing Writ Petition No. 3954 of 2004 and during its pendency, he reached the age of superannuation on 28.2.2006. The said writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 10.2.2009 quashing the impugned order dated 19.11.2003 but did not award the back wages to the applicant for the period he was out of job. The Nigam filed LPA No. 646 of 2009 challenging the order of the learned Single Judge. The applicant also filed LPA No. 542 of 2009 for claiming the arrears of pay. The LPA of Nigam was dismissed affirming the judgment and order of the Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 24.7.2009 and has attained finality. The appeal filed by the applicant was also dismissed vide judgment and order dated 10.8.2009.

3. Aggrieved, the applicant challenged the judgment and order dated 10.8.2009 of the Division Bench by filing the Special Leave Petition which was entertained as C.A. No. 4985 of 2012, which was disposed of by this Court vide judgment and order dated 5.7.2012 directing that the applicant shall be entitled to the back wages for the period during which he was out of job alongwith reinstatement. The applicant has not been given the benefit of re-designated pay/post and the pay- scale of a higher post wherein after the compulsory retirement of the applicant, one Smt. Pooman Bhasin had been appointed w.e.f. 16.3.2005 and has been extended the benefit which has been allegedly denied to the applicant.

Hence, this Contempt Petition.

4. Shri Vikas Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, has submitted that as the learned Single Judge of the High Court had allowed the writ petition filed by the applicant quashing the order of compulsory retirement with all consequential benefits except back wages and this Court allowed the appeal of the applicant and has given back wages also. The conjoint reading of both the orders tantamount to grant of all possible/permissible benefits to the applicant for his service. As the applicant was senior to Smt. Poonam Bhasin, he was entitled to the re-designated post as well as the salary for the post of Joint Secretary (Legal), which has been denied by the respondents. Therefore, the applicant is entitled for the claim and the respondents should be prosecuted and punished for disobedience of the said judgments and orders.

5. On the contrary, Shri Narender Hooda, learned AAG appearing on behalf of the respondents, has vehemently opposed the application contending that there is neither any direction of any court to give benefit of the revised post to the applicant, nor his candidature has ever been considered for that post. The State authority cannot be forced to pay the salary to two persons for one post. The applicant has never challenged the re-designation of Smt. Poonam Bhasin. Thus, there is no wilful disobedience of any order passed by this Court. The application for initiating the contempt proceedings is totally misconceived and is liable to be rejected.

6. We have considered the rival contentions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

7. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge granting the relief to the applicant reads:

“Resultantly, this writ petition is allowed, the order dated 19.11.2003 (Annexure P-27) is set aside and the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated into service with all consequential benefits. It is, however, clarified that the petitioner will not be entitled to wages for the period he was out of job.” (Emphasis added) The judgment and order of this Court dated 5.7.2012 in Civil Appeal No. 4985/2012 reads:

“Accordingly, we allow the appeal and modify the order of the learned Single Judge, as also of the Division Bench, by directing that the appellant will also be entitled to back-wages for the period during the termination of his services and reinstatement in terms of the High Court’s order.”

8. Both the judgments referred to hereinabove speak of back wages and the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the High Court referred to all consequential benefits. Therefore, the question does arise as to whether such an order would also mean that the applicant could claim post revision and benefits of the higher post without being considered for the said post.

9. Contempt jurisdiction conferred onto the law courts power to punish an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizens that his rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither fair nor reasonable for the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi- criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. (Vide: V.G. Nigam & Ors. v. Kedar Nath Gupta & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2153; Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati & Anr., AIR 2001 SC 3468; Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1405; Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 942; Sahdeo alias Sahdeo Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 705; and National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus & Anr., AIR 2013 SC 1299).

10. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is ‘wilful’. The word ‘wilful’ introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of one’s state of mind. ‘Wilful’ means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bonafide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a “bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely”. Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. “Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct”. (Vide: S. Sundaram Pillai, etc. v. V.R. Pattabiraman; AIR 1985 SC 582; Rakapalli Raja Rama Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 2185; Niaz Mohammad & Ors. etc.etc. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 308; Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, AIR 2000 SC 1880; M/s. Ashok Paper Kamgar Union & Ors. v. Dharam Godha & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 105; State of Orissa & Ors. v. Md. Illiyas, AIR 2006 SC 258; and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, Raipur, (2013) 9 SCC 753).

11. In Lt. Col. K.D. Gupta v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 2071, this Court dealt with a case wherein direction was issued to the Union of India to pay the amount of Rs. 4 lakhs to the applicant therein and release him from defence service. The said amount was paid to the applicant after deducting the income tax payable on the said amount. While dealing with the contempt application, this Court held that “withholding the amount cannot be held to be either malafide or was there any scope to impute that the respondents intended to violate the direction of this Court.”

12. In Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1293, the Court while dealing with the issue whether a doubt persisted as to the applicability of the order of this Court to complainants held that it would not give rise to a contempt petition. The court was dealing with a case wherein the statutory authorities had come to the conclusion that the order of this court was not applicable to the said complainants while dealing with the case under the provision of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

13. It is well settled principle of law that if two interpretations are possible, and if the action is not contumacious, a contempt proceeding would not be maintainable. The effect and purport of the order is to be taken into consideration and the same must be read in its entirety. Therefore, the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act. (See: Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retd.), AIR 2008 (Supp-2) SC 1837; and Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. C.E.S.C. Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 735).

14. In view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, we have repeatedly asked the learned counsel appearing for the applicant under what circumstances this Court can ask the statutory authority to pay the salary to two persons for one post, particularly in view of the fact that Smt. Poonam Bhasin had never been a party to the lis, nor her re-designation/promotion had ever been challenged by the applicant or someone else. More so, learned counsel for the applicant could not point out the service rules applicable to the applicant to assess his eligibility etc.

15. In such a fact-situation, leaving the issue of entitlement of the applicant, we are of the considered opinion that no case is made out to initiate the contempt proceedings against the respondents. The petition is totally misconceived and devoid of merit, hence, it is dismissed. No order as to costs.


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Kichha Sugar Company Limited vs Tarai Chini Mill Majdoor (1947) LIJR-SC

Kichha Sugar Company Limited vs Tarai Chini Mill Majdoor (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.

Kichha Sugar Company Limited aggrieved by the order dated 24th of June, 2008 passed by the Uttarakhand High Court in WPMS No. 3717 of 2001, affirming the award dated 12th of November, 1992 directing payment of Hill Development Allowance after taking into account the amount received as “leave encashment and overtime wages”, has preferred this special leave petition.

Leave granted.

Facts lie in a narrow compass;

The Government of Uttar Pradesh, by its order dated 5th of January, 1981, had directed for payment of Hill Development Allowance to its employees working at specified hill areas at the rate of 15% of the basic wage. Kichha Sugar Company Limited, the appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as ‘the employer’), being a unit of a subsidiary of U.P. Government Corporation, adopted the same and started paying Hill Development Allowance at the rate of 15% of the basic wage. The workmen demanded calculation of 15% of the said allowance by taking into account the amount paid as overtime, leave encashment and all other allowances. When the employer did not agree to the calculation of the Hill Development Allowance as suggested by the workmen, a dispute was raised. It was referred to conciliation and on its failure, the competent Government made the following reference.

Whether the exclusion of payment of overtime, leave encashment, bonus and retaining allowance while calculating the Hill Development Allowance by the Employer is legal and justified? If not, to what relief, the workmen concerned are entitled to get?

It is common ground that while calculating Hill Development Allowance, the employer has not taken into account any other amount including amount received as bonus, leave encashment, retaining allowance or overtime wages. It is the claim of the workmen that 15% of the Hill Development Allowance is to be calculated and paid after taking into account the payments made under the aforesaid headings. The employer repudiated their claim and according to it, the workmen shall be entitled to 15% of the basic wages as Hill Development Allowance. The Industrial Tribunal gave opportunity to both the employer and the workmen to file their claim and produce material and on consideration of the same, gave award dated 12th of November, 1992 directing the employer to “give Hill Development Allowance to their permanent and regular workers on the amount received regarding leave encashment and overtime wages.” However, the Tribunal observed that “Hill Development Allowance shall not be payable on bonus and retaining allowance or on any other allowances”. The employer, aggrieved by the award preferred writ petition before the High Court, which affirmed the same without any discussion or assigning any reason in the following words:

“9. After going through the aforesaid finding recorded by the tribunal concerned, I find no infirmity or illegality in the impugned award passed by the tribunal concerned and the same is hereby confirmed.” Before we enter into the merit of the case, it is apt to understand what Hill Development Allowance is. In our opinion, Hill Development Allowances is nothing but a compensatory allowance. A compensatory allowance broadly falls into three categories; (i) allowance to meet the high cost of living in certain, specially costly cities and other local areas; (ii) allowance to compensate for the hardship of service in certain areas, e.g. areas which have a bad climate and/or difficult to access; and

(iii) allowances granted in areas, e.g. field service areas, where, because of special conditions of living or service, an employee cannot, besides other disadvantages, have his family with him. There may be cases in which more than one of these conditions for grant of compensatory allowance is fulfilled. It seems that taking into account bad climate and remote and difficult access, the decision was taken to grant the Hill Development Allowance at the rate of 15% of the basic wage.

We have heard Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal for the appellant and Mr. Jatin Zaveri for the respondent. Mr. Agarwal submits that basic wage will not include the amount received as leave encashment and overtime wages. According to him, basic wage would mean the wage which is paid to all the employees. He submits that leave encashment and overtime wages would vary from workman to workman and, therefore, those cannot be included in the basic wage. In support of the submission he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 985 and our attention has been drawn to the following passage from Paragraph 11 of the judgment, which reads as follows:

“11. Thus understood “basic wage” never includes the additional emoluments which some workmen may earn, on the basis of a system of bonuses related to the production. The quantum of earnings in such bonuses varies from individual to individual according to their efficiency and diligence; it will vary sometimes from season to season with the variations of working conditions in the factory or other place where the work is done; it will vary also with variations in the rate of supplies of raw material or in the assistance obtainable from machinery.

This very element of variation, excludes this part of workmen’s emoluments from the connotation of “basic wages”.” Mr. Garg, however submits that any amount including the amount paid as leave encashment and overtime wages do come within the expression ‘basic wage’ and, hence, have to be accounted for the purpose of calculating 15% of the basic pay.

In view of the rival submissions, the question which falls for our determination is as to the meaning of the expression ‘basic wage’. The expression ‘basic wage’ has not been explained by the Government in the order granting Hill Development Allowance. It has been defined only under Section 2(b) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. Therefore, we have to see what meaning is to be given to this expression in the present context. Section 2(b) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 defines ‘basic wages’ as follows:

“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, –

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) “basic wages” means all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave or on holidays with wages in either case in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment and which are paid or payable in cash to him, but does not include-

i) the cash value of any food concession;

ii) any dearness allowance that is to say, all cash payments by whatever name called paid to an employee on account of a rise in the cost of living, house-rent allowance, overtime allowance, bonus commission or any other similar allowance payable to the employee in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment;

iii) any presents made by the employer;” According to http://www.merriam-webster.com (Merriam Webster Dictionary) the word ‘basic wage’ means as follows:

“1. A wage or salary based on the cost of living and used as a standard for calculating rates of pay

2. A rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional payments as bonuses and overtime.” When an expression is not defined, one can take into account the definition given to such expression in a statute as also the dictionary meaning. In our opinion, those wages which are universally, necessarily and ordinarily paid to all the employees across the board are basic wage.

Where the payment is available to those who avail the opportunity more than others, the amount paid for that cannot be included in the basic wage. As for example, the overtime allowance, though it is generally enforced across the board but not earned by all employees equally. Overtime wages or for that matter, leave encashment may be available to each workman but it may vary from one workman to other. The extra bonus depends upon the extra hour of work done by the workman whereas leave encashment shall depend upon the number of days of leave available to workman. Both are variable. In view of what we have observed above, we are of the opinion that the amount received as leave encashment and overtime wages is not fit to be included for calculating 15% of the Hill Development Allowance. The view which we have taken finds support from the judgment of this Court in Muir Mills Co.

Ltd. (supra), relied on by the appellant, in which it has been specifically held that the basic wage shall not include bonus.

It also finds support from a judgment of this Court in the case of Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. Provident Fund Commr.,(2008) 5 SCC 428 in which it has been held as follows:

“10. The basic principles as laid down in Bridge & Roofs case, AIR 1963 SC 1474, on a combined reading of Sections 2(b) and 6 are as follows:

(a) Where the wage is universally, necessarily and ordinarily paid to all across the board such emoluments are basic wages.

(b) Where the payment is available to be specially paid to those who avail of the opportunity is not basic wages. By way of example it was held that overtime allowance, though it is generally in force in all concerns is not earned by all employees of a concern. It is also earned in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment but because it may not be earned by all employees of a concern, it is excluded from basic wages.

(c) Conversely, any payment by way of a special incentive or work is not basic wages.” In view of what we have observed above, the impugned award and the judgment of the High Court are illegal and cannot be allowed to stand.

In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the award and the judgment of the High Court and hold that overtime allowance and leave encashment are not fit to be taken into account for calculating the Hill Development Allowance. No costs.


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Anand Agro Chem India Ltd vs Suresh Chandra & Ors (1947) LIJR-SC

Anand Agro Chem India Ltd vs Suresh Chandra & Ors (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

C. NAGAPPAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the interim Order dated 31.7.2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition no.14936 of 2013 whereby the Division Bench rejected the prayer of the appellant to stay the arrest of the Directors and occupiers of the appellant company.

3. The facts in nutshell are as follows. Respondents 1 to 3 supplied sugarcane to the sugar mill of the appellant in the year 2007-08, for which the appellant has not paid the price in spite of several representations made by the respondents 1 to 3 herein. This led to the filing of Writ Petition in Writ-C no.14936 of 2013 by respondents 1 to 3 seeking for issuance of the Writ of Mandamus directing the appellant herein to release the sugarcane price to them. The Division Bench of the High Court after hearing both sides directed the District Magistrate, Hathras to take immediate action against the Directors and occupiers of the appellant-sugar mill against whom several orders have been passed under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation and Supply) Act, 1913 and it further observed in the order that the District Magistrate may in exercise of his powers cause arrest of the Directors and occupiers of the sugar mill to recover the dues and in the event of such arrest, they will not be released until they have paid the entire amount due against them. The appellant-sugar mill aggrieved by the said order preferred a Special Leave Petition in SLP(C) no.16633 of 2013 and this Court by order dated 1.5.2013 dismissed the petition by observing thus :

“We have heard Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

A reading of the order under challenge shows that the appellant has not paid Rs.16.12 crores to the farmers for the crushing year 2005-06 to 2009-10, which includes the price of sugarcane, the cane development commission and the interest. It is also borne out from the record that vide letter dated 24.11.2012, the Director of the appellant had assured the Cane Commissioner that the company will pay Rs.160 lacs as the price of the cane within two weeks and an amount of Rs.700 lacs in installments, the first of which will be paid on 15.01.2013, but the company did not fulfill its assurance.

In the above backdrop, it is not possible to find any fault with the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court and there is absolutely no justification for this Court’s interference with the impugned order.

The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.……..” Thereafter the appellant-sugar mill filed an application in the pending Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking for stay of arrest of the Directors pursuant to the order dated 26.4.2013 and the Division Bench of the High Court after –

hearing both sides and after referring to the earlier orders held that no modification/vacation of the order dated 26.4.2013 is required and, accordingly, rejected the prayer of stay of arrest. Challenging the said order the appellant-sugar mill has preferred the present appeal.

4. We have heard Mr. Ram Jethmalani and Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Shobha Dixit, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents and Mr. Prabodh Kumar, Advocate appearing on behalf of the intervenor.

5. The contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani, Senior Advocate is that the property of the sugar mill has already been attached to recover the dues and the sale notice has been issued and unless there is proof of the minimal fairness of willful failure to pay in spite of sufficient means, the arrest cannot be ordered and it would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Jolly George Varghese and Another vs. The Bank of Cochin (1980) 2 SCC

360. He further contended that in any event the Director, whom he –

representing, is a senior citizen above 65 years of age and hence he cannot be arrested as a defaulter in payment of arrear of land revenue as stipulated in Section 171 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006.

6. When the matter was listed before this Court on 7.10.2013, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant said that the Directors of the mill undertake to pay Rs.4.55 crores representing fifty per cent of the total amount to the concerned authority within a period of six weeks and this Court stayed the arrest subject to fulfillment of the condition. Again the matter was listed on 19.11.2013 and Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel said that by mistake he made a statement about the total amount payable by the writ petitioner but the amount is far less than that and requested for time to file additional affidavit on behalf of the appellant. In the next two hearings the matter was adjourned on the request made by the appellant and thereafter the matter was heard.

7. Section 17 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 stipulates that the occupier of the sugar –

factory shall make speedy payment of cane price and in the event of default, sub-Section (4) stipulates that the Cane Commissioner shall forward to the Collector a certificate specifying the amount of arrears of the cane price due from the occupier and the Collector shall proceed to recover the said amount from such occupier as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Section 170 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 prescribes the process for recovery of arrears of land revenue, wherein it is mentioned that it may be recovered by anyone or more of the processes mentioned therein which includes by arrest and detention of the defaulter and attachment and sale of his movable property.

8. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in its order dated 26.4.2013 has directed the District Magistrate, Hathras, namely, the Collector to take immediate action against the Directors and occupiers of the appellant-sugar mill against whom several orders have been passed under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation and Supply) Act, 1913 and this Court has confirmed the said order. The Division Bench in the present application considered the plea of the –

appellant for the stay of arrest and after hearing both sides rejected the said plea by the impugned order and we find no error in it.

9. We say so firstly because order dated 26th April, 2013 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court directing the District Magistrate to take immediate action against the Directors of the sugar mill has already been affirmed by this Court in appeal. The question whether or not one of the Directors who is said to be 65 years old could be arrested as a defaulter and committed to prison under Section 171 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, could and indeed ought to have been raised by the appellants either before the High Court or before this Court in appeal preferred against the order passed by the High Court. No such contention was, however, urged at that stage.

10. Secondly, because the company and its Directors have not made their promises good by paying even the amounts which they had offered to pay. A plain reading of order dated 1st May, 2013 passed by this Court in SLP (C) No.16633 of 2013 extracted above would show that the company and its Directors –

had assured the Commissioner that they would pay Rs.160 lacs towards price of sugarcane within two weeks besides an amount of Rs.700 lacs to be paid in installments, the first of which installment was to be paid on 15th May, 2013. No such payment was, however, made by the company and its Directors. That apart, the statement made at the bar on 7th October, 2013 by Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel, for the appellant that the Directors would pay Rs.4.55 crores is also sought to be withdrawn on the ground that the same was made under a mistake. It is evident that the company and its Directors have been despite promises made on their behalf committing breach of such assurances on one pretext or the other.

11. Thirdly, because there is nothing before us to suggest that the company and its Directors are incapable of raising funds for liquidating the outstanding liability towards dues payable to the farmers. Simply because the sugar factory has been attached, is no reason for us to assume that the company or its Directors are in any financial distress thereby disabling them from making the payments recoverable from them. The fact situation in the –

present case is, therefore, completely different from that in Jolly George Varghese case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Ram Jethmalani.

12. In the light of the above, we see no compelling reason for us to interfere with the order passed by the High Court in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction. We regret to say that the amounts due to the farmers towards price of the sugarcane and incidentals remains to be paid to them for several years in the past thereby accumulating huge liability against the company. That is not a happy situation nor can repeated invocation of the process of law by the appellant be a remedy for it.

13. The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.


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Baldev Singh vs State Of Punjab (1947) LIJR-SC

Baldev Singh vs State Of Punjab (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.

1     Leave granted.
2     The Appellant has  filed  the  present  Special  Leave  Petition  (now

Appeal) in an endeavour to set aside the concurrent findings of the Courts below with regard to his conviction and sentence under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter ‘the P.C. Act’). The Special Judge had convicted the Appellant, which came to be sustained by the High Court in terms of its impugned judgment dated 8.7.2013.

Accordingly, the Courts below have concurrently found the Appellant guilty, and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of three years and to payment of a fine of Rs.5000/-, and in default thereof, to further undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of six months. 3 According to the Prosecution, a complaint was received from Nishan Singh, an agriculturist who along with his family owned farm land in village Golewala, which, however, was at two separate places, but was being irrigated at the same time. Since this was obviously fraught with inconvenience, the Complainant wanted to have an earlier and separate allocation of canal water for the said two parcels of land.

It was in regard to this request that the Appellant had demanded Rs.2000/- from the Complainant, and the matter was eventually “settled” at Rs.1000/-. The Complainant paid the said amount to the Appellant in his house, as demanded by him, but after alerting the Vigilance Authorities. These currency notes aggregating to Rs.1000/- were applied with Phenolphthalein Powder and were handed over to the Appellant in the presence of official/shadow witness, Jaskaran Singh, who was examined as PW4. Two other official witnesses also constituted the raid party. 4 We have perused the order of the Special Judge dated 11.8.2003, as well as the impugned order of the High Court dated 8.7.2013, both of which have gone into the minute details of the case, which exercise we do not consider necessary to replicate. Suffice it to say that the evidence establishes that the Complainant had handed over to the Appellant a sum of Rs.1000/- which was subsequently recovered from beneath the files. The formality of tallying the numbers on the currency notes was complied with, including the washing of the Appellant’s hands in Sodium Carbonate solution, leading to his unassailable implication.

The Courts below have disbelieved the Appellant’s version, inter alia, that the currency notes had been kept under the files by the Complainant on his own volition without any demand being made in that regard by the Appellant. The Courts below have also rightly noted that the Complainant would have had no occasion to go to the house of the Appellant unless he had been specifically called; and it was improbable for the Complainant to be called to the home and not to the office, unless there was some ulterior motive, such as claim and receipt of the subject bribe. It also appears that the Complainant’s turn to receive water would not have occurred before 1.10.2000, whereas, in fact, water was received much in advance of the previous practice on 28.6.2000. The Appellant has not succeeded in showing any contradiction or inconsistency in the statement of the Complainant, who appeared as PW3 In this conspectus, we find no error in the impugned Judgment, which in turn affirms the Order of the Special Judge.

5 We are also not persuaded by the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the decision of this Court in Banarsi Dass vs State of Haryana (2010) 4 SCC 450, is of any succour to him. The prosecution in that case failed to establish that the accused had demanded illegal gratification and contrary to what has been proved in the case in hand, the recovered money was found lying on the table, apparently on the unilateral volition of the complainant. Similarly, C.M. Girish Babu vs CBI , Cochin, High Court of Kerala, (2009) 3 SCC 779, is also of no assistance to the Appellant because the Court had concluded that the sum of Rs.1500/- was accepted by the Accused in that case believing it to be repayment of a loan taken from him by PW2, and it further held that prosecution failed to establish any demand of bribe/illegal gratification made by the Accused to the PW10, as PW10 did not support the story of the prosecution. This Court found the evidence of PW2 about the demand of bribe amount by the accused as inadmissible since the same was hearsay. A. Subair vs State of Kerala (2009) 6 SCC 587, has enunciated that the prosecution is required to prove that the accused in this genre of cases had demanded and accepted illegal gratification. In A. Subair, the complainant was not examined rendering the factum of demand unproved.

Interestingly, the entire case was based solely on the evidence of PW10, whose evidence was found to be lacking in quality, and , therefore, unreliable. In contrast, both the constituents of demand and acceptance stand proved beyond reasonable doubt in the case in hand. As early as in M.K. Harshan vs State of Kerala (1996) 11 SCC 720, this Court has opined that to bring home charges of bribery, the twin concomitants of ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ must be substantiated. In the afore-noted case, owing to conflicting versions and suspicious feature in the story of prosecution, the version of the Accused that the money was put in the drawer in his office without his knowledge was found probable. The Appellant Accused, therefore, was given benefit of doubt and thereby acquitted. It seems to us to be irrefutable that culpability or innocence is always regulated by the evidence that has been brought on record, therefore, multiplying previous decisions of this Court will be of no advantage to the Appellant. Discussing each of them will lead to making this judgment avoidably prolix.

6 In the particular circumstances of the case, we have noted that the Appellant is 62 years of age, and has already retired. As already mentioned, he has been sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default thereof, to further undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of six months. Keeping in perspective the age of the Appellant and that he is no longer in service and, therefore, cannot indulge in corrupt practices, we are inclined to reduce the sentence to two years Rigorous Imprisonment, but increase the fine to Rs.10,000/-, and on failure to pay the said amount, to further undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for an enhanced period of nine months.

7 The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.


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Indo Asian Ltd vs State Of Uttrakhand & Anr (1947) LIJR-SC

Indo Asian Ltd vs State Of Uttrakhand & Anr (1947)

LawGlobal-Hub Indian Judgment Report – Supreme Court

K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The High Court while exercising its powers conferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure quashed proceedings of Criminal Case No.1004 of 2010 arising out of Crime No.24 of 2010, holding that no offence has been made out under Section 406 IPC.

3. The Appellant is a company engaged in the manufacture of copper wire having its factory at SIDCUL, Haridwar. The accused-Respondent No.2 is running his business in the name of his sole proprietorship concern by name M/s. Dynasty India and also in the name of his company named M/s. Dynasty India Private Limited. On 25.8.2008, a contract was entered into by the accused-Respondent No.2 whereby it was to process the copper rods to be supplied by the Appellant Company into copper wire.

4. The Appellant submitted that during the period between 4.7.2008 to November, 2008, the Appellant entrusted in total copper rods weighing 39,689 kgs. for processing and out of that the accused returned only 33,440.10 kgs. of copper wire to the Appellant Company. Copper weighing 26.87 kgs. was used in processing, and as such, the copper rods weighing 6,222.04 kgs. remained with the accused-Respondent No.2 which, according to the Appellant, was misappropriated and converted to his own use and the said copper was never returned to the Appellant. Few correspondences were exchanged between the parties, including few meetings as well. According to the Appellant, even though the accused had undertaken to return the copper rods, the same was not done. Consequently, the Appellant preferred a complaint which was registered as Crime Case No.24 of 2010 registered at PS Rampur, Haridwar under Section 406 IPC.

5. The investigating officer initially filed a report on 30.4.2010. Again there was further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code and, after due investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 13.12.2010 against the accused under Section 306 Cr.P.C. Respondent then preferred Writ Petition No.224 of 2010 before the High Court for quashing the FIR and not to arrest him. While the Writ Petition was pending, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the case vide his order dated 23.12.2010, and issued summons. Those proceedings were challenged before the High Court and, as already stated, the High Court quashed those proceedings, against which this appeal has been preferred.

6. We have gone through the FIR as well as various invoices produced before us. On going though the allegations raised in the FIR as well as the documents, we are of the view that the High Court, at the threshold, should not have quashed the complaint and the summons issued by the Criminal Court. In the circumstances, we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and leave it to the Criminal Court to proceed with the case in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and leave it entirely for the Criminal Court to decide the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties. Ordered accordingly.


Credit: Indian Kanoon