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Chief Ajayi Olowoye Alejo Awe & Ors V. Olajide Akinlolu Ademehinti & Ors (2016) LLJR-CA

Chief Ajayi Olowoye Alejo Awe & Ors V. Olajide Akinlolu Ademehinti & Ors (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.

This appeal is against the judgment of Hon. Justice C. E. T. Ajama of the High Court of Justice, Ondo State sitting at the Akure Judicial Division, delivered on 25th of March, 2013.

The respondents herein who were plaintiffs at the Lower Court commenced this action against the defendants/appellants by a writ of summons dated and filed 07/06/2010 and a statement of claim dated 02/06/2010. The plaintiffs filed an Amended Statement of Claim dated 01/09/2011 and filed 27/09/2011 claiming jointly and severally against the defendants for the following reliefs:
a. A DECLARATION that the plaintiffs are entitled to the grant of Certificate of Statutory Right or Occupancy over the piece or parcel of farm land lying, situate and being at Ona-Ule Ilere Akure South Local Government which parcel of farmland is otherwise known and called Odo-Igbodudu, Oko-Okuta near Omolegan land, Oko-Okuta Alahere and Oko Aarin which farmland is bounded on the North by late Bayo Omolegan farmland, South by Umojo stream East by Omolegan farmland and late Ayodele Alejoawe farmland, west by Ona-Ule (Road) and at

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Oke-Ehinkunle I, Oke-Ehinkunle II bounded on the North by Ibukun Agbakarin Cocoa farmland, South by one Ona Odo Oko, West by Ona-Ule, East by Omolegan/Late Oyedele Cocoa farmlands.
b. N250,000 damages for trespass.
c. N100,000,000 damages for assault/injuries committed on the person of 1st plaintiff.
PARTICULARS OF INJURIES
(i) Bruises over the back
(ii) Tenderness over the right hip
(iii) Fractures of the right clavicle close to the acromioclavicular joint.
PARTICULARS OF DAMAGES
a. Inability to use the right leg effectively (leaping).
b. Inability to stand erect.
c. Inability to perform physical exercises activities, viz jumping, jogging, running, driving, climbing etc
d. Inability to use the right hand for any physical activities etc.
e. Emotional and mental disturbance etc.
f. Loss of livelihood.
d. AN ORDER cancelling, nullifying, setting aside, any sale or sales purportedly made or carried out by the defendants their servants, agents or privies on, over or upon the said parcel or farmland subject – matter of this action, property of the plaintiffs.
e. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL

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INJUNCTION restraining the defendants, whether by themselves, servants agents, privies or whomsoever from trespassing, remaining interfering in whatever manner alienating, claiming the plaintiffs’ parcel of farmland lying situate and being at Ona-Ule Ilere Akure South Local Government which parcel of farmland is otherwise known and called Odo-Igbodudu, Oko-Okuta near Omolegan land, Oko- Okuta Alahere and Oko Aarin which farmland is bounded on the North by late Bayo Omolegan farmland, South by Umojo Stream East by Omolegan farmland and late Ayodele Alejoawe farmland, West by Ona – Ule (Road) and at Oke – Ehinkunle 1, Oko – Ehinkunle II bounded on the North by Ibukun Agbakarin cocoa farmland, South by one Ona Odo Oko, West by Ona Ule, East by Omolegan/late Ayodele Farmlands.

The defendants responded by filing a Further Amended Statement of Defence and counter claim dated 13/02/2012 and filed 25/04/2012 against the plaintiffs praying as follows:
a. A declaration that the defendants’ counter-claimants are entitled to the grant of  Certificate of Statutory Right of Occupancy over the piece or parcel of farmland lying, situate and being at Ona Oko Odo left

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side of Ilere community bounded on the right by Elere Olagboyegun farmland, on the left by flowing River/Okesi farmland, on the top by lsomo farmland/flowing River, on the Bottom by Odeyemi Farotimi Farmland.
b. N50,000,000 damages for trespass
c. N150, 000, 000 damages for assault committed on the person of the 1st defendant.
d. AN ORDER PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the plaintiffs whether by themselves, servants, agents, privies or whomsoever from trespassing, interesting in whatever manner laying claim to the defendants parcel of land lying situate at Ona oko odo bounded on the right by Elere Olagboyegun farmland, on the left by flowing River/Okesi farmland, on the top by Isomo Farmland/Flowing river, on the bottom by Odeyimi Farotimi farmland.

In the course of the proceedings the plaintiffs called seven (7) witnesses while the defendants had three (3) witnesses who testified by giving evidence before the Court. Written addresses were filed and exchanged between the parties; defendants afterwards replied on points of law and judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiffs on the 25/3/2013.

Dissatisfied with the trial Court’s

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decision, the appellants herein approached this Court vide a notice of appeal dated 22/04/2013 and filed 23/04/2013 containing ten (10) grounds of appeal.

In line with the rules of this Court, appellants filed a further amended appellants? brief of argument dated 25/11/2015 and filed 27/11/2015 and was deemed 03/03/2016. Respondents? brief dated 19/10/2013 was filed on the 21/10/2013 while appellants? reply brief is dated and filed 04/11/2013.

Following a motion filed on 02/12/15 which was granted by this Court on 03/03/16 the respondents in view of the notice of cross appeal filed with the leave of this Court on 30/05/15 filed a respondents?/cross appellants? brief of argument dated 16/11/15 and filed 02/12/15 and deemed 03/03/16.

Appellants?/cross respondents? brief of argument dated 25/12/16 was filed on 03/03/16. Counsel on both sides adopted their briefs of arguments on 25/5/2016.
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Appellants formulated the following six (6) issues for the determination of the appeal:
i. Having regard to the plaintiffs’ traditional evidence whether the learned judge properly directed himself when he adjudge

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that the plaintiffs discharged the onus and standard of proof in establishing title to the disputed land, grounds 1, 2,3 & 4.
ii. Whether or not the respondents proved boundaries to which the claim was attached, ground 5.
iii. Having regards to the appellants’ pleadings and evidence at the trial, whether or not the appellants proved their case in accordance with law to entitle them to the reliefs claimed ground 6 & 10.
iv. Whether or not the award of Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N750,000) as damages for trespass is based on legal principles in awarding damages, ground 7.
v. Whether the learned judge properly directed himself as to the burden of proof in respect of the award of N5,000,000.00. Having regards to the allegation of crime in issue and the fact that the prayers placed before the Court is not specific on items of damages.
vi. Whether or not the award of Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N450,000.00) and One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N150,000.00) respectively are just and properly awarded according to legal principles, ground 9.

The respondents on their part distilled four (4) issues for the

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determination of the appeal to wit:
i. Whether the trial Court is right in holding that the respondents have satisfactorily proved their case and entering judgment in their favour.
ii. Whether the trial Court is right in dismissing the counter – claim of the appellants.
iii. Whether the trial Court is right in award of N5, 000. 000. 00 (Five Million Naira) damages in favour of the 1st respondent for assault resulting in injuries on the 1st respondent.
iii. Whether the award of N750,000.00 damages for trespass in favour of the respondents by the trial Court is justified and proper, based on correct legal principles and whether the award of the sum of N450,000 and N150,000.00 as costs in the suit are justified.

I consider the issues as raised by counsel on both sides to be similar. I shall therefore, be adopting the issues formulated by the appellants for the determination of this appeal; they are so adopted.

ARGUMENTS:
ISSUE ONE:
Having regard to the plaintiffs? traditional evidence whether the learned judge properly directed himself when he adjudged that the plaintiffs discharged the onus and standard of proof in

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establishing title to the disputed land. (Ground 1, 2, 3 and 4)

Learned counsel for the appellants began his submissions by referring to Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 7 , 8,9, 10, 11 and 13 of the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim as relevant to the 1st issue herein.

He argued relying on the case of Iroagbara V. Uformadu (2009) 11 NWLR (pt. 1153) Page 587 @ 591 that the respondents relied on grant in establishing their title to the land in dispute and thus ought to plead and lead in evidence the root of their title. That the respondents are bound to plead.
a. Who founded the land
b. How the founder founded the land
c. The particulars of the intervening owners through whom he claims. He cited the following cases: Anyanwu V. Mbara (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.242) 386 @ 390: Akinloye V. Eyiyiola (1968) NMLR 92; Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 238 and Adejumo V. Ayantegbe (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110- 417)

It is learned appellants’ submission that Elere of Ilere being a mere title and non juristic is incapable of granting title. That the plaintiffs did not plead names of persons on whom the title to the disputed land devolved since it was

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founded. He is of the view that the successor in title as in this case must mention the names of the grantor in order to prove the grant. That failure to so do offends the law.

Counsel argued that it was not sufficient for the PW2, the Elere of Ilere to say that his predecessors granted the land in question. That where title to a disputed land is put in issue, the title must be proved. Counsel referred to: Alade V. Awo (1975) 4 SC 215: Piallo V. Tendo (1976) 12 SC 31 : Kaho V. Woluchem (1985) (Pt.41) 616 and Olanma V. Youdubagba (2006) 2 NWLR (pt. 964) 337 @ 359.

That PW2’s evidence in Chief that Elere gave the land to Akinlolu Ademehinti was contradicted by his evidence under cross – examination to the effect that Elere gave the land to Alejo Awe and Adopetu. He referred to PW2 and DW2’s evidence on pages 58 – 60 and 78 of the record respectively to contend that the learned trial judge did not asses properly the evidence on the record. He cited Mogaji & Ors. V. Odofin & Ors. (1978) 4 SC 91 @ 94 – 96. Learned counsel contended that where a material contradiction exists, the Court cannot pick and choose which set of the evidence to

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believe. That the learned trial judge erred in his conclusion that the defect in the evidence of the plaintiffs has been cured by the evidence of PW2.

Learned counsel submits that the trial judge did not place side by side the evidence of PW2 and those of DW2 and DW3 but rather chose that of PW2 in arriving at his decision. His view is that the totality of the parties’ evidence was not examined. He urged the Court to so hold relying on the following authorities: Obadara V. The President Ibadan West District Grade ‘B’ Customary Court (1964) 1 ALL NLR 331: Onwunalu V. Uche (supra): Dagaci of Dere V. Dagaci of Ebwa (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt. 979) 382 @ 452 – 453 Paragraphs G – C.

Learned counsel aver that claimants must prove their case with credible evidence and not rely on the weakness of the case of the defendant; they have the primary burden of proving their case. That he who asserts must prove. He relied on:
– Healthcare Products (Nig.) Ltd. V. Bazza (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt.861) 582 @ 605-606.
– Atunwa V. Cadenike (1998) 7 NLWR (Pt. 557) 221 @ 228 – 227
– Gbafe V. Gbafe (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.455) 5117.

Counsel submits that it was not judicially

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proved that it is the Elere of Ilere that has the authority to grant land. He urged us to hold that the trial Court’s decision on the above issue was unreliable.

It is also appellant’s contention that they have proved possession and ownership of the land in dispute. That they were in possession when the respondents’ mother begged to occupy a portion of the land as Customary tenants. Referring to the evidence of DW1, DW2 and DW3 on the record, counsel argued that a judgment must not only demonstrate a full and dispassionate appraisal of all the issues raised in the pleadings and proved by evidence but must also flow logically from the findings on such issues. He referred to Polcarp Ojogbue & Ors. V. Ajie Nnubia (1972) 1 ALL NLR (pt.2) 226.

Counsel went further to submit that the respondents having not pleaded the names and history of their grantor, have equally failed to establish their case. He contended also that the trial Court?s decision on acts of ownership in favour of the plaintiffs was wrong. He is of the view that where traditional evidence failed, that the respondents’ root of title also collapsed and the Court’s order, he submits

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would be that of dismissal. He cited Alhaji Karimu Adisa V. Emmanuel Oyinwola & 4 Ors. Vol. 1 L. L. A. C. 1 @ 4: Odofin V. Ayoola (1984) NSC 711 @ 731. Learned counsel’s argument on acts of possession and ownership as evidence of title to land is that a party relying on same must show that such acts not only extend over a sufficient length of time but that they are numerous and also positive to warrant the inference of exclusive ownership. He stressed that the party must show:
a. That from the overwhelming number of such acts he must have regarded the land as his own; and
b. That from the nature of such their openness and their being exercised without force or stealth any person asserting title would have known of such an exercise and be expected to assert his contrary title. He referred to: Anyanwu V. Mbara (Supra): Ekpo V. lta 11 NLR 68 @ 69: Pairo V. Tenalo (Supra).

Counsel urged us to hold that the respondents’ title had collapsed and that the trial Court’s decision on acts of long possession was in error.
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In reacting to this issue, learned counsel for the plaintiffs’/respondents submits that the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4,

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PW5, DW1, DW2 and DW3 show that the respondents successfully proved by clear, cogent, credible and satisfactory evidence the area and identity of the farmlands in dispute. He referred to: Kyari V. Alkali (2005) 2 FWLR (pt. 60) 145 @ 149 and Nwokidu v. Okamu (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt. 522) 1633 ? 1637.

Respondents placed heavy reliance on their pleadings to show that there is credible evidence supporting the learned trial Court’s conclusion in their favour; respondents’ counsel contended that the evidence given by PW1 was supported by the evidence of PW2 and which he believes established the respondents’ title to the land in dispute. In an effort to drive home his points, counsel referred to Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 of the amended statement of claim and the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW5, DW1 and DW2 as supporting the respondents’ evidence that they derived title to the land in dispute by grant from the original owner/founder of the farm land (Elere of Ilere).

That an action for declaration of title to land on grant, the grantor or his successor in title must be called to prove his title. Referred to: Ofume V. Ngbeke (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt.641) 746 @

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756.

On further reference to the case of Idundun v. Okumagba (1996) 9-10 SC 6 @ 227. Counsel argued that the respondents have proved their title to the land in dispute by satisfying one of the five ways of proving title law. He urged us to uphold the decision of the learned trial Court. That the pleadings and evidence of the respondents have established that it was the Elere of Ilere who founded the land, how it was founded and the intervening owners. That the Elere of Ilere, the founder off the Land in dispute as agreed by parties, being the traditional ruler and first settler has the sole authority to grant land to people in Ilere.

Counsel aver that the respondents? father and his wife and children cultivated the land undisturbed. That the respondents inherited the said land after the death of their father in 1996 and also had undisturbed possession until 2007 when the appellants came in.

Learned counsel went further to contend that appellants did not deny the existence of the title of Elere of Ilere and that issues were not joined on the pleadings pertaining to the non juristic nature of the title (Elere of Ilere). That DW1 and DW3

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acknowledged in evidence the Elere of Ilere (PW2) who testified that his successor in title granted the farmlands in question to the father of the respondents. That DW1 and DW2 also acknowledged in evidence that the Elere of Ilere is the paramount traditional ruler and founder of Ilere town. That the present Elere of Ilere who is recognized as the traditional authority of the community that grants land, testified that his successor in title granted the disputed farmland to the respondents’ father. He referred to Exhibits J and M. Counsel continued by urging the Court to reject the appellants’ arguments on the non- juristic personality of the title “Elere of Ilere” as incapable of granting title to land, having acknowledged same.

On the trial Court judgment, learned counsel submitted that the decision was on the premise that the respondents? father and themselves have been on the land in dispute and did exercised ownership extending over sufficient length of time numerous and positive to infer that the respondents are the true owners, He urged us to so hold. Referred to pages 140 ? 141 of the record that the learned trial Court did arrive

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at its decision by also examining Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and K on the record.

Counsel further urged the Court to uphold the trial Court’s decision.

The appellants in their reply brief challenged the evidence of the PW2 that they derived title from their forefathers, the Elere of Ilere. Learned appellant’s counsel referred to page 11 of the record contending that PW2 under cross – examination did admit that he has a maternal relationship with Elere. That it is only the DW3 who is a direct son of Elere Farotimi that can lay claims to the past Eleres as his forefathers. That it does not accord with customs and traditions of Yoruba land for mother’s child from a particular family to lay claims to paternity in another family.

On the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW5, DW1 and DW3 relied upon by the respondents, that it is a notorious fact that Elere of Ilere is a title of the holder of office of Ilere and that it is ascribed to all the holders who bear different names.
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That the respondents must show by name which of the past Elere granted them land. Relying on the case of Iro – Agbara V. Ufomadu (Supra), learned counsel submits that the

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respondents must state the founder of the land, how he founded same and particulars of intervening owners through unbroken chain of succession.

On the case of Ofume v. Ngbeke (Supra) cited by the respondents establishing that grantor or his successor in title in title must be called to prove his root title, appellants? counsel contended that the word ?prove? indicate that it is not sufficient to call the grantor or his successor in title but must be called to establish his root of title. That appellants? evidence as to settlement and their root of title is consistent. Appellants referred to the evidence of DW3 to aver that PW2 does not know the history of Ilere which according to appellants, PW2 admitted in evidence under in evidence under cross-examination. On the award of costs by the trial Court, learned counsel argued that costs awarded by the Court in a judgment form part of Nigeria, 1999. He urged us to hold that the respondents failed in proving title to the disputed land claimed.

RESOLUTION
The law is trite that the standard of proof in Civil cases is discharged on the balance of probabilities or the preponderance

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of evidence. Where parties to a suit give evidence on their claims before the Court, the trial judge has the duty of weighing the evidence by resorting to the imaginary scale of justice. S.S. Alagoa. JSC in Odutola V. Mobogunje (2013) 1 SCNJ 175 @ 216 cited the case of Mogaji V. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91 @ 94 where the Apex Court held to wit: ” —- Before a judge before whom evidence is adduced by parties in a Civil case comes to a decision as to which evidence he believes or accepts and to which evidence he rejects, he should first of all put the totality of the testimony adduced by both parties on an imaginary scale; he will put the evidence adduced by the plaintiff on one side of the scale and that of the defendant on the other side of the scale and weigh them together. He will then see which is heavier not by the number of witnesses called by each party but by the quality of the probative value of the testimony of those witnesses.”

It is established principle of law that traditional history is the first mode of proof of title to land. See Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 10 SC 140.

It is a primary duty on the plaintiff who claims a declaration of title to land

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to show the Court clearly the area of the land to which his claim relates so that the land can be identified with certainty. See Section 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

In the instant case, the first plaintiff at the trial Court gave evidence and testified as PW1 along six (6) other witnesses. The other plaintiffs are his brother and a sister. They gave the description of the disputed land as a parcel of farm land situate and being at Ona – Ule Ilere Akure South Local Government known as Odo – lgbodudu, Oko – Okuta near Omolegan land, Oko – Okuta Alahere and Oko Aarin bounded on the North by Umojo Stream, East by Omolegan farmland and Late Ayodele Alejoawe farmland, West by Ona – Ule (Road) and at Oke – Ehinkunle I, Oke – Ehinkunle II bounded on the North by lbukun Agbakarin Cocoa Farmland, South by One Ona Odo Oko, Next by Ona Ule, East by Omolegan/late Ayodele Cocoa farmlands.

This is contained in the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim on pages 36 – 41 of the record and also PW1 ‘s evidence before the Court on pages 50 – 56 of the record.

Plaintiffs traced their Customary Title to one Akinolu Ademehinti, their father whom

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the said land was first given to by the then Elere about 100 years ago. The record shows that Akinlolu Ademehinti had been farming on the said farm land until 1996 when he died and the subsequent inheritance by the plaintiffs who continued to farm on the farm land devoid of any encumbrance or disturbance from the defendants? family until 2007, about 11 years after the death of Akinlolu Ademehinti.

PW2, the current Elere of Ilere who is recognized by witness on both sides, to be the custodian of all land in Ilere, testified before the Court that his predecessors granted the disputed land to Akinlolu Ademehinti, the 1st plaintiff?s father. PW3 a 100 years old wife of Omelagan who by the evidence on record is well known to both sides testified that she shares boundary with the plaintiffs. Her evidence on page 60 of the record is hereunder excerpted: ?my farm is known as Omolegan farm. I share boundary with the plaintiffs. I am the wife of Late Omolegan. We share boundary on Mojo River side and at the foot path to the farm on Omolegan farm.?

Substantially, the above evidence went unchallenged and uncontroverted and which

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supports the plaintiffs’ evidence relating to ownership and possession of the land in dispute, having cultivated same undisturbed until 2007 when defendants began laying claims to the land. The question is, where were the defendants during the life time of Akinolu Ademehinti who died at 80 years in 2006? Where were they about eleven years after, until 2007 before coming on the land, a period the plaintiffs continued cultivation of the said land.

The evidence of PW5 was also not discredited, it sailed through unchallenged. This witness testified that at the death of Akinolu Ademehimti, he and two others were nominated by the head of the family to inspect the farms left behind by the deceased. His evidence is hereunder quoted:
When Akinlolu died 3 of us met the people at Ilere to inspect the farms. These people are 1. Olomi Adenira, 2. Adewole Adeniyi and myself. The head of the family who sent us is Olulayo Ademehinti. Nobody opposed our visit and there was no other person who laid claims to the farms. The defendants were there but they made no objection, or adverse claim.?

It is on the record that when trouble

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started in respect of the land in dispute, the matter was taken before the present Elere of Ilere who arbitrated on it and ruled that the land belong to the plaintiffs. He also gave evidence before the Court (PW2) in that respect. The appellants herein took the matter before his Royal Highness the Deji of Akure who also arbitrated on it and ruled that the plaintiffs are the true owners of the land in dispute.

PW7 who was the secretary to the Deji of Akure testified before the learned trial Court and tendered Exhibit ‘M’ the decision passed by the Deji of Akure.

The law is trite that a party relying on arbitration under Customary law should plead and convincingly prove that those who presided over the dispute are competent to so do under the law. I feel that the two arbitrations held in respect of this matter were competent. I am convinced by the pleadings and the evidence on record that the plaintiffs were not only in exclusive possession, and enjoyment of the land in issue, they have in my view proved acts of ownership extending over a sufficient period of time numerous and positive enough to warrant the inference of true ownership. I

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completely agree with the trial Court where it held on page 139 of the record that; “First there is no evidence that Alejoawe gave land to Odagbabodo. Secondly, Atandara is not shown to have power to grant land as alleged. Put side by side with the story of the plaintiffs that land was granted to Akinolu Ademehimti by the Elere of Ilere and the confirmation of the defendants that it is the Elere that has authority to grant land to those in occupation of the land at Ilere including the forefather of the defendants Alejoawe; the story of the plaintiffs looks to” credible and I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have proved the title to land by traditional evidence.”

This is further supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Duruosihimiri V. Duruodunze (2001) 9 NWLR (pt.717) 244 @ 248 ratio 1 that: proof of traditional evidence does not comprise just cataloging one’s dead ancestors and stating that each of them farmed the land in dispute. Rather, it is the weight of evidence that matters and in proving it, convincing evidence has to be adduced.
It is not enough for the appellants herein to state that the land in question was inherited from

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their forefathers without supporting it with clear and convincing evidence. The Elere of Ilere to my mind is not just a mere title as adumbrated by the appellants but a permanent office with powers and authority recognized by the people to be exercised by the occupant as the custodian of the Ilere land.

It is established law that a party relying on evidence of traditional history must plead his root of title. The learned trial Court accepted the traditional evidence of the plaintiff as more probable on the preponderance of evidence. I have gone through the evidence on record and the pleadings and I am also convinced that the plaintiffs? evidence is more probable than that of the defendants. They have been able to prove through evidence and witnesses their root of title thus, acts of ownership and enjoyment of the land in dispute. The Supreme Court held in Oyadare v. Keji 21 NSCQR 58 @ 73 per Niki Tobi, JSC to wit: ?It is good law that a plaintiff who succeeds in proving acts of possession can obtain judgment claiming trespass. Acts of possession and enjoyment of land could be evidence of ownership or of Right of Occupancy. See Okechukwu v.

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Okafor (1961) 1 ALL NLR 685. Where a plaintiff proves sufficient acts of possession, the burden is thrown on the defendant under Section 145 of the Evidence Act to prove the contrary. In order to get judgment, the defendant has the onus to rebut the evidence of the plaintiff. Acts of long possession and enjoyment of land can be prima facie evidence of ownership of the particular piece of land within reference to which such acts are done.

I hold that the defendants failed in their effort to rebut the plaintiffs’ evidence on the record. The evidence of all the witnesses including the defendants’ witnesses acknowledging the authority of the Elere of Ilere to grant land supports the case of the, plaintiffs. Infact, DW3 confirmed under cross – examination that the plaintiffs? father Akinlolu Ademehinti was a farmer who had farmland at Ilere and farmed on the land for about 20 years. The evidence of plaintiffs? witnesses relate and are uncontradictory.

This issue is resolved in favour of the respondents and against the appellants.

ISSUE TWO:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS PROVED BOUNDARIES TO WHICH THE CLAIM WAS ATTACHED (GROUND 5)<br< p=””

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Learned appellants? counsel pointed out Paragraph 4 of the plaintiffs? amended statement of claim as being relevant to this issue. That the boundaries mentioned in the above paragraph were denied in Paragraphs 1, 5 and 27 of the defendants? further amended statement of defence and counter claim . He referred to Paragraph 26 of the said statement of defence and counter claim where the defendants stated their boundaries and praying the Court to declare same in their favour. That the evidence at the trial Court shows the boundaries claimed by the plaintiffs differ with those of the defendants. He submits that the cocoa farm claimed to have been granted to the plaintiffs’ father by the Elere of Ilere was the one in dispute and not the ones the plaintiffs’ father bought.

Counsel referred to the plaintiffs’ evidence on page 55 of the record. He cited the case of Nwabuoke V. Onwordi (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 331) 1236 @ 1239 to contend that a party seeking declaration must plead and lead evidence of title to a defined area of land. That the Court cannot choose and pick among various boundaries which one relate to the grant.

Counsel is of the view that the boundaries claimed by the plaintiffs are vague. He urged the Court

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to hold that plaintiffs did not establish boundaries upon which a claim for declaration can be attached. He referred to the cases of Baruwa Ogunshola 4 WACA 159; Olusanmi v. Oshosona (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 245) 22: Onwuka v. Echala (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 182 and Ugbo v. Aburime (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 360) 1.

The respondents on their part argued through their counsel that they established with certainty the identity of the disputed land with defined boundaries upon which the trial Court granted them declaration sought. They prayed the Court to uphold the lower Court?s decision.

Learned counsel referred to the respondents? pleadings Paragraphs 3 and 26 (a) of the Amended Statement of Claim in support of his arguments above, describing thee area of the land with boundaries. He also referred to PW1?s evidence on pages 1, 2 and 3 of the record on same issue, that he (PW1) was not even cross-examined on the identity of the farms and their boundaries. Relying on the authority of Adeleke v. Akanji (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 341) 715 @ 725.
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Counsel argued that PW2, the Elere of Ilere testified that he knew the land in dispute and PW3 also gave

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evidence before the Court that she shared boundaries on two sides of the farm lands were not cross – examined.

That PW5 on page 15 of the records gave evidence of the location of the land in dispute. He said DW1 knows the land in dispute but gave a contrary description while DW2 testified knowing the disputed land. He went further that DW3 testified under cross – examination that he knows the PW3 and that she has boundary with Akinlolu Ademehinti (the respondents’ father).

Learned counsel submits that the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PWs, DW1, DW2 and DW3 clearly established boundaries/identity of the land upon which respondents sought title. He referred to the trial Court?s position on page 138 of the record, urged this Court to so hold.

RESOLUTION
In a claim for declaration of title to land, the law places onus on the plaintiff to prove title to a defined area to which a declaration can be attached. See Nnabuife v. Nwigwu (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.719) 710 CA; Odesanya v. Ewedemi (1962) 2 SCNLR 23.

The plaintiffs pleaded the description of the land in their amended statement of claim Paragraph 26(a) on page 36 of the record. PW1 who is

28

the 1st plaintiff while giving evidence before the Court, further identified the land on pages 50-51 of the record and went ahead to buttress that the said land which was given to their (Akinlolu Ademehinti) by the Elere of Ilere was a virgin land which was deforested and had crops like cocoa, kolanut, palm trees, bush mango, bitter cola, pineapples, yam, cocoyam, plantains, banana, etc planted on it by their father. PW1, PW2, PW3 (boundary person to the plaintiffs), PW5 and DW1, DW2 and DW3 all claim to know the land in dispute. While PW1 described the land as “——– in the South by Ona – Odo Oko (Road) in evidence and in their pleadings, DW1 who is the 1st defendant and DW3 described the land as Odo ? Oko also in evidence. See pages 70 -77 of the record. DW2 simply claimed he knows the land in dispute.

From the evidence on record therefore it is clear to me that the land in dispute is known to all the parties. I completely agree with the position of the lower Court where it held on page 138 of the record that; “Here the plaintiffs described with clarity the identity of the farms of their father. The defendants, through DW1, DW2 & DW3 are

29

quite aware of the land area in dispute even though they described it using different terms”.

This Court decided in the case of Iwuno V. Dieli (1991) 126 in line with the trial Courts position above that “where parties, from the evidence, are clear as to identity of the land in dispute, the fact that different names are given to it or the area it is located cannot affect the case”.
I hold that the above decision applies in this case more so that the law has established boundary dispute to be one and the same thing as dispute over title or ownership of land in dispute. lt was held per Tabai, JSC in the case of Tanko V. Echendu (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 253 @ 255 SG that;
“Even if it is accepted that it is boundary dispute it is, in my considered opinion, one and the same thing as a dispute over title or ownership of the land in dispute. I am unable to find the distinction which the Court below tried to make….”
Thus, I am unable to fault the position of the learned trial Court that the land in question is known to both sides, considering the pieces of evidence on the record. The land was clearly described and in fact, by the position of the

30

Apex Court in Tanko V. Echendu (Supra). plaintiffs’ title is further supported.

This issue is resolved for the respondents and against the appellants.

ISSUE THREE
HAVING REGARDS TO THE APPELLANTS’ PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE AT TRIAL, WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANTS PROVED THEIR CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW TO ENTITLE THEM TO RELIEFS CLAIMED (GROUNDS 6 & 10)

Learned counsel is of the contention that the appellants? case having regard to the pleadings on the record, has met the requirements of pleading title by settlement. That the appellants were able to show through their pleadings how plaintiffs? father came into the disputed land through the appellants ancestors. That the relationship between Odogbo, the mother of Ademehinti and Otundara, the wife of Late Alejo Awe who is the 1st, 2nd and 4th appellants?ancestors, is not in dispute and that when linked with both parties is sufficient to show the circumstances which brought the respondents on the land.
?
Learned counsel aver that the 3rd defendant ought not to be joined as a

31

party, as according to him there was no cause of action against him. That the evidence he gave before the Court as on the record is believable and should be accepted. He referred to pages 42 and 44 of the records to show why the 3rd defendant was joined as a party in this suit. Counsel submits that evidence was led in support of the appellants’ pleadings.

He referred to PW2’s evidence under cross – examination to contend that his evidence lend weight to the appellants’ case. He is of the view that the appellants by their pleadings and the evidence proffered have discharged the burden of proof placed on them by law in respect of their claims for title.
He submits that the onus is on the respondents to establish title and not rely on the weakness of the defendants’ case. He relied on the following authorities: Oyenevin V. Akinkugbe (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1184) 265 at 271 and Eva V. Olapade (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 505 @ 508 – 509.
?
Learned appellants’ counsel further argued that the appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought in the further amended statement of defence and counter claim having proved traditional evidence by pleading the founder of

32

the land, how the land was founded and particulars of the intervening owners through whom the appellants claimed. He cited: Anyanwu V. Mbara (Supra): Akinloye V. Eyiyiola (Supra): Olujinle V. Adeagbo (Supra) and Adejumo V. Ayantegbe (Supra) in support of his arguments.

Relying on Section 124 of the Evidence Act, 2011 counsel disagrees with the position of the learned trial Court that where the counter claimants’ claim succeed, no award can be granted for trespass and assault as the counsel did not state whether the damages is in Naira, Dollars etc. That Naira is a Nigerian Legal Tender and a mistake of counsel should not be visited on the litigants. He urged us to so hold.

The respondents responded to this issue in their issue No. 2.01(b) by urging this Court to uphold the learned trial Court’s decision on the basis that the evidence given by the defendants in respect of their root of title is inconsistent unreliable and unsatisfactory to ground the counter claim of the appellants. That they did not lead evidence on title by settlement.
?
Counsel excerpted the evidence of DW1 and DW2 on pages 22 and 29 of the record respectively, as follows:<br< p=””

</br<

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DW1 – “Our forefather Alejoawe a hunter from Erin -Oke in Ekiti land got to llere where he met llere Olagboyegun who gave him land or the left hand side to the farm”.
DW3 – lt was my father Olagboyegun that gave the land to Alejoawe for farming purpose.?

Respondents? counsel contended against the appellants? assertion that they (appellants) led evidence in support of title by settlement. That evidence led must be in line with pleaded facts.

On the counter claim of the defendants counsel agreed that the position of the learned trial Court on pages 144-145 of the record was correct. That the figures were not stated in words to enable the Court properly assess the claim of the appellants. That is the duty of counsel to ensure pleadings conform with the rules. He referred to Order 25 Rules 4(1) of the Ondo State High Court Rules, 1987 which states to wit?.. dates, sums and number shall be expressed in figures but may be expressed in words.?
?
It is counsel’s view that learned appellants’ counsel was under a duty to state clearly in words what is claimed and in the proper denomination. That the error herein relates

34

to the conduct of the case and litigants, says he, are bound by the conduct of their counsel. He relied on the case of Bello V. A. G Ovo State (1996) NSCC (Pt. 11) 1257 where it was held that: “The day the Courts allow the inarticulacy or ignorance of counsel to determine the result of an action before it, that day will herald the obtrusive genesis of the unwitting enthronement of injustice by the Courts itself by default.”

The Court was further referred to the cases of Akanbi V. Alao (1983) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 171 @ 118.

Learned counsel submits that the trial Court’s position that it does not know if the claimants’ claim was in pounds sterling, Dollars or a Nigerian Naira or in Tubers of yam was proper and not misconceived.

Appellants replied on this issue that the evidence they presented before the Court were not inconsistent. On the issue of settlement counsel referred to pages 24 and 25 of the record where he excerpted DW1’s evidence under cross – examination to wit: Both Olagbogun and Alejo – Awe founded the settlement today known as llere, he came hunting from Erin ? Oke in Ekiti – land but he was a co- founder of llere. I do not know

35

when my forefathers first settled at llere. I was only told by my father.

Learned counsel further referred to Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the statement of defence and counter claim in support of their arguments. That it was clear how the appellants’ forefathers came and settled at llere, that facts relating to the settlement on the part of llere must be made clear to the Court. Submits that it was by reason of the appellants’ settlement that the family has always held the number two potion with the Adopetu title.

That the pleading relating to settlement and the appellants’ evidence on root of title were consistent. Submitted that parties are bound by their pleadings and that evidence led on unpleased matters go to no issue. He referred to the cases of:
Ojo V. Kamalu (2005) 18 NWLR (pt. 958) 523 @ 536
Adebisi V. Oke (1967) NMLR 64.
Orizu V. Ayaegbunam (1978) 5 SC 21
Kayode v. Odutola (2011) 11 NWLR (pt. 725) 659.
Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291
Ewaremi v. ACB Ltd. (1978) 4 SC 99.
Udechukwu v. Okwuka (1956) SC NLR 189.

RESOLUTION:
The arguments by the appellants on this issue is that on the pleadings and the

36

evidence before the Court, they have proved traditional evidence by showing the Court the founder of the land in dispute, how it was founded and the particulars of the intervening owners, entitling them to the reliefs sought. I feel that issue one above where I resolved that appellants are by law required to furnish the Court with cogent and reliable evidence in support of their inheritance through their lineage has taken care of this issue. The evidence of DW1 and DW3 have been found to be inconsistent regarding their lineage in an effort to prove their root of title.

While DW1 gave evidence that the first Elere is Odogboyegun who handed down to Esubi Adebiyi who handed over to Farotimi the father of the DW3 before it finally got the current Elere, the PW2, DW3 confirmed under cross – examination that Adegboyegun is the first Elere but went ahead to testify that there were other Eleres before his father.
?
Hereunder is an excerpt of DW3’s evidence on page 78 of the record. “—–Olagoyegun is the first Elere. Olabosimi was an Elere but I do not know him. Okerusolo was also Elere but I do not know him. I do not know Araromiro. There were other Eleres

37

before my father.”

This witness (DW3) also testified in evidence as on page 77 of the record, on one hand that Farotimi was his father and in another breath he said “it was my father Olagboyegun that gave land to Alejoawe for farming purposes.?

His evidence as to the number of Eleres that ever existed is not only contrary or inconsistent with the evidence of DW1 but with the pleadings and even Paragraph (e) of the particulars of ground six(6) of the grounds of appeal. The learned trial judge exhaustively dealt with this issue in his judgment on pages 138 and 147 of the record wherein he found the evidence given by the respondents in this regard to be more probable than that of the plaintiffs, which I also believe having thoroughly gone through the record. To avoid repetition therefore, I adopt my position in issue No. 1 above.

It is established law that where findings of the trial judge are not perverse, an appellate Court judge cannot interfere with the findings. See Oyadare v. Keji (supra); E.A.T.B. Ltd v. P.I.C. Ltd. (2013) 12 SCNJ @3.
?
I am not convinced by the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that they have

38

successfully proved their root of title to the land in dispute by showing the founders, how the land was founded and the intervening owners considering the inconsistencies earlier mentioned in the evidence of the witnesses.

On the issue of trespass as contended by the counsel for the appellants, the law is trite that trespass is founded on possession. I have read the evidence on record and the judgment of the learned trial Court and I am satisfied that justice has been done to this issue by the learned trial judge.

I hold that the plaintiffs did prove better root of title than the defendants.

I also hold in respect of the other reliefs claimed by the appellants that the findings of the learned trial Court on pages 141 – 145 of the record was in order and same cannot be faulted.

This issue is resolved for the respondents and against the appellants.

ISSUE FOUR:
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND NAIRA (N750,000) AS DAMAGES FOR TRESPASS IS BASED ON LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN AWARDING DAMAGES (GROUND 7).

Learned appellants? counsel argued that the respondents herein must establish a better title before

39

they can be entitled to such damages. That the grant of Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N750,000.00) to the respondents by the trial Court was wrong. He urged us to hold that the respondents failed to establish a better title and hence not entitled to the grant claimed. Referred to the case of Amori v. Iyanda (2008) 3 NWLR (pt. 1074) 250-261.

In response to this issue, learned counsel for the respondents is of the firm view that there is overwhelming evidence before the Court which led it to arrive at its decision.

That the evidence before the Court upon which it based its decision was credible, reliable and uncontradicted. Counsel urged the Court not to disturb the trial Court’s position for reasons that respondents did prove their case entitling them to damages. He referred to the case of Okunrinmeta V. Mrs. Agitan (2002) FWLR (Pt. 100) 137 @ 138.

Counsel concluded on this issue by saying that a claim for trespass is rooted in possession and that the trial Court after a thorough review of the evidence before it was satisfied that the land in question was in the possession of the respondents, hence, proved a better title. He urged us to

40

so hold.

RESOLUTION.
I have resolved earlier that the plaintiffs herein have proved a better title to the land in dispute as against the defendants/appellants. In a claim for damages, what the law compensates for is the loss incurred by the claimants resulting from the wrong done them by the other parties (defendants in this case). The loss incurres by the plaintiffs must be linked to the alleged trespassers before claimant can succeed in his claim before the Court. See the cases of Zenith Bank Plc v. Ekereuwem (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1290) 207; O.M.T. Co. v. Imafidon (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1290) 332.

The learned trial Court held in its judgment on page 145 of the record that “The claim for trespass is assessed on the damage done to the plaintiffs’ farms and the economic crops and trees on the land. Exhibit K tendered show the extent of damage done to the property of the plaintiffs when the defendants trespassed thereon. I assess damage on the trespass of the defendants at N750, 000. 00 (Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) Only.”

The alleged trespass complained by the plaintiffs against the defendants, especially the evidence of PW1 and Exhibit K tendered through the PW4 are impregnable. I find

41

that the assessment of damages by the learned trial Court is proper.

This issue is resolved in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.

ISSUE FIVE:
WHETHER THE LEARNED JUDGE PROPERLY DIRECTED HIMSELF AS TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN RESPECT OF THE AWARD OF N5,000,000 HAVING REGARD TO THE ALLEGATION OF CRIME IN ISSUE AND THE FACT THAT THE PRAYERS PLACED BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT SPECIFIC ON ITEMS OF DAMAGES (GROUND 8).

On this issue, counsel for the appellants referred to the evidence of PW1 and PW6 and the pleadings to argue that allegation of crime has been set out and that respondents must prove same beyond reasonable doubt in order to succeed. He submits that despite the injuries complained about, there was no evidence of police investigation of the alleged crime or the evidence of payments for drugs or treatment at the hospital. He referred to page 54 of the record in order to buttress his point that only analgesic was administered to the patient. That analgesic was not sufficient for the treatment of fractures as described by the patient.

Learned counsel urged the Court to hold that the respondents are not entitled to the

42

award of N5, 000. 000 (Five Million Naira) having failed to prove the allegation of crime beyond reasonable doubt. Referred to Onuagulushi V. Ndu (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt.679) 517 @ 570: Famuroti V. Agbeke (1991) 15 NWLR (Pt. 189) 1: N. B. Plc. V. Adetoun Oladeii Nig. Ltd. (2002) 15 NWLR (pt. 791) 585 @ 594.

Appellants further submit that the prayer for damages sought were vague. That, prayer placed before the Court needed to be specific, decisive and precise. That, it is not the duty of the Court to embark on a voyage of discovery. He referred to Ozuah V. Ezeweputa (2005) 4 NWLR (pt. 915) 221 @ 241.

That it was not certain whether the damages claimed were special or general damages. He urged the Court to hold that the trial Court erred in granting N5, 000. 000. 00 as damages. Counsel relied on the case of Gbafe V. Gbafe (supra) to stress that the onus of proving a particular fact is fixed by the pleading.
?
On the other hand counsel for the respondents in an effort to establish the claim for damages herein referred to the evidence of PW1 wherein he testified on his ordeal in the hands of the appellants and how he sustained degrees of injuries. To

43

support the case of the PW1, counsel referred to the evidence proffered by the PW6, a medical doctor who confirmed treatment of the PW1 (1st respondent). He tendered Exhibit ‘L’, a medical report through this witness. That the evidence of PW1 and PW6 was not unchallenged in evidence and it was accepted by the learned trial judge. He urged us to so hold and referred to Audu V. Okeke (1998) 3 NWLR (pt. 542) 373 @ 38.

On the issue of allegation of crime, respondents’ counsel is of the contention that it was not directly in issue and that assault is both Civil and Criminal wrong. Counsel further referred to the evidence of PW1 and PW6 to contend that defendants did not deny the allegation of assault.

That in law the evidence of a single witness if credible and uncontroverted is sufficient and that evidence not contradicted or denied is deemed admitted. That the appellants herein neither denied the pleadings nor contradicted the evidence of PW1 and PW6 on the damages suffered. He urged the Court to so hold.
Counsel cited the cases of Ajibare V. Akomolafe (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt. 672) 1689 @ 17000 and Cappa & Dalberto Ltd. V. Akintilo Tilo (2003) 9

44

NWLR (Pt. 824) 49 @ 61.

RESOLUTION:
The prayers sought by the plaintiffs is for damages sustained as a result of the acts of the defendants. PW1 testified in evidence on page 54 of the record as follows: “On the 13th of March, 2010 l was on the farm when the defendants came to the farm and attacked me with their agents. They lay me flat on the ground and started beating me. I was admitted into the State Specialist Hospital Akure for injuries sustained – bruises on the back, tenderness on my right hip, I sustained injuries on my back, fractures on my right calved close to the acromioclavicular joint since then, I have not been able to walk erect or stand erect and I cannot engage in any physical exercise. I cannot use the right hand effectively for anything. I cannot drive anymore and I suffered both mental and psychological damages and loss of livelihood, also suffered hip dislocation so that I cannot walk on my feet rightly?..?

This evidence was neither challenged nor controverted during cross – examination and the trial judge believed and accepted same. Exhibit ‘L’ was tendered through PW6 who gave evidence that he attended to

45

the PW1 while on admission on his 3rd day at the hospital. This evidence was also not debunked.

In a matter such as this having, to do with personal injury suffered, there is no doubt that the agony and pain of the sufferer cannot be easily assessed being that it is deeply internalized in the sufferer. The trial Court is faced with challenges of seeing and observing such a pain and agony in order to be able to assess the damages suffered by the party claiming. The appellants? submissions on the evidence of PW6 cannot in my view stand or defeat the evidence on record.

It was held in the case of Ighosewe v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd. (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 410) 741 that ?Expert evidence of a medical doctor is not necessary to prove the effect of pain and suffering in a person neither is such evidence necessary in the consequence of any injury which can be visually observed by the Court and the parties to the case in point.?

The learned trial Court held on page 145 of the record to wit: “On the damages claimed for injuries sustained by the 1st plaintiff due to the assault of the defendants, I asses this based on the permanent injury

46

and deformity suffered by the plaintiff and I award the sum of N5,000,000. 00 (Five Million Naira) only against the defendants in favour of the 1st plaintiff.”

Based on the evidence on the record I find no fault in the learned trial judge’s position as held above. lt was further held in the case of lgbosewe V. Delta Steel Co. Ltd. (Supra) that “Where a party adduced sufficient evidence on reliefs sought by him without any challenge whatsoever by way of cross – examination by the opponent, those facts are therefore deemed admitted and proved.?

On the non specificity of damages as argued by the appellant?s counsel, the law is trite that the proper thing to do in awarding damages in personal injury cases is to make awards for pain and suffering and also for loss of amenities of life under separate heads of damages both falling under general damages. See Ighosewe v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd. (Supra); Straba Construction (Nig) Ltd v. Ogarekpe (1991) 1 NWLR (pt. 170) 733; U.B.A. Plc. V. Achoru (1990) 6 NWLR (pt. 156) 254.

As quoted earlier the damages awarded by the learned trial Court on this issue is for injuries sustained by the 1st

47

plaintiff due to the assault of the defendants. The trial Court only exercised its duty as provided by law. It is imperative to note that the matter before the Court is Civil, which is decided on the preponderance of evidence. The plaintiffs herein have not activated the Court?s powers to exercise its criminal jurisdiction in this case. The appellants’ argument that crime has been raised and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt does not arise.

I resolve this issue against the appellants and in favour of the respondents.

ISSUE SIX:
Whether or not the award of four hundred and fifty thousand naira (N450,000) and one hundred and fifty thousand naira (N150,000) respectively are justly and properly awarded according to legal principles (ground 9).

Appellants on this issue disagree with the learned trial Court’s award of Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N450,000.00) and One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira (N150,000.00) respectively in favour of the plaintiffs.

Learned counsel’s argument is that the plaintiffs/respondents do not merit the award by the trial Court as according to him, they failed to prove their root of title,

48

that the Court by that reason is precluded from awarding such costs in their (respondents?) favour as costs, he says follow events.

Learned counsel urged us to set aside the award and the judgment of the learned trial Court and grant the appellants? counter claim.

On the respondents part, learned counsel argued that ground 9 of the grounds of appeal from where this issue was distilled has to do with the discretionary powers of the Court and thus says he required the leave of the Court.

That the ground and the issue therefrom were misconceived. That the only complain open to a party is either the award of cost was excessive or too low. Relying on the authority of Mobil Production Ltd. V. Monokpo (2011) FWLR (Pt. 78) 1210 @ 1213. learned counsel urged the Court to strike out the ground of appeal and the issue raised from same for the reasons above mentioned.

Counsel further urged the Court to uphold the award of the costs of N450,000. 00 and N150, 000. 00 respectively as cost according to him is awarded to compensate the successful party for loss incurred in the course of litigation. He referred to Registered Trustees of Ifeloju

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v. Kuku (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) 65.

Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the appellants? appeal and to uphold the decision of the learned trial Court delivered on the 25th of March, 2013.

In reply to the the respondents, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appeal herein is against the whole judgment. That cost awarded in a judgment forms part of the said judgment. Counsel referred to Section 241(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. That the decision of the Court was not interlocutory but final decision. That the award cannot stand where the root of title fails. He urged the Court to so hold and set aside the award.

RESOLUTION:
The award of damages as established by law is essentially the duty of the trial Court judge. The exercise of such power after a careful and judicial assessment of the damages is discretional. See the case of lgbosere V. Delta Steel Co. Ltd. (Supra): Harka Air Services (Nig.) Ltd. V. Keazor (2011) 13 NWLR (pt. 1264) 320 SC.

The award of N450, 000. 00 and N150, 000. 00 by the trial Court against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs were in respect of the costs incurred by

50

the plaintiffs in the course of litigation and which they succeeded. The Court as I can infer did exercise its discretionary powers which is permissible in law.

It was held in the case of ACB V. Okonkwo (1997) 1 NWLR (pt.480) 194 that “A party cannot appeal on failure of the High Court to award costs without first obtaining the leave of either the Court of appeal or of the High Court. This is the requirement of Section 220 (2)(c) of the 1979 Constitution. In this case, since the 1st respondent did not obtain leave, the ground of appeal in the cross – appeal complaining against costs ought to be struck out and the issue formulated from it becomes a non issue.” The above authority is in tandem with the provision of Section 241(2) (c) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, by which I am guided to opine that the appellant herein must show that the learned trial judge proceeded upon some wrong principles of law or that the award was an entirely erroneous estimate in order to succeed. We shall therefore not interfere with the lower Court’s exercise of discretion in awarding costs which in our view was judicially carried out. See Ladega V. Akinliyi (1992) 2

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SC 91: Rewane V. Okotie ? Eboh (1960) SCNR 461.
I agree based on the aforementioned authorities that the ground of appeal and issue formulated therefrom cannot stand. The arguments put up by the learned counsel for the respondents that the only complaints open to the defendants on this issue was whether the costs awarded were too low or excessively high.

Therefore, ground Nine (9) of the grounds of appeal and issue No. 6 emanating from same are hereby struck out.

On the issue of title to the land in dispute as to warrant the award of damages, I had earlier decided on the preponderance of evidence that respondents herein did prove a better title as against the defendants/appellants title.

This issue is resolved in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents and against the defendants/appellants.

Having resolved the six issues in this appeal against the appellant, this appeal fails for lacking in merit. Consequently, the judgment of Hon. Justice C.E.T Ajama of the High Court of Ondo State, sitting at the Akure Judicial Division in Suit No. AK/131/2010 delivered on the 25th of March 2013 is hereby upheld.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8952(CA)

Access Bank Plc V. Vicapek International Limited & Anor (2016) LLJR-CA

Access Bank Plc V. Vicapek International Limited & Anor (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A. 

This is an appeal against the judgment delivered on the 9th March, 2012 in the High Court of Osun State holden at Osogbo wherein the Respondents were the Plaintiffs while the Appellant was the Defendant/Counterclaimant.

The claim of the Respondents against the Appellant was for the following:
(i) A declaration that by the terms and condition of the Forth (sic) Three Million Naira (N43,000,000.00k) Bankers Acceptance Facility agreement entered between the Claimant and the Defendant which agreement was executed by the Claimant at Osogbo on 21st December, 2007, the Claimant is not in any way, form or manner indebted to the Defendant.
(ii) A declaration that by terms of the written agreement between the Claimant and the Defendant the collateral securities for the said facility are the Claimant’s shares at Zenith Bank Plc, Professional shares purchased by the Defendant’s subsidiary Intercontinental Securities Limited and no more.
(iii) An order directing the Defendant to give a true and accurate account of the value of the Claimant’s shares in its

1

custody at the expiration of the tenure of the said facility and to pay the balance (if any) into the account of the Claimant.
(iv) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, by itself, its solicitors (especially Wilson Atirene of the law firm of WILSON ATIRENE & CO) agents, representatives or privies and the Law Enforcement Agents from further harassing embarrassing and arresting the Claimant, its agents representatives or privies as a result of the facilities which is the subject matter of this suit or any matter relating thereto.
(v) The sum of Five Hundred Million Naira Only (N500,000,000.00) being general and special damages for the arrest, assault, defamation, deprivation and tribulation of the 2nd Claimant as a result of the her (sic) arrest detention and humiliation suffered consequent upon her travails on 9th of September, 2009 in the premises of the Eagles Squad of the Osun State Police Command, Osogbo.
(vi) Another sum of N20,000,000.00 being special damage in consequence of the defendants failure or default to sell the shares at the expiration of the tenor of the facility which sum of money would have accrued as

2

profit on the said date to the 1st Claimant.

PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
1. Medical bills, drugs and other expenses as (sic) different hospitals N5,000,000.00k
2. Expected profit to the 1st Claimant from Sales of shares within N20,000,000.00k
GENERAL DAMAGES N495,000,000.00k
TOTAL N520,000,000.00k

The Appellant’s counterclaim against the Respondents was for the following:
a. The Sum N83,931,930.10 (Eighty Three Million Nine Hundred and Thirty One Thousand Nine hundred and Thirty Kobo) as at 31st day of July, 2010.
b. Claim of 17% on the sum of N83,931,930.10 (Eighty Three Million Nine Hundred and Thirty One Thousand Nine hundred and Thirty Kobo) from the 31st day of July 2010 until judgment of the Court is pronounced.
c. Claim of 10% per annum on the adjudged sum until the judgment sum is finally liquidated.
d. DECLARATION that in the event that the value of the Zenith shares over which defendant exercise a lien does not completely pay off the adjudged sum, the defendant shall be entitled to sell whatever asset of 1st claimant available.

The case of the Respondents through their lone witness was that

3

the 1st Respondent was and still is a customer of the Appellant. By an agreement between the parties the Appellant advanced the sum of N43 million which was to be transferred to Intercontinental Securities Limited for the purchase of shares. The 1st Respondent was asked to submit an irrevocable letter authorizing the Appellant to sell the existing shares and remit the proceeds to its account and it complied. The Respondents also executed a document authorizing the Appellant to sell the pledged shares.

The tenor of the facility was six months and it therefore lapsed on 1st June 2008 which was the point at which the lien became enforceable.

Instead of the Appellant enforcing the lien, it held on to the shares purchased by its subsidiary Intercontinental Securities Limited until the stock exchange market started crashing on or about the 25th July 2008.

Repayment was conditioned upon the following factors;
(a) The exercise of power of sale of the shares by the Appellant immediately the value of the shares fell by 15% or
(b) The sale of the shares by the Appellant at the expiration of the six months tenor.

That if the Appellant had

4

complied with the terms of the agreement by selling off the shares 25 days from the end of the transaction or at the expiration of the tenor on 1st June 2008, the whole facility would have been paid up and the Respondents would have got not less than N20million as profit and the Respondents are not indebted to the Appellant.

Notwithstanding this, the Appellant through its agents have subjected the Respondents to a regime of harassment claiming that the Respondents were owing the sum of over N58,297,111.

That on 9th September, 2009 policemen from Police Eagle Squad Osogbo picked the 2nd Respondent upon the complaint of the Appellant and she was detained for nine hours consequent upon which she was admitted in the hospital and she spent N5million on medical treatment.

The defence of the Appellant and evidence in proof of the counterclaim through a sole witness was that sometimes in 2007; Elder M. A. Ojo approached the Appellant to enquire how his company could benefit from the I – margin facility of the Appellant. Elder M. A. Ojo is the promoter the 1st Respondent.

The 1st Respondent later sent in a letter to the appellant requesting for

5

N43million loan to purchase Zenith Bank Plc Shares. The Respondents promised in the letter to repay the loan within 6months subsequently the parties entered into an agreement dated 21st December, 2007 by which the Appellant advanced a loan of M3million to the Respondents at 17% interest per annum.

That it was never an undertaking between the parties that the repayment of the loan was conditioned on the sale of the Zenith Bank shares and no more. That the word collateral was never used in the agreement.

That the Appellant was never negligent or liable in damages to the Respondents for failure to sell the shares when share prices started dropping.

That it was not possible to sell the shares without the shares’ certificate. That after the shares’ certificate was out Elder M. A. Ojo stealthily collected it from Zenith Bank Plc through his brother working at Zenith Bank. This deprived the Appellant of the opportunity of selling the shares.

The Appellant had to apply again to Zenith Securities for re-issue of another certificate.

That the 1st Respondent was indebted to the Appellant in the sum of N85,931,930.10 as at 31st October 2010 which

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it has failed to pay despite entreaties necessitating the appointment of a recovery agent.

That the purported harassment of the 2nd Respondent was not approved by the Appellant.

After considering evidence led by both parties and addresses of their counsel the lower Court entered judgment in favour of the Respondents and dismissed the counterclaim of the Appellant.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court, the Appellant approached this Court by an initial notice of appeal dated and filed 14th May 2012. With leave if this Court granted on 3rd June 2015, the Appellant filed an amended notice of appeal dated and filed 4th June, 2015. The amended notice of appeal contains ten grounds of appeal from which the appellant presented the following four issues for determination:
i. Can the learned trial judge be justified in law for making use of and heavily relying on, the PW1’s Statement on Oath when PW1 admitted under cross-examination that she signed the said Statement on Oath in her office?
ii. Was the trial judge correct in law to have held the Appellant liable for the tortuous acts of Wilson Atirene, Esq. of counsel and, on the

7

basis of that holding, to have awarded N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) general damages against the Appellant?
iii. Whether the learned trial judge came to a right and correct decision in awarding any of the reliefs claimed by Plaintiffs/Respondents.
iv. Whether the learned trial judge reached a right and correct decision when he dismissed the Counter-Claim of the Appellant.

The Respondents on the other hand formulated the following issues for determination :
(1) Whether the learned trial judge was wrong in holding that the Appellant has breached the condition of the contract between her and the Respondents.
(2) Whether the learned trial judge was wrong in holding the Appellant liable for the acts of her agent which has occasioned injury on the 2nd Respondent.
(3) Whether the learned trial judge was wrong in making use of the evidence of PW1, a victim of the wrongful act of the Appellant’s recovery Agent in the determination of this case.
(4) Whether the learned trial judge was wrong in dismissing the counter-claim of the Appellant.

The appeal was thus argued on the following briefs:
1. Appellant’s Brief of

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Argument dated and filed on 4th June 2015 settled by Solomon S. Wada Esq.
2. Respondents’ Brief dated and filed on 25th February 2016 settled by S. O. Popoola Esq.

Arguing the appeal learned counsel for the Appellant referred the Court to evidence of the Pw1 under cross-examination to the effect that she signed her written statement on oath in her office. The office of the Pw1, it was submitted is not the Registry of the lower Court. The implication of the admission of Pw1 that she signed the written statement on oath in her office, it was contended, is that it is inadmissible because it was made contrary to Section 117 (4) of the Evidence Act 2011.

On issue 2, it was submitted that the holding by the lower Court that the Appellant was liable in damages in the sum of N20million in favour of the Respondents is erroneous in law on the following grounds:
Firstly, the Appellant denied in the pleadings any responsibility for the action of Barrister Wilson Atirene against the Respondent. The burden of proof was then cast on the Respondents to aver to facts and produce evidence of the complaint lodged with the police vide a certified true copy of

9

the complaint made to the police or subpoena the appropriate police officer to give evidence.]

The 2nd Respondent, it was submitted did not prove that she was detained by the police for nine hours in view of the Appellant’s defence in the pleading that “Barrister Wilson Atirene was engaged not to use illegal means nor police services in the recovery of the loan but to apply his professional skill…… to recovery the debt.”

The Appellant, it was submitted, could not be held responsible for the acts of Barrister Wilson Atirene. We were referred to Labode v. Oyubu & Anor (2001) 3 SC 15 at 41.

It was further submitted that although Exhibits D and D4 were tendered by the parties, the effect they were intended to have in the case of the Respondents were never pleaded nor canvassed and tested in oral evidence. That Exhibit E was not even pleaded and should be discountenanced. We were referred to N.N.P.C. v. A.I.C. (2001) 49 WRN 140 at 158.

The Respondents, it was submitted, impliedly abandoned the issue of police harassment, arrest and detention as it was not made an issue in the address at the lower Court.
Exhibit D7, it was submitted,

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was pleaded by the Appellant to show that Wilson Atirene was employed to recover the debt by means of his professional skill as a solicitor and not by unlawful means.

On issue 3, learned counsel for the Appellant relied on his arguments on issues 1 and 2 and submitted further that the Respondents ought but failed to plead facts and give evidence of the value of the shares in the capital market as at 1st of June 2008 which the Respondents averred should have been the time for the sale of the shares. They also ought but failed, to plead and give evidence of what would have been the value of the shares as at 1st of June, 2008. It was submitted that it is the difference in the value of the shares at the point of sale and at the point of purchase that will enable a reasonable Tribunal come to a sound decision that the value of the shares as at 1st June, 2008 was enough to pay off the loan of 43million plus the interest element of 17% per annum and that the 1st Respondent is not in anyway, form or manner” indebted to the Appellant. It was submitted that the declaration by the lower Court that the 1st Respondent is no more indebted to the Appellant is faulty

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having regard to paucity of pleaded facts and evidence.

It was submitted that if the first declaration granted by the lower Court is set aside, the 6th relief on special damages should also be set aside.

It was submitted that it was erroneous for the lower Court to have granted the 6th relief for special damages which was for not less than twenty million Naira as profit from the transaction. Special damages, it was submitted do not lend themselves to speculative figures but are with scientific exactitude. We were referred to Joachin E. Oseyomon & Anor v. S. O. Ojo (1997) 7 SCNJ 365 at 386.

It was submitted that there was neither pleading nor evidence from the respondent on (a) the total unit shares the Appellant bought for the 1st Respondent, (b) the price of each unit share; (c) the prevailing market price per unit share at the time the Appellant ought to have sold the shares; (d) the profit on each share and (e) the profit unit share multiplied by total shares to give the figure of special damages.

It was submitted that in the absence of these figures in evidence, the lower Court was in error in awarding N20million damages. The Court

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was referred to Sinyeofori A. Umoetuk v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2002) 3 WRN 62 at 79.

The lower Court, it was submitted, granted special and aggravated damages even though the Respondent did not ask for aggravated damages.

It was submitted that to give a right meaning to the intention of the parties in Exhibit C, the lien on the shares is a security and not a collateral security. The collateral security is the three channels of repayment mentioned in Exhibit C.

The Court was urged to set aside the second declaration granted to the Respondents.

It was submitted that the lower Court had granted relief three by making an order that Appellant give a true and accurate account of the value of the respondents’ shares in the custody of the Appellant at the expiration of the tenure of the said facility and to pay the balance (if any) into the account of the Respondents.

It was submitted that on the face of Exhibit D7 it was inequitable for the Respondents to have gone to Court at all and it was erroneous for the lower Court to have ordered the Appellant to give account of the property both parties had by their own hands surrendered in

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writing to a third party.

On issue 4, it was submitted that the accuracy and correctness as well as the exactness of the sum of N83,931,930.10 contained in Exhibit D3 were not rebutted neither by the evidence of Pw1 nor controverted under cross-examination of DW1 who gave evidence that he was aware that the 1st Respondent was indebted to the Appellant in the sum of N83,931,930.10 as at 31st June 2010 and that the 1st Respondent refused to pay of the huge indebtedness despite several entreaties. The lower Court, it was submitted, ought  to have received this piece of evidence.

It was submitted that no evidence was proffered on the averments in the Respondents’ Reply to statement of Defence and Defence to counterclaim. The Reply to the statement of defence and defence to counterclaim was therefore abandoned.

It was submitted that the evidence of DW1 was cogent and credible enough to support the Appellant’s claim for N83,931,930.10.

It was submitted that from the evidence of DW1 under cross examination, after the expiry of the tenure the loan was not cleared up and Exhibit D3 was generated for the period Exhibit D3 covered. It was the Appellant

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who needed Exhibit D3 for proving the counterclaim it was argued.

The Respondents, it was submitted, did not make any issue in their pleadings on the statement of account.

Exhibit D7, it was submitted, was a joint memorandum for a lien to be placed on the shares. From 9th September 2009 the shares had been moved into a CSCS reserve lien account and had been removed from the custody of the Appellant. We were referred to the evidence of DW1 at page 327 lines 4-6 of the record.

The lower Court, it was further contended, erred in dismissing the counterclaim because the Appellant did not observe the terms of the contract. This is so because the DW1 at page 125 of the record stated that it was not possible to sell the shares as the certificate with which to sell the shares was not issued until after six months of the purchase and the prices had started dropping then. That Elder M.A. Ojo the alter ego of the 1st Respondent through a proxy stealthily collected the certificate and hindered the Appellant from selling the shares. That the Appellant had again to apply for another certificate.

The above piece of evidence, it was submitted, was not

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controverted. Therefore the lower Court was wrong to have concluded that the Appellant did not observe the terms of the contract. We were referred to Asafa Foods Factory Limited v. Alraine Nig. Limited & Anor (2002) 52 WRN I at 17.

It was finally submitted that from the pleadings and oral evidence the Appellant proved the counterclaim.

Respondents’ issue 3 is the response to Appellant’s issue 1, issue 2 of the Respondents is the response to Appellant’s issue 2, Respondents’ issue 1 is the response to Appellant’s issue 3 while Respondents’ issue 4 is the response to Appellant’s issue 4.

On issue 3 formulated by Respondents, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that once the Commissioner for Oaths signs an affidavit as sworn before him, there is a presumption of regularity until the contrary is proved.

It was submitted that a written statement on oath is different from other categories of affidavit which are concluded with the signature of the Commissioner for Oaths and the stamp of the Court. That a written statement on oath is filed along with the case while the deponent still has to enter the witness box and swear before the

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Court, the deponent will adopt statement on oath inside the witness box and will be cross-examined by the opposing counsel. The provision of Section 117 (4) of the Evidence Act, it was submitted, does not validate a written statement on oath until the witness adopts same in evidence and is subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel. The written statement on oath, it was contended, remains a mere piece of paper where the witness is not available to give evidence on oath and all the facts therein are deemed abandoned when no evidence is given by the deponent despite the compliance with Section 117 (4) of the Evidence Act. The provision of Section 117(4) of the Evidence Act, it was submitted, is not strictly applicable to a written statement on oath since the witness must of necessity take another oath before the Court before the adoption of his or her written statement on oath.

The Pw1 in this case, it was contended, swore on the Bible in the open Court and adopted her written statement on oath and this procedure has ruled out the possibility of the Pw1 not being the maker of the statement on oath or not being the deponent therein. Therefore the

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lower Court was right in making use of the written statement on oath of the Pw1 and relying on same in the determination of this case.

It was contended that the fact that the Pw1 said under cross-examination that she signed the written statement on oath in her office is not conclusive evidence that she did not sign her signature before the Commissioner for Oaths. That Appellant’s counsel did not ask the Pw1 how the signature of the Commissioner for Oaths appeared on her written statement on oath.

On issue 2, learned counsel for the Respondents asked whether the Appellant was right to appoint a debt recovery agent in respect of the alleged debt of the Respondents. In other words whether the Respondents were actually indebted to the Appellant at the time the Appellant appointed a debt recovery solicitor for the recovery the alleged debt of the Respondent.

It was submitted that the appointment of a debt recovery solicitor in respect of the Respondents’ alleged debt was wrong ab initio as there was no debt for the solicitor to recover from the Respondents on behalf of the Appellant instead it is the Appellant that should give an account of her

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management of the Respondents’ shares in her custody subject to the contractual agreement between them. Appellant it was contended cannot recover any debt from the Respondents until it renders account of the N43million shares of Zenith Bank Plc purchased under Bankers Acceptance Facility which is a product of the Appellant.

Since the appointment of a Debt Recovery Solicitor by the Appellant to recover the alleged debt from the Respondents under the Bankers Acceptance Facility was wrong ab initio, it was contended, it was unwarranted and constituted further breach of the contractual agreement under the Bankers Acceptance Facility which was governing the relationship between the parties. It was further contended that none of the steps taken by the Appellant’s Recovery Solicitor can be right because of the wrong foundation upon which his appointment stood. That there is little wonder that the solicitor acted in a manner that occasioned injury on the Respondents especially the 2nd Respondent.

The action of the Debt Recovery Solicitor, it was argue, was not unconnected with the nature of the appointment and the instruction which he received from the

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Appellant. That the letter of appointment speaks volumes. The letter of appointment of the Debt Recovery Solicitor to the Respondent was direct reaction to the letter of appointment which gave the solicitor an extremely limited time for the recovery of the debt. That the solicitor was bound to act the way he acted in order to satisfy the Appellant as the Appellant did not give the solicitor any space of time to take a civil action for the recovery of the Respondents’ debt.

On issue 3 which is Respondents’ issue 1, it was submitted that the agreement between the Appellant and the Respondents is governed by a written contract Exhibit C.

It was submitted that the maximum time for the determination of the contract was 180 days or six months as provided by Exhibit C. However, the period for the determination of the contract may be shorter as there was a provision in the contract which gave the appellant absolute power to sell off the 1st Respondents shares whenever the price dropped by 15%.

The N43million loan, it was submitted, was in the custody of the Appellant and was never handed over to the Respondents. Also the purchase of 1,000,000

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shares of Zenith Bank Plc with the said loan was also the obligation of the Appellant to perform.

It was submitted that the failure of the Appellant to sell the Respondents’ shares at the expiration of 180 days provided by the contract is a breach of a fundamental condition of the contract and the lower Court was right to hold that the Appellant breached the condition of the contract between her and the Respondents. We were referred to Oceanic Bank v. Chitex Ind. Ltd (2000) FWLR (Pt 4) 678 at 693 and 695, Ndinwa v. Igbinedion (2000) FWLR (Pt 30) 2673 at 2687.

The plea of frustration, it was submitted, is not available to the Appellant as the contract between the Appellant and the Respondents was never prematurely determined and there was no intervening event or circumstance that affected the contract.

It was submitted that the lower Court rightly observed that the name of the proxy who stealthily collected the certificate would have been mentioned in the appellant’s pleading and evidence hence there is no evidence in support of the allegation and what is more the Appellant is still keeping the shares over seven years after the expiration of the

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contract.

The Appellant, it was submitted, was negligent in the fulfillment of her obligation under the contract and had breached a fundamental term of the contract by not selling the Respondents’ shares at the end of the tenure of the contract until the price of the shares crashed at the stock market

The Respondents, it was submitted, are entitled to damages for breach of contract and the lower Court was right to award damages.

On issue 4, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the arguments of the Appellant in favour of the counterclaims are misconceived. That the arguments are only relevant to conventional loans being given by the bank and handed over to the debtor to be used according to the debtor’s wishes. That the Bankers Acceptance Facility was never handed over to the debtor. The Appellant bought and managed the shares bought for and on behalf of the Respondents under an agreement called the Bankers Acceptance Facility which gave the Appellant the management and control of the collateral security of the loan which are the Zenith Bank Shares bought by the Appellant with the loan. The Appellant, it was submitted, had the duty

22

of observing strictly the terms of the agreement in her own interest and also in the interest of the Respondents. That there is no doubt that the Appellant breached the terms of agreement between her and the Respondents by holding on to the Respondents’ shares beyond the time provided by the agreement.

It was submitted that assuming but without conceding that the plea of frustration of the contract put up by the Appellants succeeds, it is the law that where there is frustration the question of breach will not arise as none of the parties can be held responsible for what happens.

In any case it had earlier been argued that plea of frustration is not available to the Appellant in this case as there was nothing outside the contemplation of the parties that happened between the initiation of the agreement and the expiration of the tenure provided by the agreement.

Learned counsel for the Appellant argued forcefully that the lower Court erred when it relied on the written statement on oath of the only witness for the Respondents when the witness said under cross-examination that she signed the written statement on oath in her office. But the written

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statement on oath of the witness is shown to have been signed before the Commissioner for Oaths in the High Court of Osun State. It is the law that when any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with. See S.150 (1) of the Evidence Act now S.168 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011. There is a legal presumption that judicial and official acts have been done rightly and regularly until the contrary is proved. See Amala v. State (2004) LPELR – 453 (SC) and (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt 888) 520.

As the written statement on oath in this case is shown to have been deposed to before the Commissioner for Oaths, High Court of Osun State I am afraid I cannot accept the argument of learned counsel for the Appellant that the said written statement on oath should have been discountenanced by the lower Court.

On the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the written statement on oath of the Pw1, the lower Court did not need to look for evidence outside the Court to rely on it. If the lower Court looked for evidence outside the Court to confirm the regularity of the

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statement on oath as learned counsel for the Appellant argued that was wrong. However this did not affect the decision of the lower Court to rely on the written statement on oath.

Issue 1 is therefore resolved in favour of the Respondents.

Turning to issue 2, the Pw1 in her written statement on oath deposed as follows in Paragraphs 28 and 29:
28) That on 9th September 2009, Policemen from the Police Eagle Squad, Osogbo picked me up on the complaint of the Defendant/Respondent and I was detained at the custody of the Police for about 9 hours.
29) That upon my release at about 11.30pm on that day, I ran into a coma and was rushed down to Government House Clinic, Osogbo where I was put on admission for three days.”

On this evidence, the lower Court in its judgment at page 365 of the record of appeal stated in part as follows:
“There is no evidence too that the Defendant ever made any formal request for the repayment of the loan from the 1st Plaintiff before the 9th September 2009 when the police invaded the office of the Plaintiff and took the 2nd Plaintiff into their custody on account of the alleged indebtedness of the

25

1st Plaintiff. The action of the police was provoked by Messrs Wilson Atirene & Co. whom the Defendant employed as debt recovery solicitor. The Defendant has claimed as part of its defence that the instructions given to Messrs Wilson Atirene & Co did not include the use of force.”

From the pleadings and Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the written statement on oath of the Pw1 reproduced above, there was no basis for the finding of the lower Court that the police invaded the office of the plaintiff. It was not pleaded and Pw1 never suggested in the written statement on oath that she was picked from the office. Secondly although, it was pleaded in the amended statement of claim and the Pw1 reiterated in the written statement on oath Paragraph 28 reproduced above that she was picked upon the complaint of Appellant and detained in police custody for about 9 hours, the lower Court found that the action of the police was provoked by Messrs Wilson Atirene & Co whom the Appellant employed as debt recovery solicitor. Again there was no basis for the above finding.

There was no evidence before the Court to show that the Appellant made a complaint

26

to the police, as the Respondents’ witness claimed. No police extract was tendered in proof of this fact. As I pointed out earlier, the Pw1 did not say that she was picked from the office. She did not say where she was picked from. Although she claimed to have been released at 11.30pm; she did not say when she was arrested to arrive at the 9 hours she purportedly spent in custody and what type of custody. Was she detained behind the counter or in a police cell?

On the pleadings and evidence led by the Respondents it did matter who the Respondents say instigated the purported arrest of the Pw1 between Appellant and Messrs Wilson Atirene & Co since no evidence was led to show that she was ever arrested.

Furthermore, even if there was evidence that Barrister Wilson Atinere caused the arrest of the 2nd Respondent, that certainly was outside the brief given by the Appellant which was to recover what it considered was its debt.

Also Barrister Wilson Atirene or Wilson Atirene & Co who are supposed to know that the police is not a debt recovery agent, was not made a party to the case by the Respondents.

In my view issue 2 should be resolved

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in favour of the Appellant.

I therefore resolve it in favour of the Appellant.

On issue 3, it appears to me that the lower Court erred when it granted the first relief which was for a declaration that the Respondents were not in anyway indebted to the Appellant when the value of the shares in the capital market as at 1st June, 2008 was not established on the pleadings and evidence led by the Respondents. The Respondents failed to lead evidence to establish the value of the shares in the capital market as at 1st June 2008 when they said the tenure of the agreement ended. They also failed to plead or lead evidence to show the difference in the value of the shares as at 1st June 2008 and the sum of N43million which was the value of the shares at the time of purchase.

It is the difference in the value of the shares at the point of sale, that is, 1st June, 2008 and at the time of purchase, that is when Exhibit C was executed that would enable the Court arrive at a sound decision as to whether the value of the shares as at 1st June, 2008 was enough to pay off the loan of N43million plus the interest of 17% per annum and that the Respondents were not in

28

anyway, form or manner indebted to the Appellant.

As there was no basis for the grant of the first relief, relief 6 would not stand since it depended on the success of relief 1.

Furthermore, the lower Court ought not have granted relief six which was for special damages, It is trite law that special damages must be pleaded with particularity and must be strictly proved. See Okunzua v. Amosu & Anor (1992) LPELR – 2531 (SC); 1992 NWLR (Pt 248) 416.

Relief VI of the amended statement of claim reproduced again immediately hereunder reads as follows:
“Another sum of N20,000.000.00 being special damages in consequence of the Defendant’s failure or default to sell the shares at the expiration of the tenor of the facility which sum of money would have accrued as profit on the said date to the 1st Claimant.”

In Paragraph 23 of the amended statement of claim the Respondents pleaded thus:
“Claimant avers that if the Defendant had (as provided for under the operating agreement) executed the lien and perfected the agreement it would have received not less than N20,000,000.00 as profit from the transaction.”

It is clear from the

29

pleadings of the Respondents particularly of the Respondents’ Paragraph 23 of the amended statement of claim reproduced above that relief 6 was not pleaded with particularity. As shown elsewhere in the judgment it was not strictly proved. It was not even proved. A claim for special damages does not lend itself to speculative figure as in this case.

It was not pleaded and no evidence led to establish:
a) The total unit shares the Appellant bought for the Respondent;
b) The price of each unit share;
c) The prevailing market price per unit share at the time the Appellant ought to have sold the shares;
d) The profit on each share; and
e) The profit per unit share multiplied by the total shares to give the figure of special damages claimed.

In the absence of these figures in evidence, the lower Court erred in awarding the sum of N20million special damages.

In addition, the 6th relief which is a claim for exactly N20million special damages contradicted the averment in Paragraph 23 of the amended statement of claim reproduced above which put the profit as not less than twenty million.

There is also another problem with relief 6

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granted by the lower Court. While the Respondents asked for N20million as special damages, the lower Court granted the said sum as special and aggravated damages. A Court may grant less but not more than is asked for by a party. There was no basis for the award being granted for aggravated damages as well when the Respondent only asked for the amount as special damages.

The same virus has inflicted relief 2. The 2nd relief ended with the words no more. The lower Court amended the relief by adding the following:
“….. except the case flow and other sources of income of the 1st Claimant/Plaintiff. However since the valued of the shares would have been sufficient to repay the loan as at 1st June, 2008 if the Defendant had complied with the terms of the contract the claimant/plaintiff is no longer indebted to the Defendant.”

The above amendment to relief 2 helped the case of the Respondents to the extent that the lower Court held that the value of the shares as at 1st June 2008 were held to be sufficient to repay the loan and that the Respondents were no longer indebted to the Appellant.

Furthermore, relief 2 in the language it was granted

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failed to consider Exhibit C which stated that repayment of the loan shall be from:
i) Cash flow from the 1st Respondent;
ii) Proceeds of sale of the shares; and
iii) Other sources of 1st Respondents’ income.

For the foregoing reasons relief 2 granted should be set aside.

However, I see nothing wrong with relief 3 granted by the lower Court to the Respondents. The shares were bought for the 1st Respondent by the Appellant and were to be sold by the Appellant within six months of purchase or when the value went down by 15%. The lower Court rightly found that the shares have still not been sold. Relief 3 was appropriate in the circumstances. I do not see how Exhibit D7 could be a bar to the grant of relief 3.

Issue 3 is resolved partly in favour of the Appellant and partly in favour of the Respondents.

On issue 4, it is clear from the terms of the facility that what the Appellant granted to the 1st Respondent was not a conventional loan wherein money was given to the 1st Respondent by the bank to use as the debtor wished. Under the facility the Appellant bought and managed the shares for the 1st Respondent. The shares were to

32

be sold by the Appellant for the 1st Respondent within six months or when the value of the shares went down by 15%. The shares were not sold as agreed.

I am in agreement with learned counsel for the Respondents that Appellant could not determine whether the 1st Respondent was owing the Appellant any money until the 1st Respondent’s shares which the Appellant bought for the 1st Respondent were sold.

In my view the counterclaim was rightly dismissed by the lower Court.

Issue 4 is resolved in favour of the Respondents.

The appeal succeeds in Part.

The judgment of the lower Court dismissing the counterclaim of the Appellant is affirmed.

The order of the lower Court granting relief 3 of the Respondents’ claim is affirmed.

Reliefs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 granted by the lower Court to the Respondents are hereby dismissed.

Parties to bear their respective costs.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8951(CA)

Chief Gabriel Oparanti & Ors V. Alhaji Nasiru Oyeniyi & Ors (2016) LLJR-CA

Chief Gabriel Oparanti & Ors V. Alhaji Nasiru Oyeniyi & Ors (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.

This judgment is in respect of interlocutory decision of the High Court of Osun State delivered on 28/1/2011 and 18-2-2011 respectively in suit no. HOS/7/2010, per Aderibigbe, J. pursuant to an amended notice of appeal filed on 3/02/16. Following the leave of this Court granted on 20-1-2016, the appellants herein filed their amended appellants? briefs of argument dated 3-2-2016 on the 12-2-2016 in respect of their two appeals.

In consequence of the aforesaid and in response, the 1st and the 2nd respondents filed their joint 1st and 2nd respondents’ brief of argument, whilst the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th respondents did not file any brief of argument in opposition to the appeals.

The appeals emanating from the same proceedings and not having been consolidated, I shall proceed to determine each of them on their respective briefs of arguments as filed and oral submissions on points of law where made and as allowed in law. Starting with the first appeal.
APPEAL NO CA/AK/57/2011.
?To capture the essence of this appeal, I think it

1

appropriate to set out the amended notice of appeal and the particulars thereof. They are as follows:-
AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL.
?Take notice that the 1st to 7th appellants dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court of Justice of Osun State, Oshogbo Judicial Division, Osogbo contained in the ruling of Honourable Justice A. A Aderibigbe dated 28th January, 2011 both hereby appeal to the Court of appeal, Akure upon the amended grounds set out in paragraph 3 and will at the hearing of the appeal seek the amended reliefs set out in paragraph 4.
Take notice of further notice that the names and addresses of the persons directly affected by the appeal are those set out in paragraph 5.
2. PART OF DECISION APPEALED AGAINST- THE WHOLE DECISION
3. AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL
1. The learned trial Judge erred in law and he failed to exercise his discretion judicially and judiciously by his refusal to hear and give any date for the hearing of the 10th to 17th defendants’ motion on notice dated 20th but filed on 21st January 2011 to set down for hearing and hear the preliminary issues/points of law which were validly pleaded and raised on issues relating to the plaintiffs’ locus standi to institute

2

the case, juristic personality, limitation period, re judicata, competency of the case and the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the case before he proceeded to hear and grant the plaintiffs’ application dated and filed on 17/9/2010 seeking to set aside the nomination, selection, approval and issuance of instrument of appointment and presentation staff of office to Oba Olanipekun as the Ataoja of Osogbo thereby occasioning miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS OF ERRORS
1. The 10th to 17th defendants entered conditional appearance and filed a joint statement of defence dated 25/10/2015 wherein they denied the plaintiffs’ claims and raised some objections on issues relating to the plaintiffs’ locus standi to institute the case, juristic personality, limitation period, res judicata, competency of the case and the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the case, etc with an indication that the said issues would be called upon for determination at/or before the trial (pages 193 to 209 of the record).
2. By their application dated 20/1/2011 but filed on 21/1/2011, the 10th to 17th defendants prayed the lower Court to set down for

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hearing and to hear their said various objections and points of law which challenged the substantive case (pages 395 to 496 of the records).
3. The plaintiffs reacted to the said application by filing their counter affidavit and counsel’s written address thus making the said application ripe for hearing as at 28/1/2011 on which date the lower Court refused to hear and/or give any date for the hearing of the said 10th to 17th defendants’ application.
4. The lower Court on 28/1/2011 heard the plaintiffs? motion dated 17/9/2010 without considering the relevant facts, arguments and legal principles and without exercising its discretion judicially and judiciously.
5. The lower Court by its ruling of 28/1/2011 over ruled its previous ruling of 1/11/2010 delivered in the same case on the priority of the applications challenging the Courts jurisdiction and other applications after the Court had become functus officio, thereby demonstrating bias against the appellants.
2. The learned trial judge erred in law when he failed, declined and /or neglected to consider and follow the decisions of the Supreme Court and other Courts of records

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including (1) Owners of the MV “Arabella” V. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance (2008) 5 SCNJ 109 @ 124 to 126 (2) First Bank off Nigeria Plc. v. T.S.A Industries Ltd. (2010) 38 WRN 1 at 36, (3) A.G. Lagos v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111). 552 (1989) 6 SCNJ 134, (4) Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2001) 46 WRN 1, (5) Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1981) 1 NCLR 135, (1980) 1 ALL NLR 158, (6) Elebanjo & Anr. v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR 76 @ 134-143; (2006) SCNJ 204 @ 238-245 cited to him on the on the issue of the priority of two applications before the proceeded to hear the plaintiffs’ application filed on 17/9/2010 seeking to set aside the appointment and installation of Oba Olanipekun as the Ataoja of Osogbo without first hearing the 10th to 17th defendants’ motion dated 20/1/2011 but filed on 21/1/2011 praying to set down for hearing and to hear the appellants’ preliminary points of law/objection to dismiss or strike out this case thereby occasioning miscarriage of justice.
Particulars of errors
a. The appellants’ motion filed on 21/1/2011 was capable of disposing of the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the appointment and installation of Oba Olanipekun and this case

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without full trial
b. Various decision of the Supreme Court and other courts cited before the learned trial judge on the need to give priority to the appellants’ motion to set the objections down for hearing before considering the plaintiffs’ application to set aside Oba Olanipekun appointment were ignored.
3. The learned trial judge erred in law when failed to exercise his discretion judicially and judiciously by proceeding to hear and by hearing the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside Oba Olanipekun’s appointment and installation without first hearing the appellants’ motion set down for hearing and to hear the appellants’ objections to the whole case, thereby occasioning miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS OF ERRORS
a. The discretion given to the Court by Order 22 of the Osun State High Court Amended (Civil Procedure) Rules 2008 ought to be exercised judicially and judiciously.
b. The Lower Court did not exercise its discretion judiciously.
4. The decision of the lower Court is against the weight of evidence.
4.AMENDED RELIEFS SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS
1. An order to set aside the ruling of the lower Court delivered on

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28th January, 2011.
2. An order of this Court to hear and determine the 10th to 17th Defendants’ motion on notice dated 20/1/2011 but filed on 21/1/2011 to challenge the competency and jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain substantive case AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, an order of this Court remitting the substantive case with the said defendants? application to the High Court of Justice of Osun State to be heard by another judge apart from Hon. Justice A.A. Aderibigbe with an order that the said application should be given top priority in the overall interest of justice.?

The appellants? narration of the history of the proceedings in this appeal together with the facts are so aptly captured. I having read the entire record of appeal in its bulky form.
It is for this reason of honest and articulate reproduction, that I shall adopt the same and reproduce them herein thus:-
The dispute in this suit before the lower Court centers essentially on the amended 2005 Ataoja of Osogbo Chieftaincy declaration. The 1st set of respondents as the plaintiffs at the lower Court are challenging the validity of the amended 2005 Ataoja of Osogbo chieftaincy

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declaration and calling for its nullification, extinction of certain Ruling Houses and and injunctions among other reliefs. The writ of summons by which the 1st set of respondents instituted the proceedings is on page 1 to 4 of the records. The statement of claim of the 1st set of respondents is on page 5 to 15 of the records. The 1st set of respondents by the endorsement on the writ of summons and statement of claim, claimed against the appellants sixteen reliefs the centre focus of which are declarations and injunctions in respect of Ataoja of Osogbo Chieftaincy.
The appellants denied the 1st set of respondents’ claim in their entirety and set out their statement of defence. However, by paragraphs 30 and 31 of the said Appellants? statement of defence as required by the rules of the Honourable Lower Court, the Appellants raised the preliminary issues or points of law which could have disposed of this case without going through the rigour of trial of this case. The statement of defence of the Appellants is on page 195 to 200 of the records wherein the Appellants raised the said preliminary issues or points of law.
It must be emphasized at this

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stage that Oba Jimoh Oyetunji Olanipekun Olarooye II as the Ataoja of Osogbo was not a Party to case at the time of moving the application.
He has not even been joined as a party in the case.
The Appellants filed a motion on notice for setting down for hearing the preliminary issues or points of law raised by paragraphs 30-31 of their statement of defence with an affidavit in support and two (2) Exhiibits attached marked as Exhibits GAAC 1 AND GAAC 2 respectively. Some of the issues raised in the said motion are the issues of locus standi, res judicata, legal personality, statute bar and the jurisdiction of the Honourable to hear the entire case. All the Respondents were duly served with their application for setting down for hearing and hearing off the preliminary point or issues of law raised which challenges the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court to hear the matter. The said motion on notice was dated and filed on 21/1/2011 and same is contained on page 395 of the record.
The 1st set of respondent also filed an application to set aside the installation and appointment of the incumbent Ataoja of Osogbo who is not a party and

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has not been joined as a party in this case as presently constituted. The 1st set of Respondents? said application contained on page 622 to 643 of the record.
Meanwhile, the lower Court had, in a ruling delivered on Monday, the 1st day of November, maintained rightly that an application that challenges the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court has precedent over and above any other applications and same should be heard first. The ruling of the lower Court on the priority of applications is on pages 1076 to 1090. However, on 28th day of January, 2011 when the attention of the lower Court was called to the appellants’ pending application to set down for hearing the preliminary issues or points of law for hearing and the reasons while the Honourable Lower Court should exercise its discretion to hear the application first (supporting the reasonings with Supreme Court cases) over and above any other applications that might be pending before the Court, the lower Court in its short ruling stated that the Appellants’ application challenging the jurisdiction of the Lower Court “is not a preliminary objection per se”. The learned presiding/trial judge went

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further to state that he would therefore exercise the discretion he has under Order 22 of the Osun State High Court (Amended) Civil Procedure Rules, 2008 to refuse to hear the application for setting down the preliminary issues before the previous application. The short rulings of the Honourable Lower Court is contained on pages 1071 to 1075 of the record.
The Honourable lower Court then proceeded to hear the 1st set of respondents? application for setting aside the appointment and installation of the incumbent Ataoja of Osogbo and delivered the ruling in the said application on 18th February, 2011 and set aside the set appointment despite that he was not a party and has been joined as a party. The said ruling of the lower Court setting aside the appointment and installation of the incumbent Ataoja without affording him a hearing is on page 1113 to 1130 of the record.
This appellant formulated 2 (Two) issues for our determination thus:-
1. Whether the appellants? motion which raises some preliminary issues/points of law challenging the jurisdiction of the lower Court in this case is by its very nature a preliminary

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objection to the jurisdiction of the lower Court. (Relates to ground 1 of the grounds of appeal).
2. Whether the lower Court has exercised its discretion judicially and judiciously by refusing to give priority to the appellants? motion on notice for setting down the preliminary issues or points of law challenging the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the case by declaring that the motion is not a preliminary objection per se and proceeded to hear the first set of respondents’ application for setting aside and whether same can be supported by the weight of evidence.

The 1st and 2nd respondents formulated a sole issue in this appeal, and by their respondents brief of argument filed on 10/3/16 and deemed filed on 16/5/16 and adopted on same date.

The said issue is coined thus:
Whether the learned trial judge was not right in his decision to hear first the 1st and 2nd respondents’ motion on notice dated and filed 17th September, 2011, to set aside the unlawful acts of the appellants slated for 28th January, 2011 tor hearing, instead of the appellants’ motion of 20th January, 2011 (pages 247 – 297 of the record) to set aside

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for hearing some points of law raised in their statement of defence. Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,7 ,8 and 11 of the amended notice of appeal).

?I shall proceed to summarize the submissions of the learned counsel, for the appellants. Arguing the appeal, the brief whereof was prepared by G. T. Adesina Esq, Ijatuyi Esq, leading, adopted the said brief and the reply brief thereto the 1st and 2nd respondents brief and urged hat the appeal be allowed and the decision in the ruling of the learned trial judge – be set aside.
The two issues postulated were argued together. Learned counsel, referring to Order 22 Rules 1 and 2 of the Osun State High Court (Amended) Civil Procedure Rules, 2008 contended that a defendant in a case who believes that he has some preliminary issues or points of law which can dispose of case before or during the hearing of the case is expected to raise by his pleadings such preliminary issues or points of law; pointing out that the said rules expressly disallows demurrer but allows a party to apply to set down for hearing such points of law so raised and gives a presiding judge the discretion to hear such points of law before the trial.<br< p=””

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The learned counsel pointed out the fact that the 10th to 17th defendants, the present appellants herein and his clients filed their application dated 20/1/2011 on 21 – 1 -2011 wherein they raised the issues of locus standi, re judicata, legal personality, statute bar/limitation period and the jurisdiction of the lower Court to hear the entire case. That all the respondents were served the said application challenging the jurisdiction of the trial Court to hear the entire case.

It is submitted that the said application is capable of disposing the said case at the lower Court and the lower Court ought to have heard the said application when its attention was called to the said application. Learned counsel contended that the said application amounted to a preliminary objection in its own right contrary to the holding of the lower Court that “it is not a preliminary objection per se.”
Referring to the definition the phrase – “per se’ in the Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition at page 1162 where it is defined to mean (1) of, in, or by itself, standing alone, without reference to additional facts and (2) As a matter of law; the learned counsel

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contended that the learned trial judge erred in this respect and his finding was not supported by the facts and documents before him and was perverse.
Proceeding in his argument, the learned counsel further contended that the learned trial judge accentuated his error by that ruling when he reversed himself against his previous ruling of 1 – 11 -.2010 wherein he had rightly given priority to applications challenging the Courts’ jurisdiction to hear a case over and above all pending applications. Counsel is of the view that the lower Court was biased against his clients.
Learned counsel is, of the view that whilst the Court may have a discretion to set down the application for the consideration of those preliminary points of law, that discretion was not exercised judicially, and judiciously in the instant case on appeal; that it was arbitrarily exercised when rather than hear and rule on the application, the Court proceeded to take the 1st and 2nd respondents’ motion on notice dated 17 – 9 – 2010 for setting aside all the processes that led to the nomination, selection etc of Oba Olanipekun as the Ataoja of Osogbo without hearing or fixing any date for

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the hearing of the appellants’ application filed on 21 – 1 – 2011 to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the suit etc which preliminary issues/points of law had been validly raised in paragraphs 30 – 31 of the statement of defence.

The learned counsel contended that while the exercise of a Court’s discretion may not be lightly interfered with by an appellate Court, an appellate Court should nonetheless interfere, where it is obvious that having set out clearly the matters and principles of law he had to consider in carrying out a judicial exercise but failed to apply these principles correctly to the facts before him to arrive at the right decision, the appellate Court should interfere.
Counsel referred us to Williams V. Hope Rising Voluntary Society (1982) ALL NLR (Pt. 1) page 1 at 10. He contended that the application for setting down for hearing of the preliminary issues/points of law, though by way of motion on notice is a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the whole case. That Order 22 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules of Osun State High Court that abolished demurrer and

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only enjoined the appellants as defendants to raise in their statement of defence any preliminary issues or points of law had been complied with; and that, that constituted a preliminary objection on jurisdiction capable of disposing the case without going through the rigours of hearing the substantive case, finding, anchor in the case of Owners of the MV “Arabella V. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 5 SCNJ 109 @ 125.wherein the Supreme Court held that a point of law or defence can be raised on preliminary objection or in a motion if the point of law will be decisive of the whole litigation. See FBN Plc. V. TSA Industries Ltd. (2010) 38 WRN 1 @ 36.
That a challenge to jurisdiction is a radical issue that goes to the root of a case and no matter how well decided a case is, once the Court has no jurisdiction the entire exercise is a nullity as a defect in competence is not only intrinsic but extrinsic to adjudication. A. G. Lagos State V. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 111) 525 at 566 referred.
Referring again to FBN Plc. V. TSA Industries Supra, it was submitted that Rules of Court are meant to regulate matters in Courts and help

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parties in the presentation of their cases within a procedure meant for the purpose of fair and quick dispensation of justice. That the Rules are meant for the attainment of justice and must be observed and obeyed.
That the appellants have done all they needed to do and the trial judge denied them fair hearing and fair trial. Ebenogwu V. Onyemaobim (2008) 3 NWLR 396 at 421 was referred to.
That the further proceedings in hearing the application to set aside were a nullity. It was also contended and forcefully too, that it is trite that a question of law and jurisdiction can as a matter of fact, nay an objection could be taken at any stage even orally and not necessarily by a motion alone.
The learned counsel referred us to the locus classicus case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2001) 46 WRN 1 @ 13 on the factors that must guide the Courts and exist before a Court assumes jurisdiction in a case, thus;
1. It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no members is disqualified for one reason or another; and
2. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no

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feature in the case which prevents the Court exercising its jurisdiction; and
3. The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.

That when the jurisdiction of a Court is challenged, it is better to settle it one way or the other before proceeding to hearing the case on its merits. That any failure by the Court to determine the challenge to its jurisdiction is a fundamental breach which renders any further step taken in the proceedings a nullity. That an objection may be raised at any time in the proceedings, but it is not a free for all procedure. When a statute under which an issue or matter is to be raised has provided a procedure for raising such issues or matter, and no other must be followed. See Adejobi V. The State (2011) 6 SCNJ 409 @ 424.
Learned counsel argued that the word “may” as appears in the Rules connotes mandatoriness on the part of the judge to entertain the appellants? application over and above other application pending. Counsel submitted that the interpretation ascribed to the phrase ?May? in the circumstances

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was erroneous as according to him it would amount to cosmetic/ornamental display if such interpretation holds sway and the Rules will be otiose and academic; that the failure to hear the appellants? application and proceeding thereafter was a nullity and that the subsequent proceeding and Rulings thereon be set aside as they were all nullities.

We have been urged to order for the hearing of the appellants application on the grounds that the lower Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction and did not exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously by hearing the 1st and 2nd respondents? application dated 17-9-2011 before fixing any hearing date for the appellants? motion dated 20/1/2011 filed on 21-1-2011.

That the issues jointly argued be resolved in favour of the appellant against the 1st and 2nd respondents and the appeal be allowed. That the case be remitted to be heard by another judge and the appellants’ motion dated 20 – 1 – 2011 and filed on 21 – 1 – 2011 be given accelerated hearing.
The 1st and 2nd respondents’ by their brief of argument settled by Adewale Adegoke Esq. and filed on 10 – 3 – 2016; by their learned counsel

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submitted in the main appeal that Order 22 Rules 1 and 2 of the Osun State High Court (Amended) Civil Procedure Rules herein after called “the Rules or “the Rules of the trial Court” give the judge the discretion as to the time he could or might take any application brought under the Rules and whether he could take the point of law raised in the statement of defence before or at the trial of the suit.
Quoting from the case of Olaniyan v. Oyewole (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1079) at 138, paragraphs B-D where the Court held inter alia thus:
?An interpretation that would justice a slave to grammar should be deplored. An interpretation that would convey the intendment of the legislature must always be preferred. I am also of the firm view that rules of Court being merely adjectival law should not be elevated to the status of substantive legislation for which there must be strict compliance by the parties and the Court.
In the principle of the construction of statutes, the Courts have adopted liberal and purposive approach to give effect to the law makers. In that sense, the entire statutes must be considered and the general object meant to be secured

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by the statutes should be looked at.?

That a holistic view of the Rules in point, gives both the parties and the judge a discretion to exercise; that a party may decide to raise any point of law in his pleadings, or file a formal application challenging the jurisdiction of the defence. That the judge too has a discretion to either take the point raised in the pleadings before or at the trial of the suit, depending on the pleasure of the judge and the circumstances surrounding the case.
That if a party decides to raise a point of law in his defence pursuant to the Rules, he should be ready to abide by the opinion/decision of the Court with respect to time of taking such points of law. That the point of law is not a preliminary objection per se as the Rules gives a discretion as to the time to take it and that the appellants had conceded to this fact in their argument at paragraph 4.012 of the brief of argument.
That this was distinct from a situation where a party files a notice of preliminary objection to the suit challenging the jurisdiction of the Court without filing a statement of defence or raising any point of law in the statement of

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defence in which case the judge has no discretion as to the time of taking such preliminary objections pending before him first inspite of the fact that the 1st and 2nd respondents? application to set aside the unlawful act of the appellants was filed before the preliminary objections.
That the word ?May? in the Rules made it discretionary for either thee party or judge and that the cases cited were in applicable as none of them involved an interpretation of the Rules; that it was not correct to say that the Judge did not exercise his discretion judicially and judiciously. Referring to Dinyadi v. INEC (No.1) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) Pages 1-146 paragraph A wherein the Supreme Court said ?I must remark that the Rules of Courts are made for attaining justice with ease, certainly and dispatch.
They are made for the purpose of obtaining justice by parties in the citadel of justice. They must not be used in the instant of this case as a clog in the wheel of obtaining such justice” that the appellants and 3rd, 6th and 9th respondents, had hurriedly nominated, selected, appointed and approved the installation and presentation of

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staff of office to Alhaji Jimoh Oyetunji Olanipekun as the Ataoja of Osogbo not minding the pendency of a suit and motion for interlocutory injunction to restrain them from installing a new Ataoja of Oshogbo and against the order of Court that, they should avoid taking steps that would foist on the Court a fait accompli and inspite of counsel’s assurances.
That the 1st and 2nd respondents had on 11 – 1 -2011 informed the Court of their application to set aside and that the appellants? counsel were in Court when it was adjourned to 28-1-2011 for hearing and that he did not inform the Court of is intention to set down the application for hearing the point of law raised. In his statement of defence filed earlier and inspite of the dismissal of the two preliminary objections filed by the other defendants by the Ruling of the Court on that date. That on 28-1-2011 being the date for the hearing of application to set aside, that appellants? counsel informed the Court of his points of law raised in the statement of defence, which was filed after the proceedings of 11-1-2011.
That some of the counsel to the other respondents on the date informed

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the Court that they had just been served but were ready for the motion to set aside fixed to the knowledge of the appellants? counsel.
That in the circumstances, the decision of the judge was properly exercised. That there was no preliminary objection filed but only a motion filed a few days earlier which the appellant?s counsel only brought to the attention of the judges on 28-1-2011.
Alluding to and quoting Adamu v. Sadi (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) 205 at 217-218 wherein Edozie, JCA deprecated the habit of filing processes late, by stating:
“This case underscores the need for counsel to file Court processes long before such processes are due to come before the Court to allow sufficient time for necessary formulated or file a document intended to be used in a case on the day on just a day before the case is due to come before the Court. Even where counsel takes the unusual step to see that the document is before the Court on the day of hearing, the case may be adjourned if the opposite party complains of non – service on it, the Court is in a position to take the case not having the opportunity of reading through the documents

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beforehand. The Court deprecates such a practice, which usually causes unnecessary prolongation or delay in the administration of justice.?

It was submitted that the only reason the appellants filed their process, the hearing of which the hearing of which the Court overruled on the 28th January, 2011, was to stop the hearing of the 1st and 2nd respondents motion to set aside. That the Supreme Court has warned parties against engaging in practice only aimed at frustrating and cheating out a plaintiff against a judgment which he is legitimately entitled to.
Relying on Karibi Whyte, JSC?s distum in Nishizawa v. Jethwani (1984) 12 SC Page 234 @ 315-316 wherein His Lordship stated thus:
“That a defendant who has no real defence to the action should not be allowed to dribble and frustrate the plaintiff and cheat him out of judgment he is legitimately entitled to by delay tactics aimed, not at offering any real defence to the action, but at gaining time within which he may continue to postpone meeting his obligation and indebtedness.”

?He contended that it was the exercise of a disciplinary jurisdiction for contempt against people who

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had not come to Court with clean hands.
That the applicants cannot be in contempt and at the same time be asking for favourable exercise of discretion.
That to have done otherwise, would render the pending processes, a mere academic exercise. That the acts of the appellants and other respondents amounted to stealing a match against the 1st and 2nd respondents and should not be allowed to stand. Daniel v. Ferguson (1891) 2 CH 27 at 30. That all that the Court did was to restore the parties to the position they were when the offending party became aware of the pending application. Ivory Merchant Bank v. Partnership Investment Limited (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 448) Page 362 @ 367-368 referred.
That the action of the Court did not prejudice the application of the appellants. That rather than pursue their pending application the appellants have abandoned it and urging the Court to give approval to the flagrant disobedience to the Court processes.
That it was not the appellants? case that the lower Court had no authority to entertain the 1st and 2nd respondents? case and ruling having been given, it was a mere academic exercise to complain

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now.
That the application was not declined but held not to be ripe for hearing that it could be taken at the appropriate time; and that the issue of fair hearing raised was grossly misconceived. That the point could be taken at any time and would bear on the substantive suit. That this issue be resolved against the appellants and their appeal be dismissed. Adeniyi Esq, State counsel for the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents filed no brief of argument and aligned with the appellants.
In the same manners, M. A. Shittu Esq. for the 6th respondent filed no brief and said he aligns with the appellants’ position.
Aliu Esq. for the 7th respondent filed no brief but said he aligns with the 2nd respondent. It must in this instance be stated that a party that does not file a brief in opposition is deemed to be with the appellant and not the other way. He that is not against you is for you.
If the 7th respondent wanted to go with the 2nd respondent, he ought to have filed a respondent’s brief of argument articulating his support and in opposition to the appellants’ brief. There shall be no presumption in law as to his supporting a fellow respondent who is not

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the challenger in this appeal.
Sanusi Esq. for 8th respondent filed no brief and leaves it at the discretion of the Court and rightly so; the 9th respondent, represented by Olanogun Esq. filed no brief and by his silence on any position in this appeal is presumed not to oppose the appeal.

In reply to the 1st and 2nd respondents? brief of argument, the appellants by their brief filed on 11-4-2016 but deemed filed on 16-5-2016 which is undated, complained that the said respondents? brief was irregular, misconceived and incompetent for all alluding to the existence of 11 grounds of appeal when infact the appellants? amended notice of appeal upon which his brief was filed had only 3 grounds of appeal and that the brief should be struck out.
I shall do no such thing. Just as the appellant’s reply brief of argument is undated but is non the less a brief of argument as it has been filed and clearly is connected to the appeal and in response, so also the respondents’ brief replying the issues raised in the appellant’s brief is competent, regular and satisfies the purpose, the error in stating the number of grounds of appeal

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notwithstanding.
After all, a reply brief is in response to the appellants’ issues for determination and not to the grounds of appeal, which numerical number and mistake in stating them is not material.
I refuse the unenticing and injudicious invitation to strike out the 1st and 2nd respondents’ brief of argument.

On the merit, learned counsel contended that demurrer had been abolished and the rules of the High Court of Osun State did not allow for the filing of any preliminary objection alone without filing a statement of defence.
That the appellant did the right thing under Order 22 of the Rules relevant and applicable. The case of Owners of the MV Arabella v. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 5 SCNJ 109 at 125 emphasizing that the Rules of Court allows that point of law or defence may be raised by preliminary objection or in a motion if the point will be decisive of the whole litigation and that as a matter of fact, an objection may be taken at any stage orally and not necessarily by motion.
It was submitted that any challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction if raised, it must be resolved first and that Rules of Courts

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are meant to be obeyed. See FBN Plc.V. TSA Industry Ltd. (2010) 38 WRN 1 @ 36: that demurrer having been abolished, raising the point of law as to jurisdiction in the statement of defence, as done, was in order. Ajilorura v. Disu (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 333) 1613 per Mukhtar, JSC was referred.
That the appeal was not academic and that the act of the Court was prejudicial to the interests of the appellants and was of no moment. In the same manner, an objection is not only a preliminary objection when it is so tagged; the fact that it is not so called, does not rob it of that description nor make it less an objection. The perception of the Court as to what a preliminary objection ‘per se’ is, is wrong.
The appellants had rightly raised points of law relating to limitation of action, locus standi and the challenge to jurisdiction based on the non fulfillment of condition precedent to the taking of an action in a Court by the 1st and 2nd respondents as plaintiffs at the trial Court.
Having so pleaded those defences and brought them to the attention of the trial Court, the trial Court was bound in law to consider and decide on those challenges on points of law

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bordering on the challenges to jurisdiction first as they were jurisdictional questions. They had priority of place in the adjudication process and may be raised at any time and how so ever.
Indeed they may be raised even for the first time in the Supreme Court and or at the Court of Appeal.
Indeed at any level of the litigation process at the trial Court and without leave of Court being sought and granted. The Courts, indeed the Apex Court, has made it clear that it may even be raised orally or by motion or in any form.
Indeed the Court has a duty to raise it suo motu and to have it determined first. This is more so that it is even apparent on the statement of defence filed as contained inn paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 thereof.
In Zakari v. Nigerian Army (2015) NWLR 77 the Apex Court held that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of a case and even without leave of Court, and the Court was duty bound to consider and resolved that issue before taking any further step in the proceedings as, if it is not so done, any subsequent action taken shall be a nullity no matter how well conducted and correct the decision may be on the

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merit.
The appellants, having pleaded defences raising challenges to jurisdiction, the Court was bound to consider them first. The Court had no discretion to postpone it to be heard after any other application except perhaps one that was strictly for contempt of Court in facie curia. The application to set aside was not such application that could be given priority as its consideration amounted to a subversion of the application or challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court as made
In Attorney General of Lagos State V. Dosummu (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. lll) 552 at 566, the apex makes it clear that the issue of jurisdiction is not only intrinsic, but it is extrinsic to adjudication.
That is the case, and more so that such challenge to jurisdiction may be raised by preliminary objection or by motion; see Owners of the MV Arabella V. NAIC (2008) 5 SCNJ 109 @ 125 and being an issue that will be decisive of the matter at the Court, the trial judge was bound to consider the points of law raised before any other application(s) in the suit.
That the highest Court has so said, makes any contrary disposition or action nothing but an act of judicial impertinence

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and a violation of the settled position of stare decisis.
This, the Supreme Court has frowned at. See Suleiman V. C. O. P. (2008) SCNJ. The argument that the appellants will not be prejudiced by a consideration of their application at a later stage to be determined by the Court at its whims and caprices suggests that the Court has an uncanalysed discretion; there is no such discretion in the Court in the circumstance of an objection on the question of jurisdiction as to when it may be taken.
It has to be taken first before any other act in the litigation. Just as the parties have no jurisdiction to compromise jurisdiction, so also it cannot be waived by either the parties or the Court. See Ariori v. Elemo (1983) SC1.
The Court cannot appropriate or reprobate the issue of jurisdiction in the same case, as the want of jurisdiction is fatal to the proceedings no matter how well it is conducted.
In this case, the trial Court held that the issue of jurisdiction must be considered first, but reprobated by bending backwards in a discriminatory and prejudicial posture in the appellants’ challenge on jurisdiction by reversing itself. The Court had

34

become functus officio in that respect as rightly submitted by the appellants’ learned counsel. His task has been accomplished and all he needed to do was to apply that principle across board; – that would have been an impartial administration of justice. In Ngere V. Okuruket XIV (2014) 11 NWLR (pt. 1417) page 14, at page 163 Ngwuta, JSC stated at page 179 of the report thus “The Court cannot approbate and reprobate on the issue of jurisdiction in the same case as the want of jurisdiction is fatal to the proceedings no matter how well it is conducted. See Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 SC 11: Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 ALL NLR (pt 4) 587, (1962) 2 SCNLR 341: Okafor v. Ezenwa (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 237) 611.
In an appeal to it, the lower Court with the issue of jurisdiction still hanging and not resolved one way or the other, ordered that the case be retried by another judge of the High Court. The Court below ought to have resolved the jurisdictional question of the trial Court assuming and declining jurisdiction in the same case. The Court, trial or appellate has no omnipotent authority to make orders. See Chia V. Cop (1989) BNLR 118.
The Court acts within

35

the limits of its powers and the powers do not include the power to assume and decline jurisdiction in the case or to reverse itself as if sitting on appeal over its judgment/ruling.
Effluxion of time or estoppel cannot affect the right of party to raise the issue of jurisdiction as judgment delivered without jurisdiction is, and remain for all times and purposes, a nullity. See Peenok Ltd. V. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 SC 1: National Bank v. Shoyoye (1977) 5 SC 181: Barclays Bank V. Central Bank (1976) 6 SC 175. It is inherent in the issue of jurisdiction herein that no delay, no matter its duration can be said to be in excusable. Exercise of judicial discretion in favour of the applicant is, on the facts before the Court, in accord with common sense. See Odusote V. Odusote (1971) NMLR 228”
The arguments by the 1st and 2nd respondents? counsel that the appellant were tardy in bringing their application to the notice of the Court is on the aforesaid authority, without basis, therefore. What is more, as Ariwoola, JSC stated in the same case supra, “The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage and even for the first time in the

36

Supreme Court.
The issue of jurisdiction must be thoroughly examined and finally resolved before the merit of the case can be entertained. It is trite law that where a Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a matter, its decision amounts to nothing.
The entire proceedings and decision are void no matter how well conducted. See Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341: Nwankwo & Anr. V. Yar’Adua & Ors. (2010) 12 NWLR (pt. 1209) 518: 6 SCM 121; Chief Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508 as stated earlier, the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Our rules of practice permit this and this Court has stated so over and over again that indeed the issue of jurisdiction can be raised up to the final determination of an appeal by this Court.
The reason being that the existence or absence of jurisdiction in the Court of trial goes to the root of the matter so as to sustain or nullify the decision or order of the trial judge in respect of the subject matter.
See Obikoye V. The Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver of Pool House GRP (1975) 4 SC 31: Adegoke V. Adibi & Anr. (1992) 5 NWLR

37

(pt. 242) 410 (1992) 6 SCNJ 136.”

The appellants cannot be accused of having a motive to stultify the hearing of the 1st and 2nd respondents application to set aside and thus using the perceived motive as a ground for assuming jurisdiction to discard the hearing of an application that must in law be heard first; and what is more, to proceed to giving a far reaching decision on the merit that has completely taken away the existence of the lis or res ie the purported nomination, selection and installation or appointment that constituted the reason for the suit and defence in the first place.

The learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, in my view, only attempted to turn the law in this situation of a challenge to jurisdiction on its head by embarking on speculative academic postulations intended to subvert the rules of Court and the settled position of the law. A Court?s discretion, nay power is not uncanalysed even where it exists, as it must be exercised judiciously and judicially and in the full appreciation of the circumstances of the case. See also Ngwuta, JCS in Ngere V. Ukureket xiv (Supra).
?A discretion, even if it exists, it

38

must not be used to truncate justice by the judex subterraneously foisting a fait accompli on litigants by enthroning the desire to protect what it perceives as a threat to its integrity beyond the rights of the competing litigating parties to have an impartial determination of their disputes and/or issues raised and in accordance to settled procedures of law/regulations, relevant and applicable. The issues raised by the appellants which also encapsulate those raised in the negative by the 1st and 2nd respondents’ are each resolved in favour of the appellants.
It needs to be said loudly that it is strange that the lower Court which had rightly identified issues of challenge to its jurisdiction will isolate some for determination and leave others because they have not been tagged as “preliminary objection” and filed as such or that attention was only drawn to it after the fixture of the counterpart objection on their date of hearing. There was nothing wrong with or rather the applications would have been, at worst, taken together or adjourned compositely to allow responses to them by the other parties who had all acknowledged the service thereof. That may explain

39

the non objection to and the non challenge posture of the other respondents to the instant appeal. As they saw no defence to the appeal.
Where there is no defence or answer to an appeal, counsel as minister in the temple of justice should feel bold to say so, as their first duty is to justice and to the Courts before their clients.

The appeal has merit and is allowed.
Accordingly, the ruling of the Osun State High Court delivered by Aderibige, J on the 28th January, 2011 in suit No HOS/71/2001 is set aside and quashed. The learned Honourable Chief Judge of Osun State shall in his discretion, re – assign this case to a different judge other than Aderibigbe, J. and which different judge shall hear the case denovo with priority to be given to the appellants’ application relating to the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court, as made.
I make no orders as to costs.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8950(CA)

Zhao Jianan & Anor V. Ma’aji Mairiga (2016) LLJR-CA

Zhao Jianan & Anor V. Ma’aji Mairiga (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A. 

This application was brought pursuant to Orders 18 Rules 2 & 10(1) and 8 Rule 11(a) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

It is for an order of this Court dismissing this appeal for lack of diligent prosecution and such orders as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
The grounds for the application are:
1. The Appellants are not diligent in the prosecution of the appeal as they have failed/neglected to file their Briefs of Argument within the time provided for under Order 18 Rule of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011.
2. The Appellants are not diligent in the prosecution of this appeal as they have not deposited any sum as required by Order 8 Rule 11 for the due prosecution of the appeal.

The application is supported by an 11 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by Abdulkareem Taiye Ibrahim with a letter that accompanied the compiled records of appeal dated 31st December, 2015 attached as Exhibit A, along with written submissions of learned counsel for the applicant.
?
In opposition the respondent filed a 19 paragraphs

1

counter affidavit with a letter from P. Atayi Esq., of counsel to the respondent dated 27th June 2016 attached as exhibit.

The said letter complains of failure of the trial Court to make the record available to the respondent/appellant.

I have carefully gone through the application along with the grounds, and the affidavit in support of the application as well as the counter affidavit, including the respective exhibits accompanying the affidavit and the counter affidavit, and submissions of learned counsel.

It is clear from the record that this appeal was filed on the 2nd of November, 2015, vide a notice and grounds of appeal and dated 16th of October, 2015 on the following grounds shorn of their particulars:

GROUND ONE:
The learned trial judge erred in law by denying the Defendants fair hearing and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

GROUND TWO:
The learned trial judge misdirected himself by descending into the arena, made a case for the Claimant and on the strength of that case, made a generous award of exemplary or punitive damages and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
?

GROUND THREE:<br< p=””

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2

The learned trial Court erred in law by assuming jurisdiction in this matter and holding that the 2nd Defendant/Appellant is a necessary party and vicariously liable for the acts of the 1st Defendant/Applicant.

The record of appeal was transmitted to this Court on the 31st day of December, 2015; the appellants are required by the rules of this Court to file their briefs within 45 days, but they have clearly failed or neglected to do so as required.

The respondent contend at Paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit that they ‘mobilized’ the appeals unit of the Industrial Court at Paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, without giving details of when or how, and at Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 contended to the effect that sometime in January, 2016 learned counsel was told the records had been transmitted, but did not include the handwritten portions of the trial judge’s writing; and he was asked to wait for it to be proof read.

Tired of waiting, he complained several times got only promised, no details of what he did or didn’t do was stated; and finally he wrote Exhibit A to the Chief Registrar of the trial Court on the 27th June 2016, only three

3

days before the appeal itself was taken on the 30th June 2016.

Clearly nothing in the affidavit or even Exhibit A shows any sign of seriousness on the part of the respondent/appellant to prosecute the appeal; the appellant’s effort at putting the blame on the registry of the trial Court for failure to transmit the record on time rings hollow, because there is nothing to show that after filing the record and grounds of appeal he did any of the things he claims to have done, assuming those things are even enough to help him.

Even the letter of complaint to the Chief Registrar of the trial Court was written on the 27th of June, 2016, when indeed this application to dismiss was filed on the 25th of April, 2016.

“Where the Court has discretion to dismiss an appeal for want of diligent prosecution, the Court of Appeal can look into the conduct of the party in breach of the rule right from when the writ was issued as the appeal in law is a continuation of the original cause of action. It is the totally of the conduct of the party in breach of the rules that the Court will take into consideration in exercising its discretion”. PER OLATAWURA, J.S.C. in

4

FAWOLE AJAYI & ANR V. EGIEROBO OMOROGBE (1993) LPELR-290-SC.
From the totality of the conduct of the appellant he had not been diligent, to say the least, and this Court does not indulge non diligent prosecutors who have flouted the avowed rules of this Court with reckless abandon; no Court exercises its discretion just because it is asked to or on a whim, “Judicial discretion would mean that they were to act according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion and according to law and not humour.” Per Mohammed JSC;OLUMEGBON & ORS V. KAREEM (2002) LPELR-2624SC.

Order 18 Rule 2 of the rules of this Court state as follows:
“The Appellant shall within forty-five days of the receipt of the Record of Appeal from the Court below file in the Court a written brief, being a succinct statement of his argument in the appeal”

This application is accordingly granted as prayed, appeal no. CA/A/816/2015 is dismissed for non diligent prosecution.
No order as to costs.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8949(CA)

Li Lewei (Alias Bede Bede) & Anor V. Francis Michael (2016) LLJR-CA

Li Lewei (Alias Bede Bede) & Anor V. Francis Michael (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

This application is brought Pursuant to Orders 18 Rule 2, 10(1) and 8 Rule 11 (a) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

It is for an order dismissing this appeal for lack of diligent prosecution, and such order or orders as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

The grounds for the application are:
1. The Appellants are not diligent in the prosecution of the appeal as they have failed/neglected to file their Briefs of Argument within the file provided for under Order 18 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011.
2. The Appellants are not diligent in the prosecution of this appeal as they have not deposited any sum as required by Order 8 Rule 11 for the due prosecution of the appeal.

The application is supported by a 12 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Abdulhakeem Taiye Ibrahim with Exhibit A the letter that accompanied the compilation of the record of appeal dated 31st December, 2015 attached along with written submissions of learned counsel.

In opposition a 19 paragraph counter affidavit was filed for the respondent,

1

deposed to by Paul B. Atayi Esq., with a letter dated 27th June, 2016 from P.B. Atayi Esq, of counsel to the respondent attached. The said letter complains of failure to make available failure of the trial Court to make the record available to the respondent/appellant.

I have carefully gone through the application along with the grounds, and the affidavit in support of the application as well as the counter affidavit, including the respective exhibits accompanying the affidavit and the counter affidavit, and submissions of learned counsel.

It is clear from the record that this appeal was filed on the 2nd of November, 2015, vide a notice and grounds of appeal and dated 14th of September, 2015 on the following grounds shorn of their Particulars:
GROUND ONE:
The Learned Trial Judge of the National Industrial Court, Abuja, erred in law by holding that the Court has jurisdiction to try the matter and further, the issue relating to jurisdiction was an abuse of Court process.
GROUND TWO:
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law by holding that the 2nd Defendant/Appellant is a necessary party and vicariously liable for the acts of the 1st

2

Defendant/Appellant.
GROUND THREE:
The Learned Trial Court misdirected himself on the evidence adduced before him by holding that the Claimant proved his case of assault and entitled to reliefs sought which decision is perverse and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of Justice.

The record of appeal was transmitted to this Court on the 31st day of December, 2015; the appellants are required by the Order 18 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Court to file their briefs within 45 days, but they have clearly failed or neglected to do so as required.

The respondent contend at paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit that they ‘mobilized’ the appeals unit of the Industrial Court at Paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, without giving details of when or how, and at Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 contended to the effect that sometime in January, 2016 learned counsel was told the records had been transmitted, but did not include the handwritten portions of the trial judge’s writing; and he was asked to wait for it to be proof read.

Tired of waiting he complained several times got only promised, no details of what he did or didn’t do was stated; and finally he

3

wrote Exhibit A to the Chief Registrar of the trial Court on the 27th June 2016, only three days before the appeal itself was taken on the 30th June 2016.

Clearly nothing in the affidavit or even Exhibit A shows any sign of seriousness on the part of the respondent/appellant to prosecute the appeal; the appellant’s effort at putting the blame on the registry of the trial Court for failure to transmit the record on time rings hollow, because there is nothing to show that after filing the record and grounds of appeal he did of the things he claims to have done, assuming those things are even enough to help him.

Even the letter of complaint to the Chief Registrar of the trial Court was written on the 27th of June, 2016, when indeed this application to dismiss was filed on the 25th of April, 2016.
“Where the Court has a discretion to dismiss an appeal for want of diligent prosecution, the Court of Appeal can look into the conduct of the party in breach of the rule right from when the writ was issued as the appeal in law is a continuation of the original cause of action. It is the totality of the conduct of the party in breach of the rules that the

4

Court will take into consideration in exercising its discretion”. PER OLATAWURA, J.S.C in FAWOLE AJAYI & ANR V. EGIEROBO OMOROGBE (1993) LPELR-290-SC.

From the totality of the conduct of the appellant he had not been diligent, to say the least, and this Court does not indulge non diligent prosecutors who have flouted the avowed rules of this Court with reckless abandon; no Court exercises its discretion just because it is asked to, or on a whim. “Judicial discretion would mean that they were to act according to the rules of reason and Justice, not according to private opinion and according to law and not humour.” Per Mohammed JSC; OLUMEGBON & ORS V. KAREEM (2002) LPELR-2624-SC.

For the avoidance of doubt Order 18 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Court state as follows:
“The appellant shall within forty-five days of the receipt of the Record of Appeal from the Court below file in the Court a written brief, being a succinct statement of his argument in the appeal.”

This application is accordingly granted as prayed, Appeal No. CA/A/816/2015 is dismissed for non diligent prosecution.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8948(CA)

Li Lewei (Alias Bede Bede) & Anor V. Francis Michael (2016) LLJR-CA

Li Lewei (Alias Bede Bede) & Anor V. Francis Michael (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.

This application is brought Pursuant to Orders 18 Rule 2, 10(1) and 8 Rule 11 (a) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

It is for an order dismissing this appeal for lack of diligent prosecution, and such order or orders as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

The grounds for the application are:
1. The Appellants are not diligent in the prosecution of the appeal as they have failed/neglected to file their Briefs of Argument within the file provided for under Order 18 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011.
2. The Appellants are not diligent in the prosecution of this appeal as they have not deposited any sum as required by Order 8 Rule 11 for the due prosecution of the appeal.

The application is supported by a 12 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Abdulhakeem Taiye Ibrahim with Exhibit A the letter that accompanied the compilation of the record of appeal dated 31st December, 2015 attached along with written submissions of learned counsel.

In opposition a 19 paragraph counter affidavit was filed for the respondent,

1

deposed to by Paul B. Atayi Esq., with a letter dated 27th June, 2016 from P.B. Atayi Esq, of counsel to the respondent attached. The said letter complains of failure to make available failure of the trial Court to make the record available to the respondent/appellant.

I have carefully gone through the application along with the grounds, and the affidavit in support of the application as well as the counter affidavit, including the respective exhibits accompanying the affidavit and the counter affidavit, and submissions of learned counsel.

It is clear from the record that this appeal was filed on the 2nd of November, 2015, vide a notice and grounds of appeal and dated 14th of September, 2015 on the following grounds shorn of their Particulars:
GROUND ONE:
The Learned Trial Judge of the National Industrial Court, Abuja, erred in law by holding that the Court has jurisdiction to try the matter and further, the issue relating to jurisdiction was an abuse of Court process.
GROUND TWO:
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law by holding that the 2nd Defendant/Appellant is a necessary party and vicariously liable for the acts of the 1st

2

Defendant/Appellant.
GROUND THREE:
The Learned Trial Court misdirected himself on the evidence adduced before him by holding that the Claimant proved his case of assault and entitled to reliefs sought which decision is perverse and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of Justice.

The record of appeal was transmitted to this Court on the 31st day of December, 2015; the appellants are required by the Order 18 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Court to file their briefs within 45 days, but they have clearly failed or neglected to do so as required.

The respondent contend at paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit that they ‘mobilized’ the appeals unit of the Industrial Court at Paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, without giving details of when or how, and at Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 contended to the effect that sometime in January, 2016 learned counsel was told the records had been transmitted, but did not include the handwritten portions of the trial judge’s writing; and he was asked to wait for it to be proof read.

Tired of waiting he complained several times got only promised, no details of what he did or didn’t do was stated; and finally he

3

wrote Exhibit A to the Chief Registrar of the trial Court on the 27th June 2016, only three days before the appeal itself was taken on the 30th June 2016.

Clearly nothing in the affidavit or even Exhibit A shows any sign of seriousness on the part of the respondent/appellant to prosecute the appeal; the appellant’s effort at putting the blame on the registry of the trial Court for failure to transmit the record on time rings hollow, because there is nothing to show that after filing the record and grounds of appeal he did of the things he claims to have done, assuming those things are even enough to help him.

Even the letter of complaint to the Chief Registrar of the trial Court was written on the 27th of June, 2016, when indeed this application to dismiss was filed on the 25th of April, 2016.
“Where the Court has a discretion to dismiss an appeal for want of diligent prosecution, the Court of Appeal can look into the conduct of the party in breach of the rule right from when the writ was issued as the appeal in law is a continuation of the original cause of action. It is the totality of the conduct of the party in breach of the rules that the

4

Court will take into consideration in exercising its discretion”. PER OLATAWURA, J.S.C in FAWOLE AJAYI & ANR V. EGIEROBO OMOROGBE (1993) LPELR-290-SC.

From the totality of the conduct of the appellant he had not been diligent, to say the least, and this Court does not indulge non diligent prosecutors who have flouted the avowed rules of this Court with reckless abandon; no Court exercises its discretion just because it is asked to, or on a whim. “Judicial discretion would mean that they were to act according to the rules of reason and Justice, not according to private opinion and according to law and not humour.” Per Mohammed JSC; OLUMEGBON & ORS V. KAREEM (2002) LPELR-2624-SC.

For the avoidance of doubt Order 18 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Court state as follows:
“The appellant shall within forty-five days of the receipt of the Record of Appeal from the Court below file in the Court a written brief, being a succinct statement of his argument in the appeal.”

This application is accordingly granted as prayed, Appeal No. CA/A/816/2015 is dismissed for non diligent prosecution.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8948(CA)

Industrial Training Fund Governing Council & Anor V. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2016) LLJR-CA

Industrial Training Fund Governing Council & Anor V. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A. 

This application is pursuant to Section 241 and 242 of the 1999 Constitution, Section 15 and 24 of the Court of Appeal Act, Orders 4 Rule 6, 7 Rules 1, 7 and 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

The application is for:
1. An order extending time within which to seek leave to appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court, Abuja Division Coram E. S. Chukwu, of the 26th of June 2015, in FHC/ABJ/CS/316/2015, between Industrial Training Fund Governing Council; & Anor v. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria.
2. An order granting leave to the applicants to appeal against the decision.
3. An order extending time within which the applicants may appeal against the decision.
4. An order granting leave to the applicant to raise a fresh issue on appeal, to wit, the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain labour related matter.
5. Such orders as the Court may deem fit to make in circumstances.
The grounds for the application are:
1. The claim of the plaintiff relates to or is connected with the employment, salaries,

1

condition of service and welfare of the defendants’ employees and Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain cases relating to or connected with employment.
2. The service of originating processes is invalid as same was not done in accordance with requirement of the law.
3. The cause of action was founded on Public Officer Protection Act and was not commenced within three months of accrual and therefore statute barred.
4. The learned trial judge has delved into substantive issues based on his personal opinion without any evidence at this stage of proceeding.

The application is supported by a 22 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by Muhammad Doko Idris, with the ruling of the trial Court and the notice and grounds of appeal attached as exhibits.

M.D. Idris Esq. of counsel to the appellants/applicants urged the Court to grant the application in the interest of justice; in opposition a five paragraphed counter affidavit deposed to by Joy Odoh was filed on behalf of the respondent; P. Olise Esq., of counsel urged this Court not to grant the application.

This Court has carefully gone through the affidavit in support of the

2

application and the counter affidavit, paying no less attention to submissions of learned counsel before arriving at the conclusion that in an application of this nature it is not enough to merely contend that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, see Paragraph 5 of the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application; because jurisdiction being what it is can be raised at any stage, even on appeal, and that therefore allows for the trial Court to hear the substance of the suit, and the applicant can conveniently bring his grievances, inclusive the issue of jurisdiction a in a basket on appeal rather than piecemeal.

Generally speaking this Court sees very little sense in interlocutory appeals, especially for the reason that more often than not they are time wasting, to both the Court and the parties, needlessly:
“In Amadi v. N.N.P.C. (2000) FWLR (pt.9) 1522, (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 66 at 02, the Supreme Court observed the dilatory effect of interlocutory appeal to the substantive suit and directed that the point on jurisdiction should be taken in the course of proceedings in the substantive claim, and any aggrieved party can

3

appeal on both the issue of jurisdiction and the judgment on merit in the proceedings. The reasoning of the Supreme Court being that interlocutory appeals cause unnecessary delay. Indeed, they are a waste of resources and precious judicial time. The Supreme Court had cause to frown at such appeals. SEE TUKUR. V. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT.63) 39; GLOBE FISHING INDUSTRIES LTD. V. COKER (1990) 11 SCNJ 56”; PDP V. ABUBAKAR (NO.1) (2007) ALL FWLR part 386 697 at 709, Per Rhodes-Vivour JCA, as he then was.
Again in RIBADU V. DALHATU (2012) LPELR-192729, this Court held “… it is improper to grant an extension of time within which to appeal against an interlocutory Ruling since the issues which the Applicant sought to appeal against could be taken after the Judgment on the merit, see Abubakar vs. Chuks (2007) 18 NWLR Part 1066 Page 386 at 411…”
The dilatory nature of interlocutory appeal came to fore again in this case, see Paragraph 3 (a) (c) (e) (f) and (g) of the counter affidavit of the respondents.
Even though the applicant stated the failure to appeal before now was not deliberate, this Court fails to see any convincing reason from the

4

affidavit of the applicant, OKERE V. NLEM (1992) 4 NWLR (PT 234) PG.132 SC. C.C.B (NIG.) LTD. V. OGURU (1993) 3 NWLR (PT.284) PG 630 and UKPE IBODO & ORS V. ENOROFIA (1981) 5-7 SC 41 AT PG. 51.

Discretion is never exercised in favour of an applicant just for the asking, “Judicial discretion must be exercised according to the relevant rules of law and practice and according to the rules of reason and justice. The guiding principle is that discretion, being judicial, must at all times be exercised not only judicially but also judiciously based on sufficient materials placed before the Court.” ONI V. FAYEMI (2008) 8 NWLR part 1089 pg. 400 at 440, per Sankey, JCA.

This Court does not believe that sufficient reasons exist for the exercise of its discretion in favour of the applicant, and for the reasons stated above I find no merit in the application, it is accordingly dismissed.

Parties to bear their respective costs.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8947(CA)

Obi Okudo V. Inspector-general of Police & Ors (1997) LLJR-CA

Obi Okudo V. Inspector-general of Police & Ors (1997)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MUSDAPHER, J.C.A.

Pursuant to provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, the appellant herein Mr. Obi Okudo applied to the Court below for the following reliefs:-

“1. Declaration that the arrest and detention of the applicant from the 9th to the 16th February, 1983, by the Respondents, their servants and or agents is unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal.

  1. Declaration that the continued arrest and detention of the applicant by the respondents is unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal.
  2. Declaration that the respondents’ directive compelling the daily and indefinite attendance of the applicant at the Force C.I.D., Alagbon Close, Lagos, since 16/2/1983 is unconstitutional and illegal.
  3. An order for the immediate and unconditional release of the applicant from the said arrest and detention.
  4. Declaration that the applicant is entitled to compensation and apology from the police on account of the unlawful arrest and detention as aforesaid in accordance with Section 36(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
  5. Order against the respondents for the payment to the applicant of N500,000.00k as special damages and aggravated and general compensation for the wanton in fraction of his fundamental right to personal liberty as aforesaid.”

The respondents filed counter-affidavits denying the allegations and the learned trial Judge called on the parties to give oral evidence. The applicant testified in proof of his allegations while the respondents called two witnesses. After the address of counsel, the learned trial Judge found for the applicant. He held in his judgment as follows:-

“The facts clearly show that the applicant detained for a period of 7 days continuously 9-16th of February, 1983 without being brought to Court, the detention was by the police. This was not denied but was attempted to be justified… I can see no justification for the detention of the applicant for such a period without bringing him to Court of law.

In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the detention of the applicant for the period 9th February to the 16th of February, 1983 was unlawful and I shall so declare … I hereby order that the respondents shall pay to the applicant a sum of N5,000.00k as compensation for loss of liberty by police for detaining him from the 9th February, 1983 to 16th February, 1983. Also that the Inspector General of Police should apologise to the applicant”

Mr. Obi Okudo, the applicant felt disgruntled with the award of only N5 ,000.00k as the compensation for the loss of his liberty and has appealed to this Court on one ground of appeal which reads:-

“That the award of damages by way of compensation to the Plaintiff in the sum of N5,000.00k is manifestly inadequate, unreasonable (sic) and failed to consider all the relevant circumstances and the principles ought therefore be enhanced.”

Three particulars in support of the ground were included in the ground. The particulars merely contained arguments on why this Court should enhance the quantum of damages. It is trite and well settled that a ground of appeal must be so succinctly couched and specifically described that the respondent will know the exact complaint against the judgment. It should avoid prolixity, repetition, narration or arguments. There should be no ambiguities or roundabout arguments in a ground of appeal. See Anie v. Ugagbe (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) 425 at 452. The particulars required for the nature of the error or misdirection alleged in relation to a ground of appeal should be the specific reasoning, findings or observations in the decision in question relating to the error or misdirection complained of. The particulars supplied should not be arguments or narratives that ought to be proffered in the brief or at the hearing of the appeal to establish the complaint against the judgment. The particulars should not also, as in this case, be independent complaints from the appeal itself but ancillary to it. See Atuyeye v. Ashamu (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 267. Globe Fishing Industries Ltd. v. Coker (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 162)265; Oge v. Ede (1995) 3NWLR (Pt.385) 564; Boogom v. Awan (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt 410) 692.

It is for the above that I strike out the particulars of the said ground of appeal and shall treat the appeal on the basis of the complaint against the quantum of damages only. I shall ignore the particulars which contain arguments and or narratives. See Order 3 rule 2 (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 as amended.

Now, the respondents in this case did not appeal or file a brief, when the matter was called for hearing, after we satisfied ourselves that the respondents were served, we invoked our powers under Order 6 of the Rules of Court and decided to hear the appeal on the basis of the appellant’s complaint on his brief only.

Before dealing with the issue for determination, it is appropriate at this juncture to set out the facts. Put briefly, the appellant was the Editor of an Enugu Weekly Newspaper the Weekly Star. A story was published in the paper which the police decided to arrest and detain the appellant for the purposes of prosecuting him for alleged false publication. He was arrested by the police in Enugu on the 9/2/1983 and was flown to Lagos. He continued in detention until the 16/2/1983. The appellant was not charged to any Court for the alleged offence for false publication. That the appellant suffered a lot of indignities while under the detention. It was also alleged that the appellant (after his release on bail on the 16/2/1983) was directed to be reporting to Alagbon Close daily. He was reporting daily for a period of two weeks each day from 9.00a.m. Until 3.30p.m. It was after his lawyers have petitioned to the police and the Court that he stopped the daily visit to Alagbon Close. That was why he took the action under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979. The respondents denied the allegations. In his judgment aforesaid, the learned trial Judge found that the appellant had been unlawfully detained for the period of between 9/2/1983 – 16/2/1983 and was therefore awarded as compensation the sum of N5,000.00k. The Inspector General of Police was also ordered to apologise to him.

Now, the issue formulated in respect of the single ground of appeal reads:-

“Whether the award of damages by way of compensation to the appellant in the sum of N5,000.00k is not manifestly inadequate and unreasonable in the light of the circumstances of this case.”

Now, before dealing with the argument of counsel on this issue, I must point out, that the learned trial judge found only that the respondents had unlawfully detained the appellant from 9/2/1983 – 16/2/1983. The learned trial Judge did not make any findings on the inhuman and undignified treatments meted out to him by the respondents. Nor did he make a finding on the issue of the appellant reporting to the Police after his release. There is no ground of appeal complaining against these issues. This appeal will therefore be treated only on the basis of the finding of the learned trial Judge aforesaid. This Court is bound to consider only the valid ground of appeal filed. All the arguments that go beyond the ground of appeal or which are based on the decision not appealed against go to no issue. See Bakule v. Tanarewa Ltd. (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 728. All arguments not based on the issue for determination properly distilled from the ground of appeal are irrelevant. See Anero v. Eze (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 370) 129 at 138.

A finding of fact by a trial Court which is not appealed against stands admitted and undisputed. See Adejumo v. Ayanlegbe (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 417; Okuoja v. Ishola (1982)7 SC314; Awole v. Owodunmi (No. 1) 1986 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 941; Oluma v. Onuyuna (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt, 443) 449. Accordingly all the arguments of counsel go to no issue, since there is no appeal against the finding or non finding of the issues raised and argued in the appeal.

The learned counsel conceded in his brief, that the learned trial Judge limited himself in the award of damages to the period of detention between 9/2/1983 – 16/2/1983. He did not take into account the other periods of detention or when the appellant suffered more inhuman treatments or indignities in the hands of the police. As mentioned above, there is no appeal on the facts as found by the learned trial Judge; in view of the authorities cited above, the facts as found by the learned trial Judge stand admitted and could not be disputed without a ground of appeal.

The only issue that remains to be considered is whether on the facts admitted aforesaid, the award of N5,000.00k as damages is inadequate so as to move this Court to enhance it. It has long been established and settled that an appeal court will not disturb the award of damages of a trial court unless it is convinced that the trial Court acted on a wrong principle of law or the amount awarded is so high or low that there was an entirely erroneous estimate of damages. See Nwobosi v. A.C.E. Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 404) 658. It is also trite that an appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded by the lower Court simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance.

In UBN. Ltd. v. Odusote Bookstores Ltd. (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt 421) 558 at 586. Wali J.S.C. said –

“The general principle of law is that an award of general damages is a matter for the trial Court and that normally an appeal Court will not interfere with such an award, unless:

(i) Where the trial Judge has acted under a mistake of law.

(ii) Where he has acted in disregard of principle.

(iii) Where he acted under misapprehension of facts.

(iv) Where he has taken into account irrelevant matters or failed to take account of relevant matters or

(v) Where injustice would result if the appeal court does not interfere …

Having regard to these principles and also having regard to the finding of the learned trial Judge, I am not convinced that the award of N5,000.00k as damages for compensation was unreasonable. In 1983, when the cause of action arose the sum of N5,000.00k was a very heavy amount. Converting the awarded sum to its present day value, that sum amounts to about N500,000.00k.

I find no merit in this appeal and I hereby dismiss it. I affirm the decision of the Court below. The respondents also caused to be filed a Notice of Appeal. They did nothing about it. The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondents/appellants on the 30th day of April, 1987, is also dismissed by me.

I make no order as to costs.


Other Citations: (1997)LCN/0271(CA)

Lawan Mai Gana V. Ya Falmata Alhajiram (1997) LLJR-CA

Lawan Mai Gana V. Ya Falmata Alhajiram (1997)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MUNTAKA-COOMASSIE, J.C.A. 

At the Maiduguri Upper Area Court No.1 the plaintiff, now appellant instituted an action against the defendant, now respondent claiming 12 cows from the respondent.

The Upper Area Court No.1 herein called the trial court entered judgment in favour of the appellant herein, the cows were given to him.

The respondent herein successfully appealed to the Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal herein referred to as court below.

This appeal therefore is against the decision of the Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal. I reproduce the grounds of appeal as contained on the Notice of Appeal filed thus:-

  1. The Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal erred in law by entertaining the appeal when it clearly lacked jurisdiction over it

Particulars of Error:

(a). The claim before the Upper Area Court No. 1, Maiduguri did not disclose any issue of Islamic Law.

(b) The Notice of appeal before the lower court dated 8th June, 1993 did not disclose any issue of Islamic Law.

(c) Neither the arguments canvassed in the court below nor the judgment of the lower court involves questions of Islamic Law for determination.

(d) In the circumstances, only the High Court of Borno State is competent to hear the appeal.

  1. The Borno State Sharia Court of appeal erred in Law when it heard the appeal based on grounds which are incompetent.

Particulars of Error:

(a) All the grounds of appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal dated 8th June, 1993 were filed without particulars.

(b) The place of abode of the plaintiff s witnesses, weight of evidence, reliance by the trial court on a decision of the High Court and impropriety of fresh trial were all argued as grounds of appeal before the lower court despite the fact that they were not contained in the Notice of Appeal as grounds of Appeal and no leave was granted by the lower court to argue same as grounds of appeal.

  1. The decision is against the weight of evidence.

This court ordered briefs to he filed and exchanged. The appellant in compliance with the rules of this court filed their amended appellants’ brief by the order of this court on 27/6/95. Since then the respondent failed to file their respondent’s brief of argument. On 7/7/97 under Order 6 Rule 9(e) allowed the appellant to argue the appeal on his brief alone. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. J.T. Gunda drew the attention of this court to their amended appellants’ brief. He indicated his reliance and adoption of same. He told the court that he has nothing more to add other than urging this court to allow the appeal.

In the appellant’s brief two issues were distilled from the three grounds of appeal filed. They read thus:-

i. Whether the Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal Maiduguri is competent to entertain an Appeal WHOSE (sic) subject matter does not border on Islamic Law, and,

ii. Whether the Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal Maiduguri is equally competent to entertain an appeal whose (sic) grounds are otherwise incompetent.

It is observed that the appellants’ counsel is perfectly in order to have raised in their original grounds issues that were never raised at the court below. In other words they raised issues of jurisdiction in their grounds of appeal for the first time in this court being Court of Appeal. The law is this that “the issue of jurisdiction, being a fundamental one can be raised at any stage of a proceeding, even in the Supreme Court, for the first time.”

See Salati v. Shehu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 15) page 198 at 199.

In his brief at page 2 Mr. Gunda learned counsel for the appellant contended that the jurisdiction of the court below, i.e Sharia Court of Appeal, is spelt out in section 242 of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria as amended, and the matters under which it could exercise jurisdiction are those enumerated in subsection (2) paragraphs (a-c) of the same constitution.

Learned counsel then contended that the yardstick for measurement is the statement of complaint of the plaintiff (Appellant) before the Upper Area Court Maiduguri. He relied on the unreported decision of this court in the case of Alhaji Adamu Maihodu v. Saidu Sarkin Kaji (unreported) Appeal No. CA/J/215/S/89 dated 25/1/90. He then reproduced the statement of claim thus:-

“……I, Lawan Mai Gana and Modu Kur the father of Audu disputed over 12 cows and that it was declared to me by the High Court that Modu Kur should give the cows, before that could take place Modu Kur died, therefore. I sued his son by name, Audu to give me my cows since his father left many cows”.

Learned counsel then submitted that reading through the provision of section 242(2)(a-c) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria amended the matters contemplated by the paragraphs over which the Sharia Court of Appeal could exercise appellate jurisdiction are as follows:-

(a) Questions relating to marriage concluded in accordance with Islamic Personal Law;

(b) Questions of Islamic Personal Law regarding Wakf, gift, will or succession;

Questions regarding an infant, prodigal or person of un-sound mind who is a Muslim.

Learned counsel for the appellant then emphatically submitted that a critical perusal of the statement of claim of the appellant does not fall within any of the matters enumerated in paragraphs (a-c) herein before itemized. The claim is purely that of dispute over cows, he concluded. It is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal. That being the case, counsel submits, the entire proceedings and judgment of the Sharia Court of Appeal, Maiduguri is a nullity as it was delivered without jurisdiction. He relied on Solari v. Shehu (1986) 1 WLR (Pt 15) 198/199 and F.C.M.B Ltd. v. Abiola and Sons Ltd. (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 165) 14 & 16 – 19 and a host of others.

It is manifest from the record that the respondent has not been represented by any counsel and no brief was filed by the respondent this court, under the authority of Order 6 Rule 9E, deemed the appeal as having being taken on the appellant’s brief. The respondent relied on her case as reflected in the Records of Proceedings of the lower courts.

Having considered the relevant ground of appeal and the first issue the proper issue to be thrashed out is whether the court below (Sharia Court of Appeal Borno State) has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

It is the law that it is the claim of the plaintiff at the trial Court that eventually determines the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal – Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR Part (117) 517; or (1989) 8 SCNJ P1: Engineer Samuel Yalayu-Amaye v. A.R.E. Cons. Ltd. (1990) 4 NWLR (Part 145) 422.

If I may visit the statement of claim of the appellant at the Borno Upper Area Court. That claim reads thus:-

“I Lawan Mai Gana and Modu Kur the father of Audu disputed over 12 cows and that it was declared to me by the High Court that Modu Kur should give the cows, before that could take place Modu Kur died, therefore I sued his son by name Audu to give me my cows since his father hay left many cows ….”

From the above claim one can clearly and easily see that the claim relates to the ownership of disputed cows. The parties are not related looking for the estate of their deceased father or Grand father for distribution. The appellant is not saying that the respondent is keeping an estate of his deceased father which has not been shared.

Far from that. There is no element in the claim to suggest that an issue within the province of Islamic Personal Law is involved. It relates to the ownership of disputed cows. Can we therefore say that the Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal leading to the judgment appealed against.

The jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal throughout this country is governed by the Provisions of Section 242 (2) of the 1979 Constitution as amended. Even though between 1979 – to 1993 up to 1995 there were some instances of legislative interpolations none the less the position remains the same. The legal conclusion is that once the issue on appeal is title to land or ownership of a thing simpliciter, the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal is ousted. It is the High Court of a State that can entertain same. Abuja v. Bizi (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 119) 120; Garba v. Dogo;n Yaro (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.165) 102; Isa v. Kado (unreported) suit No. CA/J/136/S/88 delivered on 21/6/89; Usman v. Umaru (Unreported) Suit No. CA/J/325/85 delivered on 16/10/85.

The Supreme Court recently has affirmed the position taken by the Court of Appeal in the case of Usman v. Umaru (1992) 7 SCNJ (Pt. 11) 388 that the Sharia Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as questions regarding Islamic Personal Law are not involved.

There is what I used to think is merely academic argument to the effect that in Decree No. 107 of 1993 the word “Personal” has been deleted leaving the phrase Islamic Law. Whether it enlarges the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts of Appeal in the country. Because Islamic Law definitely is over and above Islamic Personal Law. The former includes all aspects of Islamic Civil matters plus criminal law while the latter is restricted to Islamic Personal Law as provided by section 242 (2) (a-b) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended.

I think such argument is quite uncalled for. The deletion of the word personal does not, in my view, confer additional jurisdiction on the Sharia Court of Appeal. In Usman v. Kareem (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt.379) 537/541 the Supreme Court not being unaware of the so called deletion in Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993 held the position before 1993. The Supreme Court in the above case says;-

“Where a case involves Islamic Personal Law as in this case which is about a gift between Muslims, an appeal from the decision of the Area Court, the matter lies to the Sharia Court of Appeal.”

The cause of action in this appeal involves a gift and the donors are moslems.

Section 242(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 as amended by Decree No. 26 of 1986 vests the Sharia Court of Appeal with jurisdiction to exercise appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving question of Islamic Law which the court is competent to decide in accordance with the provision of subsection (2) of that section. Subsection (2)(c) of Section 242 provides;-

“(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section the Sharia Court of Appeal shall be competent to decide-

(a) ……

(b) ……

(c) any question of Islamic Law regarding wakf, gift, will or succession where the endower, donor, testator or deceased person is moslem.”I think i will hold as I held in the unreported case of Ali Sugulma v. Mohammed Isabe Suit No. CA/J.113/S/94 delivered on 11th day of July, 1997 thus:-

” Since in 1995 the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of a Sharia Court of Appeal of a state is limited to the matters provided under section 242 (2)(a-e) of the 1979 Constitution as amended despite the existence of Decree No. 107 of 1993 I will hold that any subsequent alterations, amendments and or deletions with regard to the provisions of section 242 of the 1979 Constitution did not add or subtract anything. Those alterations do not increase or enlarge the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal of a state”.

Consistently with the above, “I hold that the Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal, herein lower court, lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal since the claim of the plaintiff/appellant at the trial court was an issue involving or pertaining to ownership of cows without more it does not concern itself with any inheritable estate being withheld by anybody. The claimant or plaintiff is not the deceased person.

In the result I uphold the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Sharia Court of Appeal Borno State has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal before it, in that the claim of the appellant as plaintiff at the trial Upper Area Court did not affect Islamic Personal Law matters as enumerated under Section 242(2)(c) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. I am of the firm view that the intendment of the legislatures then was to confine the powers and jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts of Appeal to matters of Islamic Personal Law. The mere deletion of the word “personal” perse without amending other wings of section 242(2) (c) of the 1979 Constitution as amended cannot possibly and reasonably too enlarge the jurisdiction of the Shaira Courts of Appeal in this country.

That being the case, this appeal succeeds and it is allowed on the issue of jurisdiction alone. There is no necessity of going further to do otherwise is to embark on a wild chase leading to a nullity. The decision of the Borno State Sharia Court of Appeal is declared a nullity by me for want of jurisdiction. It is accordingly set aside. This appeal is therefore remitted back to the Borno State Chief Judge for determination by the State High Court. I make no order as to costs.


Other Citations: (1997)LCN/0270(CA)

Ezemonye Okwara V. Dominic Okwara & Anor. (1997) LLJR-CA

Ezemonye Okwara V. Dominic Okwara & Anor. (1997)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

ONALAJ A, J.C.A

Plaintiff now appellant in this appeal commenced the action in a representative capacity with the leave of the High Court of Imo State holden at Orlu Judicial Division Orlu for himself and on behalf of the other members of Okwara Family of Umueze Abukwa Umuobom against the defendants in a representative capacity for themselves and on behalf of the other members of Okwara Family of Durueze Abukwa Umuobom. The defendants are hereinafter referred to in this judgment as the respondents.

The claims of the appellants are discernable in paragraph 30 of the amended statement of claim at page 106 of the record of appeal. This paragraph is adopted following the rule of law that in our civil jurisprudence a statement of claim supersedes the particulars of the writ of summons especially that the averments in the statement of claim must not be in conflict or contradict the particulars of claim endorsed in the writ of summons. Paragraph 30 aforesaid states as follows:-

“30 Wherefor the plaintiff claims jointly and severally against the defendants as follows:-

(a) A declaration that plaintiff and members of his family are entitled to the customary right of occupancy covering Ala Duruigbo in dispute situate at Umueze Abukwa Umuobom shown in plaintiffs plan No. DS/9357/IM 1847D/87 verged green (except the portion verged black) being of an annual value of N20.00 (Twenty Naira).

(b) N2000.00 general damages for trespass.

(c) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendants themselves, their servants, agents and privies from further trespassing on the portion of the said Ala Duruigbo verged green excepting the portion verged black in the said plaintiffs plan.”

After service, respondents filed their statement of defence which was also amended with the leave of court.

To substantiate his claim appellant called nine witnesses. A summary of the testimonies of appellant’s witnesses are at page 165 of the record of appeal being part of the judgment of Hon. Justice G.O. Oyudo delivered on 7th day of January, 1994 which judgment covers pages 163 to 172 of the record of appeal.

Respondents on their part called 7 witnesses. The summary of their testimonies are at pages 166 and 168. The survey plan of the appellants was admitted as Exhibit C. The parties joined issues as to the identity of the land in their pleadings. From the pleadings and testimonies of the parties the learned trial Judge on the importance of the identity of the land in an action for right of occupancy at pages 167 and 168 of the record of appeal stated thus:-

“First on the location of the land in dispute according to the evidence accepted by both parties, there are four villages in Abukwa namely, Eluama, Umueze, Uhuizi and Umuobasi. The plaintiff is from Umueze while the defendants are from Eluama. Each party has contended that the land in dispute is situate in its territory. Their survey plans Exhibits “B” and “C” respectively attempted to depict the location of the land. The big question is “which of the two plan exhibits correctly depicts the land in dispute as being in Eluama or Umueze?…. at page 168……

I have taken a close look at the two plan Exhibits “B” and “C”. It seems to me that the two Exhibits are conspicuously marked “Nkoro” (trench) on the eastern side which apparently separates Eluama from Umuobasi and on close examination one can see that the land in dispute is like a bowel anguished inside a bigger container. That container is Eluama people’s land with a barricade on the eastern side. The barricated is the trench (Nkoro) referred to above. I therefore hold that the land in dispute is situate at Eluama village and not in Umueze.” (The italics is mine).

Earlier on at page 164 of the record of appeal the learned trial Judge stated as follows in his judgment that:-

“Pleadings were filed and exchanged and subsequently both sides had their pleadings amended. In this judgment reference should be made to the amended statement of claim and amended statement of defence. The only issue which appears to have emerged from the parties’ pleadings is whether the land in dispute was the subject matter of customary grant by the forebears of the defendants to the plaintiff’s father Okwaradagu and his relative by the defendants’ forebears or whether the land in dispute was inherited by the plaintiff through an unknown chain of devolution from his original ancestral father down to himself.” (The italics is mine).

At page 172 of the record of appeal the learned trial Judge concluded his judgment as under:-

“On the whole it is my finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove this case on the balance of probabilities. I accept the evidence of traditional history of the land as given in evidence before me by D.W.1 and D.W.6 which is substantially verified by acts of recent events by these witnesses. I have no doubt in my mind that the land in this dispute is situate at Eluama Abukwa and it is only a grant to Umueze plaintiff that can explain the presence of the plaintiff people on the land in dispute. The plaintiff is in possession of the area verged green in Exhibit “C” as a result of grant made to Okwaradagu by the defendants’ forebear. Accordingly this action will be dismissed and is hereby dismissed with N300.00 costs to the defendants.”

Being dissatisfied, the appellants filed immediately the notice of appeal to be found at pages 173 to 190 wherein he “used 14 grounds of appeal and furnished the particulars. With the leave of this court appellant sought and was granted leave to amend his notice of appeal wherein he also raised with their particulars 14 grounds of appeal because of their prolixity, especially, the particulars furnished as the appeal, is narrowed down to the crux of which the appeal turns out reference shall only be made to salient grounds of appeal without their verbose particulars as listed below:-

“Ground 3

Error in law:- The learned trial Judge roiled to properly appreciate the entire issues which called for his determination in the case and thereby erred in law when he held as follows:-

Quote: “The only issue which appears to have emerged from the parties’ pleading… an unknown chain of devolution from his original ancestral father down to himself (supra) as underlined. Particulars of Error

Ground 4

The learned trial Judge failed to give the plaintiff fair hearing on the case especially with regards to the situs or location of the land in dispute and caused a miscarriage of justice by refusing plaintiffs’ application by motion on notice to visit the locus.

Particulars of Error

Ground 13

Error in Law:- The lower court erred in law when it stated as follows:-

Quote: “I have taken a close look at the two plan Exhibits “B” and “C”. It seems to me…..The bigger container is Eluama people’s land with barricade on eastern side.” supra as underlined.”

Following the rules and practice of this court appellant in his brief of argument distilled the issues for determination based upon the grounds of appeal. It is the only issues that are fundamental to the outcome of this appeal that are considered in this appeal. They are issues 3 and 4 in appellant’s brief of argument and also 3 and 4 in respondents’ brief of argument. For case of reference appellant’s issues for determination 3 and 4 are hereby set down below as:-

“(3) Whether the failure of the trial court’s failure to visit the locus did not amount to denial of fair hearing which caused miscarriage of the justice?

(4) Whether or not the trial court properly appraised the evidence in this suit before coming to the conclusion that the appellant did not prove his case.”

Whilst issues 3 and 4 in respondents’ brief are also set down thus:-

“3. Whether it is statutorily mandatory for a trial judge in all land matters to visit the locus in quo just for mere fun of it.

  1. Whether the plaintiffs who pleaded situs or location of the land in dispute did successively prove the land to be in Umueze of the plaintiffs or did the defendants not rather prove that the land to be in Eluama of the defendants.”

It is pertinent to state that in the appellants’ brief of argument, Issues 3 and 4, appellants contend that rejection by the learned trial Judge after payment of the necessary fees for the locus in quo and for the learned trial Judge to rely in the determination of the crucial issue of the identity of the land in dispute on Exhibits “B” and “C” as stated above amounted to a denial of fair hearing under section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. This failure to visit the locus engendered miscarriage of justice, thereby urging the court to allow the appeal.

For the respondent in Issues 3 and 4 contended that it is not in every case in respect of action for right of occupancy especially where survey plans showing the land in dispute as Exhibits “B” and “C” in the instant appeal a visit to the locus in quo is mandatory. The learned trial Judge had a close and hard look at Exhibits “B” and “C” and made the finding of fact that appellant’s land was like a bowel anguished inside a bigger container. That container is Eluama people’s land village and not Umueze, the appellant’s land. In coming to this conclusion the learned trial Judge evaluated the evidence properly and came to a right decision with the finding of fact borne out from the evidence, which finding was not perverse. Therefore, this appeal court should not disturb the finding of fact. The court should dismiss the appeal.

The above reflects the contention of the parties on the visitor non visit to the locus in quo. As stated above the parties joined issues as to the identity of the land in dispute. The learned trial Judge realised the importance of the identity of the land in dispute in a contested issue of title leading to grant of right of occupancy since the promulgation of the LAND USE ACT, though the principle of law to grant or refuse right of occupancy remained the same before and after the LAND USE ACT. The resolution and treatment of the identity of the land in dispute was highlighted above in this judgment making a repetition unnecessary.

In Seismograph Services (Nig) Ltd. v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 SC 85 1976 NSCC Volume 10 page 130 it was held that:-

“3 There being conflict of evidence as to the materials used in the construction of the respondent’s building and the number and extent of the cracks visible on the building, the learned trial Judge was not in a position to evaluate the evidence without a visit to and inspection of the building.”

This case was adopted and followed by this court in CA/PH/55/92 delivered on 5th day of November 1996 between Danien Mbionwu & Two Ors (For themselves and on behalf of the people of Osina Community Orlu) v. Ugorji Obi & 4 Ors (For themselves and as representing their Akokwa Community) reported as 1997 4 NWLR (Pt. 500) page 436 wherein it was held as follows:-

“It seems to me that this is a proper case in which the trial court should have undertaken a visit to the locus in quo in order to clear the conflicts in the evidence of the parties vis-a’-vis their pleadings and their plans Exhibits “A” and  Having regard to the pleadings vis-a-vis the evidence adduced the conflicts would only have been resolved by a visit to the locus in quo with a finding made upon it. See Seismograph Ltd. v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 SC page 85. As this was not the case, in order to do substantial justice to both parties we consider it a fit and proper case for retrial

de novo before another Judge see the case of Abodundu v. The Queen (1959) 4 FSC 70; (1959) SCNLR 162. This is necessary to avoid a substantial miscarriage of justice.”

In the instant appeal the two disputed survey plans admitted as Exhibits “B” and “C” were tendered by the appellants and respondents respectively. No composite plan was made out of the two survey plans. There was no superimposition of the two survey disputed land and to show whether they cover the same parcel or area of land. It is pertinent to state that in the comparison of Exhibits “B” and “C” the only connecting link as found by the learned trial Judge was to quote him:-

“It seems to me that the two Exhibits are conspicuously marked “NKORO” (trench) on the eastern side which apparently separates ELUAMA from UMUOBASI and on close examination one can see that the land in dispute is like a bowel anguished inside a bigger container. That container is ELUAMA people’s land with a barricade on the eastern side. The barricade is the trench (NKORO) referred to above. I therefore hold that the land in dispute is situates at ELUAMA village and not UMUEZE.”

In making the above finding of fact reliance was based as stated upon a look of Exhibits “B” and “C”. There was no link between Exhibits “B” and “C” through co-ordinates having used the same True North origin TN by showing same survey beacons or pillars, but with respect it is an expert who can assist the court through composite plan by establishing by preponderance of evidence of probability that the parcels or pieces of land in Exhibits “B” and “C” cover the same piece of land reference to a trench in both eastern part with respect to the trial Judge was not sufficient to conclude that Exhibits “B” and “C” cover the same parcel of land, the conflict could only have been resolved and properly evaluated and assessed through a visit to the locus in quo which golden opportunity was allowed to slip off notwithstanding payment for the visit by appellant was rejected in my view erroneously. This finding of fact with respect is therefore perverse. Being an appeal court, this court can disturb and interfere with the said finding being an exception to the rule that generally a Court of Appeal is loathe to disturb a finding of fact by the lower court except of course where the finding is found to be perverse as in the instant case for failure to visit the locus in quo to resolve the conflict in the pleadings, evidence of the parties on the crucial issue of the identity of the land. There is much force in the contention of the appellants that the rejection of the application to visit the locus and resolving the same without a composite survey plan of Exhibits “B” and “C” without the assistance of an expert denied appellants of fair hearing under section 33(1) of 1979 Constitution of Nigeria is convincing and meritorious. Much as the court agrees with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents and being trite law that it is not in every land case that a visit to the locus in quo is mandatory, in the instant case to really resolve the issue as to the identity of the land in dispute as shown in Exhibits “B” and “C” without a composite survey plan of Exhibits “B” and “C” applying Seismograph Services v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 SC 85 a visit to the locus in quo is not only relevant but also mandatory. Respondents’ contention that a visit to the locus in quo was unnecessary is hereby rejected.

Be that as it may, in opening his judgment, the learned trial Judge after stating supra that pleadings were filed and exchanged without consideration of the issues joined, assessment, and evaluation of the evidence of the parties straight away jumped into the conclusion that:-

“The only issue which appears to have emerged from the parties pleadings is whether the land in dispute was the subject matter of customary grant by the forebears of the defendants to the plaintiff’s father, Okwaradagu and his relative by the defendants’ forebears or whether the land in dispute was inherited by the plaintiff through an unknown chain of devolution from his original father down to himself.”

Apart from tracing their title to the radical, owner by inheritance, appellants and respondents joined issues of traditional history, native arbitrations, acts of ownership and possession, to assert ownership. The learned trial Judge without first of all assessing and evaluating the pieces of evidence, based on the joined issues as pleaded that the only issue that emerged from the pleadings was the subject matter of customary grant by the forebears of the defendants to plaintiffs/appellant’s father Okwaradagu and his relative by the defendants/respondents forebears or through inheritance was a wrong evaluation and assessment of the evidence with a short circuit of the issues pleaded, this is contrary to the established duty of court in evaluation of evidence. In Attorney General of Oyo State & Anor v. Fairlakes Hotels Ltd. & Anor No.2 (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.121) page 255 at 292 SC, it was held on the duty of court in evaluation of evidence that:-

”The primary duty of a trial court is to evaluate all the evidence before it, whether given by an expert or not before coming to a conclusion as to the preponderance of the evidence adduced by the parties.”

In the same vein the Supreme Court observed in Mogaji Lasisi Atanda & 3 Ors (For themselves and Adenko Aje Ojoku Family) v. Salami Ajani & 4 Ors (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) page 511 at 531 and 539 held as follows:-

“(8) A trial court has a duty to make a finding on the evidence before it (Okuwosi v. Ishola (1973) 3 SC 43: Anukanti v. Ekwonyenso (1978) 1 SC 37; Okonojua v. The State (1981) 6/7 SC 1; Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91 referred to.)

(9) A court must always give full and dispassionate consideration to all issues raised or canvassed before it (Ojogbue v. Nnubia (1972) 6 SC 227; Oyediran v. Amoo (1970) 1 All NLR 313 at 317 referred to).

The guide of the legal consequence of failure to decide on all the issues canvassed before a court was put by Olatawura, J.S.C. in Obi Nwanze Okonji & 4 Ors (For themselves and on behalf of the Umuedogwu Family Ibusa) v. George Njokanma & 2 Ors. (For themselves and on behalf of the Ogbeile Family of Asaba) (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt.202) page 131 at 146 as follows:-

“As it is the law that a court should not deal with issues not before it, so also when a party submits an issue to the court for determination the court must make a pronouncement on that issue except where the issue is submitted to another and the omission of the lower court to make any pronouncement on the issues properly raised before will not prejudice the appeal court looking into it (Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR 372 referred to and followed). A point properly raised as an issue cannot be ignored or glossed over in an appellate court.” Applied followed and adopted by this court in the case of Ebe Uka & Anor (For themselves and as representing Ndi Ojiugwo Village of Abam) v. Chief Kalu Okorie Irolo & 5 Ors. (For themselves and on behalf of Ndi Ebe Village of Abam) 1996 4 NWLR (Pt.441) page 218 and at page 235, Onalaja, J.C.A. observed as follows:-

“The crux of this appeal is that the learned trial Judge having failed to consider a fundamental issue being the roots of titles in the consolidated suit what is the legal consequence?

Under our adversarial system of jurisprudence it is a pillar of the rule of natural justice to trial any person before a court of law must have his civil rights and obligations decided by an impartial adjudicator by ensuring fair play, justice and equity as enshrined in section 33(1) of 1979 Constitution. As in the instant appeal where there had been a fundamental breach of failure to decide on all the issues canvassed before it and which led to dismissal of appellant’s case could it be said appellants have had fair hearing of their case.”

Applying the above to the instant appeal the appellant’s complaint of denial of fair bearing is amply justified, the appeal therefore succeeds.

Uwais, Acting Chief Justice of Nigeria (as he then was) observed in Okonji v. Njokanma supra stated below the legal consequence of a failure of a trial Judge to consider all the issues canvassed before him thus:

“Where a court failed to consider an issue properly submitted to it the proper order will be one remitting the case back to the court for a proper consideration of all issues raised Ezeoke v. Nwagba (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) page 616 at 627 adopted.

In conclusion, the appeal is therefore allowed and under section 16 Court of Appeal Act Cap. 75 and Okonji v. Njokanma supra followed and adopted in Uka v. Irolo supra the case SUIT IIOR/60/85 is hereby remitted to the High Court of Imo State Orlu Judicial Division holden at Odu for a retrial de novo before another Judge not Hon. Justice G.O. Oyudo as the judgment delivered by him in the above mentioned suit delivered on Friday 7th day of January 1994 is hereby reversed and set aside with an order of a retrial before another Judge.

The other issues 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 in appellant’s brief of argument and issues 1, 2, 5 and 6 in respondents’ brief of argument have been subsumed in the consideration of issues 3 and 4 in appellant’s brief of argument also issues 3 and 4 in respondent’s brief of argument.

I am of the view that as the appeal succeeds the appellants are entitled to the cost of this appeal which I fix at N3000.00 against the respondents. The cost awarded by the learned trial Judge in the High Court is hereby set aside. Should the said cost had already been settled or paid, a refund is hereby ordered to the appellants. The cost in the lower court shall abide the new trial.


Other Citations: (1997)LCN/0269(CA)