Gafaru, Akanni V. J. A. Sijuwade (1952)

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Practice and Procedure—Claim on contract—Contract admitted—Document of contract unstamped.

Facts

In the Court below, the plaintiff, who had occupied two rooms belonging to the defendant, sued the latter for damages, alleging in regard to one room that he held it from the defendant under a written agreement of lease for a specified term at a specified rent—all of which the defendant admitted in his defence.

Notice had been given by the plaintiff to the defendant to produce the agreement; the defendant produced it and the trial Judge noted that it was unstamped.

At the end of the plaintiff’s case the Judge non-suited the plaintiff on the ground that as the agreement was unstamped, he could not lead oral evidence of its contents. The plaintiff appealed. (As regards the other room the alleged sub-lease was oral, and oral evidence of it was given.)

Held

The written agreement by which the respondent (defendant below) leased one room to the appellant (plaintiff below) was admitted by the respondent in his defence, and the case could therefore have proceeded, had the respondent so chosen, without any formal tender of that agreement.

Appeal allowed: new trial ordered.

Said Ajami V. The Comptroller Of Customs (1952)

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Evidence—”Expert”—Experience; duties of office—Evidence Ordinance, section 56.

Facts

Section 56 of the Evidence Ordinance reads as follows:—
“56. (1) When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, native law or custom, or of science or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, native law or custom, or science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, are relevant facts.

“(2) Such persons are called experts.”
The point of substance in this appeal was whether a certain witness was admissible as an “ expert ” on whether certain notes described as French Colonial Franc Notes were legal tender in French territory.

The point arose in this way: the appellant had a number of such notes in a suit-case in an aeroplane on the point of leaving an airport in Nigeria, namely Kano in the North, for Rome.

The suit-case and notes were seized and the Comptroller of Customs, as plaintiff, brought an action for penalties against the appellant as defendant (who was a passenger on the plane) for attempting to export the notes on the ground that the export of them was prohibited by the Exchange Control Ordinance and was a contravention of section 125 (1) of the Customs Ordinance (under which proceedings could be taken by virtue of a provision in the Exchange Ordinance).

In the claim made before the Magistrate the Comptroller did not aver that the notes were legal tender in French territory (which he might have done under section 245 of the Customs Ordinance) but called a witness who testified that he was the Manager of Barclays Bank, Kano, that he had 32 years’ experience of banking business, 24 years being in Nigeria, that to the besj of his knowledge the notes were French Colonial Franc Notes and that they were legal tender in French West Africa on the material date; he was not cross-examined.

The Magistrate gave judgment in favour of the Comptroller; the defendant appealed
to the Supreme Court, where he lost, and appealed further, mainly on the ground that the question whether the notes were legal tender was a question of foreign law and that the witness was not shown to be so qualified in it as to render his opinion admissible as that of an expert witness (that is to say as a person “specially skilled” in the subject within the meaning of section 56 of the Evidence Ordinance).

For the Comptroller reliance was put on the witness’s banking experience in Nigeria, which adjoins French West Africa, and on the fact that Barclays Bank was gazetted as an authorised dealer under the Exchange Control Ordinance in foreign currency, as sufficient prima facie to show that the witness was qualified to testify as an expert.

Held

The witness had by virtue of his banking experience in Nigeria peculiar means of knowledge on the subject, and as the manager of a branch of an authorised dealer in foreign currency had important and responsible public duties in relation to such currency and was bound to make himself acquainted with the subject; his evidence was rightly admitted and was sufficient to establish that the notes were legal tender in French West Africa.

Appeal dismissed.

Mubashiru Aiyepola V. Commissioner Of Police (1952)

Appeals in Criminal Cases—Appeal to Supreme Court—Trial a nullity—Order of re-trial—Magistrates’ Courts (Appeals) Ordinance, section 43 (a) (i).

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Facts

The appellant was charged before the Magistrate with an offence which could be tried with the appellant’s consent but not otherwise. The Magistrate omitted to ask for that consent and the trial was therefore a nullity under the second proviso to section 20 (iv) of the Magistrates’ Courts Ordinance.

On Appeal to the Supreme Court the Judge declared the trial to be a nullity and remitted the case for re-trial.

The appellant appealed further, arguing that a re-trial could be ordered only where there was a finding and sentence which might be reversed, but where the trial was null and void ab initio, as in this case, there was no finding or sentence to reverse, and the Judge could not do more than quash the conviction as being null in that it was part of the trial.

For the police it was argued that when a trial was declared null and void, a new trial must be ordered.

The question turned on section 43 (a) (i) of the Magistrates’ Courts (Appeals)
Ordinance, which reads:—
“ (a) On an appeal from a conviction—
(i) reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be retried by a court of competent jurisdiction, or commit him for trial.”

It was sought in argument to avoid that provision on the ground that the Judge in declaring the trial to be a nullity was not exercising powers of that provision but declaring the law in the terms of the proviso to section 20 of the Magistrates’ Courts Ordinance.

Held

(1) The Supreme Court in appeals from Magistrates’ Courts is confined to the powers conferred by the Magistrates’ Courts (Appeals) Ordinance.

(2) Where the trial was null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court should reverse the findings and sentence and may then order a re-trial under section 43 (a) (i) of the Magistrates’ Court (Appeals) Ordinance.

Appeal dismissed.

Akintola Aina V. The Queen (1953)

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Appeals in Criminal Cases—Judge suggesting manslaughter—Jury convicting of murder—Verdict warranted by evidence.

Facts

The applicant stabbed the deceased in the course of a fight. In summing up the judge explained the law on provocation and indicated that the jury might properly convict of manslaughter, but the jury unanimously convicted of murder.

There was evidence to support the conviction.

Held

The verdict would not be interfered with as it could not be said that it was unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence.

Application refused.

E. E. Agbeyegbe & Anor V. Inspector-General Of Police (1955)

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Forgery—liability for.

Facts

Both appellants, who were Prison Officials, were convicted on various charges, including a charge for forgery of a receipt appearing on a voucher. At the time the first appellant signed the voucher, the receipt was not completed, and there was no evidence to show that the receipt ever came back to him, and it was argued that he could not be held liable for the forgery of the receipt.

Held

The first appellant at the time he signed the voucher knew that it contained false information and was to be used to defraud the Government. He therefore helped in the commission of and was liable for the forgery.

Appeal dismissed.

Chief Salami Agbaje V. Habib Suleiman And Anor (1954)

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Native Lands Acquisition Ordinance (Cap. 144), sections 3 (1) and (3), regulations 1 to 4—Approval of alien—Approval of instrument.

Facts

The parties made an agreement for a building lease of a plot in a Southern Province, but the owner (appellant now, defendant below) refused to execute the deed of lease, though he had received rent in advance and his ground of refusal was untrue.

He was sued and lost; and in his appeal he made, for the first time, a submission that the agreement was null and void under the above section, the plaintiffs being aliens.

Section 3 (1) provides that:—
“No alien shall acquire any interest or right in or over any land within the Southern Provinces from a native, unless such alien has been approved in writing by the Governor in that behalf, and then only under an instrument which, and the terms whereof, have also been so approved.’*

And section 3 (3) makes a transaction or instrument not so approved null and void. A procedure is laid down (with forms of instruments) in regulations made under the Ordinance. The alien has to supply certain particulars (regulation 1); the District Officer must satisfy himself that the alien is of good character and desirable as a resident or trader (regulations 2 and 3) and may prepare a draft
instrument and submit it with a report to the Resident for transmission to the Regional Lands Officer and approval by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Region.

The facts were that the plaintiffs took an application to the District Officer, who being satisfied with the purpose of the lease and knowing them to be desirable persons put up at their request the draft agreement for the lease, and when the parties had signed it submitted it for the Lieutenant-Governor’s approval, which he communicated to them in writing.

Held

(1) The objection, though not raised at the trial, raised a question of mixed law and fact which the Court of Appeal would consider.

(2) The facts established that section 3 (1) of the Ordinance and the regulations made thereunder had been sufficiently complied with.

Appeal dismissed.

The African Press Limited V. The Queen (1952)

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Criminal Law—Sedition—Criminal Code, section 50—Raising discontent among inhabitants.

Facts

The appellant was convicted of printing a seditious libel on the ground (a) that it tended to bring into hatred or contempt the person of the Governor and the Government, and (b) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the inhabitants of Nigeria.

On (a): The article referred to the “Macpherson Constitution” as an “obnoxious constitution” and by other similar epithets; it also inveighed against the administrative officers of the Government.

On (b): The article warned the public to beware of administrative officers: that they were cleverly disguised enemies of the struggle for freedom, mostly incompetent dictators, openly pretending to be friends but secretly working against nationalists, and therefore most dangerous.

The defence was that it was criticism to remedy defects and was covered by the exceptionsin (ii) and (iii) ofsection 50 (2) which are mentioned in the judgment infra.

Held

(1) Criticism of the Constitution called after the Governor’s name could not be held to be bringing the Governor into contempt, nor could inveighing against the administrative officers be held to be bringing the Government into contempt.

(2) The article was designed to whip up hostile feeling against administrative officers; no specific errors or defects were mentioned for remedy; and its effect was to cause not only disaffection and discontent towards those officers from the people but amongst those officers themselves, who were equally the subjects of Her Majesty and inhabitants of Nigeria.

Appeal dismissed.

The African Press Ltd. V. Dr. Okechukwu Ikejian (1953)

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Tort — Libel — Untrue allegation — Defence of fair comment — Qualified privilege—Malice. Appeals in Civil Cases—Test ofintervention on damages awarded—Uniformity of costs desirable.

Facts

The respondent as plaintiff below sued in libel in respect of an article headed “The Fraudulent Saints of Africa ” which attacked “ noisy and dishonest followers ” of someone and alleged of the respondent that he “ claimed to have obtained a doctorate degree in medicine ”, that “ it was later proved that the degree was a fake ”, and that ” consequently the quack expert was kicked out of
the University ”; and he was referred to as one of those ” dishonest followers ”, as a ” fraudulent nationalist ”, and as one who has “ waxed rich at the expense of the honest but credulous public ”.

In fact the plaintiff had a degree as a doctor of medicine, so the allegation that it was a ” fake ” was untrue. He had however claimed to be a doctor of science and received an academic appointment at a higher salary than he would have had, which he was forced to give up on its being discovered that he was not a doctor of science.

The trial Judge held that the article was a gross and very damaging libel and awarded the plaintiff £750 as damages and £200 as costs plus his out-of-pocket expenses.

The defendants appealed and argued (a) that the comment was warranted by the fact that the plaintiff had falsely claimed to be a doctor of science, (6) that there was a bona fide duty to tell the public that he was not discharged from his appointment on political grounds and to encourage honesty, (c) that the damages awarded were excessive, and (d) that the costs allowed were inordinate.

Held

(1) The defamatory comment hung upon the alleged fact that the respondent-plaintiff falsely claimed to be a doctor of medicine; that allegation was untrue; therefore the comment hanging upon it could not be fair.

(2) Whether or not the defence of privilege could be raised, the recklessness with which that untrue allegation was made and the violent language and general tenor of the article, which struck at the respondent-plaintiff’s professional practice in medicine, justified the trial Judge in holding that the publication was malicious—a finding which destroyed that defence.

(3) The damages would not be disturbed, for there was no mistake in principle or the basis of assessment, nor was the amount so excessive as to disclose an entirely erroneous estimate of the injury suffered.

(4) The costs allowed were out of all proportion to the damages awarded and to the length of the trial, and the costs would be reduced having regard to the costs allowed in a similar case.

Appeal dismissed but order on costs below varied.

Raji Afonja And 6 Others V. The Queen (1955)

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Murder or manslaughter—provocation—when duty to direct jury or consider in Judgment—only when issue arises on evidence—definition of—accused’s cultural status to be considered.

Facts

As a result of a dispute between two political parties disturbances broke out and a leading member of one political party was injured. Some time later a large number of that party attacked the house of the deceased, and the deceased in trying to escape was attacked by the six appellants and died as a result ofinjuries he received.

On the appeal it was argued that from the Judgment of the Court below the trial Judge did not address his mind on the question as to whether there was provocation which would reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter.

There was no evidence that the deceased had anything to do with the attack on the leader of the opposite political party or that he had anything to do with any attack on that party.

Held

(1) That on the evidence in this case there was nothing which would have entitled
the Judge to find a verdict of manslaughter and that there was, therefore, no need for him to direct his mind on this issue.

(2) The Court adopted the definition of provocation as set out in the Judgment of Devlin, J. in Rex v Duffy (1) and held that the defence of provocation could not be sustained here as it was shown from the evidence that the deceased did not commit any provocative act against the appellant.

Note —The Court distinguished between the facts in this case and that in Rex v Udo
Ekpo (2) as in that case the deceased was a member of a group whose attack gave rise to the provocation, but in this case the deceased took no part in any hostile act. The Court also pointed out that the question of the cultural status of an accused person, as considered in the case of Rex v Adekanmi (3), had no application to this case as here the deceased committed no provocative act at all.

(1) That on the evidence in this case there was nothing which would have entitled
the Judge to find a verdict of manslaughter and that there was, therefore, no need for him to direct his mind on this issue.

(2) The Court adopted the definition of provocation as set out in the Judgment of Devlin, J. in Rex v Duffy (1) and held that the defence of provocation could not be sustained here as it was shown from the evidence that the deceased did not commit any provocative act against the appellant.

Note —The Court distinguished between the facts in this case and that in Rex v Udo
Ekpo (2) as in that case the deceased was a member of a group whose attack gave rise to the provocation, but in this case the deceased took no part in any hostile act.

The Court also pointed out that the question of the cultural status of an accused person, as considered in the case of Rex v Adekanmi (3), had no application to this case as here the deceased committed no provocative act at all.

Appeals dismissed.