S. O. N. Okafor V. D. O. Ikeanyi & Ors (1979)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

BELLO, J.S.C. 

The appellant in this appeal was the plaintiff in the High Court of the former East-Central State in which he claimed from the respondents, who were the defendants in the action, as follows:

“In a daily newspaper called The Renaissance published on Thursday, May 23,1974 and circulated throughout Nigeria including Onitsha within jurisdiction, the defendants at the back page of the said paper jointly published of and concerning the plaintiff a notice headed “Chief S.O.N. Okafor Deposed” (NB. the full will be set out in the pleadings). Both the heading and the contents of the said publication are false and malicious and were calculated to, and indeed put the plaintiff to, shame and ridicule and lowered his esteem in the society. The plaintiff therefore claims from the defendants jointly and severally the sum of Fifty Thousand Naira as general damages for libel. ”

Pleadings having been ordered were duly filed and delivered. After the witnesses of the parties had been heard, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted during his address, inter alia, that the claim should be dismissed because the words complained of were not set out in the writ nor in the Statement of Claim. In his reply to that submission learned Counsel for the appellant contended that it was not mandatory to set out the words complained of in his pleading. The learned trial Judge reserved judgment after the submission of Counsel.

On the day the case was fixed for judgment but before the judgment was delivered, learned Counsel for the appellant by an application by motion, sought leave of the Court to amend the Statement of Claim by setting out therein the words complained of Learned Counsel for the respondents opposed the application. In his ruling delivered on that day, the learned trial Judge refused the application upon the following ground:

“Having considered the application I think that even though Order 34 of the High Court Rules gives unfettered discretion to the Court to allow amendments at any stage of the proceedings, it would be a dangerous precedent to postpone a judgment that has already been written. It would have been a different proposition if the application for amendment had been made some days before the very date fixed for the delivery of the judgment.

Exercise of discretionary powers must be based on apparent justice. To postpone a judgment that is ready in order to allow an amendment of a Statement of Claim can hardly be considered justice in the eyes of reasonable men and women.”

Thereafter the learned Judge proceeded to deliver his judgement in which he dismissed the claim on two grounds. Firstly, the words complained of were not specifically pleaded and, secondly, that the words complained of were not defamatory in their natural meaning.

The appeal to this Court is against the ruling refusing the appellant leave to amend his pleading and also against the judgment dismissing his claim. Although in the final result ten grounds of appeal were filed and nine grounds argued, we think only grounds Nos. 1, 5,8 and 10 merit our consideration.

Although grounds 1 and 5 were argued together, we think it is appropriate to start with the complaint relating to ground no.5 which reads:

“The learned trial Judge erred in law when he said as follows:

‘I think that the law is that the libel must be set out verbatim in the Statement of Claim; it is not enough to set out its substance or effect as ‘the precise words are material.’ As the above requirement of the law is mandatory, and as I am not satisfied that the requirement of the law has been met here, I think that the case should in the circumstances be dismissed.’ (Page 42 lines 1- 9).

Particulars of error in law:

(a) the appellant pleaded in paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim the date and particulars of the newspapers containing the libel and tendered the same;