Paterson Zochonis & Co. Ltd Vs A. J. Ogedengbe (1972) LLJR-SC
Paterson Zochonis & Co. Ltd Vs A. J. Ogedengbe (1972)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MADARIKAN, J.S.C.
The respondent was the plaintiff in the Lagos High Court, (Suit No. LD/484/65), where she had claimed 1,000 pounds from the defendant as damages for wrongful dismissal. In the concluding paragraph of her Statement of Claim, she itemized the claim as follows:
“(1) One year’s salary at 280:0:0d per annum; being time within which plaintiff may likely get another employment.
(2) 720 pounds being general damages for wrongful termination of appointment.”
The plaintiff’s case was that she was employed by the defendant on the 12th of January, 1957, as a sales clerk and that subsequently she rose to the rank of shop keeper on a salary of 280 pounds per annum from 1st of June, 1965. On the 2nd of August, 1965, she received a query from the defendant asking her to explain why she had sold 5 yards of tetrex materials at the rate of 15/6d per yard instead of the selling price of 16/11d per yard. She sent a reply to the query the following day, but she maintained that, as a follow up of the query, her appointment was terminated by the defendant by letter dated the 4th of August, 1965, and marked as Exhibit 6 at the trial. Exhibit 6 reads as follows:
“4th August, 1965.
Mrs. A. J. Ogedengbe c.c. Wages Department
P.Z. & Co. Limited, c.c. The Retail Manager,
Department 2, Lagos
Broad Street,
Lagos. In reply please quote
“LSD/P.O43/70
Dear Madam,
T E R M I N A T I O N
We write to inform you that with effect from the date of this letter, your services are no longer required. Please call at the Wages Department for one month’s salary in lieu of Notice, and on reporting to the undersigned, you will be informed of other entitlements payable to you on leaving the Company’s service (if any)
Yours faithfully,
For PATTERSON, ZOCHONIS & CO. LTD.,
(Sgd.)
S. K. OGBOTOBO
LABOUR/STAFF MANAGER.”
The conditions of service which governed the employment of the plaintiff were also tendered in evidence as Exhibit 10. As it was common ground that Exhibit 10 is silent about termination of appointment, the learned trial Judge, rightly in our view, came to the conclusion that the defendant was not acting under Exhibit 10 when they terminated the appointment of the plaintiff by the letter Exhibit 6. After reviewing the evidence, the learned trial Judge observed as follows:
“I do not find it established by proof that the plaintiff is entitled to only one month’s notice. She held a position of trust, as admitted by 1st defendant’s witness, and she was at the time of the termination of her appointment on a salary of 280pounds per annum, to which she attained by dint of labour and perseverance. x x x x x On the facts and circumstances, I find that reasonable notice in this case should have been for three months and not for one month.”
The learned trial Judge then concluded that the defendant’s had wrongfully terminated the appointment of the plaintiff and awarded her damages as follows:-
“’70 pounds in lieu of three month’s notice
720 General damages
790 pounds
The defendant has now appealed against that decision. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant was two-pronged. Firstly, it was submitted that upon the facts of this case, one month’s notice of termination of appointment was reasonable.
As the plaintiff’s contract of employment does not prescribe the length of notice necessary to terminate it, we think the learned trial Judge was right in considering what length of notice was reasonable in the circumstances. Upon the uncontroverted facts of this case, especially having regard to the status of the plaintiff in the employment of the defendant and the length of service already put in by her, we fail to see how the decision of the learned trial Judge that three months’ notice was reasonable could be successfully challenged.
The second limb of counsel’s argument was directed against the award of 720 pounds as general damages. It was his contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to general damages.
In Swiss Nigerian Wood Industries Ltd. v. Danilo Bogo (S.C. 14/70) decided on 3/7/70, the plaintiff claimed 20,000 pounds for breach of contract occasioned by his wrongful dismissal from the employment of the defendants. The particulars of the claim were as follows:
“1. Salary due for the month of April,
1969 which is unpaid 300 0. 0.
- Salary due for the unexpired period
of contract of service in Nigeria 6,420 0. 0.
- Estimated costs of employment
benefits and entitlements including
free house, free medical treatment, free
car and chauffeur and steward and
other items for the unexpired period
of service 6,000 0. 0.
- Expenses incurred on behalf of the
defendants at Switzerland for trans-
portation, visa, medical treatment
and for the delay of the travelling
of plaintiff to Nigeria at the defen-
dants’ request. 95 0. 0.
- Unpaid retained salary for 1st
November, 1968 to 12th January,
1969 for the services rendered in
Europe to the defendants at their
request 300 0 0
13,115 0. 0.
6.General damages for wrongful
dismissal 6,885 0. 0.
Total amount claimed 20,000 pounds 0 . 0.
On item 6 of the claim, that is, the claim for 6,885 pounds as general damages, the learned trial Judge awarded 500 pounds. When that case before this Court, the award was attacked, and in upsetting it, we said:
“Learned counsel for the defendants also contended that the Judge’s award of 500 pounds under item No. 6 is in the circumstances of this case insupportable since the item was not attached to any particular head of claim and such award may in fact be tantamount to reparation being made twice over in respect of the same detriment or a mere bestowal by way of punitive damages.
The law with respect to the measure of damages had not changed ever since the famous dictum of Alderson, B., in Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341 where at p. 354 he observed as follows:-
Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: – Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. “In the preparation of the claim for, as well as in the consideration of an award in consequence of, a breach of contract, the measure of damages is the loss flowing naturally from the breach and is incurred in direct consequence of the violation. The damages recoverable are the losses reasonably foreseable by the parties and foreseen by them at the time of the contract as inevitably arising if one of them broke faith with the other. In the contemplation of such a loss there can be no room for claims which are merely speculative or sentimental unless these are specially provided for by the terms of the contract. It is only in this connection that damages can be properly described as “special” in the conception of contractual awards and it must be borne in mind that damages normally recoverable are based on the normal and presumed consequences of the breach complained of (See Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (1967) 3 WLR 1491). Thus the terms “general” and “special” damages are normally inapt in the categorisation of damages for the purposes of awards in cases of breach of contract. We have had occasion to point this out before (see Agbaje v. National Motors Ltd. (S.C. 20/68 dated 13th March, 1970) and we must make the point that apart from damages naturally resulting from the breach, no other form of general damages can be contemplated.
We think therefore that the argument of learned counsel for the defendants that the further award of 500pounds as general damages in this case could not be supported, as such is well founded and it must be set aside.”
For the same reason, we have come to the conclusion that the award of 720 pounds as general damages in the instant case cannot stand.
In the event, the appeal must succeed and it is hereby allowed. The award of damages totalling 790 pounds in the judgment of Caxton’ Martins, J., in the High Court Lagos in Suit No. LD/484/65 is hereby varied to 70 pounds and this shall be the judgment of the court. The plaintiff/respondent will pay the costs of this appeal fixed at 56 guineas. As the plaintiff has partially succeeded in her claim, we do not propose to disturb the award of costs in the High Court.
Other Citation: (1972) LCN/1516(SC)