Nze J.u. Nwanara & Ors V. Chief I.u. Okeahialam & Ors (1998)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

UWAIFO, J.C.A.

The plaintiffs (now appellants) commenced this action at the High Court. Owerri by writ of summons on 4 November, 1993. In it, as also contained in the statement of claim they subsequently filed on 30 November, 1993, they sought four reliefs against the defendants (now respondents). I shall henceforth refer to the parties as appellants and respondents as appropriate.

The first relief seeks a declaration that the recognition given to the 1st respondent (Chief I.U. Okeahialam) as the Traditional Ruler of Onicha Amairi Autonomous Community in Ezinihitte Local Government Area was obtained by fraud and therefore illegal and a nullity being contrary to the relevant provisions of the (Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities) Law. The second relief seeks an order of court nullifying that recognition. Third and fourth reliefs ask for injunctive orders restraining the respondents from holding out the 1st respondent as such Traditional Ruler and also restraining him from so parading himself.

The appellants pleaded in their statement of claim, among other facts, that the Traditional Ruler, by the constitution of the community, must be identified, selected. installed and presented by 10 persons from each village of the community and members of the Ndi Nze Council which procedure is to be supervised by any of the existing cultural organisations of the people, such as Onicha Si. But they averred that Onicha Si having been mutually dissolved the Onicha Town Union was formed to take its place.

The 1st and 2nd respondents were sued for themselves and on behalf of the Onicha Town Union the 2nd respondent being the Secretary General of The Union.

It is said that it is the function of the Onicha Town Union to organise the selection of a successor to a late Traditional Ruler (the late one being Eze J.H. Onyenebo).

A further averment is that by section 41 of the constitution of the community, it is the responsibility of the Ndi Eze Onicha (or Council) to organist the installation of a Traditional Ruler.

The appellants’ complaint is that they became aware that the 2nd respondent conspired with others to pervert the constitution, first, by illegally amending it to impose a condition of a non-refundable levy of N20.000.00 on any person wishing to aspire to the traditional rulership, and secondly, by contriving to return unopposed the 1st respondent who paid the N20.000.00 whilst there was still raging a stiff opposition to that levy, and real conflict and confusion. Then they alleged that they were surprised when the 1st respondent began to flaunt a letter signed by the Deputy Governor of Imo State dated 28 September, 1993, informing the 1st respondent that the Governor of the State had accorded him recognition as the Traditional Ruler of Onicha Amairi Autonomous Community. They avert the 1st respondent was never identified, selected, appointed and installed by the community according to the custom of the people and presented for recognition according to the Law.

The respondents in their statement of defence pleaded in a rather prolix form a number of facts and issues, some of which they raised as preliminary points and thereafter argued in a later motion they brought. The appellants filed a reply to the respondents’ said statement of defence. It was after this, if I may keep the record straight, that the respondents brought their said notice or motion on 25 May, 1994.

In the said motion, the respondents prayed that the trial court should dismiss or in the alternative strike out the appellants’ suit on the following grounds which I prefer to reproduce:

“1. The court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit, the suit having been instituted in gross violation and or contravention of section 25 of the Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law No. 11 of 1981.

2. The plaintiffs have no locus standi to institute this action.
3. The suit is tainted with a fundamental vice of improper joinder and misjoinder of parties.
4. The 1st and 2nd plaintiffs as expressed on the statement of claim represent the Council of Ndi Eze which is a non-juristic person that cannot sue nor be sued.
5. The plaintiffs as expressed on the statement of claim are also defendants in the suit by virtue of the fact that 1st and 2nd defendants are sued in a representative capacity on behalf of members of Onicha Town Union which Union expressly and impliedly include all the plaintiffs and ipso facto make them defendants in this suit.
6. Reliefs a and b of the plaintiff’s claim are a duplication and constitute legal misnormer (sic) and ipso facto outs (sic) the jurisdiction of the court to grant the said reliefs.”

The learned trial Judge (Maranzu, J.) on 28 July, 1994, on the strength of the said notice of motion argued before him, struck out the appellants’ suit on the basis that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. I shall refer in more detail later in this judgment to the reasons and circumstances he relied on for so holding. The appellants have complained against that decision and have requested this court to determine the appeal arising therefrom by resolving two issues. namely:”( I) Whether the provisions of section 25 of Law No. 11 of 1981 apply to the present suit since none of the reliefs is predicated on any claim of an infringement of the rules of natural justice. (2) Whether the alleged defect in the Statement of the panics in the suit, if it existed, was not amendable.”

I have looked at the first of the two grounds of appeal filed by the appellants along with the three issues framed therefrom by the 1st and 2nd respondents and the four issues by the 3rd and 4th respondents. I am of the view that issue I framed respectively (to the same effect) by the 1st and 2nd respondents and the 3rd and 4th respondents. issue 2 also framed respectively (to the same effect) by the 1st and 2nd respondents and the 3rd and 4th respondents, and issue 2 framed by the appellants (as may be slightly reframed) are appropriate for the purpose of this appeal. I shall now set the issues for determination out as just indicated above:

(a) Whether the appellants’ suit was statute-barred having been instituted outside the statutory period allowed by the provisions of section 25 of the Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law No. 11 of 1981.