Madam B. O. Shobogun V. Raimi Sanni & Ors. (1974)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

ELIAS, C.J.N.

In Suit No. LD/60A/71, the applicants made an application on November 28, 1968 to the Registrar of Titles to register themselves as the owners of the freehold property Plots 43 and 44, near Iwaya Road, Onike, Lagos. The application was duly advertised in accordance with section 8(2) of the Registration of Tiles Act; Cap 181, and two objections were lodged against the first registration The hearing of these objections was held and they were dismissed on May 1, 1971 by the then Acting Registrar of Titles, who there upon ordered that the applicants be registered.

The applicants, who were the administrators of the estate of one Aminu Adediran Aderibigbe empowered to administer the estate (see Ex. A), claimed to derive title from the Oloto Chieftaincy family by virtue of Ex. E which was, the conveyance of the plots from the Oloto to Mr. Da Costa who testified that he sold the same to the deceased intestate as per Ex. B. A surveyor also gave.. . evidence and the Acting Registrar said: “From the evidence of the. surveyor and, Exhibits B, C, D and E, I am satisfied that the applicants have fully established their legal title to the land and I do so hold.” Their first objector admitted that the land in dispute originally belonged to the Oloto Chieftaincy family but failed to link her title to this source. As the Acting Registrar put it:

“In an application for first registration once the applicant has established his title to the land, the onus is on the objector to prove that his own land falls on that of the applicant or part thereof.

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In this case, ‘besides failing to establish the identity of her land, the objector does not seem to know the land she is claiming. The only important witness for the 1st objector Femi Shobogun stated in evidence that the land covered by Exhibits F, L and K is quite different from the land in dispute.”

The Acting Registrar accordingly dismissed the objections, the second objector having dropped out of the case. From this decision the objector went on appeal to the High Court where Taylor, C.J., confirmed the Acting Registrar’s judgment on January 5, 1973. The present appeal has been brought against this decision.

Before us two grounds of appeal were argued in the alternative, the first being in two parts as follows:

“(a) That the whole proceedings were a nullity in so far as the Court of first instance was presided over by a Senior Magistrate who is not competent to exercise original jurisdiction in any cause or matter which raises any issue as to the title of land or to any interest therein.

(b) That the whole proceedings were a nullity as they were held before a person not authorised to investigate title with a view to first registration by section 4(3) of the provisions of the Registration of Titles Act as amended by Legal Notice No. 22 of 1964.”

In support of his contention that the whole proceedings in the Land Registry were a nullity, Dr. Yesufa, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted (a) that the serving officer at all material times was a magistrate, not a registrar, (b) that a magistrate of any grade has no jurisdiction to decide matters relating to land or any interest in land, (c) that, accordingly, a magistrate cannot also decide objections lodged against applications for a first registration because the issue involved really relates to title to land, (d) that mere administrative transfer of a magistrate either by the Chief Justice of Lagos State or by the Chief Registrar does not confer jurisdiction on that magistrate, and (e) that a formal appointment as registrar must therefore be made in accordance with section 4(2) of the Registration of Titles Act, Cap. 181 before any person can have power to hear and determine issues of title to land. He pointed out that, in the instant case, Mr.A.O. Agbebi signed his judgment and his court notes as “Acting Senior Magistrate” and not as “Acting Registrar”.

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The second ground of appeal argued by learned counsel in the alternative reads:

“(a) The trial court entered in law in ordering registration for first registration to proceed in favour of the applicants as owners of the property in dispute without being first satisfied of the competency of the applicants to be registered as such as provided for by section 9(2) of the Registration of Titles Act, Cap. 181 Laws of Nigeria.

(b) The trial court erred in law in failing to observe that the applicants are administrators in respect of personal estate and cannot deal with real estate except they produce evidence that administration had been completed or an order of court entitling them to deal with the real estate of the deceased.”

Learned counsel submitted that the applicants for registration had not established that they were competent to bring the application since, as administrators only, they could not ask to be registered as owners of a freehold estate, and that they could only deal with the personal estate of the deceased. Under section 9(2) of the Registration of Titles Act, the Registrar is required to satisfy himself that the applicant for registration has a right to be registered as owner of the land in question, or that he has obtained an order of court (if he is only an administrator of the estate). On the issue of competency, learned counsel reflected us to Alhaji Ajao v. Sonola (1973) S.C. 119, at p. 120, where the question of competency to sue was held capable of being raised for the first time on appeal. As regards the question of an administrator’s capacity to apply to be registered, he cited Prattv. Haffner (1959) 4 F.S.C. 82 in which the Federal Supreme Court held that, after completion of the administration of the estate, the Administration (Real Estate) Ordinance ceases to apply and that the administrator becomes a trustee of the realty by virtue of section 1 of the Land Transfer Act, 1897. It was counsel’s contention that the applicant had failed to show by evidence that he had completed administration of the estate in this case.


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