M. G. O. Iweka V. S.C.O.A. (Nigeria) Limited (2000)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

ONU, J.S.C.

This interlocutory appeal by the Plaintiff/ Appellant (hereinafter in this judgment referred to shortly as Appellant) is against the ruling of the Court of Appeal, Enugu given on 14th July, 1992 disallowing three motions filed by him on 30th August 1991, 7th February, 1992 and 3rd June, 1992 respectively, in which he sought to amend his appeal (still pending in the Lower Court) and to introduce further evidence therein, it is pertinent to point out in addition, that the action whose tortuous but humble origin commenced in the High Court of Anambra State before Iguh, J. (as he then was) sitting at Onitsha in Suit No.O/241/86, wherein the Appellant’s claim in paragraph 13 of the Amended Statement of Claim it is averred as follows:-

“(i) Specific performance by the Defendant of the contract between the parties for the delivery by the Defendant to the Plaintiff of a 504 G.R. air-conditioned Saloon Car.

OR

In the preferred alternative:-

An order for delivery of a comprehensively insured new Peugeot 504 GR. A.C. Car to the Plaintiff by the Defendant.

(ii) N750.000 (Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) damages being remedy for breach of contract and/or detention of the said car, till same is delivered to plaintiff.”

The learned trial Judge having heard the evidence proffered on both sides. on 4th July 1990 delivered his judgment in which he arrived at the conclusion that the Respondent did indeed fail to deliver the car as well as to insure it after the one month agreed by the parties. He therefore proceeded to find the Respondent liable in the sum of N16,766.00 being special and general damages for the breach of contract. Being aggrieved by the decision of the trial court the appellant appealed to the court below where in his desire to introduce the current or present cost of Peugeot G.R. A.C. Saloon Cars into his main appeal to enable the court below enhance his damages for breach of contract on which in his opinion, that Court’s judgment should be based as at the date of delivery, he brought the three motions herein-before referred to. In each of these, the Court below (Coram: Oguntade, JCA, Uwaifo, JCA, (as he then was)and Akintan. JCA, disallowed the application against the background or a Notice of Preliminary Objection filed and argued by the Respondent in opposition thereto.

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A brief comment, I think, is necessary to shed more light on the motions at this juncture.

In the motion of 30th August, 1991, the Appellant sought to “further amend the Writ and Prayers in Suit No.0/241/86” which was filed at the Onitsha High Court on 7th June, 1990 and struck out by that Court on 11th June. 1990. As against the striking out, he never filed a fresh motion, nor did he request the High Court to relist the same and neither did he appeal against this order to the Court of Appeal At the Court of Appeal. Enugu, he now prayed it to have the same relisted. Opposing it, the respondent filed the Notice of Preliminary Objection herein before mentioned.

In the second motion filed on 7th February, 1990, the Appellant inter alia prayed for an order to further. further amend the Writ and the prayer in suit No.O/241/86. In effect, the prayer sought was to allow the Appellant tender a document which listed the new price of Peugeot 504 as at 25th March. 1992, so as to affect the price or Peugeot cars for which judgment was given on 4th July, I990 notwithstanding the fact that the Court below held that the breach accurred on 25th July. 1986.

Being dissatisfied with the said Ruling dismissing all three motions, the Appellant who after obtaining leave for extension of time granted by this Court for the purpose in 1993, filed the interlocutory appeal herein premised on seven grounds. From these latter grounds twenty-three prolix and for the better part thereof, irrelevant issues were formulated from the Ruling given on 14th July. 1992. These issues in pith and substance constitute mere legal discussions which lack merit for any judicial consideration as the purpose is not to write discourses, embark as it were, on wild and futile academic exercises unrelated to the issues of the day. It is in that wise that I share the humble view preferred by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that issues 1(b) (e) (d), Issue Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 7(b), 8(a), 8(d), 9(a), (b), Issue Nos. 10, 10(b), 11, 12, 13, 13(b) 13(e), 13(d), 14, 15, 15(b),(e), 16, 17, 17(a) and (b), Nos.18, 19, 21, 22 and 23, have no relevance to the interlocutory appeal which is against the ruling on the Appellant’s three motions which were filed to enhance his chances of success at the substantive appeal.

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Furthermore, I am of the firm view that for the effectual disposition of the issues, it is only right to totally ignore what the Appellant has postulated as “the circumstantial and legal background” save where it is overridingly necessary to refer to any relevant point in the argument put forward. Likewise, I do not deem it worthy for consideration what the Appellant dubs as Summary vide pages 165-169 of the Record as deserving of any particular attention in so far as the issues discussed therein are essentially matters to be considered in the main appeal before the Court below and are not matters opportune to be given any treatment at this interlocutory appeal.

This is because this Court has advised in the case of Sylvanus Mortune v. Alhaji Mohammed Gambo (1983) 4 NCLR 237 at 242 “that care should be taken when a court is hearing an interlocutory application to avoid making any observation in its ruling on that application which might appear to prejudge the main issue in the proceedings relative to the interlocutory application.” This is as it should be for as Coker, J. (as he then was) stated in Kufeji v. Kogbe (1961) 1 ALL NLR (Part I) 113 at 114, the tendency is to avoid trying the main question twice and to grant injunctions only in clear cases: Article 951 Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 24. 4th Edition. As further pointed out in the latter case, it is not necessary for the Plaintiff or Applicant to make out a complete case as he would be required to do on the merits. That is why the House of Lords (England) in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) AC 396 at 407, per Lord Diplock said:,


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