John Eboigbe & Ors Vs Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (1994)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

ADIO, J.S.C. 

The appellant, in the High Court of the defunct Bendel State of Nigeria, Abudu Judicial Division, instituted legal proceedings against the respondent. The writ was filed on the 13th June, 1985, and the appellant’s claim was for N200,000 being special and general damages for the destruction, by the respondent, of the economic crops of the appellant at Uvbenise, Orhionmwon Local Government area of Bendel State. Pleadings were duly filed and exchanged by the parties. The respondent then filed an application for an order dismissing the appellant’s claim on the ground that the appellant’s action was statute-barred under the following Laws:-

(a)          section 11(1) and (2) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, No. 33 of 1977; and

(b)           Section 4 (1) (a) of the Limitation Law, Cap. 89 of the Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976.

The preliminary objection was set down for hearing. It was duly heard and, in his ruling, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application. He held that the appellant’s contention that the respondent was estopped from raising or relying on the aforesaid Laws was valid.

Dissatisfied with the ruling, the respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The court below held that the appellant’s action was incompetent and it dismissed it.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the court below, the appellant has appealed to this court. The parties, in accordance with the rules of this court, filed and exchanged briefs. Each party formulated, in his/its brief, one issue for determination. The main and only issue formulated in the appellant’s brief, which was based on the ground(s) of appeal, is sufficient for the determination of this appeal and it is as follows:-

“Whether considering the entire conduct and representations of the defendant, especially as highlighted by the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, the defendant is not estopped from taking the benefit and/ or advantage of any statute of limitation.”

The court below gave consideration to the aforesaid issue and came to the conclusion that, on the state of the pleadings, the respondent could, in the circumstances of this case, take advantage of and rely on the provisions of sections 11(1) and (2) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act and section 4(1) (a) of the Limitation Law, Cap. 89 of the Laws of Bendel State. The view of the court below, on the point, as stated in its judgment, was inter alia, as follows:-

“The cause of action in this suit, therefore, accrued and actionable a day after the respondent’s crops were damaged in February, 1979 while the action was brought on 13th June, 1985. This was clearly in excess of twelve months permitted by section 11(1) of Act 33 of 1977; whether the time commenced running from accrual of cause of action in 1979 or from the brake down of negotiations between the parties. On either interpretation the suit was time barred.

The case of Iga & Ors. v. Chief Amakiri & Ors (1976) 11 S.C. 1. (supra) and section 150 of the Evidence Act do not, in the circumstance of this case call for consideration. The reason why they are not to be considered being that by any interpretation placed on the date of accrual of the cause of action the respondent’s delay was more than twelve months allowed by the statute; it necessarily follows that their cause of action was statute-barred. ………………………………….. The appellant’s letter of 16/4/84 is of no consequence. This letter was a reaction to the letter caused to be written by a solicitor to protest against the appellant’s disclaim of liability …………………………………….. This cannot be construed as re-opening of negotiation which had been effectively terminated…………………… It is neither an excuse under the relevant enactment that the respondent was an illiterate or the literates amongst his family were not immediately available. ………………………….. The statute of limitation does not cease to run from the date of accrual of the cause of action irrespective of the status of the parties.”

The foregoing statement by the court below covered related matters such as the effect, if any, which the alleged conduct of the respondent warranting its being estopped from relying on the relevant statutes of limitation herein before mentioned: illiteracy of some members of the appellant’s family; travelling by some members of the appellant’s family for a certain period from the place where the alleged destruction of the crops occurred to somewhere within Nigeria; and negotiation which involved exchange of correspondence between the parties for a certain period before it broke down. should have in the determination of the merit or otherwise of the appellant’s claim. The contention for the appellant was that in view of the contents of the letters addressed to him by the respondent and taking into consideration certain things allegedly done by the respondent or its agents pursuant to the claim of the appellant, the respondent of should not be allowed to reply on or take advantage of the statutes limitation. Some members of the appellant’s family were illiterates and others travelled out of the place where the destruction of the crops occurred to a place within Nigeria during the relevant period and those aspects of the matter ought to be taken into consideration for the determination of the question whether the action of the appellant was statute-barred. In particular, it was also contended for the appellant, that the period during which the parties engaged in negotiation ought to be excluded. The respondent’s contention was that illiteracy of some members of the appellant’s family and the fact that some of them traveled out of the local government area to a place within Nigeria for a certain period were completely irrelevant to the question whether the appellant’s claim was statute-barred. It was further contended that the exchange of correspondence between the parties and anything done, by the respondent, as a result of the negotiation were all part of the negotiation and that, in any case, negotiation by the parties could not, in law, stop the time from running once it had started running from the time that the cause of action had accrued. It was the respondent’s case that the cause of action accrued in February, 1979 when the crops were allegedly destroyed and since the appellant instituted his action in June, 1985, the action was statute – barred by section 11(1) and (2) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1977, and section 4(1) (a) of the Limitation Law.

The first question which comes to mind is the nature of section 11 (1) and (2) of the legislation known as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1977. As the provisions impose a limitation of time upon existing right of action, they are statutory provisions having the same effect as a statute of limitation. See Egbe v. Yusuf (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.245) 1 . Section 11(1) and (2) of the Act provide as follows:-