Force, Fault, And Self-defense: Rethinking Proportionality In Nigerian Criminal Jurisprudence

ABSTRACT

Self-defense, an inherent and constitutionally guaranteed right in Nigeria, serves as a legal safeguard, allowing individuals to protect their lives, dignity and property from immediate or threatened harm. However, this right is not without limitations, as it is subject to the principles of proportionality, necessity, and culpability of the aggressor.

This paper dissects the interplay between these concepts under Nigerian law, analyzing issues around the limitations of self-defense and its implications on criminal liability. With the aid of statutes, case-laws and George Fletcher’s theories of self-defense, this paper examines the balance between legitimate self-

defense and excessive use of force. It also 

examines the role of aggressor’s culpability in shaping the confines of self-defense. Through the instrumentality of robust legal reasoning and compelling examples, this paper unearths the complex dynamics of self-defense, presenting a meticulous dimension that aims to usefully contribute to discourse on the subject in the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence.

Keywords: Self-defense, Proportionality, Culpability, 

Criminal Law, Aggression, Nigeria.

Introduction

Self-defense is a natural instinct inherent in every human, which underscores why even a newborn baby is by nature, triggered to resist any object that it perceives to have the potential to harm it. This also justifies the recognition of self-defense as a defense to murder in our criminal statutes. The right to self-defense serves as the foundational basis for the exercise of power to lawfully protect oneself from threat of imminent harm to life, property and personal dignity.

According to Russell:

“a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who manifestly intends and endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a known felony against either his person, habitation or property. In these cases, he is not obliged to retreat, and may not merely resist the attack

where he stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the danger is ended and if in a conflict between them, he happens to kill his attacker such killing is justifiable.”¹

However, the exercise of self-defense is not a beanstalk planted by Jack, as it is subject to certain limitations stipulated in our laws. This then raises certain legal questions, particularly, with regards issues around proportionality of the measures adopted in self-defense and the legal implications of an aggressor’s culpability in mitigating the effect of disproportionality in the force used in defense of self.

Thus, questions around where to draw the line between lawful, bonafide self-defense and excessive use of force by a defender, remains subject of unending debates. This paper dissects these questions, and with the aid of the relevant statutes, case-laws and analogies, it seeks to explore the dynamics of proportionality in self-defense, under the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence.

Self-defense: Conceptual Clarifications

Self-defense is an inherent right of every human being, to use such force as is reasonably necessary to defend his person and property from unlawful aggression.² Self-defense originated from the latin phrase “se-defendendo” which means to defend oneself; it is the use of reasonable force to protect oneself, family or property from actual or imminent harm.³

In the case of Ekpoudo v. State,⁴  the Court of Appeal defined self-defense as “the use of force to protect oneself, one’s family or one’s property from a real or threatened attack. Generally, a person is justified in using a reasonable amount of force in self-defense if he or she reasonably believes that danger of bodily harm is imminent and that force is necessary to avoid the danger.”

The effect of a successful plea of self-defense is to negate the commission of an offense; hence, where a person in defense of self, kills another, the law will excuse such killing and it will not even amount to manslaughter under the Criminal Code,⁵ or Culpable Homicide not punishable with death under the Penal Code.⁶

The Right To Self-defense Under Nigerian Laws

Whilst section 33 of the 1999 Constitution codifies the fundamental right to life guaranteed to every Nigerian,⁷) this right is however, subject to certain limitations placed on it by the same constitution. ((Palmer v. R. (1971) 55 Cr. App. C. 223.; 

Sunday Udofia v. The State (1984) 12 S.C. 139, at 148.))

One of such derogations is death resulting from an act of self-defense. It provides: “A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this section, if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by the law, of such force as is reasonably necessary – (a) for the defense of any person from unlawful violence or for the defense of property.”⁸)

The CC contains elaborate provisions on self 

defense,⁹ 

the PC also similarly makes elaborate provisions on “private defense” rather than using the term “self defense” as used in the C.C.¹⁰

Key Ingredients For Establishing Self-defense

For a plea of self-defense to succeed, certain vital elements must be present. 

These can be deduced from statutory provisions, and several decisions of the courts.

In the case of Mohammed v. State,¹¹) the Court of 

Appeal held that:

“The defence of self-defense is clearly a child of necessity. It is a defense that is not pleaded as a matter of course, but one in 

which the defendant is expected to establish that he was at the time of the killing in reasonable apprehension of death to himself or grievous harm and that it was necessary at the time to use the force which resulted in the death of the deceased in order to preserve his life. As an important aspect of the force used by the defendant must be shown to be proportionate to the force used or imminently threatened against him and reasonable in the circumstances in which it was used. The defense of self defense, is of course not available where the person attacked used a greater degree of force than was necessary in repelling the attack.”

Also, in Ita & Anor. V. State,¹² 

the penultimate court also gave a similar ruling.¹³

From the above authorities, the following elements must co-exist for a plea of self-defense to succeed:¹⁴

1. There must be a reasonable apprehension of an imminent threat of death or grievous harm, leaving no reasonable opportunity for the defendant to seek protection 
   from law enforcement agents;¹⁵
2. Such force must have been reasonably necessary in that circumstance, to avert imminent danger;
3. The force used must be proportionate to that 
   used or threatened by the aggressor.¹⁶

The third element has raised questions as to what criteria should be used in measuring the retaliatory actions of the defendant, to determine whether 

it was commensurate to the danger being averted. Thankfully, the Apex court has answered this question in George v. State,¹⁷)  wherein it held that: “Proportionality can be determined by the nature of the weapon used in retaliation, and the obvious disparity in the relative physical strength of the parties.”

Thus, where for instance, the defender pulls out a riffle and shoots an aggressor who had merely attacked or threatened to attack him with a stick, there is clearly a disparity in the force or weapon used, hence, the plea of self-defense may not succeed.¹⁸

In Obaji v. The State, ¹⁹   the court convicted the defendant for manslaughter, for killing a Man who merely attacked him with a stick, because the force used by the defendant was excessive.²⁰

However, as also held in the preceding case,²¹) the disparity in the parties’ relative physical strength and bodily structure may be a factor, which courts will take into cognizance in determining whether the force used was proportionate.

The defendant also has a duty to retreat, as the law expects him to disengage or flee from the scene of the danger, rather than applying deadly force.²² This however, may aggravate the risk of likelihood of death or grievous bodily harm for the person retreating, especially where the aggressor is armed with a gun or other deadly weapons and the defendant fears that retreating might aggravate the danger.²³ It is humbly submitted that in such case, the defendant should be excused if he fires the first shot in self-defense. In the recent case of Sunday Jackson v The state,²⁴) the appellant was while working on his farm, attacked by a herdsman who tried to stab him with a dagger, and after some scuffle, he managed to disarm his assailant and subsequently, used his assailant’s weapon to stab the assailant thrice on the neck, resulting in his death.

Both the high court and court of appeal found him 

guilty for culpable homicide punishable with death, and on further appeal to the supreme court, the concurrent findings of the two lower courts was upheld by the supreme court on a ratio of 4:1 (Justice Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JSC dissenting). The majority judgement of the apex court held  that 

having successfully disarmed his assailant, the appellant was wrong to have gone ahead to stab the assailant multiple times, resulting in his death – according to the court, the defense of self-defense no longer avails the appellant, as the appellant’s life ceased to be in danger of imminent harm the moment he snatched the dagger from his assailant, 

and he was therefore not entitled to kill the aggressor who no longer had the means to harm him. This decision has been criticized by many as superfluous, fanciful, and as placing unrealistic expectation on a victim of potential harm or attack by an unprovoked aggressor as in the instant case. It is submitted that had the majority of the supreme court addressed their minds to the possibility of the assailant resuming back hostility and probably overpowering the victim afterwards if the victim had not killed him first, or even the possibility of the aggressor re-strategizing and possibly launching a more deadly attack on his victim or even the whole community in future, the decision ought to have been different. This is more so, if we put into consideration the modus operandi of these killer herdsmen, who have been notorious in recent years for perpetrating several unjustifiable attacks on farming communities and leaving uncountable number of people dead. This decision is a huge setback to the development of self defense jurisprudence under Nigerian law and seems to criminalize bonafide and well founded defense of life and property.

Aggressor’s Culpability As A Relevant Consideration

Albeit, the requirement of proportionality relates to the conduct of the defender, the aggressor’s culpability however, also plays a significant role in determining whether self-defense was legitimate.²⁵ Where it is found that the aggressor first initiated an unwarranted assault against the defender, which triggered him to act, in a bid to defend himself against the aggressor’s hostility, such unlawful hostility will incur certain legal implications for the aggressor. One of the consequences is that the aggressor will forfeit his protection under the law, as one can not fetch an ants infested firewood and expect not to host the lizard to a sumptuous feast.²³

This does not however, grant the defender unbridled rights to use unrestricted force in retaliating. In Akpan v. The State,²⁶ the defendant used a machete to kill a man who had threatened him with a bottle. The court held that although, the victim started the aggression, the use of deadly weapon in response was disproportionate to 

the harm threatened, hence, the defendant was convicted of murder.²³

The second legal implication is contributory or 
shared culpability. Here, the extent of the

defender’s contribution will be considered, vis-à-vis the aggressor’s culpability. In the case of

Akinrinsola v. State,²⁷ the court had to 
consider the extent of the defender’s contribution in

provoking the aggressor’s hostility. It is submitted that the supreme court ought to have put this into consideration in deciding whether the plea of self defense in the Jackson’s case above, should or should not succeed, and the extent to which the aggressor’s 
hostility contributed to his woes. But sadly, the supreme court failed to properly utilize that opportunity.

Fletcher’s Theories of Self Defense

In his article,²⁸ Gorge Fletcher discussed in detail three models of self-defense.²⁹ One of them is Self-defense based on the protection of defender’s autonomy, under which self-defense does not consider aggressor’s culpability, but merely requires proportionality. He gave an analogy of a man riding in an elevator alongside a psychotic person, who suddenly goes haywire and attacks the Man using a knife, and the only way the Man could avoid serious harm to himself was by killing the psychotic aggressor.³⁰ Fletcher also classified this as self-defense by the process of elimination. Under this model, the force must be proportionate and the harm inflicted must not be significantly worse than the harm sought to be avoided, since the life of the psychotic aggressor is equal to that of the defender.³¹ The criticism against this model, is that it does not permit an unrelated party to assist a victim of an unprovoked aggression, but allows the psychotic aggressor to defend himself against 
any attempt by his victim to resist his unprovoked hostility. Secondly, it is inconsistent with sections 33(2) CFRN and 296 of the CC, which gives even a third-party the right to use reasonable force as is necessary to defend another against an unprovoked hostility. It is predicated on the above that several persons have submitted that this theory cannot apply in Nigeria, because of 
its inconsistency with our socio-cultural, constitutional and jurisprudential reality.

The second model proposed by Fletcher, is self-defense based on justificatory necessity.³² This model is founded on the principle that it is justifiable to use force, even extreme force in certain circumstances to defend oneself against an aggressor’s hostility.²³ This right flows from a comparison of the competing interests of the aggressor as well as the defender, and taking into cognizance the fact that the aggressor first started the fight, while the defender merely responded so as to defend himself.³³ It simply applies the principle of lesser evils, in-which culpability of the aggressor is taken into account and his interest is granted a lesser protection.³⁴

The third model under Fletcher’s theory of self-defense, is that of protecting autonomy and is not subject to the proportionality requirement. This model holds that a defender has the right to defend his domain against any unwanted and unwarranted intrusion, so as to safeguard his space.³⁵ Therefore, a person whose vital interest is being attacked by an aggressor, has unlimited right to resist such aggression, and this self-defense model does not consider the aggressor’s culpability as relevant.³⁶ The aim is simply to counteract the enemy’s aggressive intrusion and preserve the inviolability of the defender’s domain.³⁷

Conclusion

The concept of self-defense under Nigerian law presents a delicate balance between the right to protect oneself and the corresponding obligation to exercise such rights within the limits of proportionality and necessity. This essay has dissected the intersection of these principles, using judicial, statutory and theoretical analogies. 

Drawing from decided cases and Fletcher’s theories, it is obvious that while self-defense is constitutionally guaranteed, it must however, be exercised within legal confines, devoid of abuse.
 

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About Author

1. Russell, W.O., “Russell on Crime” (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 11^th Edn. Vol.1, 1958) at p 491. [↩]
2.  Famsville, “Self-Defense Under Nigerian Law” (Aug. 2022) https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/crime/1220858/self- defence-under-nigerian-law 
   accessed January 27 2025. [↩]
3.  LSD Law, “Se Defendendo” https://www.lsd.law/define/se-defendendo accessed January 27th 2025. [↩]
4. (2021)LPELR-52826(CA).
   [↩]
5. Criminal Code Act, Cap C38, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010 (C.C. applicable in the southern part of Nigeria). [↩]
6. Penal Code Act, CAP.53, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (P.C. which is applicable to the Northern part of Nigeria). [↩]
7. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (CFRN, as altered in 2023) s 33(1 [↩]
8.  Ibid, s 33(2)(a [↩]
9. Criminal Code Supra (n 4), ss 286-293. [↩]
10. Penal Code Supra (n 5). [↩]
11. (2020) LPELR-50919(CA [↩]
12. (2013) LPELR-21392 (CA). [↩]
13. In this case, the court held that: “A Man is justified in 
    using against an assailant a proportionate amount of force in defence of himself or other persons who he is under a duty to defend, where he considers his life or such persons lives to be in danger.” [↩]
14. Criminal Code (n 4), s 286 [↩]
15. Yahaya v. The State (1984) 2 N.C.R. 117, the defendant’s plea of self-defense was rejected by the court, because the alleged threat which the defendant claimed to be defending himself against was no longer immediate when the defendant acted. [↩]
16. Nwede v. The State (2017) LPELR-41972 (SC), the appellant fatally stabbed a Man during 
    altercation, and the court held that the use of a knife by the appellant during the altercation was excessive. [↩]
17. (1993) LPELR-1320(SC [↩]
18. Desmond C. Otikpa, Esq., “Debunking the Legal Myth: Does Self Defense Always Justify Violence?” (Legal Mythbusters, 28 Oct. 2024)<https://streetlawyernaija.com/does-self-defense-always-justify-violence/> accessed Jan. 28 2025. [↩]
19. (1965) 1 All N.L.R. 269. [↩]
20. In Adekunle v. The State (2006) LPELR-61 (SC), the appellant responded to a slap by stabbing the aggressor to death, hence, his claim of self defense was rejected as the assault did not justify the use of lethal weapon. [↩]
21. George v. State (n 18 [↩]
22. Chidiebere Obi & Ogochukwu A. Okpokwasili, 
    “Ethical Foundation of Legal Provisions of Self-defense in Nigeria” https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ujah.v24i1.4 accessed January 28 2025. [↩]
23. Ibid. [↩] [↩] [↩] [↩]
24. (2025-03) Legalpedia 85898 (SC [↩]
25. Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler, “Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing”(Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 2012) https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2613 accessed January 31 2025. [↩]
26. (1994) 9 N.W.L.R. 617. [↩]
27.  (2016) LPELR-40192(SC). [↩]
28. George P. Fletcher, “Proportionality and Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory” (Israel Law Review, Vol.8. 1973) 367-390. [↩]
29.  Ibid, p 371. [↩]
30.  Ibid. [↩]
31. Ibid, p 375. [↩]
32. George P. Fletcher, “Rethinking Criminal Law” (Little, Brown & Co. 1978) 855-864.. [↩]
33. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, “Proportionality and the Aggressor’s Culpability In Self Defense” (Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39. 2004) 875, p 882. [↩]
34. Ibid, pp 857-858. [↩]
35. Ibid, p 860 [↩]
36. Ibid, 862. [↩]
37. Fletcher (n 7) p 381. [↩]