F.C. Udoh & Ors Vs Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board & Anor (1993)

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KARIBI- WHYTE, J.S.C.

I summarily dismissed this motion on the 24th May, 1993 and indicated that I will give my reasons today. This I now proceed to do.

The only issue in this ruling is whether the appeal before this court has abated by virtue of section 2 of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Decree No.47 of 1992.

The facts of this case are straightforward and undisputed. On the 11th August, 1986, Hon. Justice A. Iguh (as he then was) of the High Court of Anambra State, sitting at Enugu gave judgment dismissing in its entirety the action brought by the applicants as plaintiffs seeking various declarations and injunction restraining the defendant its agents and servants from unlawfully interfering with the exercise of the rights and powers and/or enjoyment of privileges and fruits of membership mutually subsisting between the Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions on the one hand, and the members of the said Union in the employment of the defendant at the Orthopaedic Hospital Enugu on the other hand.

The co-defendant’s counter-claim was granted in its entirety. The counter claim was for a declaration that the registration and recognition as the Trade Union representing the interests of all categories of employees in the Hospitals operated by the defendant, excluding medical doctors, pharmacists, radiographers, medical laboratory technologists, denial technologists. nurses and midwives is valid, continuous and has not been withdrawn, having regard to the provisions of the Trade Unions Acts 1973-79.

There was a claim for a declaration that there was no valid withdrawal by any of the employees of the defendant from the membership of the co-defendant Union having regard to the provision of section 5(3) of the Labour Acts 1974-78. An immediate refund by the plaintiff Union to the co-defendant Union of the sum of N9,908.02 or the total sum unlawfully collected as check-off dues as from 1/12/82 to 31/12/83. An injunction was sought restraining the plaintiff Union from further interfering in the organization of all categories of employees already represented by the co-defendant Union in the Orthopaedic Hospital. Enugu or of any other hospital in the control and management of the plaintiff.

Plaintiffs appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. The Court of Appeal on 24/5/90 affirmed the judgment of the High Court with N150 costs against the plaintiffs.

The two defendants being dissatisfied with part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, appealed to this Court on a notice of appeal dated 8th August. 1990. Appellants have satisfied the conditions of the appeal. Parties have also filed their briefs of argument. The appeal was fixed for hearing when respondents filed this motion on notice to the appellants on the 12th May, 1993 praying the Court to strike out the appeal on the ground that since Decree No.47 of 1992 the judgment of the High Court of Enugu State is deemed to have abated and have ceased to have effect since State High Courts no more had jurisdiction over inter and intra union disputes.

In the affidavit in support of the motion it was averred in paragraph 3, that the Federal Government promulgated the Decree No.47 of 1992 after appellants lodged the appeal. That the issue before the Enugu High Court was a dispute which arose from the restructuring of Trade Unions establised under the Trade Unions Act.

The motion was argued on the 24th May, 1993. G. Adetola-Kazeem for the respondents, who is also learned Counsel to the appellants in the substantive appeal opposed the motion.

The gravamen of the motion is on the correct interpretation of section 2 of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Decree 1992 Mr. Adeniran, learned Counsel to the applicants put the case simply as a case of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts in respect of inter and intra Union disputes. He submitted that the subject matter of the appeal is an inter union dispute, and the effective date is 1st January, 1992. Learned Counsel submitted that in view of the provisions of the Decree, the appeal must be struck out, the matter having abated, the court had no jurisdiction. Mr. Adetola-Kazeem, did not agree with this submission. He submitted that a careful interpretation of the provisions of section 1(2) of section 1A of the Trade Disputes Act as amended, suggests that the section did not apply to final judgments. He argued that the Decree No.47 of 1992 did not cover appeals pending before the court or previous decisions.

Learned Counsel approached the interpretation of the provision by construing the meaning of the words “action,” “other judgment or decision,” “interim or interlocutory” as used in the section. Counsel pointed out that the word “action” was not defined in the Decree. Section 2 of the High Court Law which has defined it did not include an appeal. It was submitted that any other interpretation will have the effect of abrogating vested rights by a retrospective nullification of both previous and subsisting decisions of the courts. This it is submitted will be against established principles of interpretation. Learned Counsel referred to Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) 377; (1987) SCNJ 98. A decree which tends to deprive the courts of its jurisdiction must be strictly construed ’97 Salami v. Chairman L.E.D.B. (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.123) 539; (1989) 12 SCNJ 113.

Mr. Adetola-Kazeem, relying on Savannah Bank Ltd v. Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.97) 305: (1989) 1 SCNJ 169, submitted that the law should be so construed as to avoid confusion, uncertainty and friction. It was submitted that the consequence attributed to the law could not have been contemplated. It was finally submitted that the Decree did not contemplate appeals pending before the courts or matters already cuncluded.

The only issue before us is whether by virtue of section 1A of the Trade Disputes Act Cap. 432 as amended by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Decree No.47 of 1992, the appeal before us has abated. Learned Counsel to the applicant has urged us to hold that the jurisdiction of this Court has been ousted by Decree No. 47 of 1992 and that the action before the Court had abated. Learned Counsel to the respondents submitted to the contrary.