Delu Liman V. The State (1976)

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BELLO, JSC

The appellant was convicted by Adewuyi, J., in the High Court, Makurdi, of culpable homicide not punishable with death under Section 224 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment.    

The charge stated that on or about the 11th April 1974, at Panda village the appellant caused the death of Chippi Liman by causing her such bodily injuries as was likely to cause her death. There was no eye-witness to the commission of the offence. The husband of the appellant and of the deceased (P.W.1) testified at the trial that on 11th April, 1974, the two wives had gone to the market together and the appellant later returned home without her mate; that when he asked the appellant of the whereabouts of the mate, the appellant   PAGE| 2   replied after some silence that he should go and look for her.

He stated that as he went to do so he found her dead on the road and he did not see anything around her. He made a report to the police. P.C. Idi Magaji (P.W.2), who saw the corpse at the scene on the same day stated that he saw sign of struggling at the scene. The corpse was not removed from the scene until the following day. The police officer (P.W.2) who conveyed it to Keffi General Hospital testified as follows:   “On receiving the information I left for the place the following morning.

I saw the deceased lying down on the ground. I found the accused and the husband at the scene, (P.W.1) is the husband. I asked what happened. The accused told me that she greeted the deceased but did not answer. Instead the deceased abused her and they started to fight. She rushed the deceased down and she died. At the scene I saw the struggle within the area.” (Underlining is ours)    Upon her arrest the appellant made a voluntary statement in Hausa, which was admitted at the trial. Its translation in English is Exhibit 2B, which reads:   “I can remember some time in the past. We started from our house for the market. I saw one woman my matrimonial mate by name Kibi standing on the road.

I asked if she was waiting for me? She did not reply me, but she abused me that she will have sexual intercourse with my mother and father, but I did not revenge, and she did not stop abusing me, at long last I felt it and revenged. She came and pushed me. I also pushed her, then we started fighting I pushed her to the ground and climbed on her. She stood up and pushed me, I also revenged that one, she felt down and she was unable to stand up again.

I went home and left her lying on the ground. I told my husband that I fought with my mate on the road, I pushed her down and she was unable to stand up again. After I have finished telling about the fight with my mate, I asked him to go and see whether she woke up, when he went to the place he met her lying dead, then he went and reported the matter to the chief at Panda and the police were informed.”    The prosecution also put in evidence under Section 249 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code a report of the doctor who had examined the corpse and part of the report stated: “The neck showed signs of bruised subcutaneous tissues and the arch of the cricoid cartilage was broken from the front concominent of manual strangulation.

The lungs showed congestion and Haemorrhage concinent with asphyxia otherwise the tissues showed no pathological changes.    I certify the cause of death in my opinion to be: asphyxia of manual strangulation.” The doctor was not called as a witness at the trial. The evidence of the appellant may be a record in brevity in the history of trials for homicide.

It is simply:   PAGE| 3    “I live around Panda. I did not strangle my mate.”  Its glaring aspect is that the State Counsel who represented the prosecution at the trial did not cross-examine the appellant as a witness.    After having reviewed the evidence in the case and found cause of death as being due to asphyxia of manual strangulation, the learned trial Judge concluded thus:   “It is evident that the accused was stronger and over-powered the deceased: she held the deceased by the neck until she was completely suffocated. I do not believe the accused that it was mere pushing and fall that caused the death of Chippi Liman.

I believe the report of the doctor that Chippi Liman was strangled to death. Accused was very callous to treat her mate that way whatever might have transpired between them.” and he convicted her of the offence charged.    The only ground of any substance argued before us on appeal was that upon the admission in evidence of the medical report, the learned trial Judge failed to comply with the provisions of Section 249(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereby occasioned actual miscarriage of justice.

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was not asked by the trial Judge whether she disagreed with anything in the report as required by the said paragraph of the sub-section, and therefore the necessary conditions for the admission of the report in evidence were not satisfied. He relied on Ganganma Bukar Tarade v. Bornu Native Authority (1967) NNLR 15.

He further contended that if the report had been excluded as being inadmissible, there would have been no evidence of cause of death and for this reason the conviction of the appellant is unsupportable.    Now Section 249(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides as follows: “(3) (a) A written report by any medical officer or registered medical practitioner after he has examined any person or the body of any person may at the discretion of the court be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving the nature of any injuries received by such person or, where such person had died, the nature of the injuries received by such person and, where possible, the physical cause of his death.    (b) On the admission of such report the same shall be read over to the accused and he shall be asked whether he disagrees with any statement therein and any such disagreement shall be recorded by the court.  

PAGE| 4    (c) If by reason of any such disagreement or otherwise it appears desirable for the ends of justice that such medical officer or registered medical practitioner shall attend and give evidence in person the court shall summon such medical officer or registered practitioner to appear as a witness.”    This court had the opportunity to interpret the provisions of Section 249(3)(c) in Yahaya Idirisu v. The State (1967)1 All NLR where upon the admission in evidence of a medical report at the trial, the accused when the report was read to him expressed disagreement with it and applied to the Judge that the maker of the report be called as a witness and the Judge refused the application, Coker, JSC., delivering the judgment of the court stated at p.16:   “A person standing trial is entitled to defend himself and to avail himself of all facilities provided by the law.

Section 249(3)(c) gives to such a person the right to have the maker or a report received in evidence by virtue of this section attend and give evidence in person in the court where the accused person will at least have the opportunity of cross – examining him and where it is manifest from the disagreement over the written report that a chance of defending himself had been denied to the accused it would be difficult to resist the conclusion that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.