Christian Emeryi v. The State (1973)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

S. SOWEMIMO, J.S.C.

The appellant, who was the accused in charge No. LA/36/72, was tried at the Lagos Assizes for the murder of one Funmilayo George, hereinafter referred to as “deceased”, on or about the 6th day of September, 1969. The trial was by jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the appellant was sentenced to death by Kassim, J. He has now appealed to this Court against the conviction.

The fact of the killing is not in dispute. On the morning of the 6th of September, 1969 for no apparent reason whatsoever, the appellant suddenly attacked one Abimbola George (the 4th prosecution witness) in the compound of a house in which both she and the appellant were resident. Abimbola George ran into a room in the compound and the appellant chased her and inflicted several matchet cuts on her. She raised an alarm, as a result of which the deceased Funmilayo George, who was then in a kitchen cooking, came out and ran towards the room. There was a child lying on a bed in the room in which the appellant had pursued Abimbola George. The appellant attacked the baby and cut off two of his fingers. When the appellant saw Funmilayo George approaching, he switched his attack on to her. On seeing this development, the deceased took to her heels pursued by the appellant who inflicted matchet cuts on her until she fell down.

The mother of the deceased, one Enitan George (the 3rd prosecution witness), was at the material time in her room when she heard the cries of her daughter Abimbola George (4th P. W.) and on coming out saw the appellant chasing her other daughter, Funmilayo George. She ran after the appellant. When she eventually got to the scene she saw the appellant inflicting matchet cuts on the deceased who was lying on the ground. Enitan George got hold of the appellant and asked him why he was matcheting her two daughters. The appellant there and then attacked and inflicted several matchet cuts on her as well. She fell down unconscious. Later on, the deceased, Funmilayo George, Enitan George and Abimbola George were taken to the hospital (LUTH). The appellant was eventually apprehended by an officer in the Nigerian Army and later handed over to the police.

This incident took place in the compound of a house known as No. 1 Owodele Street, Ishaga, Surulere. The appellant was sharing a room in the house with another townsman of his, one Okon Ekpo, the 2nd defence witness. The deceased was at the material time living in a room in the same compound with her mother, Enitan George (3rd P.W.). The appellant moved into that house about three months before the day of this incident. According to the 3rd P. W., the appellant was on good terms with her and her two daughters and there had been no previous quarrel whatsoever between them.

At the trial evidence was led by both the prosecution and the defence on the mental state of the appellant. The learned trial judge, in his summing-up described the totality of such evidence as positively “indicative” of insanity. The defence witnesses gave evidence of some abnormal behaviour of the appellant before the 6th of September, 1969. The deposition of one Dr O.O. Bassey was tendered as exhibit G., and he described how the appellant was brought to him on a complaint of heat in the head. He referred the appellant to one Dr Adeyemi. This was in August 1969. The prosecution also tendered exhibits N and N1 as the entries made by Dr Adeyemi on the appellant on 18th August, 1969.

The learned trial judge summed up the case for the jury, who later returned a verdict of guilty against the appellant. It is against this verdict that the appellant has appealed to this Court.

Mr F.O. Akinrele, learned counsel for the appellant, was granted leave to argue the following grounds of appeal in substitution for those originally filed by the appellant.

The grounds are-

(1) That the judgment is unreasonably, unwarranted and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

(2) That the verdict is wrong in law in that the standard of proof required from the accused on the issue of insanity has been established.

(3) That the learned trial judge in the circumstances of the case misdirected the jury on their functions as to the issue of facts in this case in saying that “In the course of this summing-up I may have occasion to refer to witnesses who have testified and say what I think of them or what I think of the facts of this case, but you and you alone will ultimately decide who to believe and what facts you find to be established” when in law their functions is to decide not necessarily “ultimately”.The sum total of the argument of learned counsel was that since all the evidence as to the mental state of the appellant, before and after the date of the incident was, as described by the learned trial judge in his summing-up, indicative of insanity, it was wrong to have left the issue of insanity as open to the jury to determine. The contention was that there was no other evidence besides that referred to by the learned trial judge as indicative of any contrary view to that expressed by the learned trial judge himself. Learned counsel contended that the proper direction would have been that on the evidence before them, the jury could only return a special verdict, based, either on an acceptance by them that the defence of insanity has been established or that there was some doubt as to what the mental state of the appellant was at the material time and so give the benefit of that doubt to the appellant.

The learned trial judge in his summing-up directed the jury thus-

“To establish insanity and to overcome the presumption that every man is sane and accountable for his actions, the defence must prove, first that the prisoner was at the relevant time, that is, at the time he was committing the offence, suffering either from mental disease or from natural mental infirmity, and secondly that the mental disease or natural infirmity was such that, again, at the relevant time, the prisoner was as a result deprived of capacity (a) to understand what he was doing; or (b) to control his actions; or (c) to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.