Chevron Nigeria Limited Vs Lonestar Drilling Nigeria Limited (2007)
LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report
A. OGUNTADE, J.S.C
The respondent, (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) at the Warri High Court of Delta State brought a suit against the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) for special and general damages arising out of an alleged breach of contract for ten million United State dollars. The parties filed and exchanged pleadings.
The defendant, after the exchange of pleadings, brought an application praying for the following orders:-
“(1) An order of this Honourable Court setting down for hearing and determination the points of law raised in the defendant’s statement of defence particularly paragraphs 15-22.
(2) Based on prayer one above, an order dismissing the plaintiff’s action for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and for being incompetent, frivolous and vexation in the circumstances.
(3) An order striking out this suit for lack of jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain same.” The grounds relied upon for bringing the application were stated to be these:
“( a) That the matter being an admiralty matter is outside the jurisdiction and competence of this court to entertain same.
(b) That by virtue of S. 230(g) and (o) of Decree No. 107 of 1993 and Decree No. 59 of 1991 the matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.”
The trial Judge in his ruling on the defendant’s application which was delivered on 3/12/99 reasoned that the plaintiff’s suit disclosed a reasonable cause of action and that the writ of summons and statement of claim showed that the plaintiff’s claim was for a breach of contract and not founded in admiralty. The defendant was dissatisfied with the ruling. It brought an appeal before the Court of Appeal, Benin (hereinafter referred to as the court below). The court below on 4-4-01 dismissed the appeal. Still dissatisfied, the defendant has come on a final appeal before this court. The defendant has in its appellant’s brief formulated two issues for determination. The issues are:
“1. Whether or not the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the plaintiff’s action discloses a reasonable cause of action against the defendant/appellant.
- Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the plaintiff’s claim is contract and not admiralty thereby vesting the Delta State High Court with jurisdiction as against the Federal High Court.
The plaintiff in its respondent’s brief formulated two issues which in substance are the same with the defendant/appellant’s issues. I intend to take the two issues serially.
On issue 1, the appellant’s contention was that plaintiff’s writ of summons when read along with the statement of claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. This issue brings into the fore a consideration of ‘a cause of action’. I can do no more on the meaning of a ’cause of action’ than call to mind the observation made by this court per Karibi-Whyte, JSC in Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828 at 876 thus:
“I think a cause of action is constituted by the bundle or aggregate of facts which the law will recognize as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to make the claim against the relief or remedy being sought. Thus the factual situation on which the plaintiff relies to support his claim must be recognized by the law as giving rise to a substantive right capable of being claimed or enforced against the defendant. In other words, the factual situation relied upon must constitute the essential ingredients of an enforceable right or claim – see Trower & Sons Ltd. v. Ripstein (1944) AC 254 at p. 263; Read v. Brown 22 Q.B.D. 128; Cooke v. Gill (1873) L.R. 8 C.A. 107, Sugden v. Sugden (1957) All ER 300; Jackson v. Spittal (1870) L.R. 5C. P. 547). Concisely stated, any act on the part of the defendant which gives to the plaintiff his cause of complaint is a cause of action.” See also Akilu v. Fawehinmi (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 102) 122 at 169. In Ibrahim v. Osim (1988) 1 N.S.C.C. 1184 at 1194; (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 82) 257, this court per Uwais, J.S.C. (as he then was) discussed the proper meaning of the expression ‘reasonable cause of action’ thus; “The question therefore is what is a ‘reasonable cause of action’ The words ’cause of action’ without the adjective ‘reasonable’ had been defined by this court in Savages & Ors. v. Uwaechia (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt. 1) 251 at p. 257: (1972) 3 S.c. 214 at p. 221, where Fatai-Williams, J.S.C. (as he then was) said: ‘A cause of action is defined in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary as the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. To our mind, it is, in effect, the fact or combination of facts, which give rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements the wrongful act of, the defendant which gives the plaintiff ‘his cause of, complaint and the consequent damage. As Lord Esher said in Cooke v. Gill (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 107 and later in Read v. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128 (C.A). it is every fact that it could be necessary for the plaintiff ‘to prove, if , traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. (See Kusada v. Sokoto Native Authority (1968) 1 All N.L.R. 377 where the definition in Read v. Brown (supra) was referred to with approval. ‘ By the two elements in the foregoing definition of ’cause of action’ there can be no doubt that as far as the respondent was concerned and as indicated in his statement of claim, the wrongful act of the appellant was that the appellant imported sardine with the import license issued to the respondent, made profit and refused to share the profit as agreed with the respondent. By this, if proved, the respondent would be entitled to damages for breach of contract. However the definition of the words ’cause of action’ is, for the purposes of the present case, incomplete without the meaning of the word or adjective ‘reasonable ascertained. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Special deluxe, 5th Edition, the word has been defined to mean, ‘fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances. But the phrase ‘reasonable cause of action’ which is used in Order 18 rule 19 of the English rules of the Supreme Court (See Volume 1 of the Supreme Court Practice, 1979) had been defined in Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association & Ors. (1970) 1 W.L.R. 688 at p. 696 by Lord Pearson who observed –
‘First there is in paragraph (1)(a) of the rule the expression ‘reasonable cause of action’, to which Lindley, M. R. called attention in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd. v. Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Limited (1899) 1 Q.B. 86 pp. 90-91. No exact paraphrase can be given, but I think ‘reasonable cause of action’ means a cause of action with some chance of success, when (as required by paragraph (2) of the rule) only the allegations in the pleadings are considered. If when those allegations are examined it is found that the alleged cause of action is certain to fail, the statement of claim should be struck-out.’ This definition was approved by this court of Chief ( Dr.) Irene Thomas & Ors. v. The Most Reverend Timothy Omotayo Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669 at P. 682 (Per Obaseki JSC)”
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