Babatunde Adenuga Vs J.k. Odumeru (2003)
LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report
UWAIFO, JSC
The appellants as plaintiffs seek six reliefs in the suit no. ID/2853/98 it filed in the High Court of Lagos State, sitting at Ikeja. The first relief upon which, it would appear, the other five could be seen to dependence, but not necessarily sustainable simply because of that depend, asks for-
“(a) A declaration that the tenure of the 1st – 3rd defendants as President, Vice President and Treasurer respectively of the 8th defendant expired by effluxion of time on 26th June 1998.”
A part from the issue of locus standi that was raised later in the course of procedings, the focus must be the implication of the relief recited above. It seems to represent the cause of action relied on by the plaintiffs. That is to say, the expiration of the 1st-3rd defendants’ tenure of office by effluxion of time. As a result of that, the plaintiffs want them to cease to exercise the authority of their offices.
The five reliefs that follow may be abbreviated thus: (b) A declaration that the 1st – 3rd defendants cannot continue in their respective offices. (c) An order of perpetual injunction to restrain them from further parading themselves as representing the 8th defendant. (d) An order declaring any further acts done by them in the respective offices as void. (e) An order for them to render account. (f) A declaration that the tenure of the Council members of the 8th defendant has ended and an order appointing a seven-member interim caretaker of the 8th defendant to conduct an annual general meeting to constitute a new Council.
The parties exchanged pleadings. I shall confine myself at this stage to paras. 2, 3 and 4 of the statement of claim and paras. 2 and 3 as well as part of para. 4 of the statement of defence of the 1st – 3rd and 8th defendants. The said paragraphs of the statement of claim read:
“2. The 8th defendant has a Council which is the highest body and the main decision making organ of the 8th defendant and is constituted every three years nomination at the Annual General Meeting. (sic)
That last Council was constituted on the 20th of January, 1994 to 19th of January, 1997 when a new Council is required to be appointed.
That 1st and 2nd defendants were appointed President and Vice President by the last Council on 27th June, 1996 for a two year term expiring on 26th June, 1998.”
The statement of defence reacted to the above as follows:
“2. The defendants admit the status of Council of the 8th defendant but deny that the Council is constituted every three years as neither the Law and regulations governing the 8th defendant stipulates the tenure of Council, and will at the trial put the plaintiffs to the strictest proof of the said averments contained in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim.
That paragraph 3 of the statement is denied and the plaintiffs put to the strictest proof thereof. Further there is never a vacuum in the hierarchy nor in the Council since only one third of 18 members of Council would have retired having 12 still in the Council and by Council resolution of 24/9/97 and but for the ex parte order of Justice Olugbani, the baton of succession would have evolved at the Annual General meeting scheduled for 27/6/98. The defendants will at the trial rely on regulation 40, 41(3) of the 8th defendant.
The defendants in answer to paragraph 4 of the statement of claim repeat paragraph 3 of the statement of defence and will at the trial put the plaintiffs to the strictest proof thereof.”
The plaintiffs brought a motion on notice on 15 December, 1998, the very day they filed their statement of claim, praying the court for seven orders. They were virtually in the same nature as the reliefs sought in the substantive action but in one or two aspects they even went beyond. The first of the orders sought was:
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