Architect Zubairu Ahmed V. Mallam Ahmed Dasuki (1997)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

OGEBE, J.C.A.

This appeal arose from the interlocutory ruling of the High Court of Kaduna State restraining the appellant from operating in the partnership name of TRIAD ASSOCIATES pending the determination of the substantive suit. The appellant sued the respondent before the lower court with respect to their partnership agreement. The respondent in the statement of defence also counter-claimed. Both sides brought motions for interlocutory injunction.

The relevant motion for the purpose of this appeal is that of the respondent. In that motion he sought in the first relief an order of interlocutory injunction restraining the plaintiff/appellant, the present appellant or any of his servants, agents or privies from carrying on any form of business in the name of TRIAD ASSOCIATES pending the hearing and determination of this suit. The trial court heard the motions of both parties and in a joint ruling restrained both sides from their using the names of TRIAD ASSOCIATES or Triad Consultants for their business pending the determination of the substantive suit. Dissatisfied with this ruling the appellant has applied to this Court, and in accordance with the rules of court filed a brief of argument in which he identified two issues for determination as follows:-

“1. Whether the learned trial Ag. Chief Judge properly exercised her discretion when in the face of all the facts and material before her to the contrary, she restrained the appellant from carrying on business under the pre-existing name “TRIAD ASSOCIATES”?

2. Having regard to the balance of convenience, was it just and proper for the trial court to have restrained the appellant from the use of his existing business name?”

The respondent also filed a brief of argument and identified two issues for determination. In the course of argument of this appeal the respondent abandoned the 2nd issue as it did not arise from any of the grounds of appeal and it was accordingly struck out. The surviving issue of the respondent is Issue (A) and it reads: –

“Whether the lower court properly exercised its discretion, judiciously and judicially,”

The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted on the first issue that the trial judge was wrong in restraining his client from using the trade name “TRIAD ASSOCIATES” to carry on his business when it was clear from the materials before her that it was the respondent who voluntarily resigned from the partnership and left the appellant to carry on the business with liabilities of the partnership still to be satisfied. He argued that to stop his client from carrying on the business would tantamount to dissolving the partnership, a relief which was sought for by the respondent in his counter-claim. This amounted to pre-judging the outcome of the substantive counter-claim.

The learned Senior Advocate submitted further that even after the withdrawal of the respondent from the partnership, the appellant continued to run the business and therefore for the trial judge to maintain the status quo, she was duty bound to allow the appellant to continue with the business name of TRIAD ASSOCIATES. The court in restraining both sides from using the name TRIAD ASSOCIATES was not maintaining the status quo. In his submission status quo can only mean the situation prevailing before the conduct complained of. He relied on the case of Akapo v. Hakeem Habeed (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266. The learned Senior Advocate argued forcefully that from the letters written by, the respondent Exh. ZA. 3 and Exh. S.i, it was clear that the respondent had no objection at the time of his withdrawal from the partnership to the use of the trade name TRIAD ASSOCIATES for continuing the business pending its winding up especially as he vowed not to be responsible for any liability of the partnership from the date of his withdrawal. It follows therefore that if the appellant did not continue to maintain the trade name he would not be expected to meet the liabilities outstanding against the partnership.

On the 2nd issue the learned senior counsel submitted that the trial Judge failed to consider the issue of balance of convenience which weighed heavily in favour of the appellant. If she had considered it, she would not have restrained the appellant from continuing business with the partnership name of TRIAD ASSOCIATES.

He referred to the case of Obeya Memorial Hospital v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 325.

In reply to the submission of the learned Senior Advocate the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the lower court exercised its discretion judiciously and judicially by restraining both parties from using the business name TRIAD ASSOCIATES because the main issue before the lower court from the pleadings and applications from both sides was the use of the trade name.

The principles governing the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction are well stated in the case of Ahamadu v. Attorney -General Rivers State (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 459) 236 at page 248 as follows:-

“The grant or refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction is at the discretion of the court. That discretion must be exercised judicially. Although it is impossible to lay down any general rule regulating the exercise of the court’s discretion in a case, it must be borne in mind that interlocutory injunctions are not granted as a matter of grace or routine. On the contrary, the injunction is granted only in deserving cases on law and facts. See A.C.B. v. Awogboro (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 176) 711. Clearly therefore an applicant in an application of this nature must establish before the court that there is a serious issue to be tried at the hearing. Once he had done that, the trial court will then proceed to consider the balance of convenience. Of course, the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the balance of convenience is on his side. When an applicant satisfies these conditions, he is unquestionably entitled to an order of interlocutory injunction pending the determination of the substantive action. The reason is obvious, the object or purpose of the injunction is to maintain the status quo pending the determination on the merits.”

Similarly in the case of Obeya Memorial Hospital v. A. G. Federation & Ors (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 325 at p. 338 Obaseki J.S.C. stated the object of interlocutory injunction as follows:-