Alhaji Nanner Buka Umoru Mandara V. The Attorney General Of The Federation (1984)

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IRIKEFE, J.S.C.

The appellant was tried at the Federal High Court, Lagos, on four counts charging treasonable felony, incitement to mutiny and attempting to cause disaffection amongst members of the armed forces of this country. Specifically, the charges were brought under section 41 (a), 44 (a), 44 (b), and 46 (1) (a).

Some of the above charges attract a punishment of life imprisonment, but having been found guilty at the end of what undoubtedly must have been a very tedious trial, judging by the size of the printed record of proceedings, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to a maximum of 15 years imprisonment on two of the counts and 10 years imprisonment on the other two, the said terms to run concurrently.

He was thus to serve a total of 15 years imprisonment. The conviction was recorded on 30th July, 1982 and the appellant is still in prison custody. All the charges were brought under Part II of the Criminal Code (Cap 42 Laws of the Federation) with the heading:

“OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER”

On conviction, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on a number of grounds. The said grounds were later amended to raise the issue of the jurisdictional incompetence of the Federal High Court to try the charges brought against the appellant.

Before this appeal, the court of Appeal had decided when the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to try criminal matters other than those within the contemplation of section 7 of the Federal High Court Act (No. 13 of 1973) was contested in Eze v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 259) C.L.R. 259) that that court had jurisdiction. This was also the decision of the Court of Appeal in Senate of National Assembly v. Momoh Suit No. FCA/L/45/81-decided on 19th July, 1982.

On 10th June, 1983 this court delivered judgment in Suit No. SC.110/1982 – Bronik Motors Ltd & Anor v. Wema Bank Ltd. This judgment dealt exhaustively with the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court both under the original Act establishing that court (then designated-The Federal Revenue Court) that is Act No. 13 of 1973 and under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria-1979.

In view of the binding effect of the above decision on the Court of Appeal, the appeal of the appellant to that court which was decided on 18th November, 1983 was based exclusively on an interpretation by that court of our decision in BRONIK (supra) and its bearing, if any, on the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to try the appellant. The Court of Appeal by a split decision of two to one (KAZEEM and NNAEMEKA(J.C.A.) ADEMOLA, J.C.S. DISSENTING, RULED THAT OUR DECISION IN BRONIK (supra) notwithstanding, the Federal High Court was competent to try the appellant and that it derived the power so to do under section 7 (3) of the Federal High Court Act-No. 13 of 1973. The appellant has now appealed to this court on the following two grounds, namely:

(a) The Federal Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to try the appellant.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR

Section 7 (3) of the Federal High Court Act is purely explanatory of section 7 (2) and ought not to have been Construed as enlarging its scope.

(b) The Federal Court of Appeal erred in law in not holding that the appellant has not been tried before a court of competent jurisdiction and the conviction ought to have been quashed.

It is thus clear that this appeal is concerned with the very narrow issue of the correct interpretation of section 7 (3) of the Federal High Court Act No. 13 of 1973. Chief Williams, learned Senior Advocate, who represented the appellant set out in his brief the only issue which calls for a determination as