Alhaji Chief A. B. Bakare V. The Attorney-general Of The Federation & Ors. (1990)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

ESO, J.S.C.

On 16th July, 1990 this court, sitting as a full court, allowed the appeal of the plaintiff. Reasons for the course taken were adjourned till today. I hereby give my reasons.

Though Mr. Harris-Eze, Director of Civil Litigation, appeared for the respondent in this case, and he filed no brief for the respondent, he was permitted to make oral submissions on behalf of the respondent, even without a written brief.

The issue which is involved, in fact, is very narrow, if one goes by the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The issues before that court were two fold and they are –

1. Whether the appellant who was the plaintiff in the trial court could validly bring his suit in view of the Petition of Rights Act (even in this, the issue is duofold. For the date of commencement of the action was brought into focus).
2. If he could, whether or not the award made by the trial court was reasonable.

On the first issue the Court of Appeal held as per Uche-Omo, J .C.A.-

“I would hold that the (sic) petition of rights law cannot prevent the respondent (that is the plaintiff who is now appellant in this court), in the absence of any other disability, from commencing an action after October 1979 to recover rents due to him.

The learned justice of the Court of Appeal, having so held, asked himself a question –

“Secondly, did the cause of action arise before or after the commencement of the constitution in October, 1979 This is important because the provisions of the constitution can only apply in respect of the latter, since its provisions do not have retrospective effect vide F.S. Uwaifo’s case (supra)”

He answered the question –

“Whilst counsel for the appellant [the defendant] has submitted that the cause of action in this case arose between 1978 and August, 1979 when the rents became due and payable, respondents’ counsel’s submission in his brief is that the important date is that on which the action was taken. Before us, in oral argument respondent’s counsel has submitted that the operative date when cause of action accrued is after the rent had been demanded and not paid i.e. after exh. G was written on 23/11/79.

It seems to me that the submission of appellant’s counsel is the correct position of the law. The cause of action therefore accrued before October, 1979. The constitution of 1979 would then be inapplicable and the petitions of rights law would apply.

It would therefore follow that the action of the respondent not having been commenced as provided by that law should not have been entertained by the court below.”

Upon this finding the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the defendant. That is, though the constitution of 1979 has rendered nugatory the Petition of Rights Act, the instant case is not protected by the constitutional provision only because the cause of action arose before the date of the constitution. He dismissed the claim of the plaintiff, which claim he said he would have found in his favour but for this earlier finding. And it is this part of the decision that has constituted the main spring of the second issue which came before the Court of Appeal.

What are the facts of the case