Chief Chibuzor N. Ziggy Azike Ksc V. Chief Ifeanyi Godwin Ararume & Ors. (2003)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

ABOYI JOHN IKONGBEH, J.C.A. 

This is an appeal by the petitioner before the National Assembly/Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Petitions Tribunal, sitting at Owerri. The Tribunal, at the instance of the 1st respondent, struck out the petition on grounds of vagueness and non-joinder of parties.

Chief M.I. Ahamba, S.A.N., in the appellant’s brief has formulated three issues for determination, Chief Bon. Nwakanma, S.A.N. in the 1st respondent’s brief took objection to issue 2 on the ground that it has not arisen from any ground of appeal. It is an objection well taken. The issue raises the question whether the 1st respondent was competent to raise objection on behalf of other respondents. Chief Ahamba readily conceded the point in the appellant’s reply brief. The remaining two issues in the two briefs are identical but the first issue as framed in the appellant’s brief brings out the matters in controversy more clearly than as framed in the 1st respondent’s brief. The reverse is, however true as regard the second issue.

I will, therefore set out the first issue in the appellant’s brief and the second one in the 1st respondent’s brief. The two read:
“a) whether the Notice of Preliminary Objection before the Election Petition competent.”
“b) Whether the petition was not incompetent on the basis of vagueness of pleadings and non-joinder of parties (Grounds four, five and six).
I propose to take the second issue first.

The appellant’s complaint here is two-fold. First is said that the Tribunal was wrong in its conclusion that paragraphs 11(b) and (c). 14(i) and 14(ii)(a) and (b) and 15 were vague and ought to be struck out. Secondly, it is complained that the Tribunal erroneously struck out the petition on the ground that necessary parties had not been joined.   `

On the first complaint Chief Ahamba S.A.N. for the appellant, submitted that the pleadings in the paragraphs specified were quite adequate and in compliance with the rules of pleadings. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the appellant in some of the paragraphs of the petition complained of even went so far as to specify some of the details of the conduct of the 2nd respondent complained of. Moreover, senior counsel argued, the very fact that the respondents responded intelligibly to the allegations contained in the affected paragraphs was clear evidence that they quite understood what the allegations were.

In answer, Chief Nwakanma, S.A.N. for the respondent by way of preliminary observation, pointed out that ground 4 of the grounds of appeal from which this issue has been formulated did not raise any complaint in respect of the striking out of paragraphs 11(b) and 14(ii)(d).

I must say straight away that these minor points made here would not matter much if the decision of the Tribunal to strike out the paragraphs was erroneous and did not justify the striking out of the entire petition. I shall, therefore, concentrate on seeing whether or not those paragraphs were properly struck out for vagueness.

On these paragraphs senior counsel for the 1st respondent insisted that the decision of the Tribunal was unimpeachable. According to counsel, paragraph 14(i), (ii)(a), (c) of the petition contain only a general and self-opinionated account of the conduct of the election without regard to the requirement of either order 26, rule 4(1) and (4) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000, or paragraph 4(1)(d) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2002.

The question here is whether the affected paragraphs are indeed vague as held by the tribunal. How did the Tribunal deal with the question?

At pages 105 – 106 the tribunal observed and held:
“In arguing grounds 5(a) and (b) of the Notice of Preliminary Objection learned senior counsel to the 1st respondent argued that paragraphs 14(1) and sub-paragraph (a), (b), (c) and (d) are vague and should be struck out. He contended that those paragraphs offended rule of pleadings as stipulated in Order 26, Rule 4(4) of the Federal High Court Rules 2000, and that they were all in breach of the law. He stated that the manners of pleadings as contained in those paragraphs are contrary to rule of pleading. He relied on Kauri v. Dalori supra to the effect that a petitioner on election petition must plead necessary particulars in support of material averments of facts in the petition.

But in a swift reaction Chief Ahamba, S.A.N. contended very strongly that those paragraphs of the petition are not at all vague. He referred us to section 67(3) of the Electoral Act, which states that the polling agents shall certify the election materials from the office and that the I.N.E.C. Officer in charge of that was the Electoral Officers in the local government areas. He submitted that by sections 151 of Electoral Act, I.N.E.C. has offices at Ward, Local Government and State levels therefore have joined I.N.E.C., as a corporate body and a person who takes responsibilities for all its officials the petitioner has pleaded adequately. He submitted that the pleading was a good one.

We have perused paragraphs 14(i), 14(ii) a-d on page of the petition and we find that paragraphs 14(i), 14(ii), (a), (b) and (d) of the petition are vague and are herby struck out.

On ground 1 of the application the learned S.A.N. for the 1st respondent argued that paragraph 11(b) and 11(c) are vaugue in that paragraph 11 offends rules of pleading. He relied on the decision of this Court in GLLHET IMS/21/2003 – Uzodinma v. Udenwa. Ruling delivered on 19th June, 2003.