Umarco (Nigeria) Plc V. Jofabris and Associates Ltd. & Anor (2003)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

JAMES OGENYI OGEBE, J.C.A. 

The 1st respondent sued the appellant and the 2nd respondent in the Federal High Court, Lagos claiming a total sum of N2,541,200.00 (Two million five hundred and forty-one thousand two hundred naira) being special and general damages for breach of contract of carriage of goods covered by bill of lading No. 101.

The 1st respondent filed a statement of claim on the 9th of April, 1997. The appellant did not file a statement of defence but chose to file a motion on the 6th of November, 1997 requesting the trial court to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was statute-barred.

The trial court heard argument and dismissed the motion. It is against that ruling that the appellant has appealed to this court.

The learned counsel of the appellant filed a brief of argument and formulated two issues for determination as follows:

1.Is the 1st respondent (plaintiff) bound by the terms and conditions of the bill of lading contract entered into by the 1st respondent and the appellant’s principals?

2.Whether in view of the provisions of the terms and conditions of the bill of lading contract, this suit is statute-barred?

He also filed a reply brief in reply to the 1st respondent’s brief and a reply brief in respect of the 2nd respondent’s brief.

The 1st respondent filed a brief and adopted the issues formulated by the appellant. The 2nd respondent also filed a brief and formulated one issue for determination as follows:

“Whether learned trial Judge rightly or wrongly found that the 1st respondent’s suit against the appellant was not time barred.”

The facts of this case are relatively simple. The appellant brought some goods by sea to the 1st respondent. The goods were containers of frozen fish. They were discharged to the 2nd respondent on the 11th of October, 1995 from the MVCNBT Europe.

The 1st respondent collected the goods on the 24th of October, 1995 and found that one of the containers was spoilt. It complained both to the appellant and the 2nd respondent about the damage and when nothing was done it brought an action on the 16th of October, 1996 claiming damages as stated earlier in this judgment.

The dispute between the parties is whether or not the time for institution of the action began to run from the 11th of October, 1995 or the 24th of October, 1995.

The trial court held that time began to run from the 25th of October, 1995 and therefore the action which was filed on the 16th of October, 1996 was within the time of the one year allowed by law.