Hajiya Aisha Aliko Mohammed V. The Executive Governor of Kaduna State & Ors (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A. 

This is an appeal against the Ruling of the High Court of Kaduna State delivered by Hon. Justice Balogun on the 13th day of March 2012, dismissing the suit of the Appellant (Plaintiff therein) on the ground that it was statute barred, consequent upon a Motion filed by the Respondents. Aggrieved by the Ruling, the Appellant filed a Three Ground Notice of Appeal dated and filed on the 12th day of April 2012.

In prosecution of the appeal, the Appellant filed a Brief of Arguments dated 12/6/15 and filed on 13/6/15, settled by Ogbeni Biola Oyebanji of Biola Oyebanji & Co. The Respondents, in spite of service on them of the Appellant’s Brief filed no Briefs of Argument. Following an application by the Appellant, leave was granted for the hearing of the appeal solely on the Appellant’s Brief.

Learned Counsel to the Appellant formulated a sole issue for determination to wit:
Whether or not from the totality of facts deducible from the file of the land marked EXH ?A?, the action instituted by the Appellant was statute barred.

On the lone issue formulated, learned

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Counsel submitted that a cause of action has been judicially stated to be a sets of facts which gives a person a right to judicial relief and that a cause of action is said to have arisen on the date of the occurrence, neglect or default. He referred this Court to the case of Mosojo v Oyetayo (2003) 13 NWLR part 837 Page 340. This presupposes that where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action could be brought, legal proceedings cannot properly and validly be brought or instituted after the prescribed period. Citing the cases of Ogunko v Shelle (2004) 6 NWLR Part 858 Page 17 and Osun State Govt. v Dalami Ltd (2007) 9 NWLR Part 1038 Page 66 at 81/82, he submitted that an action brought after the expiration of the period is said to be barred. Time, he said, begins to run, for the purposes of determination of the limitation period, from the date the cause of action arose. The law is settled, he submitted, that it is only the Writ and the Statement of Claim and not the defence that shall be considered. The Court, he said, is precluded from considering any facts pleaded by the defence.

?Counsel alleged that the trial judge, who stated

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the principles of law correctly, later misapplied the said legal principles, referring to affidavits filed by the parties.

The issue for determination formulated by the Appellant, to wit, whether or not from the totality of facts deducible from the file of the land marked EXH “A”, the action instituted by the Appellant was statute barred, is inappropriate, I hold. This is because, as held in the case of Attorney General Of Adamawa State & Ors V. Attorney General of the Federation (2014) LPELR-23221(SC) per Mary Peter-Odili JSC “..in the consideration of whether an action is caught by the statute of limitation, what is of paramount consideration is the determination of:
(a) the cause of action;
(b) when the cause of action accrued; and
(c) when the action become statute-barred.
To determine the conditions above, what the Court would look at are the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed.” Underlining Mine.

Thus, it is to the writ of Summons and not the affidavit that

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the Court has recourse to.