Idachaba & Ors V. University Of Agriculture, Makurdi & Ors (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C.

The Appellants were all senior staff and employees of the Respondent Institution, whose appointments were terminated at different dates from 1995 to 1999 because inter alia they were sent on various training overseas by the 1st Respondent and after the completion of their courses and allowed time, refused to return to the 1st Respondent. By an Originating Summons dated 17/7/2000, the Appellants sought the following reliefs before the Federal High Court, Abuja:

1. A declaration that there is no provision in Decree No. 48 of 1992 as amended by Decree No. 11 of 1993, that permits or allows the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants, their servants or agents to perform or do all or any of the functions/duties of the 4th defendant specified in Section 3(2), 6, 10, 11, 15 and 16 or any other Section of Decree No. 48 of 1992, in the absence of the 4th defendant being duty constituted and or without the approval/delegation of the 4th defendant; and consequently every action or decision taken by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants which ought not to have been taken by the 4th defendant and which were taken by the

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1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants in the absence of the 4th defendant or without the approval or sanction of the 4th defendant between January 1997 – 11th July 2000 A.D; were ultra vires, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

2. A declaration that there is no provision in Decree No. 48 of 1992 as amended by Decree No. 11 of 1993, that permits or allows the 5th defendant herein to step into the shoes and assume the role, functions and duties of the 4th defendant as specified in SS. 3(2), 6, 10, 11, 15 and 16 or any other Section of Decree No. 48 of 1992 when the said 4th defendant is not constituted and in place and consequently every approval purportedly given to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants by the 5th defendant from January 1997 – 11th July 2000 A.D; on behalf of and or in place of the 4th defendant is ultra vires, null and void and a breach of Decree No. 48 of 1992 as amended.
3. An order quashing the warning letters issued to the 1st and 3rd plaintiffs, letters of suspension of the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs from supervision of the postgraduate students, letters of termination of the appointments of the 4th, 5th and 6th plaintiffs on the grounds

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that the said warnings, suspension, termination and dismissal were done contrary to and in breach of the provisions of Decree No. 48 of 1992.

4. A declaration that the 4th-14th plaintiffs are still in employment of the 1st defendant and are entitled to their salaries, allowances and other benefits accruing thereto from the dates of their purported termination and dismissal until they leave office or removed from office in accordance with the provisions of Decree No. 48 of 1992 as amended.
5. A declaration that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants herein cannot create in the 1st defendant new offices, schools, colleges, departments, units, posts, divisions and re-designating the office of the 1st plaintiff and split same into two, without the approval and sanction of the 4th defendant and consequently every such schools, colleges, departments, units, posts, divisions and re-designation of the office of the 1st plaintiff by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants between January 1997 – 11th July, 2000 A.D is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
6. An order restraining every member of the 4th defendant from ratifying or approving every action done or

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decision taken by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th defendants on behalf of or in place of the 4th defendants between January 1997 – 11th July, 2000 A.D.

7. Any other legal or equitable remedies that this Hon. Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstances of this case.

Before the Originating Summons was heard, the 1st-4th Respondents filed a motion on notice for the dismissal of the suit on the grounds amongst others that:

1. The suit of the Appellants was statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. 379, LFN, 1990, and
2. The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Appellants herein by virtue of the provisions of Section 3(3) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap.379, LFN, 1990.

The trial Court in its ruling held that the suit of the Appellants was statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. On appeal by the Appellants to the lower Court, their case was equally dismissed, hence the appeal to this Honourable Court. The Appellants therefore, for the determination of this appeal, formulated these issues:

1. Whether the Court of Appeal

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was right to hold that the claim of the Appellants founded on contract of employment was statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, and when that called (sic) failed to consider all issues submitted for adjudication.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to hold that the jurisdiction of the trial Federal High Court was ousted by virtue of the provisions of Decree No. 17 of 1984.

I shall consider this appeal on a combined issue formulated thus:

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION: