Senator Iyiola Omisore & Anor V Ogbeni Rauf Adesoji Aregbesola & Ors (2015)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, JSC

My Lords, the proceedings, which culminated into this appeal, were prompted by the divergent responses to the outcome of the election which the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) conducted in Osun State on August 9, 2014. In the said election, the first appellant in this appeal, who was sponsored by the second appellant, a registered political party, was the latter’s Governorship candidate. On the other hand, the first respondent herein was the candidate of the second respondent in the said election. Sequel to the third respondent’s declaration of the results and return of the

PAGE| 2 first respondent as the winner in the keenly-contested election, the petitioners beseeched the Governorship Election Petition Tribunal, Osun State (in this judgement, simply, referred to as “the trial Tribunal”) with a petition challenging the declaration and return of the first respondent in seventeen out of the thirty Local Government Areas of Osun State. Even in the said seventeen Local Government Areas, the petition was only circumscribed to certain wards and polling units. They claimed the following reliefs: 1. Whereof the Petitioners pray that it be determined and declared that the first respondent, Ogbeni Rauf Adesoji Aregbesola, was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes cast in the Osun State Governorship election held on the 9th of August, 2014, and therefore his election is null and void; 2. That it be declared that Senator Iyiola Omisore was duly elected and ought to have been returned as duly elected Governor of Osun State having scored the highest number of lawful votes cast at the election held on the 9 August, 2014, and satisfies the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) to be so declared; 3. In addition, that Senator Iyiola Omisore be declared as the winner of the Osun State Governorship election held on the 9th of August, 2014, based on the results obtained at the physical recount and re-examination by and before the Tribuanai or otherwise of the votes from the affected or aforementioned Local Governments, Wards, Units and/or Centres. Or, in the alternative: 4. That the Osun State Governorship election held on 9th August, 2014, having been vitiated by substantial non-compliance with the mandatory statutory requirements which has substantially affected the validity of the election in the Units and Wards of the Local Government Areas being challenged be declared nullified or cancelled and the third respondent be ordered and or directed to conduct fresh elections for the office of the Governor of Osun State in the affected areas. The grounds of the petition were listed as follows: (a) The first respondent was not duly elected by majority of the lawful votes cast at the election and did not score VA (one-quarter) of the lawful votes cast in at least twenty of the thirty Local Government Areas of Osun State and therefore did not meet the requirements of the law to be returned as the winner of the election;

PAGE| 3 (b) The election of the first respondent is invalid by reason of corrupt practices and electoral malpractices perpetrated by the members and agents of the first and second respondents in the places challenged in this petition; (c) The election of the first respondent is invalid by reason of substantial non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the Manual for Election Officials, 2014, the Guidelines issued for the conduct of the election and the law in the conduct of the election. Issues were joined in the settled pleadings [and there were many processes, indeed]. On October 16, 2014, the first respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection under paragraph 4 (1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act. The appellants, vigorously, opposed it. Not done yet, the first respondent filed another Motion on Notice on October 21, 2014, under paragraphs 16 (1) and 18 (1), (3) and (4) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act. In it, he prayed for the following reliefs: an order of the trial Tribunal striking out the appellants’ Reply to the first respondent’s Reply on the ground that it was filed out of time; an order deeming the petition as abandoned and an order dismissing the said petition for the appellants’ failure to apply for the issuance of notice of pre-hearing session within the time prescribed by the Rules. Expectedly, the appellants, stridently, opposed the application. Just like the first respondent, the second respondent filed a Motion on Notice on October 29, 2014 asking for the same reliefs which the first respondent had sought for in his own motion of October 21, 2014. The appellants opposed it, as well. At the hearing of the petition, the appellants [who were first and second petitioners, respectively, at the trial Tribunal] marshalled a whopping forty three witnesses, namely, PW1 to PW43. They, equally, tendered documentary exhibits, marked exhibits 1A to 380. These were electoral forms, result sheets and sacks of ballot papers which were, incautiously, dumped on the trial Tribunal without any attempt to chart their nexus with the specific complaints in the specified areas on which issues were joined in the settled pleadings. On his part, the first respondent called nineteen witnesses, RW1- RW 19. Although he did not tender any documentary exhibits through his own witnesses; while his counsel was cross examining the appellants’ witnesses, he tendered some documents through them. The second respondent called eight witnesses, viz, RW 20- RW27. The third respondent did not call any witness. However, counsel tendered exhibits 395, 396 and 397 from the Bar. While cross

PAGE| 4 examining the appellants’ witnesses, he, nevertheless, elicited vital evidence from them. At the close of evidence and final addresses, the trial Tribunal delivered its judgement on February 6, 2015. While it overruled the said preliminary objections of the first and second respondents, on the one hand; it dismissed the appellants’ petition, on the other hand. The appellants were dissatisfied with the judgement which dismissed their petition, just as the first and second respondents were aggrieved by the trial Tribunal’s ruling overruling their said objections to the competence of the petition and the admissibility of certain documents. Thus, while the appellants appealed against the substantive judgement to the Court of Appeal, Akure Division [hereinafter, simply referred to as “the lower court”], the first respondent cross appealed against the ruling relating to the competence of the petition and the issue of admissibility of documents. So, also, did the second respondent. In its judgement of April 2, 2015, the lower court dismissed the appellants’ appeal while allowing the first and second respondent’s cross appeal in part. Still dissatisfied, the appellants appealed to this court against both the lower court’s main judgement, as per their first Notice of Appeal filed on April 10, 2015 and against part of the judgement in the Cross Appeal, through the second Notice of Appeal filed on the same day. On his part, not, entirely, satisfied with the judgement in the Cross Appeal, the first respondent, also, cross appealed to this court. His complaint was against that part of the judgement in the Cross Appeal which discountenanced his objection against the admissibility of some documents which the appellant tendered at the trial Tribunal. In other words, before this court, the appellant has two appeals, namely, the appeal in the first Notice of Appeal against the main judgement of the lower court and a second appeal, as evidenced in the second Notice of Appeal, against part of the lower court’s judgement relating to the cross appeal of the first respondent. The third appeal before this court is the first respondent’s cross appeal against part of the judgement in his Cross Appeal at the lower court. In addition, the first and second respondents filed Preliminary Objections to the Notices of Appeal and issues formulated from them. I shall return to these objections shortly. Before then, however, attention will now be drawn to the issues which the parties put forward for the resolution of their agitations. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION The appellants distilled seven issues for this court’s determination of this appeal. These issues

PAGE| 5 were framed in these words:- 1. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that Ground 13 of the appellants’ Notice and Issue five distilled therein (sic) are incompetent? 2. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the tribunal’s findings on the doctrine of severance; burden and standard of proof on allegation of non-compliance and irregularities in the conduct of the election? 3. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the tribunal’s findings that the appellants failed to prove substantial non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Manual for Electoral Officials, 2014 and the Guidelines for the Conduct of the election having regard to the state of the pleadings and the evidence adduced? 4. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal did not fail in their duty to evaluate properly the appellants’ evidence and draw the necessary inferences as demonstrated before them? 5. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the findings of the tribunal which rejected the reports and evidence of PW15 and PW38? 6. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in the interpretation of paragraph 16 (1) and (2) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) on [the] appellants’ reply filed in the petition? 7. Whether [the] learned Justices of [the] Court of Appeal were right in affirming the tribunal’s findings that the allegations of corrupt practice were not proved beyond reasonable doubt? On his part, although adopting the appellants’ seven issues, the first respondent rephrased the tenor of the self-same issues thus: 1. Whether the Court of Appeal rightly upheld the preliminary objection of the first and second respondents on Ground 13 of the appellants’ Notice of Appeal and issue five distilled therefrom? 2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Tribunal properly applied the required standard of proof in respect of allegations of non-compliance made by the appellants? 3. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that evidential burden would only

PAGE| 6 shift to the third respondent if the appellants proved their allegations of substantial non-compliance with the Manual for Election Officials, 2014 and Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)? 4. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it upheld the findings of the Tribunal that the appellants failed to prove its allegations of non-compliance? 5. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the decision of the Tribunal rejecting the report and evidence of PW15 and PW38? 6. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Replies of the appellants to the respondents’ Replies to the petition were filed out of time? 7. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the decision of the Tribunal that the allegations of corrupt practices made by the appellants were not proved beyond reasonable doubt? The second respondent’s seven issues were a facsimile reproduction of the seven issues of the first respondent, [paragraphs 3.1.1-3.1.7, page 6 of the second respondent’s brief]. On its part, the third respondent condensed the issues into four, viz: 1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the Tribunal examined and evaluated the totality of the evidence led by the parties and correctly found that the appellants failed to prove by credible evidence that the Governorship election conducted in Osun State on the 9th day of August, 2014 was invalid by reasons of corrupt practices, irregularities and substantial non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the INEC Manuals as well as the Guideline for the Conduct of Election? 2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the evidential burden would only shift to the third respondent if the appellants proved their allegations of substantial non-compliance with the Manual for Election Officials, 2014 and Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)? 3. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct when it upheld the decision of the Tribunal that the first respondent was validly returned as the candidate who polled the majority of the lawful votes cast at the Governorship election conducted by the third respondent in Osun State on the 9th day of August, 2014? 4. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct when it upheld the decision of the Tribunal that struck out the appellants’ Reply to the third respondent’s Reply when it found that

PAGE| 7 the Reply of the appellant was indeed filed out of the time prescribed by the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended)? It is only proper to pause here for a consideration of the Preliminary Objections of the first and second respondents. Since, like Siamese twins, the complaints in both objections are un-differentiable, a composite ruling will suffice in disposing of them. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION In the common paragraph two of the first and second respondents’ briefs [paragraph 2. 1, page 6 of the first respondent’s brief; paragraph 2.1, page 5 of the second respondent’s brief], it was averred that “[a]t or before the hearing of this appeal, the first [and second] respondent (s) will raise preliminary objection (s) to the Notice of Appeal and issues formulated therefrom/’ The particulars of the objection were highlighted thus: 1. The parties to this appeal have not been constituted in accordance with the requirements of Order 2 Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules. Except with the leave of the Supreme Court it is not open to an appellant to introduce a new party into an appeal to the Supreme Court. Therefore where a stranger has been introduced into an appeal without the leave of the Supreme Court, the appeal is incompetent and the same must be struck out. The party named as second respondent in the Notice of Appeal of the appellants was never a party to this petition and the appellant never obtained the leave of the court to make the named second respondent a party to this appeal. In the premises, the appeal is incompetent and same must be struck out; 2. Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal are vague 3. Grounds 4, 5, 6 and 7 are the same as they relate to the same complaints on the standard of proof; 4. Particulars of Ground 9 are not supported by the record; 5. Grounds 3 and 10 are similar At the hearing of the appeal, Chief Akinlolu Olujinmi, SAN who, with Kola Awodein, SAN; Chief F. 0. Fagboungbe, SAN, Deji Sasegbon, SAN and Segun Ajibola, SAN, appeared with a retinue of other counsel from the Outer Bar, and whose names were subjoined to the counsel’s list, pointed out that the said preliminary objection affects both appeal No SC. 204/2015 and appeal No SC. 204A/2015. He explained that the appellants changed the parties to the petition. Specifically, he drew attention to the fact that the second respondent is a stranger to the

PAGE| 8 proceedings, citing Order 2 Rule 8 of the Rules of this court; PPA v INEC [2012] 13 NWLR (pt 1317) 215, 237. In his submission, the Notice of Appeal being, thus, corrupted renders the two appeals incompetent. He invited the court to strike out the said Notices of Appeal. Oluwarotimi Akeredolu, SAN who, with Femi Falana, SAN, appeared with other counsel for the second respondent, associated himself with the above submissions. In addition, he contended that if judgement is given in the appeal as, presently, constituted, it would be against All Peoples Progressive Congress that was never a party to the petition. Asiwaju A. S. Awomolo, SAN, who appeared with other counsel on the list, equally, adopted the above submissions. He drew attention to pages 7984 -7993 of Volume 15 of the record for the first Notice of Appeal and pages 7994-7999 of the same Volume 15 of the record for the second Notice of Appeal. He pointed out that Ground 12 of the first Notice was related to the Ground 2 of the second Notice. He maintained that the approach which the appellants adopted in interweaving the issues for determination in the briefs in respect of the disparate Notices of Appeal was inelegant, citing paragraph 4. 95 etc of the appellants’ brief. Expectedly, Dr Alex Izinyon, SAN, who, with Chief Chris Uche, SAN; T. Ashaolu, SAN; N. O. Oke, SAN; R. Otaru, SAN and N. Rabana, SAN, led other counsel for the appellants, canvassed arguments in his gallant effort to confute the entirety of the objectors’ contention, [paragraphs 1.6-1.14 of the appellants’Joint Reply Brief, [Appeal No SC. 204/2015], to the first and second respondents’ brief of argument dated April 29, 2015, although filed on April 30, 2015]. In his elucidation of the said brief, he pointed out that the lower court delivered two judgements, namely, the main judgement and another judgement in respect of the Cross Appeal of the first respondent. They were thus two distinct appeals which necessitated two Notices of Appeal. He urged the court to look at the respective Grounds in the main appeal.and the judgement in the Cross Appeal. He prayed the court to discountenance the said objections, [paragraph 1. 14, page 3 of the said brief]. RESOLUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION With profound respect, it is, extremely, difficult to fathom the juridical Impulsion to the first and second respondents’ objections to what they described as “the introduction of a stranger” to this appeal. Senior counsel quibbled about, what evidently, is an innocuous and inadvertent slip of the interposition of the word “Peoples” into the name of a registered political party, to wit, “All Progressives Congress,” [APC], the second respondent in this appeal. It is not their

PAGE| 9 contention that the said second respondent is a non-juristic person. They have, equally, not complained that they were, in any way, misled by the said slip or that it [the slip] had occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Now, it is no longer in doubt that this court, and indeed, all courts, have made a clean sweep of “the picture of the law and its technical rules triumphant,” Aliu Bello and Ors v A. G, Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (pt 45) 528, 886. Let me explain. By its current mood, it is safe to assert that this court has, firmly and irreversibly, spurned the old practice where the temple of justice was converted into a forensic abattoir where legal practitioners, employing such tools of their trade like “the whirligig of technicalities,” daily butchered substantive issues in courts in their “fencing game in which parties engage[d] themselves in an exercise of outsmarting each other,” Afolabi v Adekunle [1983] 2 SCNLR 141, 150. Those days are gone: gone for good! This current approach, and a robust and wholesome one at that, is to permit litigants, more particularly, parties in election-related matters, to ventilate their grievances without any hindrances by technical arguments that have the tendency of clogging the wheel of electoral justice in the election Tribunals and courts entertaining appeals from them, Egolum v. Obasanjo [1999] 7 NWLR (pt. 611) 355; Nwobodo v. Onoh [1984] 1 SCNLR 1. Consistent with this robust outlook, an innocuous slip [such as the one complained of in the Preliminary Objections] will not be allowed to vitiate proceedings which were, duly, initiated or properly filed. Surely, it would not be in the interest of justice to defenestrate this appeal, as senior counsel for the objectors have urged this court to do, just because the word “Peoples” featured in the name of a juristic person, the second respondent herein. Dr Izinyon, SAN, has pleaded inadvertence. This is understandable. After all, it is a matter of common knowledge that the imaginary or fictional Printer’s Devil has become the Scapegoat for accidental slips or errors in all written works, including court processes, Njoku v. UAC Foods [1999] 12 NWLR (pt 638) 557; Carlen v. University of Jos [1994] 1 NWLR (pt. 232) 231; Nkwocha v. Federal University of Technology [1996] 1 NWLR (pt. 422) 112; Emespo J. Continental Ltd v CSR MBH and Coy (2006) LPELR -1129 (SC) 14. Different considerations would apply, however, if the argument was that the second respondent is a non-juristic person. In such a case, there would have been no valid amendment of the title of the suit since there was never a legal person before the Court, Okechukwu and Sons v. Ndah (1967) NMLR 368. The only option, open to the Court, in such a situation, would be to strike out the name of the non- juristic person, Agbomagbe Bank Ltd v General Manager

PAGE| 10 G. B. Ollivant Ltd. and Ors (1961) ANLR (Reprint) 125. What is at play in this appeal, however, is not a mistake as to the identity of the second respondent, Maersk Line v. Addide Investment Ltd. [2002] II NWLR (pt. 778) 317, 377. In my view, this court has the undoubted power to correct this slip in the name of the second respondent as this is a case of a misnomer, Njemanze v. Shell B. P. Port Harcourt [1966] Vol. 4 NSCC 6; Maersk Line v. Addide Investment Ltd. (supra) 377-378; Olu of Warn and Ors. v. Esi and Anor [1958] Vol. 1 NSCC; Establishment Baudelot v. R. S. Graham & Co. Ltd (1953) 1 All ER 149; Alexander Mountain and Co. v. Rumere Ltd. (1948) 2 All ER 483. For sure, it is the law that where the description of a party on a process in a litigation [as happened here] is a mere misnomer, an amendment would suffice to put it right provided that the person misnamed is a juristic entity and is in existence, just like the second respondent, A. B. Manu & Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Costain (W.A) Ltd. [1994] 7 NWLR (pt. 367) 112. The essence of such an amendment is to ensure that justice is done to all parties to the dispute, Vulcan Gases Ltd. v. G. F. Industries A. G. [2001] 9 NWLR (pt. 719) 610, 653. As already shown above, it is a cardinal duty of the Courts to ensure, at all times, that substantial justice is accorded to all parties to the disputes before them, Adewunmi v. Attorney-General Ekiti State [2002] 2 NWLR (pt. 751) 474, 507; Afolabi v. Adekunbe [1983] 2 SCNLR 141; Shokunbi v. Mosaku (1969) 1 NMLR 54; Vulcan Gases v. G. F. Industries A. G (supra) 653. The objection is overruled on this score. I hereby enter order effecting… the amendment of the said process by striking out the word “Peoples.” OBJECTIONS RELATING TO THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL The objectors, equally, contended that: Grounds one and two of the Notice and Grounds of Appeal are vague; Grounds four, five, six and seven are the same as they relate to the same complaints on the standard of proof; Particulars of Ground nine are not supported by the record and Grounds three and ten are similar. On the premises of the above-cited defects, they invited the court to strike out those Grounds and the issues woven around them. The answer to the objectors’ invitation is predictable. The current mood of this court to technicalities has been depicted above. Consistent with this libertarian trend, the position now is that it is not every failure to attend to Grounds of Appeal with the fastidious details prescribed by the rules of this court that would render such a ground incompetent. This is, particularly, so where sufficient particulars can be gleaned from the grounds of appeal in question and the adversary and the court are left in no doubt as to the particulars on which the

PAGE| 11 grounds are founded, Ukpon and Anor v Commissioner for Finance and Economic Development and Anor (2006) LPELR -3349, citing Hambe v. Hueze[2001] 4 NWLR (pt.703) 372; [2001] 5 NSCQR 343, 352. Even then, courts are now encouraged to make the best they can out of a bad or inelegant ground of appeal in the interest of justice, Dakolo and Ors v Dakolo and Ors (2011) LPELR -915. Hence, bad or defective particulars in a ground of appeal would not, necessarily, render the ground itself incompetent, Prince Dr B. A. Onafowokan v Wema Bank [2011] 45 NSCQR 1; Best (Nig) Ltd v Black Wood Hodge [2011] 45 NSCQR; Abe v UNILORIN (20130 LPELR. Put differently, since the essence of Particulars is to project the reason for the ground complained of, the inelegance of the said particulars would not invalidate the Grounds from which they flow, NNB Plc v Imonikhe [2002] 5 NWLR (pt 760) 241, 310; D. Stephens Ind Ltd and Anor v BCCI Inter (Nig) Ltd [1999] 11 NWLR (pt 625) 29, 3101. This position: a position shaped by the contemporary shift from technicalities to substantial justice, is, clearly, evidenced in such cases like: Aderounmu v Olowu [2000] 4 NWLR (pt 652) 253; Hambe v Hueze (supra); Abe v UNILORIN (2013) LPELR- 20643. Indeed, this court, recently, stamped its infallible authority on this current posture, Abe v UNILORIN (2013) LPELR-20643, citing Prince (Dr) B. A. Onafowokan and others v Wema Bank Plc and Ors [2011] 45 NSCQLR 181 SC; Best (Nigeria) Ltd v Black Wood Hodge (Nigeria) Ltd and Ors [2011] 45 NSCQLR 849. This court has no justification for departing from this wholesome contemporary attitude. In consequence, I find against the arguments canvassed in the above preliminary objections. I, further, find that I must, and I, hereby, enter an order dismissing the said Preliminary Objections. I endorse Dr Izinyon’s contention that the two distinct appeals necessitated the two Notices of Appeal. RESOLUTION OF ARGUMENTS IN THE MAIN APPEAL [SC. 204/2015] Having disposed of the preliminary objections, I now turn to the resolution of the submissions in the main appeal, that is, Appeal No. SC. 204/2015. As indicated earlier, while the appellants formulated seven issues, the first and second respondents adopted these issues, although rephrasing their tenor. However, the third respondent concreted only four issues for determination. From my intimate reading of the above issues, I have no difficulty in pinpointing their thematic

PAGE| 12 connections. In this regard, attention may be drawn to issues two; three; four and seven. Unarguably, the common thread which girds these four issues is the complaint against the lower court’s affirmation of the trial Tribunal’s findings with respect to: (a) The burden and standard of proof on allegations of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Manual for Election Officials, 2014 and the Guidelines for the conduct of the election; and irregularities in the conduct of the election, subject of this appeal; (b) The lower court’s affirmation of the trial Tribunal’s findings that the allegations of corrupt practice were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. (c) The lower court’s alleged failure to evaluate the evidence properly and draw the necessary inferences; Simply put, the complaints in these four issues are predicated on the trial Tribunal’s alleged improper evaluation of evidence with regard to the issues itemised above and the lower court’s touted error in affirming those findings. Against this background, therefore, issues two; three; four and seven will be dealt with under the rubric, improper evaluation of evidence. The resultant consequence is that the issues for determination will be re-numbered as: issue One [the appellants’ original issue One; first and second respondents’ original issue one]; issue two [the appellants’ original issues two; three; four and seven; first and second respondents’ issues two; three; four and seven; third respondent’s original issues one, two and three]; issue three [the appellants’ original issue five; first and second respondents’ original issue five] and issue four [the appellants’ original issue six; first and second respondents’ issue six; third respondent’s original issue four]. ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUES ISSUE ONE OBJECTION TO THE VALIDITY OF GROUND 13 [The appellants’ original issue one; first and second respondents’ original issue one] APPELLANTS’ CONTENTION When this appeal came up for hearing on May 7, 2015, Dr Alex Izinyon, SAN, who, with Chief Chris Uche, SAN; T. Ashaolu, SAN; N. O. Oke, SAN; R. Otaru, SAN and N. Rabana, SAN, led other counsel for the appellants, first, identified the following as the appellants’ processes in this

PAGE| 13 appeal: (a) The appellants’ forty-page brief of April 21, 2015, which is tied to the first Notice of Appeal against the main judgement. With the consent of counsel, this process was designated the brief of arguments in Appeal No. SC. 204/2015; (b) The appellants’ second, twelve-page brief, equally, filed on April 21, 2015, which deals with the appeal against the lower court’s judgement in the Cross Appeal and the subject of the second Notice of Appeal, designated Appeal No. SC. 204A/2015; (c) The appellants’ seven-page Joint Reply brief to the first and second respondents’ brief in Appeal No. SC. 204/2015, dated April 29, 2015, but filed on April 30, 2015; (d) The appellants’ six page Joint Reply Brief to the first and second respondents brief [in respect of the Preliminary Objection only]. (e) The appellants’ four-page Reply to the third respondent’s brief in Appeal No. SC. 204/2015 (f) The appellants’ three-page Reply filed on April 30, 2015 in respect of Appeal No. SC. 204A/2015 (g) The appellants’ ten-page process titled “first and second Cross Respondents’ Brief of Argument” filed on April 30, 2015 in relation to Appeal No. SC. 2014A/2015 He [Dr Izinyon, SAN] adopted the above-cited briefs in respect of the main appeal [in SC. 204/2015 and SC. 204A/2015] and their briefs in response to the Cross Appeal of the first and second respondents/Cross Appellants. Paragraphs 4.8 -4.14, pages 9-11 of the brief in Appeal No. SC.204/2015 were devoted to the arguments in respect of issue one. He pointed out that the appellants had urged the trial Tribunal to view the first respondent’s Chart of irregularities as an admission. Its refusal, he explained, prompted the phraseology of Ground 13 and its particulars, as set out on paragraph 4.8 of the said brief. Attention was drawn to page 7502 of Vol. 14 of the record where the trial Tribunal disagreed with the submissions of the petitioners’ counsel that the said table or Chart amounted to an admission that the first respondent scored 234, 971 valid votes. He pointed that it was the said disagreement with the submissions of the appellants’ counsel that led to the said Ground 13. Counsel maintained that it was a valid complaint and not an obiter dictum as the lower court held. The argument was canvassed that the lower court was in error in its view that the trial Tribunal did not make a finding that the first respondent made an admission in the said Chart. Akpan v Bob [2010] 17 NWLR (pt 1223) 421, 464-465 was cited as authority for the view that