Azeez Akeredolu & Others V. Lasisi Akinremi (1985)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

N. ANIAGOLU, J.S.C.

A preliminary question dealing with the computation of the times and periods prescribed by Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1960, has arisen in this appeal which came from the Court of Appeal, Ibadan, on a judgment delivered by that court, sitting on appeal on a judgment of the High Court, Ilaro, in respect of a claim for ownership of a piece of land situate in Otta, Ogun State, along Lagos/Abeokuta Road. The respondent says that the appeal was filed out of time and has raised this by way of preliminary objection.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered on Wednesday, 10th April, 1985. Mr. Ajayi, S.A.N., stated that the notice of appeal was filed on 10th July, 1985. Chief Williams, S.A.N., although arguing that the three months expiry date for filing the appeal should be the 10th day July, 1985, stated that in fact he filed his appeal on 8th July, 1985. I have since checked the file from the Court of Appeal and the records of this court and found the date of filing the appeal to be 10th July, 1985. Mr. Ajayi, in support of his objection, submitted that the time to appeal under Section 31(2) of the Supreme Court Act is “3 calendar months” and that the Interpretation Act 1964 made this clear. He argued that 3 calendar months from 10th April 1985 expired on 9th July, 1985 and that the appellants were out of time by one day. He relied on Migotti v. Colvill (1878) 4 C.P.D. 233. He pointed out that the appellants did not file any application for extension of time to appeal, and that even if they did, there must be an appeal pending to which an application for leave to appeal could be attached. The appellants, he said, made an application for leave to appeal before the Court of Appeal but that was refused by that Court. Even that application before that court was filed out of time, therefore, he said, no application was therefore, in law, made.

Chief Williams, in reply, argued that if judgment was given on 10th April, 1985, the 3 months period would expire on one whole month and not 29 days and a few hours. The day on which the event happened would not usually be

included. He gathered a pattern of general principles, namely, that

i. where a period of time is prescribed by statute and that period is to be computed by reference to an event which has happened, then the question whether the computation included or excluded, the day on which the event happened would depend on the true intention of the legislature;

ii. where the time prescribed is for the benefit of the person affected by the computation, then as much time should be given as the language of the statute admits. Generally, the computation would always exclude the date on which the event happened;

iii. when a construction of the time prescribed would work detrimentally against the person affected by the computation then the construction which avoids the detriment would be preferred.

He relied on In re North Ex parte Hasluck (1895) 2 QB. 264 particularly the judgments of Lord Esher M.R. and Rigby, L.J. These principles, he stated, had been applied to the statute of limitation in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 QBD. 135 and Pritam Kaur v. Russel & Sons Ltd. (1973) QB. 336. He finally submitted that every period of 3 months is a period calculated in days, relying upon the provisions of the Interpretation Act 1964.

Mr. Ajayi, in replying to Chief Williams’ argument further submitted, relying on the definition of the word “month” in section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 1964 where it is defined as meaning

“a calendar month reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar”,

that, the index of calculation is “month” and not “days” and that on that basis, 3 calendar months, calculating from 10th April, 1985 when the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, would expire on 9th July, 1985. In Migotti v. Colvill (supra) the term “calendar month” was being interpreted with a view to determining the date for the discharge of a prisoner after the expiration of his sentence. In that case the prisoner was sentenced on 31st October, 1878, for one offence for “one calendar month” and or a second offence for a period of fourteen days, commencing after the expiration of the calendar month. He was taken into custody on 31/10/1878 and finally released on 14//2/1878. The prisoner claimed to be entitled to be released one day earlier, namely, 13/12/1878. In his judgment, the trial judge, Denman, J. posed the question: what was the meaning of one “calendar month” at the time the sentence was passed He answered it in the following words:

“And I am of the opinion that at that time, viz, on the 31st of October, those words meant a month ending on the day in the succeeding month corresponding to the day of the sentence according to the ordinary understanding of the words “this day calendar month.”

On appeal to the Court of Appeal all the three Lord Justices, Bramwell, L.J., Brett and Cotton, LL.J., agreed with Denman, J., Bramwell, L.J. at page 237 held: