Nigerian Railway Corporation V. Dr. Babatunde Odemuyiwa (1974)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

O. ELIAS, C.J.N. 

In Suit No.LD/475/70, tried in the High Court of Lagos State, George, J. gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff whose claims against the defendant were as follows:

“1. Declaration:

(a) That the act of the defendant in suspending plaintiff from duty on half-pay and withdrawing his entitlements to car basic allowance with effect from February, 1970 is unlawful.

(b) That Plaintiff is entitled to full salary and car basic allowance for the month of February, 1970 until the date of judgment in this suit and for such period as he may be in the employment of the Defendant.

2. Special Damages:

(a) For car basic allowance at 16pounds per month from the month of February, 1970 up to date of judgment in this suit.

(b) In the sum of 678pounds 14shillings being portion of salaries due to the plaintiff from February, 1970 to June, 1970 inclusive which has been unlawfully withheld by the defendant and salaries to be calculated due to the plaintiff up to date of judgment in this suit.

3. General Damages:

In the sum of 5,000pounds for inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff as a result of unlawful suspension from duty”.

It is common ground that the plaintiff was at all material times a medical practitioner in the service of the defendant corporation; that, on February 17, 1970 (a public holiday) the plaintiff was “on call” (which meant that he did not have to be in the hospital all the time but could be sent for at any time there was an “emergency case”); that, after a staff nurse had sent for him and later the Principal Medical Officer had written a letter summoning him to come to the hospital to attend to patients with various types of serious illness, the plaintiff did not come up on the ground that he was himself too ill to travel from his home; that, on February 18, 1970, the Principal Medical Officer, Dr. Ephraim, purported by a telegram to suspend the plaintiff “from duty on half pay forthwith till further notice for disobedience of official instruction”; that, on the same day, Dr. Ephraim informed the plaintiff of his suspension by letter and also wrote to give the same infomation to the General Manager of the defendant corporation who then instructed the Assistant General Manager to inform and request approval from the Statutory Corporation Service Commission which, on February 21, 1970, replied approving the suspension; and that, after studying all the relevant papers submitted to it by the defendant corporation, the Commission directed the immediate recall of the plaintiff but on a reduced salary (from 2,200pounds per annum to 1,890pounds per annum) for one year with effect from May 21, 1970. A copy of this last letter from the Commission was never received by the plaintiff who, therefore, instituted the present action against the defendant corporation.

The plaintiff claims that he was ill on February 17, 1970 and that he could not make a telephone call from his house that day and as this was not contradicted by the defendant, the learned trial judge found both to be true. He also found that the Statutory Corporation Service Commission could not validly delegate to the defendant corporation their disciplinary power over the plaintiff and that, in any case, the defendant corporation acted contrary to their instructions in exhibits K, Land M in purporting to suspend the plaintiff as they did. The learned trial judge observed:

“It is obvious that at the time he wrote exhibit G the Principal Medical Officer did not contemplate dismissal nor had he investigated the complaint before purporting to suspend the plaintiff.

Before suspending the plaintiff, neither the Principal Medical Officer, nor the General Manager gave him an opportunity of being heard.”

He accordingly granted all the plaintiff’s claim as per his writ, including the award to him of 1,000 as general damages. From this decision, the defendant corporation has appealed to this Court on the following six grounds:

“(1) The learned trial judge erred in law in holding that the provisions of section 5 of the Statutory Corporation Service Commission Decree No. 53 of 1968 and of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Standard Conditions of Service Orders 409(a) and 411 did not support the suspension or interdiction of the Plaintiff/Respondent.