Chief D. O. Ereku v. Military Governor Mid-Western State of Nigeria & Ors. (1974)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

O. ELIAS, C.J.N. 

This is an appeal from the judgment of Obaseki, J., delivered at the High Court, Warri, on March 25, 1970, in which he dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants. The plaintiffs’ claims are as follows:

“(i) A declaration that the Notice of Acquisition and the Compulsory Acquisition under the Public Lands Law of the parcel of land in Igbudu, in Warri Division by the first defendant under Mid-Western Nigeria Notice No. 294 of the 13th of April, 1966, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ULTRAVIRES THE PUBLIC LANDS ACQUISION LAW Cap. 105 OF WESTERN REGION, IRREGULAR AND NULL AND VOID.

(ii) An order setting aside the said acquisition under the said Mid-Western Nigeria Government Notice No. 294 of 13th April, 1966, and the said Midwestern Nigeria Government Notice No. 294 of the 13th April, 1966.”

The facts of the case are fairly straight-forward and may be summarized briefly as follows. The Government of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria purported by a notice of acquisition dated April 13, 1966, to acquire compulsorily for the public purpose absolutely land situated in Warri in which the plaintiffs claim an interest. The Notice of Acquisition reads as follows:

“Mid-Western Nigeria Notice No. 294 Public Lands Acquisition Law Chapter 105)

LAND REQUIRED FOR THE SERVICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MID-WESTERN NIGERIA

Notice is hereby given that the following land near Igbudu Warri in the Warri Division of the Delta Province Mid Western Nigeria is required by the Government for public purposed absolutely:

DESCRIPTION

All that parcel of land near Igbudu, Warri in the Warri Division, Delta Province, Mid-Western Nigeria containing an area approximately 50.00 acres the boundaries of which are described below.”

This Notice was dated April 13, 1966. The land in question was later leased

by the Government of the Mid-Western State (Exhibit c) “for the term of ninety nine years starting from the first day of February, 1966″. According to Clause (2)(c), the lessee undertook as follows: ‘To pay three years rent in advance on the execution of these presents provided that if the compensation awarded by a Court of competent jurisdiction or otherwise agreed by the parties concerned with the acquisition of the demised land by the Government of Mid-Western Nigeria shall exceed 486 per acre then the Lessee will pay so much additional rent in advance not exceeding two further years rent in all as shall equal the difference between 486 per acre and the amount awarded by the Court or agreed as aforesaid.” It is quite clear from this Clause that the lease was for a permanent business transaction and not a temporary arrangement between the parties. Indeed, this particular point was not disputed at the trial because “the first to third defendants contend that they took possession of the said parcel of land at the time of acquisition for a public purpose, for which purpose the land was leased to McDennott Overseas Inc., a Panamanian company, which has now been incorporated in Nigeria under the Companies Decree No. 51 of 1968 and whose objects, Le., fabrication of structures for oil industries, relates to mining industry and economic and industrial development of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria in particular and the Federation of Nigeria in general. The 1st to 3rd defendants will at the trial lead evidence to show that McDermott Overseas Inc. also employs a large number of Nigerians” The defendants in their amended statement of defence, further claimed that they were competent under the Public Lands Acquisition Law or any law to lease the parcel of land as they had done, maintaining that the lease of the land to McDermott Overseas Inc. was in compliance with the State Land Law. At the trial, counsel for the defendants also maintained that the lease in question was for a public purpose within the meaning of section 2 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law. Learned counsel insisted “public purpose” included “whatever resulted in the advantage to the public”. In any case, the learned counsel was of the view that once the acquisition notice has specified that it be for “public purpose” the matter is closed. Two other supplementary arguments of learned counsel for the defendants were that McDermott Overseas Inc. had not been joined by the plaintiffs and also that if a declaration in terms of the writ were to be granted by the trial court, it might lead to a series of hostile actions on the part of not only the present parties to the case but other persons as well. In these circumstances, the learned trial judge, in a reserved judgment, held that the acquisition notice was valid and that the aquisition itself was for a public purpose. He also held that the complaint of the plaintiffs against the lease granted to McDermott Overseas Inc. would not earn them the declaration sought and that, in any case, McDermott Overseas Inc. was not before him.

From this decision the appellants have brought this appeal. On the four grounds argued before us by Chief Williams, counsel for the appellants, the following two were argued together:

“1. The learned trial judge erred in law and on the facts in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim having correctly held as follows: