S.A.T. Taylor And Ors V Kingsway Stores Of Nigeria Ltd & Anor (1965)

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BAIRAMIAN

In this appeal the plaintiffs complain of the judgement given by Onyeama J. On 17th October, 1962 when a judge of the High Court of Lagos, and dismissing their suit for recovery of possession of the property described in the plan attached to the conveyance dated the 16th December, 1936, and registered under Title No. L00039, now unlawfully occupied by the defendants, which has a rental value of £50,000.

The plaintiffs’ grandfather devised the property by his will to be held first by his children in joint tenancy during their lives, and afterwards to be held in common tenancy by the eldest sons of his children; that is agreed by the parties, and what is said further in the devise is immaterial here. The grandfather died in 1912; two of his children died before him without issue, and another in 1920, also without issue; the remaining three other children survived Into the year 1936 and beyond, and the last surviving child died on 14th February, 1961. These three children were

(a) a daughter, Alice Agnes, who married Mr E.J.A. Taylor; the 1st appellant and the 4th are her twin sons, born on 8 January, 1915;

(b) a son, Frederick Charles Labode Williams; the 3rd appellant is his elder son, born on 20th May, 1917;

(c) another son, Thomas Ekundayo Williams; the 2nd appellant is his eldest son, born on 11 August, 1916.

On the 1st December, 1936 a suit was begun in the Supreme Court of Nigeria for partition or sale of the property, then known as Manchester House; the plaintiffs were child (a), child (c), the 4th appellant and the 2nd appellant; the defendants were child (b) and the 3rd appellant, with the father appointed as guardian ad litem of his son. On the 2nd December counsel appeared before Butler Lloyd, acting Chief Justice, who by consent ordered the suit to be heard forthwith, and gave judgement by consent ordering as follows:

“The property is ordered to be sold by private treaty at a price not less than £10,000.

Proceeds to be pail to Mr E. J. A. Taylor for distribution among the parties entitled.”

The reason for the hurry was stated in an affidavit to be that the parties had agreed on the price for sale of the premises to the United Africa Co. Ltd., who were anxious to take immediate possession in order to begin building. Later the plaintiffs applied for an order directing Mr E.J.A. Taylor to execute a conveyance to the present 2nd respondents; the order was made on the 15th December, and the conveyance executed on the 16th. The appellants allege in paragraph 27 of their Statement of Claim, that the conveyance purports to convey the fee simple; and that is admitted by the Defence.

The statement of Claim alleges that, for certain reasons the proceedings in the 1936 suit were defective, the orders void, and the conveyance ineffectual; all of which the Defence denies. The Defence adds that ever since the time of the conveyance the 2nd respondents by themselves or through their tenants, the 1st respondents, have been in lawful and undisturbed possession, and have made developments at great expense to the knowledge of the appellants, who, however, made no objection but stood by, and are estopped by their conduct from relying on defect or want of jurisdiction in regard to the said proceedings; and also barred by laches and acquiescence from making their claim.

The learned trial judge deals with this part of the Defence under the label of laches, towards the end of his judgement, from which it will be enough to quote this passage:

“It is beyond doubt, and 1 find this as a fact, that the plaintiffs know in 1938 that the second defendant(s) believed they had bought, and had had conveyed to them, the fee simple estate in the property free of incumbrances. They knew further that acting on this belief the second defendant[s] leased the property to the first defendant who expended a large sum of money in erecting “a fine new building” on the site.” The plaintiffs did nothing for nearly a quarter of a century to assert their claims to any subsisting interest in the property. No reason for this inordinate delay has been offered, and even If I thought that the defendants had no title because of some defect in the title of their vendor I would have held that the plaintiffs (assuming they had title) had been tardy in asserting their claim and that the claim was stale.

The plea of laches appears to me well founded and sufficient by itself to defeat the claim of the plaintiffs and I hold accordingly.” The findings of fact were not challenged in the opening address on appeal, and could not be in reply. As none of the appellants gave evidence at the trial, there was no material on which any useful argument could have been built. The argument turned on the law of laches as a defence, on which the appellants argue that the leamed trial judge misdirected himself.